Udall/Overpeck 4-panel Figure Colorado River temperature/precipitation/natural flows with trend. Lake Mead and Lake Powell storage. Updated through Water Year 2025. Note the tiny points on the annual data so that you can flyspeck the individual years. Credit: Brad Udall
Click the link to read the article on the Tucson.com website (Tony Davis). Here’s an excerpt:
March 14, 2026
The record-breaking heat in this month’s forecast is likely to help push the Colorado River Basin to the edge of “disaster,” in which drastic cuts in water use will be necessary next year, experts say. The heat is almost certain to slash river flows even more than already expected after the snowpack in key sites above Lake Powell hit record lows this winter. The upshot: Lake Powell is likely to get less than one-third the water from the river that it would in an average April to July. The unusually low flows won’t be bad enough to push the basin into immediate disaster this year. But several experts said it is virtually inevitable that major cuts in river water use will be needed next year in Arizona and other Western states — unless the winter of 2026-27 is far cooler and wetter than the current one.
“We can survive this year, no problem. What’ll be interesting to see is if this year puts enough scare into the states to begin real serious rethinking about how we manage water,” said David Wegner, a retired U.S. Bureau of Reclamation planner and congressional staffer who now sits on a National Academy of Sciences board that reviews water issues.
The Bureau of Reclamation already projected, in February, that Lake Powell is likely to fall below the level at which the turbines at adjoining Glen Canyon Dam can generate electricity — 3,490 feet — by December 2026. Given the trend toward lower snowpack, higher temperatures and less runoff of water into the river, it’s very possible if not likely, that future forecasts will show the lake falling below 3,490 feet sooner than December. But most observers, including Kuhn and Wegner expect the bureau to try to forestall that possibility in advance by releasing extra water from reservoirs upstream of Lake Powell, led by Flaming Gorge reservoir at the Utah-Wyoming border. Powell is at the Arizona-Utah border.
Click the link to read the article on the Big Pivots website (Allen Best):
March 6, 2026
Might the Colorado River runoff be as bad as 2002? March could bring snow and rain. Almost certainly it will bring warm temperatures.
What if March brings temperatures suitable for flip flops in places like Steamboat, Vail and Telluride? And what if the snow that does fall on the headwaters of the Colorado River is average or less?
Things could get much more grim in the Colorado River Basin this year, conceivably as bad as 2002. That year was memorable for the pitiful runoff, the peak barely discernible in Glenwood Canyon in April and May. Worse came in June when three fires erupted at very nearly the same time.
The Hayman Fire (2002) was the state’s largest recorded wildfire. Smoke from the massive blaze could be seen and smelled across the state. Photo credit to Nathan Bobbin, Flickr Creative Commons.
Bill Owens, who was then Colorado’s governor, toured the state by plane, visiting the Hayman fire that started near Colorado Springs, the Coal Seam Fire at Glenwood Springs, and the Missionary Ridge Fire north of Durango. “All of Colorado is on fire,” he said, a remark that some, concerned about impacts to tourism, derided as an overstatement. But within that statement was a certain truth.
This week, NOAA’s Colorado River Basin Forecast Center released its projected flows into Lake Powell. It doesn’t look pretty. Jeff Lukas, the principle at Lukas Climate Research and Consulting, assembled this graphic that shows how the projections visually compare to other years since 1991.
“Despite better snowfall in February, the most probable forecast remains bleak at 36% of average,” he said on LinkedIn. That, he added, would put runoff in the observed flows into Powell in 2012, 2013, 2018, 2021, and 2025. “In other words, a bad neighborhood,” he said.
An unusually wet and cool March through May would only get the inflow to 65% of average. On the other hand, it could go in the other direction. A warm and dry March could eviscerate the existing snowpack.
James Eklund, a water attorney and former director of the Colorado Water Conservation Board, pointed out that the long-term average has been 6.7 million acre-feet. The March forecast projected runoff of around 2.3 million ace-feet.
Colorado transmountain diversions via the State Engineer’s office
“The river cares not about our legal arguments,” he said in a LinkedIn post, a reference to the intense squabbling about how to share a river that has been rapidly diminishing in average volume in the 21st century. Even in places like Arvada, people who don’t realize that they are watering their lawns and taking their showers with water imported from a Colorado River tributary do realize the Colorado River has problems.
The runoff could conceivably be worse than 2002. There’s a big difference, though. In 2002, the reservoirs held a great deal of water. Not completely full, but within a good water year of being full. Total runoff that year was 25% of average. Most years since then have been below average, leaving water levels of Powell within striking distance of deadpool.
From his post in the Glenwood Springs area, Eric Kuhn sees March storms having potential to bump up the runoff numbers. “This is one of those years where March could make a big difference. But when I look at the outlook for three or four weeks, it looks like March will definitely be above average in temperatures, which is not good news. I think it’s too soon to tell whether we will have average or below average precipitation. But warm temperatures will not be good to the snowpack.” [ed. emphasis mine]
This year’s runoff will add tension to the already fraught situation in the Colorado River Basin. Kuhn, a former manager of the Colorado River Water Conservation District, said he wouldn’t be surprised if the Bureau of Reclamation — an agency within the Department of Interior that oversees operation of the federal dams — finds it must release one million acre-feet less than the base 7.5 million acre-feet release.
This could trigger a legal fight. The Colorado River Compact imposes a requirement upon the upper Colorado River Basin states to deliver 75 million acre-feet on a rolling 10-year average. This would take the upper-basin states below that threshold.
That provision in the compact has been debated almost since Congress approved it in 1929. But, under the most aggressive interpretation by lower-basin states, this could put the upper-basin out of compliance. As such, this could be the year that puts the basin states on long road to a U.S. Supreme Court review.
A meager runoff this year will also put the Department of Interior into an uncomfortable position of having to make decisions. Kuhn says the federal agency’s water officials have traditionally tried to mediate disputes among the seven basin states. This year the agency might have to make decisions that leave people upstream and down unhappy.
“They could sit back (in former days) and say we are not going to take a position because we don’t want to upset either side. We have to work with both sides. Those days have come to an end, unfortunately.”
Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0
An early start to the irrigation season in the San Luis Valley is coinciding with the arrival of spring’s first heat wave.
Craig Cotten, Division 3 engineer for Colorado Division of Water Resources, announced a staged approach to opening the water year for producers in the Upper Rio Grande Basin.
The water season will begin on March 16 for surface and groundwater irrigators in the Conejos River area (Water District 22), the Culebra Creek area (Water District 24), the Trinchera Creek area (Water District 35) and the La Jara Creek area. The irrigation season will begin on March 23 for all surface and groundwater irrigation structures in the Rio Grande area (Water District 20).
“I decided to start the irrigation season earlier than the presumptive April 1 date for many valley areas due to the very warm, dry spring and the low current snowpack. We are already seeing an increase in streamflows due to the warmer weather, and it is beneficial for water rights holders to be able to use this water while it is available,” Cotten said in an email exchange with Alamosa Citizen. [ed. emphasis mine]
On the Conejos River and Rio Grande, another reason is that Colorado is projected to meet its compact obligation without needing to deliver water during the irrigation season, Cotten said.
“In order to avoid a significant over-delivery of water to the stateline, I have decided to begin the irrigation season on these rivers prior to April 1.”
The coming week of March 16 could see record-setting temperatures to the official start of spring. The forecast calls for midweek daytime highs in the low- to mid-70s. March has seen 21 of its 31 days establish new record high temperatures since 2004, a heating trend that accentuates the warming winters and spring months.
This March opened with back-to-back days of new daily high records. More heat records could fall in the coming week. The irrigation season can’t open soon enough.
Upper Rio Grande SWE March 14, 2026. Note the early melt-out.
Chart showing water use trends in US and Mexico. Credit: Overconsumption gravely threatens water security in the binational Rio Grande-Bravo basin. Map via Springer Nature.
Oh dear. You’d best get your skiing in now, because it looks like the spring melt will hit a lot earlier than usual. A big heat wave is on its way to the West, with the most unseasonably warm temperatures occurring in the Southwest and Four Corners regions, further dimming hopes for a spring snowpack-bolstering miracle. This could mean that mountain snowpack in the Colorado River Basin has already peaked, which would be dire for streamflows.
My apologies for bringing you more doom and gloom climate news. At least it’s cold in Alaska, though.
And that’s topping off the warmest winter on record in the Upper Colorado River Basin.
☘️ Annals of Alfalfa 🍀
As the Colorado River shrinks, the “simple” and “obvious” solutions to the crisis seem to multiply.
You know, it’s a lot of: “Whatchya gotta do is …. “
“… stop watering them golf courses.”
“… stop population growth.”
“… keep people from moving to deserts.”
“… shut down dem data centers!”
And then, the most common one: “ … stop raising cattle and hay in the desert.”
Kenny Torrella, who writes for Vox, brought up that last one on the social media platform Blue Sky recently:
While this fix holds more water (so to speak) than the preceding ones, it is not actually a solution — at least not a workable one.
There is only one obvious remedy for the Colorado River crisis, and that is for its collective users to consume less of the river’s water. Since irrigating alfalfa takes up a larger share of the river’s water than any other single use, it seems to follow that growing less of the crop would leave more water in the river. But this does not account for the way water law works.
Let’s imagine that California could designate alfalfa as an illicit crop and ban cultivation of it and other livestock forage crops. That would force a bunch of big farmers in the Imperial Valley — home of the largest single water user on the entire river — to tear up about 200,000 acres of water-guzzling alfalfa.
Problem solved? Not quite.
The Salton Sea (pictured above ) straddles the Imperial and Coachella valleys. (Source: Water Education Foundation)
The Imperial Irrigation District has senior rights to use a buttload of Colorado River water for “beneficial use,” which in this case means agriculture. Specific farmers may decide that without alfalfa, they’ll simply throw in the towel and stop irrigating altogether. But there’s no way the irrigation district as a whole is going to stop diverting that water without some sort of compensation, because while farmers pay the irrigation district a negligible amount for water, the irrigation district gets it virtually for free. That means the district is incentivized to continue using all of the water to which it has rights, and rather than leaving it in the river, they would most likely sell it to another farmer growing another crop. The result: No net reduction in water consumption.
Torrella’s claim that alfalfa’s water use gets “almost no air time” is a little off. I’ve written about it at least a zillion times at the Land Desk and at High Country News, but many a mainstream news outlet has done the same. Even the Paris Review had a pieceon it. The reason “growing less alfalfa” doesn’t show up in talks about negotiations over the Colorado River, or as an alternative in the feds’ proposed operating plan, is not because of “agricultural exceptionalism,” but because these aren’t crop-level negotiations.
The two Colorado River basins and the feds are currently looking at the macro level, and trying to hash out which basin will take what level of cuts, how those cuts will be determined, and what if anything will be done to fend off dead pool at Glen Canyon Dam. Only when all of that is settled can the individual states in each basin duke it out over respective consumption cuts, followed by the biggest users within each state. Finally, those users can make decisions about how to use their now smaller share of water, and really just about anything goes so long as it fits the definition of “beneficial use.”
Maybe they’ll continue to grow alfalfa using less water via deficit irrigation, maybe they’ll opt for a higher-value, less water-intensive crop like broccoli, maybe they’ll use it to grow cacti, but what counts is that they’ll be taking less water out of the Colorado River, regardless.
It’s not that the alfalfaphobes are wrong; it probably is a good idea to grow less alfalfa and fewer cows in the desert. For that matter, we should fallow golf courses, restrict urban growth, and take other steps to live within our means. But what’s needed now is an agreement on drastic and immediate cuts in water consumption. What that means for alfalfa or golf courses or Arizona suburbs will be dealt with later.
Now for a little data dump re alfalfa and other irrigated crops in Imperial County, California1:
$238,752,000: Gross value of alfalfa hay harvested in Imperial County, California, in 2024.
183,252: Harvested acres of alfalfa hay in 2024.
$1,300/acre: Per-acre value of alfalfa hay harvested in 2024.
6 acre-feet: Approximate amount of water required to irrigate one acre of alfalfa in the Imperial Valley for a year.
$20/acre-foot: Amount Imperial Valley farmers pay for water.
$134,822,000: Gross value of broccoli harvested in Imperial County in 2024.
$12,136/acre: Per-acre value of broccoli harvested in 2024.
3 acre-feet: Approximate amount of water required to irrigate one acre of broccoli in the Imperial Valley.
$259,861,000: Gross value of head and leaf lettuce harvested in 2024.
$9,012/acre: Per-acre value of head and leaf lettuce harvested in 2024.
2-3 acre-feet: Approximate amount of water required to irrigate one acre of lettuce in the Imperial Valley.
🐟 Colorado River Chronicles 💧
Today’s vocabulary term is: Present Perfected Rights, a term you may be hearing a lot more of in coming months.
Article VIII of the Colorado River Compact states:
Later, the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928 decreed that the “dam and reservoir” of the title (which would become Hoover Dam and Lake Mead) shall be used for the “satisfaction of present perfected rights … .”
That’s fine and good, but what are present perfected rights, or PPRs? The Compact never says what that term means. In fact, it wasn’t clearly defined until the Supreme Court laid it out in its 1964 Arizona v. California decision, a key document in the Law of the River:
Clear as mud, right?
Generally speaking, PPRs are the most senior rights on the Colorado River, they predate the Colorado River Compact, and are the last rights subject to curtailment in times of shortage. They are the “first” in the “first in time, first in right” summation of the prior appropriation doctrine, which is the foundation of Western water law.
Arizona v. California goes on to say that “in any year where there is fewer than 7.5 million acre-feet available for use in California, Nevada, and Arizona, the Secretary of the Interior must first supply water to the PPRs in order of priority, regardless of state lines.” Similarly, the Upper Basin’s PPRs will be the last to be cut if curtailments are necessary to meet its non-depletion/minimum-delivery obligation to the Lower Basin.
The Supreme Court required the Lower Basin to submit a list of its PPRs, and here they are from the document itself as submitted in 1967. Some of these, especially the tribal rights, were updated and added to later on.
The first set is for tribal nations in the Lower Basin only:
These are the top six non-tribal PPRs in the Lower Basin by order of size of diversion. There are many more smaller PPRs that are not listed here:
🗺️ Messing with Maps 🧭
I’m not sure if I’ve featured this one before, but if so, it’s worth re-upping due to its heightened relevance this year. It’s the Open ET mapping tool, with ET standing for evapotranspiration. It uses satellite imagery to calculate evapotranspiration from individual fields, which is an indicator of how much irrigation is being used and what crop is being grown. Hovering over a field will bring up a chart showing ET for each month, the acreage, and the crop type.
More than a year after a landmark $100 million environmental settlement designed to improve the Poudre River was OK’d, little progress has been made to put the agreement into action.
The settlement, signed last February, came after Save The Poudre sued to stop the $2.7 billion Northern Integrated Supply Project (NISP). The deal was crafted to allow NISP to move forward while paying to improve the Poudre and protect it from any harm the project could cause.
The Northern Integrated Supply Project, currently estimated at $2 billion, would create two new reservoirs and a system of pipelines to capture more drinking water for 15 community water suppliers. An environmental group is now suing the Army Corps of Engineers over a key permit for Northern Water’s proposal. (Save the Poudre lawsuit, from Northern Water project pages)
NISP is designed to serve roughly one dozen fast-growing cities along the Northern Front Range and will include two reservoirs and a pipeline.
The Community Foundation of Northern Colorado is leading the effort to implement the settlement, which includes projects that will make the river healthier for fish and aquatic habitat, improve water flows and water quality, and increase recreational opportunities.
The foundation is overseeing a six-member committee that began meeting last August. The committee will decide how to implement the ambitious environmental projects outlined in the settlement.
“We are taking time to be intentional,” said Jodie Riesenberger, the foundation’s vice president for community impact.
But work has also been slow because key payments from NISP participants to the foundation are tied to benchmarks in building the massive reservoir and pipeline system. The committee received its first $5 million payment last year when the settlement was signed and is supposed to get its next $5 million payment when construction begins, something that could have happened later this year but has since been delayed. The full $100 million is to be paid out over a 20-year period, Riesenberger said.
Since the settlement was approved, though, the project’s largest customer, the Fort Collins-Loveland Water District, has dropped out of NISP. A handful of other cities, including Evans, have also dropped out, citing concerns about soaring design and construction costs, as well as the cost of the environmental settlement.
In response, Northern Water, which is overseeing project construction, temporarily halted design work as it re-examined NISP’s size.
Now, construction isn’t likely to begin until 2027 or later, according to Northern Water spokesman Jeff Stahla.
“We did slow things down,” Stahla said, “but there is still a chance we can start in mid-2027.”
Save The Poudre River President Gary Wockner said the delays aren’t surprising.
The committee has “been moving slow because there is a lot to learn. If you want to fix problems on the river, you have to understand the river and know what the problems are,” he said.
Since the river committee began meeting in August, Riesenberger said work has focused on analyzing what the issues are and trying to figure out how and whether to spend the money they have on hand now.
The delays “don’t impact what we’re doing yet, but it could if it drags on longer. The dream is that these dollars could do transformational things for the river,” Riesenberger said.
The Colorado River flows beneath Navajo Bridge in Arizona on Dec. 27, 2019. Three tribes in Arizona are pushing for a settlement that would solidify their access to the River’s water and provide billions of dollars for water infrastructure. Photo credit: Mitch Tobin/The Water Desk
Click the link to read the article on the KJZZ website (Alex Hager). Here’s an excerpt:
March 11, 2026
Coverage of tribal natural resources is supported in part by Catena Foundation
Tribal leaders and U.S. senators spoke out in support of a measure that would solidify access to water for three tribes with land in Arizona during a Wednesday [March 11, 2026] hearing at the Senate Indian Affairs Committee. The Northeastern Arizona Indian Water Rights Settlement, or NAIWRSA, would settle claims to water by the Navajo, Hopi and San Juan Southern Paiute tribes, and provide $5 billion to build new water delivery systems and help the tribes access their water. The settlement would need to be authorized by congress to go into effect. At Wednesday’s Senate committee hearing, impassioned pleas to bring water to tribal communities ran up against federal concerns about the cost of a settlement, and talks of hesitation from some states that use the Colorado River.
“This settlement is more than a legal agreement,” said Lamar Keevama, chairman of the Hopi Tribe. “It is a path forward. It allows the Hopi tribe to remain and protect our homeland, supports economic development and ensures that our communities have the basic resources necessary to thrive.”
An official with the Interior Department said he was supportive of the settlement’s aims, but was concerned with the cost.
“$5 billion is a lot of money,” said Scott Cameron, Interior’s principal deputy assistant secretary for water and science. “We look forward to working with the committee and with the three tribes and the other interested parties, of which there are quite a few, to see if we can’t creatively come up with some ideas to still satisfy the purposes of the bill at somewhat less cost.”
Lamar Keevama, chairman of the Hopi Tribe, testifies in front of a U.S. Senate Committee on March 11, 2026. “This settlement is more than a legal agreement,” he said. “It is a path forward.” Photo credit: U.S. Senate Committee On Indian Affairs
NAIWRSA has partially been hung up by a unique geographical challenge and longstanding tensions between states that share the Colorado River. The river, which is at the heart of settlement talks, is divided into two regions — the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin. Its water is managed by the seven states that use it, and they have been deeply split about new policies to share water. They generally fall into two camps — the Upper Basin states of Colorado, Utah, Wyoming and New Mexico, and the Lower Basin states of Arizona, California and Nevada. The Navajo Nation straddles both basins, with land in Arizona, New Mexico and Utah. Some of its land falls within a portion of Arizona that is technically part of the Upper Basin. Some Upper Basin states worry that the settlement would allow the Navajo Nation to take water from the Upper Basin and lease it for use in the Lower Basin, creating a precedent that could open the door to more transfers out of the Upper Basin. Buu Nygren, president of the Navajo Nation, pushed back on that suggestion.
“It is hard to imagine that any Upper Basin state would object to my people being able to use water that they have used for decades simply because of the fear of a potential precedent,” he said.
From the 2018 Tribal Water Study, this graphic shows the location of the 29 federally-recognized tribes in the Colorado River Basin. Map credit: USBR
Sen. Mike Lee and Rep. Celeste Maloy, both MAGA Republicans from Utah, have formally introduced legislation to use the Congressional Review Act to revoke the Biden-era management plan for Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument. If successful, the move would also bar the feds from developing a new management plan that resembles the current one.
The current management plan is not draconian by any means. It was fashioned over years, with oodles of input and compromise, and is far less restrictive than the preservation-oriented alternatives It allowed for motorized vehicle use on designated routes and added almost no new restrictions for livestock grazing. Revoking it is not the same as rescinding the national monument or shrinking its boundaries, and will not open up any of the monument to new mining claims or oil and gas leases.
So it’s not clear what Lee and Maloy hope to achieve, except to strike a blow to a national monument that they don’t like and to throw oversight of 1.9 million acres of public land into disarray. Or maybe they’re just trying to build up their anti-public-land credentials to head off challenges from even more extreme candidates such as, say, Phil Lyman, who just challenged Maloy for her 3rd District congressional seat.
You still have time to let your representatives in Congress know how you feel.
Ugggg.
While well-intentioned greens are parsing BLM director nominee Steve Pearce’s words for indications he might be inclined to sell off public land, the Trump administration is orchestrating a massive de facto transfer of public lands to oil and gas companies.
I’m talking about oil and gas leasing. And no, it’s not an actual transfer of public land; the lessee does not take title to the land, nor can they block public access, but they do get the rights to drill that land and preclude other uses on it. And, once it is drilled, the land is scraped of all vegetation, covered with heavy equipment, poked with a massive drill, hydraulically fractured, and becomes an industrial-scale, methane-, hydrogen sulfide-, and VOC-oozing hydrocarbon factory for many decades to come.
On the auction block this June is a good chunk of slickrock-studded landscape northwest of Moab, between Hwy. 191 and the Green River, along with some parcels in the Lisbon Valley. All in all, the BLM proposes selling off 39 parcels covering some 71,600 acres. You have until March 30 to give your two cents. https://eplanning.blm.gov/Project-Home/?id=6fad61fa-a7f2-f011-8407-001dd80bcf93
***
Of course, sometimes the BLM holds an oil and gas auction and no one comes. That was the case with the Big Beautiful Cook Inlet Oil and Gas Lease Sale (yes, that is the official name) held March 4 in Alaska, in which more than 1 million acres of offshore leases were put on the block. There were zero bids. Zilch. Nada. Someday, maybe every oil and gas lease sale will be like that.
***
A federal judge has halted construction of the Northern Corridor Highway through the Red Cliffs National Conservation Area near St. George, Utah, while an advocates’ lawsuit proceeds.
The BLM approved the contested project earlier this year. The Utah Department of Transportation, apparently wanting to get started before a legal challenge could take hold, began erecting fencing along the project, even though their development plan hadn’t been approved. This activity would have disturbed desert tortoise habitat.
The court did not approve, blocking further work until the lawsuit is resolved.
***
In other Utah road news, Garfield County began chip-sealing the first ten miles of the Hole-in-the-Rock Road in Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, drawing protest and a lawsuit from environmental groups.
The county has been aching to pave the gravel road, which often becomes riddled with potholes and washboards, for years, but failed to gain BLM approval. Environmental groups have resisted, saying that improving the road could lead to more paving or widening of primitive byways in the area, and would increase the number of people and their impacts on the fragile landscape.
The county has also wielded RS-2477 — an 1866 statute — in an attempt to wrest control over the byway, which leads to the famed Colorado River crossing of the 1879 Latter Day Saint expedition to Bluff. Last July, a federal court granted Garfield County quiet title to the section of the road within the county.
Garfield County interpreted that as a green light to chip seal the road.
That triggered a lawsuit from the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, pointing out that because the road crosses BLM land, the county must still get the agency’s go-ahead for major improvements. It didn’t, but the BLM has done nothing to stop the action, which SUWA says violates federal environmental laws.
🥵 Aridification Watch 🐫
I was accused recently of being all “doom and gloom” when it comes to this year’s snow levels, so I set out to find some good news to report. It didn’t go so well, but I did uncover a few tiny nuggets, including:
After the February storms, the Center for Snow and Avalanche Studies reported: “This is rare, but currently we do not have any dust on the snowpack.” That’s good news because dust on the snow decreases albedo (reflectivity), leading to faster snowmelt. We need what little we have to stick around as long as possible. Buzzkill: The really big dust events tend to come in the springtime.
I tend to rely on a handful of high-elevation SNOTEL sites as indicators of how the mountain snowpack is doing. One of them is in Columbus Basin in the La Plata Mountains. Like everywhere else, the snow water equivalent there is way below normal. However, it’s still above 2002 levels for early March, so that’s kind of heartening. I guess?
Hope lies in 1990: That year, snowpack levels in the Animas River watershed were lower on March 6 than they are today. But beginning in mid-March, storms pummeled the region, resulting in a May 3, 1990, snowpack peak that was 94% of normal and bringing runoff up to decent levels. We could see a repeat of that March-April-May miracle!
And … oh. I’ve just been informed that there is no more good news.
As grim as this may be, it also offers a glimmer of hope: The snowpack could still recover like it did in 1990. Source: NRCS.
Now back to our regularly scheduled doom and gloom, bullet style.
The late February-early March heat wave across most of the West shattered thousands of daily high temperature records and dozens of monthly ones, topping off the West’s warmest winter on record. Monthly records (121 tied or broken nationwide during the last week of Feb.) include:
Dinosaur National Monument in Utah hit 68° F on 2/26;
Imperial County, California’s airport reached 97° on 2/28;
Albuquerque airport, 77° on 2/25;
Hovenweep National Monument in Utah, 70° on 2/28;
Havasu, Arizona, and Malibu Hills, California, were both 93° on 2/27;
Sampling of daily records (845 broken or tied during the last week of Feb) include:
Mancos, Colorado, hit 50° F on 2/28; the aforementioned Columbus Basin (elev. 10,784 feet) reached 48° and Mineral Creek, Colorado, hit 51° that same day;
McClure Pass, Colorado, reached 49° on 2/28;
Needles, California, and Phoenix both hit 92° on 2/28;
South Lake Tahoe airport, 60° on 2/28.
Those kinds of temperatures melt the snow, even on north faces, causing this year’s snow water equivalent graph lines to uncharacteristically dip during a time of year when they normally would be shooting upward. They also heighten risk of wildfires in the low country. On the last day of February, a blaze broke out in Chautauqua Park in Boulder, forcing some evacuations before it was contained. Another one was sparked west of Boulder on March 4.
The North Fork of the Gunnison, which feeds the ditches in and around Paonia and Hotchkiss and the orchards, vineyards, and farms there, is in trouble. This year’s snowpack so far is in the same boat as it was on this date in 2002 and 2018, two very dry years when irrigation ditches were shut off early in the growing season.
Aside from the entire Upper Colorado River watershed, I’m also especially concerned about the North Fork of the Gunnison. Snowpack levels are at a record low for this date, or about the same as they were in 2018, and Paonia Reservoir is currently utilizing just 22% of its storage capacity (note the record high temp on McClure Pass above, at the headwaters of Muddy Creek, which feeds the reservoir). This does not bode well for the many small farmers who rely on the river for irrigation. In 2018, downstream senior rights holders made a call on the river in June, forcing junior irrigators in the North Fork to lose water perilously early in the season.
This bad situation could be exacerbated if the feds were to decide to release water from Paonia Reservoir in an attempt to buoy Lake Powell water levels. While this is hypothetical, it is not beyond the realm of possibility by any means.
And, saving for some sort of April-May miracle, the Colorado River runoff will be extraordinarily scant this spring and summer, almost certainly pushing Lake Powell to critically low levels.
***
That demands a plan, and the Bureau of Reclamation came up with several alternatives last month. Most of the major players have commented on the alternatives, and it’s safe to say that almost no one is satisfied with any of them — albeit for different reasons.
One of the more universal critiques is that none of the alternatives adequately address dry and critically dry scenarios on the river, like the one that is likely to occur this summer. The draft environmental impact statement itself states, “In critically dry periods, all alternatives have unacceptable performance.” That leaves many wondering what, exactly, the Bureau of Reclamation plans to do to keep the system from collapsing over the next nine months.
There is a lot here, and it gets pretty darned deep in the wonk weeds. Still, what I’ve included is a mere sampling of some of the comments from just a few of the commenters in the hope that it will give readers a better idea of where different stakeholders stand, and how complicated and difficult this situation really is.
For those who don’t like weeds, here’s the short version: It’s a tangled mess with a bunch of moving pieces and stakeholders who are digging in their heels to ensure that their constituents get the water they need to drink, irrigate crops, run industries, or whatever. And they’re all butting up against the reality that there simply isn’t enough water in the river to go around.
Arizona is understandably displeased because they would take the greatest hit under any alternative. This is not because they are somehow inferior, but because the water rights to the Central Arizona Project, which delivers Colorado River water to Phoenix and Tucson, are junior to most other big users in the Lower Basin. “… each alternative, though broad in scope, will translate in practice specifically as drastic reductions to Arizona’s water supply.”
“We are deeply troubled that Reclamation all but abandons its increasingly critical role in ensuring the Upper Basin States fulfill their delivery obligations under the Colorado River Compact of 1922 (Compact).” This refers to the non-depletion or minimum-delivery obligation that I’ve written about before.
“The DEIS itself acknowledges that ‘widespread impacts on social and economic conditions may also be possible,’ including circumstances in which municipalities may need to pursue alternative or even hauled water sources to maintain basic services. Drastic cuts could have cascading consequences for human health and safety and destabilize the lives and livelihoods of Arizonans, tribal communities, and critical industries that rely on Colorado River supplies.”
They say the cuts will damage the state’s agriculture, manufacturing, and aerospace industries and that it will put at risk: “… the largest concentration of advanced semiconductor manufacturing investment in the country, representing roughly $200 billion in announced projects since 2020.” Semiconductor production is extremely water-intensive, with the average factory consuming up to 10 million gallons of ultra-pure water daily.
They call on any plans to “include verifiable Upper Basin conservation measures commensurate with Lower Basin conservation measures, including identifying tangible metrics that demonstrate Upper Basin water conservation.”
“We believe that Reclamation must institute bold and meaningful changes but that those changes must be implemented in a manner that is consistent with the 1922 Colorado River Compact, the 1944 binational treaty with Mexico, the 1948 Upper Basin Compact, and the other foundational elements of the Law of the River.”
“Reclamation must prioritize hydrologic reality over predictability for Lower Basin users. The Draft EIS places undue emphasis on predictability1 for water users, a goal that is unattainable under future climate conditions unless system storage is replenished and overall demands are permanently reduced to match the supply.”
“… several alternatives include Upper Basin water conservation ranging from zero to 500,000 acre-feet annually … <but> … fails to analyze the environmental or socioeconomic impacts associated with these conservation volumes.” It adds that a 200,000 acre-feet reduction in the Upper Basin would require fallowing 52,000 acres on the Western Slope.
“Lower Basin water use must be reduced by 1.5 million acre-feet at all times, regardless of the alternative. This amount represents system losses (i.e., transit losses and reservoir evaporation) and should not be classified as shortage.” This is a longstanding issue. Reservoir evaporation and other such losses are counted against the Upper Basin’s consumptive use, in part because of the non-depletion obligation. The same is not true for the Lower Basin; when they say they use 7.5 million acre-feet, that does not include evaporation or seepage or other system losses, only what they pull out of the river.
“The range of alternatives must include option(s) that perform under critically dry hydrology. Currently, none of the alternatives in the Draft EIS perform under critically dry hydrology. At least one alternative must protect critical infrastructure and respond effectively to significantly lower river flows than historically observed.” We are approaching a critically dry situation this summer, when the feds will have to decide whether and how to keep Lake Powell from dropping below minimum power pool. So far there is no plan for this.
“Hydrology must drive Post-2026 operations. Operating guidelines based upon comparative reservoir elevations which do not factor in real time hydrology have been disastrous for protecting storage in Lake Powell and thus, have failed to provide the water supply certainty for the Upper Basin intended by the Law of the River …”
“Interbasin transactions must not be allowed in the proposed action.” That is, Upper Basin users with senior rights should not be able to sell their water to Lower Basin users.
The team of Anne Castle, John Fleck, Eric Kuhn, Jack Schmidt, Katherine Tara, and Kathryn Soren, river experts and academics who aren’t representing any specific water user, state, or basin, also weighed in. Their comments, as Fleck put it in his Inkstain blog, could be summed up as: “Tell us what you’re going to do.” And, also:
The group calls on Interior to “primarily focus on the Dry and Critically Dry scenarios. … We think it important to be mindful of the underlying year-to-year hydrology of the 21st century as we look to the future. … we are struck by the fact that 50% of the individual years of the 21st century have been Dry or Critically Dry, and only 27% of the years (including 2017, 2019, 2023) have been Moderately Wet or Wet.”
“We suggest that the DEIS include a description of an alternative that performs sufficiently well during Dry scenarios and an alternative that performs sufficiently well during Critically Dry scenarios.”
“ … it is imperative that Reclamation provide a clear picture of what actions will be implemented in the near term (i.e., next year, next 3 years, next 5 years) to protect critical infrastructure, and to protect public health and safety.”
Noting that lawsuits are inevitable regardless of which alternative the feds choose, they urge them to avoid “safe” options and go with a plan with “… the broadest possible interpretation of Reclamation’s and Interior’s authority to provide a predictable and resilient Colorado River so that the system can continue to operate in a reasonable manner while the lawsuits proceed.”
Call on the feds to “… explore these areas for possible inclusion in the preferred alternative:
Reduction of deliveries in the Lower Basin in excess of 1.48 MAF when insufficient water is available for release.
Provision for releases of water from the Colorado River Storage Project initial units as necessary to protect critical elevations in Lake Powell and ensure continued Upper Basin Compact compliance.
Operation of federal projects in the Upper Basin to store or use less water during critical periods.
Continuation, expansion, and modification of Assigned Water programs (such as Intentionally Created Surplus and Mexican Water Reserve) with improvements to ensure operational neutrality and minimize adverse impact to priority water.
Establishing a conservation pool in Lake Powell for storing Upper Basin conserved water to be utilized for Compact compliance purposes. For more on conservation pools, check out the Shannon Mulane’s explainer in the Colorado Sun.
The group finds fault with the plan for not addressing “the need for enforceable reductions in the Upper Basin.” They go with the Lower Basin’s interpretation of the non-depletion/minimum-delivery obligation, saying that the Colorado River Compact does not guarantee that the Upper Basin gets half of the water in the river. Plus, they point out that the plan’s demand forecasts for the Upper Basin are unrealistically high, putting more of the burden for cuts on the Lower Basin.
The Southern Nevada Water Authority and Colorado River Commission of Nevadaare especially critical, writing:
“Since the onset of drought in 2002, <Nevada water users> have reduced their overall Colorado River water consumption by more than 40 percent even as our population grew by more than 875,000 people. And they, unlike so many others, have not ignored the reality facing the basin by making the flimsy argument that our economy cannot prosper while water consumption decreases.”
Like Arizona, they bring up the minimum-delivery/non-depletion clause of the Colorado River Compact and call on the Upper Basin to comply with it.
Interior’s “… approach to protecting the Glen Canyon Dam river outlet works by reducing releases from Lake Powell—rather than making infrastructure repairs and improvements—is shortsighted and harms Nevada and the Lower Basin States.”
The Upper Colorado River Commissionemphasizes the Lower Basin’s history of exceeding its Colorado River Compact allocation and failing to account for evaporation and other system losses. Colorado’s Upper Colorado River CommissionerBecky Mitchell submitted similar, very detailed comments that emphasized the Colorado River Compact’s equitable division of the river between the Upper Basin and Lower Basin. She points out that the Lower Basin’s interpretation of the minimum-delivery/non-depletion clause contradicts and even negates that division.
📖 Reading (and watching) Room 🧐
Must read: Teal Lehto’s and Len Necefer’s speculative fiction take on what might happen on the Colorado River, and to the people who rely on it, in 2030 if current climatic trends continue. It’s dramatic and sensational and catastrophic, but it’s also very well informed, smart, and not at all far-fetched, in my humble opinion.
A screenshot from a new Central Arizona Project video, which says if water deliveries to the canal system are cut too much it will “cripple our state, flatten our economy and weaken our national defense.” Provided by Central Arizona Project
Click the link to read the article the Tucson.com website (Tony Davis). Here’s an excerpt:
March 9, 2026
Arizona will take nearly a $3 trillion total economic hit and lose millions of jobs that would have come to the state by 2060 if Central Arizona Project deliveries are halted by the federal government, a new report from the project’s governing agency says. A CAP consultant’s report said the state’s total economic output would by 2060 be 11% to 14% lower than it otherwise would have been, under two proposed federal alternatives for managing the Colorado River. At worst, the state’s total jobs would shrink by 7.9% if the project’s supplies were eliminated, the report said. In addition, the state would see substantial declines in population and housing growth by then with massive CAP cuts, compared to what would have happened without them, said the report.
The three-county agency that runs the CAP’s canal system, stretching from Lake Havasu on the Colorado River to just south of Tucson, commissioned this report from the consulting firm WestWater Research, based in Boise, Idaho. The agency, known as the Central Arizona Water Conservation District, has managed daily operations for CAP since it was under construction in the 1970s. CAP submitted this report as part of its comments sharply criticizing the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s draft environmental impact statement on proposed alternatives aimed at curbing excessive water use by cities and farms in the seven-state Colorado River Basin. It comes out shortly after project officials released a video warning that such cuts would “flatten” Arizona’s economy. At the time the video came out, some outside water experts said it oversimplified and overestimated the impacts of CAP cuts, in part because the state and local governments have already stored huge amounts of CAP water underground to prepare for such emergencies. But the new report says those supplies will eventually be exhausted, forcing many cities to return to groundwater pumping, and that some shortages of groundwater supplies themselves also could begin in some regions as soon as the early 2030s.
Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0
A chart from the Colorado Basin River Forecast Center shows projected water supplies for the Colorado River basin compared to normal in 2026. (Provided by Colorado Basin River Forecast Center)
“Right now the hydrology that we have in front of us puts us in a very, very precarious situation,” said Gene Shawcroft, Utah’s Colorado River negotiator. Utah just wrapped up its warmest winter on record. Salt Lake City broke its previous maximum average winter temperature by 2 degrees Fahrenheit — a significant increase, according to the Colorado Basin River Forecast Center. While the state received similar precipitation compared to last year, much of that fell as rain, leading to the worst snowpack since 1981 in parts of the state. Now, the water supply outlook is “well below normal,” according to the center. The Bureau of Reclamation’s latest most probable forecast for Lake Powell shows it sinking below “power pool” — 3,490 feet — by December. At that level, water can’t make it through the turbines at Glen Canyon Dam that generate hydropower and keep the lights on across Utah and six other states. Powell could hit that dangerous low even sooner, though. The bureau’s most recent forecast was based on the Colorado Basin River Forecast Center’s February report. Since then, the center’s projection for water flows into Powell has dropped by 100,000 acre-feet. The bureau’s most probable forecast can also be optimistic. The agency’s minimum probable forecast, which shows a dry scenario that would statistically happen only 10% of the time, sometimes aligns more with reality. Last year, the April 2025 minimum probable study forecasted Lake Powell to hit 3,535 feet in elevation by the end of February 2026. The lake currently sits at 3,530 feet. The bureau’s latest minimum probable forecast shows the lake dropping below 3,490 by the end of August.
“It’s safe for us to assume that, unless Mother Nature is uncharacteristically generous, that Lake Powell elevations are going to fluctuate at elevations that we’re not comfortable with,” Wayne Pullan, Upper Colorado regional director for the bureau, said at a Glen Canyon Dam meeting last week…
To prop up Powell, the bureau will likely rely on another popular Utah reservoir: Flaming Gorge. The reservoir that straddles the border of Utah and Wyoming has the best water outlook in the basin, at 64% of normal, according to the forecast center. The Upper Green River, which flows into Flaming Gorge, is the “lone bright spot” for snow water equivalent — the amount of water snow holds…Under a 2019 plan, the bureau may form an agreement with Utah and the other states in the Upper Colorado River Basin — Colorado, New Mexico and Wyoming — to release water from Flaming Gorge and a few other reservoirs, such as Blue Mesa in Colorado, to maintain hydropower at Glen Canyon Dam. That’s what happened the last time forecasts showed Powell dropping to a dangerous low level in 2022. A record wet winter followed that dry year, though, boosting the reservoirs.
Lake Mead and the big “bathtub ring” as seen from next to Hoover Dam. Jonathan P. Thompson photo.
Click the link to read the article on the KUNC website (Scott Franz):
March 6, 2026
The sluggish Colorado River negotiations have entered a new phase: Long and fiery letter writing.
Politicians, water negotiators and environmental groups recently submitted hundreds of pages of comments on the Interior Department’s playbook for how to manage the waterway. There are currently five possible options to deal with the river in the absence of a deal between the seven states in the basin.
The alternatives were published in January and could result in a variety of scenarios, ranging from significant water reductions in lower basin states to creating new incentives for states to conserve water.
And after the states missed two deadlines for reaching an agreement themselves on how to share and conserve the water, it’s becoming increasingly likely the federal government will piece together its own plan before the current guidelines expire in August.
Public comment on the Interior Department’s menu of alternatives ended Monday. And leaders from both the upper and lower basins are blasting them.
The state is generally calling for a plan that forces states in the lower basin to cut back more of their water use in the face of drought.
Udall/Overpeck 4-panel Figure Colorado River temperature/precipitation/natural flows with trend. Lake Mead and Lake Powell storage. Updated through Water Year 2025. Note the tiny points on the annual data so that you can flyspeck the individual years. Credit: Brad Udall
“The Colorado River has changed dramatically over the last two decades, and our operating rules need to change with it,” Colorado River Commissioner Becky Mitchell said in a statement. “The current rules have not done enough to protect Lake Powell and Lake Mead, and it’s clear that a future management framework must better respond to today’s reality.”
Mitchell said the river is nearing a crisis point. She wrote that under current operating guidelines for the two reservoirs, which have been in place since 2007, Interior has been releasing water to the lower basin “based on demand, largely ignoring worsening hydrology and dropping reservoir levels.”
Downriver in Arizona, leaders are also blasting the Interior’s list of proposals, saying they would result in disproportional and severe water cuts to the lower basin states.
“Arizona’s agriculture, semiconductor and advanced manufacturing, aerospace and defense industries rely on the Colorado River,” the delegation wrote. “Reductions of the magnitude contemplated in the (feds playbook) would reverberate across rural communities and throughout the domestic food supply chain.”
The lower basin states of California, Arizona and Nevada are calling for mandatory water cuts in the upper basin states of Colorado, New Mexico, Wyoming and Utah.
Leaders in those states have countered that they already enact water conservation measures during times of drought.
A coalition of conservation groups, including The Nature Conservancy and Trout Unlimited, also weighed in on Interior’s draft proposals. They wrote that stabilizing the Colorado River in the face of drought “depends on early, proactive management; flexible and coordinated use of storage; meaningful Tribal participation; and integration of ecological integrity and mitigation into operational considerations.”
“Frameworks that delay action, rely on rigid rules, or institutionalize emergency operations consistently perform worse under the hydrologic conditions the Basin is most likely to face.
The Interior Department plans to review the public comments and identify which option it prefers to manage the reservoirs sometime this spring.
Environmental groups have warned negotiators in the seven states against taking their fight to court, saying that path could hold up conservation plans that are needed to protect places like the ecosystem of the Grand Canyon.
General Manager of the Colorado River Water Conservation District Andy Mueller speaks at the district’s annual seminar in 2018. Photo credit: Brent Gardner-Smith/Aspen Journalism
The general manager of the Colorado River District says that despite blown deadlines, a deal between states is still possible and needed to deal with the crisis regarding the river’s management. But Andy Mueller says time is running short to do so with an existing agreement due to expire later this year and drought and Lower Basin overuse of the river putting water levels in Lake Powell at perilously low levels.
“The best alternative from our perspective is still to have the seven states find an agreement that provides certainty. It’s really hard to do that in the middle of a really terrible drought. It’s a multi-decadal drought,” Mueller said…
Udall/Overpeck 4-panel Figure Colorado River temperature/precipitation/natural flows with trend. Lake Mead and Lake Powell storage. Updated through Water Year 2025. Note the tiny points on the annual data so that you can flyspeck the individual years. Credit: Brad Udall
Mueller said everyone has been good at pushing off the crises in the Colorado River. But the buffer at Powell and Mead in terms of stored water has disappeared due to the Lower Basin’s overuse and failure to account for system loss, and a changing river hydrology coming amidst warming temperatures, and as a result “we don’t have that buffer anymore, so it truly is hitting a crisis,” he said. The river has been beset by long-term drought for much of this century, reflecting what some refer to as aridification resulting from a warming climate…While Mueller remains hopeful that the states will continue to talk and keep the federal government from having to act on its own, the government needs to be prepared to move forward, he said. He said the next-worst alternative it is analyzing, which is called the basic coordination alternative but he considers to be the federal authorities’ alternative, imposes cuts first on Arizona, and specifically its Central Arizona Project as a junior water right in the Lower Basin. Mueller said that alternative also says the goal will be to deliver at least 7.5 million acre feet a year from Powell. He said that under most reasonably foreseeable hydrologies, that will put Powell’s infrastructure at risk. The water level would be in danger of falling below the intake tubes used to make power, which would leave the dam’s bypass tubes as the only way of getting water out of Powell and down into Grand Canyon. Those tubes have proven structurally problematic, subject to what is known as cavitation when a lot of water is moving through them, which has resulted in damage to them. Mueller said Reclamation has done a lot of work to try to repair them but no one he has talked to wants to rely on those tubes to get water below the dam..,Mueller said the federal alternative says that, to keep levels in Powell high enough to keep producing power and delivering water to the Lower Basin, it might have to take unspecified actions in the Upper Basin.
“Everybody in the Upper Basin, everybody in western Colorado should be very concerned about that statement because the question is, what do they mean by that?” he said.
He said that if the environmental impact statement is going to refer to contemplated actions, by law it needs to identify them and analyze their environmental and socioeconomic impacts. Because it doesn’t, the entire EIS process is legally flawed when it comes to the alternative most likely to be adopted by the federal government, and if it goes that route it could get sued not just by Arizona, which is facing the biggest cuts, but by the Upper Basin, Mueller said. He said the unspecified actions probably would start with massive releases of water from primarily Flaming Gorge Reservoir but also Blue Mesa and Navajo reservoirs.
Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0
Click the link to read the article on the AZCentral website (Brandon Loomis). Here’s an excerpt:
March 7, 2026
Key Points
A warm, dry winter has resulted in a disappointing snowpack across the intermountain West, affecting the Colorado River’s water supply.
Projected inflow to Lake Powell is at a near-historic low, complicating efforts to manage water shortages among states.
Arizona’s local water supplies, on the Salt and Verde rivers, are in better condition than last year, though still below average.
The federal government’s Colorado Basin River Forecast Center’s March report noted much of the drainage, especially in the mountains of Colorado and Utah, had experienced their worst snowpack since at least 1981. When meteorological winter ended on March 1, both Phoenix and Salt Lake City had broken records for maximum mean winter temperatures by 2 degrees Fahrenheit. The warmth that pervaded the West had melted much of the existing snowpack or caused it to fall as rain instead, encouraging evaporation and plant uptake and reducing the amount that will reach reservoirs this spring and summer.
“It’s not a pretty picture here,” forecast center hydrologist Cody Moser said while reviewing a color-coded watershed map emblazoned with red to indicate vast areas projected to deliver relatively little runoff.
The result, as of early March, was a projected Colorado River inflow to the critical storage pool in Lake Powell of just 2.3 million acre-feet, or 36% of the 1991-2020 average. If that projection holds up, it would be the lowest April-July boost for Lake Powell since the disastrous year of 2002 firmly entrenched this age of megadrought...This profound snow drought comes at an especially awkward time, compounding a quarter-century of regional aridification that has drained the nation’s two largest reservoirs to precarious depths. Lake Powell started March at just 24% of capacity, with much of that water functionally unavailable to flow downstream to Lake Mead and the Southwest because it’s below Glen Canyon Dam’s hydropower and bypass intakes. Lake Mead began the month at 34% of capacity. Both began this century essentially full. The lack of storage complicates the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s efforts to adopt new dam-operating and shortage-sharing guidelines without triggering a lawsuit from states and water users. Unless they do that by October, the current rules imposing cutbacks on Arizona and others will lapse, potentially worsening the shortage. Yet Arizona has panned the options that the agency initially studied because, officials say, they unfairly target the state for bigger losses while not enforcing the Colorado River Compact’s call for upstream states to let a minimum amount of water pass through.
Coyote Gulch’s Leaf in Byers Canyon, cut by the Colorado River, on the way to Steamboat Springs August 21, 2017.
Click the link to read the article on the Sky-Hi News website (Ali Longwell). Here’s an excerpt:
March 8, 2026
The state of Colorado, Upper Colorado River Commission, the Colorado River Water Conservation District, the Southwestern Water Conservation District and several Front Range water providers were among those that submitted comments, asking for the Bureau to finalize an agreement that legally fulfills all water rights while making bold and sustainable changes that align with the hydrologic reality of the river.
“The Colorado River has changed dramatically over the last two decades, and our operating rules need to change with it,” said Becky Mitchell, Colorado’s water commissioner and lead negotiator in the post-2026 operations, in a statement. “The current rules have not done enough to protect Lake Powell and Lake Mead, and it’s clear that a future management framework must better respond to today’s reality. Colorado’s comments provide constructive, legally grounded recommendations to bring the system into balance.”
[…]
Since the reservoirs’ current operational guidelines were set in 2007, the Colorado River Basin has experienced deepening drought conditions, declining inflows to the reservoirs and shrinking storage in Powell and Mead. As of March 1, Lake Powell and Lake Mead were 25% and 34% full, respectively. As the upper and lower basin states sought to reach a consensus on the post-2026 guidelines for the reservoirs, disagreements were rooted in where cuts needed to be made to deal with these worsening conditions. Through the deadline for consensus, the Lower Basin states offered up some cuts and pushed for basin-wide water use reductions. The Upper Basin states, however, have pushed back, claiming they already face natural water shortages driven primarily by the ups and downs of snowpack. In February, the upper division said this winter’s critically low snowpack will result in natural reductions “greater than 40% of the proven water rights” across the four states. In the draft, the Bureau recognizes that with “critically low storage in Lake Powell and Lake Mead, significant hydrologic variability and the anticipation of drier future conditions,” an agreement must strike a balance between “potentially profound impacts of water-delivery reductions” and “the need to maintain reservoir storage.”
The latest Upper Colorado River Commission and Colorado comments to the Bureau of Reclamation called on the federal agency to root the post-2026 guidelines on what the river actually supplies. In its comment, the state of Colorado said that the “failures of the current set of guidelines developed in 2007 have driven the current crisis on the Colorado River.”
“We can no longer rely on the management strategies of the past to solve the challenges of the present and future,” said Lauren Ris, director of Colorado’s Water Conservation Board.
Udall/Overpeck 4-panel Figure Colorado River temperature/precipitation/natural flows with trend. Lake Mead and Lake Powell storage. Updated through Water Year 2025. Note the tiny points on the annual data so that you can flyspeck the individual years. Credit: Brad Udall
With little progress in the Colorado River negotiations, some water experts are looking to a conservation program — featuring pools of invisible water and some accounting magic — as a possible path forward.
The seven Colorado River states, including Colorado, remain deeply divided over how to manage the nation’s largest reservoirs, lakes Mead and Powell, after the current management rules expire this fall. But other water users have put forward several innovative ideas for how to manage the water supply for 40 million people after 2026 as the basin’s two-decade drought continues.
One idea, known as a conservation pool, is generating a lot of conversation. Some water experts say it’s the wave of the future. A path toward, finally, some agreement among basin states.
Others say it’s a flawed concept that could hurt economies, especially in rural, agricultural areas.
“They hold great promise. They do incentivize conservation. They do create tremendous operational flexibility,” said Kathryn Sorensen, director of research at Arizona State University’s Kyl Center for Water Policy. “I think people want to see them go forward. They just also know that there’s some things that need to be fixed.”
Under a conservation pool program, water users in Colorado River states would cut back on water use, track the saved water, store it in Lake Powell on the Utah-Arizona border and/or Lake Mead on the Arizona-Nevada border, and use it to help create a more secure water supply in the river basin.
Colorado River officials are worried about the state of the basin. The river’s average flow has declined, and scientists have attributed 10 trillion gallons in water loss to higher temperatures and climate change. Lakes Mead and Powell, which together make up about 92% of the reservoir storage capacity for the entire basin, are each around one-third full.
A pool of conserved water in Lake Mead and Lake Powell could help maintain higher water levels in the reservoirs and defer drastic cuts, Stephen Roe Lewis, governor of the Gila River Indian Community in Arizona, said during an early February meeting.
It could help bring the two subbasins — the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin — closer together in their negotiations, he said.
“In our view, it offers really the only path forward that we can see that addresses the core challenge of risk each basin is facing, and provides a shared tool to manage uncertainty … in the years ahead,” Lewis said.
So how would it work?
There are lingering questions around who can participate in such a program, who would control the pool, how (and whether) people would be paid to conserve, and how the water would be used.
In Colorado, the conservation pool idea would likely start with a water user, say, for example, a farmer who grows hay near Kremmling on the Western Slope.
Colorado River water users, like farmers and ranchers, have legal rights to use water for specific purposes, at certain times and from certain places. The legal water-sharing system, called prior appropriation, gives older, more senior, rights priority. In dry years, these senior rights get water first, while more recent, or junior, rights holders might get cut off earlier than usual.
This system, however, doesn’t incentivize conservation, Sorensen said. But conservation pools would change that.
The Kremmling farmer might normally divert 5 acre-feet of water each summer, sending it through rotating sprinklers to saturate soils and grow crops.
One acre-foot is enough to cover an acre of cropland a foot deep, or roughly the annual water use of two to three urban households.
Colorado River Basin. Credit: USGS
When that farmer joins a conservation program, he or she might decide to cut their use down to 3 acre-feet one summer by not growing crops on certain fields.
The difference, 2 acre-feet, would be “conserved” water, but where does it go? Under the current water-sharing system, it would simply flow downstream, and any downstream farmer could use it on their fields.
This was one of the inherent problems in the Upper Basin’s recent pilot conservation program. In 2023, Colorado farmers and ranchers received almost $1 million to cut their use by about 2,000 acre-feet. In 2024, the estimated cuts totaled about 14,200 acre-feet and the cost was about $7 million.
Under a conservation pool program, Colorado farmers could rest assured that their conserved water would actually end up in Lake Powell.
The problem is that Upper Basin states don’t actually have ways to track that water — yet.
To reach Lake Powell, Colorado and its sister states would need to be able to shepherd conserved water past headgate after headgate, through different water districts and divisions — each with their own systems for managing water — and across state lines before it would reach Lake Powell.
“There are challenges for sure,” said John Berggren, regional policy manager for the healthy rivers department at Western Resource Advocates. “But you can overcome those challenges, and there’s a broader need to, which is to actually stay out of the courts and have an agreement.”
Once water reaches Powell, different groups want it to be used for different purposes. The Colorado River District, for example, says they will only support the idea if the water protects Upper Basin states from forced water cuts that could happen under water law if the basin’s supply falls to extreme lows.
“We do think a conservation program in the Upper Basin could be part of the solution and part of our future, but these programs should be designed and implemented in a thoughtful manner that minimizes and mitigates negative impacts,” said Raquel Flinker, the district’s director of interstate and regional water resources.
Berggren and other environmental groups are pushing for conservation pool water to be used to help Colorado River ecosystems in the Grand Canyon. The dam impacts sediment flow and water temperatures downstream from Lake Powell, which helps non-native fish species thrive and outcompete native fish.
The Bureau of Reclamation could take to their computers and “move” conserved water between Lake Mead and Lake Powell in the accounting books to make more of those releases, he said.
The art of invisible water
Many of the conservation pool ideas aim to keep the water “invisible” when the Bureau of Reclamation decides how much water to release from each massive reservoir.
The conserved water would physically be in a reservoir to keep the water levels from falling too low. At certain elevations, the dams can’t generate electricity or release water for millions of people across the West.
But when Reclamation officials look at the water accounting records, they would ignore the conserved water when calculating how much water to release and what kind of water shortages the basin states could face in dry years.
This approach would address one of the critical flaws in a similar program that has been happening in the Lower Basin since 2007, experts said.
That Intentionally Created Surplus program allows water users in Arizona, California and Nevada to cut their use and keep the water in Lake Mead to be used at a later date. In some cases, they can even divert water from other watersheds and import it into the reservoir, Sorensen said.
One of the biggest flaws of the Lower Basin program was that it artificially kept the physical water levels at Lake Mead higher than they would have otherwise been. Water levels have dictated Lower Basin shortages for the past 20 years, and the higher levels insulated the states from deeper water cutbacks, which delayed steps to adapt to the overstressed water supply in the basin.
The new conservation pools would try to correct this and expand the effort. Upper Basin, Lower Basin and tribal water users could also conserve water and use that water to help flows in rivers, protect infrastructure, and many other uses, Berggren said.
“That’s new. We didn’t have that ability before. That’s why it’s innovative,” he said.
The wave of the future?
The Department of the Interior in January laid out five options for managing the river. Three included some form of a conservation pool.
“Conservation pools are the way of the future for the Colorado River Basin,” Berggren said. “They allow for so much more flexibility in managing our reservoirs, managing our water. You’re able to respond to changing conditions quicker.”
Not everyone agrees. The Colorado River District said conserving up to 500,000 acre-feet of water in Colorado and other Upper Basin states, which is proposed in the federal options, would shrink agricultural land use and require water cuts in cities and towns.
“Conservation at this scale would have significant and potentially permanent adverse consequences, including economic impacts to communities,” Flinker of the Colorado River District said.
But — and this is a big caveat — the conservation pool concept cannot move forward without support from all of the basin states.
To set up a conservation pool program, states would need to launch new water-tracking systems. Someone would have to compensate the people conserving water. The way federal officials track, store and release water in the immense reservoirs would change.
And under its current legal authority, the federal government cannot move forward with conservation pools without risking expensive lawsuits that would tie up water management for years. But with a seven-state agreement, the feds could take action.
Arizona and Colorado, which often find themselves on opposite sides of Colorado River discussions, are open to the conservation pool idea.
The concept has merit, Tom Buschatzke, Arizona’s top water negotiator, said during an Arizona Reconsultation Committee meeting Feb. 2.
It is “something we should continue to pursue because I do believe that just formulaic attempts to deal with how you split up the water have been failing us so far,” he said.
Colorado and its sister states in the Upper Basin — New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming — have been consistently willing to do a conservation program that involves saving water in a pool within Lake Powell and potentially other upstream reservoirs, Becky Mitchell, Colorado’s top negotiator said.
“The particulars of the program and potential pool would depend upon the operational framework and/or other components of a seven-state consensus,” she said.
The Bureau of Land Management’s Mineral & Land Records System seems like a strange place to get trolled. But I think it just happened. I was looking through the MLRS to try to get an idea of whether insanely high gold and silver prices, and relatively strong uranium prices, had inspired companies or speculators to stake new mining claims n southwestern Colorado and southeastern Utah, when I came across something that seemed almost satirical.
Late last year, Kimmerle Mining Company staked four 20.66-acre lode claims in Garfield County, Utah, on the east slope of the Henry Mountains (just east of Mt. Pennell). The claim’s names? Trump I, Trump 2, Trump 3, and Trump 4.
The Kimmerle family, of Moab, control hundreds of mining claims across southeastern Utah. But they generally don’t mine them, except, it seems, to make a point.
The Kimmerles are the ones who staked mining claims on a mesa just east of Hideout Canyon inside Bears Ears National Monument just months just before the Obama administration withdrew the area from new mining claims. After Trump shrunk the monument to exclude the White Canyon area in 2017, and just before Biden restored the boundaries in 2021, Kimmerle Mining staked five new claims in the area and acquired additional claims from another mining company. Kimmerle Mining promptly filed for a permit to do exploration work there, but the BLM said they had to demonstrate the claims “validity,” or show that they contained “valuable minerals.” The process for doing so would cost up to $100,000.
Shortly thereafter, Kimmerle joined the state of Utah’s lawsuit seeking to eviscerate the national monument, claiming that its establishment had caused him to lose out on mining profits.
No word on whether the firm plans on drilling or mining its Trump claims, but at least we know these folks’ political leaning.
There have been a handful of other notable mining claim locations in the area in the past six months, including:
Platoro West Inc., located in Durango, staked twelve 20.66-acre lode claims southeast of Ouray, Colorado, in the Bear Creek drainage near Darley and Engineer Mountains. The company is registered under the name of William Sheriff, who was recently named executive chairman of Verdera Energy, which has interests in in-situ uranium mining in New Mexico.
CCKC Inc., of Philadelphia, located three 20-acre placer claims in Dolores County along the Dolores River upstream of Rico.
Roughead Resources of Moab (but which has also been associated with a Houston address) staked fifteen 20.66-acre lode claims in the Lisbon Valley of southeastern Utah near the Mi Vida Mine and the Lisbon Valley Copper Mine. At the same time, the company also staked dozens of claims in Beaver County, Utah.
Fermi Metals of Cocolalla, Idaho, staked twenty-three 20.66-acre claims on the southern slope of the La Sal Mountains, just north of the settlement of La Sal. This is near Energy Fuels’ La Sal Complex uranium mines.
Geobrines International, of Littleton, Colorado, staked twenty-five 20-acre placer claims in Grand County, Utah, along I-70 between Green River and Cisco. This adds to a cluster of previously filed claims in the same area. They are probably looking to do lithium extraction.
Utah Brine Corporation, of Omaha, Nebraska, staked seventy 20-acre claims southwest of the community of La Sal in the Lisbon Valley. UBC appears to be a subsidiary of Omaha Value Inc., which has partnered with an Australian critical materials firm Neometals on its Utah Brine Project, which aims to extract lithium and potash.
Antimony Canyon Sovereign Reserve Inc, a division of Australia firm American Tungsten & Antimony, staked nineteen 20.66-acre lode claims near Antimony, Utah, in Garfield County. The plan is to develop an antimony mine here.
In other mining news:
Metallic Minerals has been eyeing and drilling into a copper deposit in the La Plata Mountains of southwestern Colorado. While actual mining may be a long ways off, concerned locals are already coming together to keep an eye on the project and push back, if necessary. The La Plata Mountains and Public Lands Coalition now has about 225 members from the region, according to Dan King, the coalition’s administrator. Metallic Minerals’ proposal was just one of the catalysts for the coalition, and its mission is much broader and more regional in scope.
Gold and silver prices have shot up tremendously over the last year, probably due to the Trump-effect on the economy and the U.S. dollar, which is stuck at a ridiculously low exchange rate. Gold is now around $5,000/oz, while silver is hovering around $100/oz., compared to just $30 when Trump took office. Uranium’s doing well, too, sitting consistently in the $80/lb to $90/lb range.
Which is to say, mining companies suddenly have a lot more incentive to invest in reopening existing, idle mines or even building new ones (assuming they have faith that the high prices will endure). So far, however, it doesn’t seem to have sparked a surge in new mining activity. Even the Revenue-Virginius silver mine near Ouray, which is purportedly ready to produce ore, remains idle.
The uranium sector does appear to be emerging from its long slumber, but mostly in the form of exploratory drilling, smaller companies selling claims to bigger ones, and staking mining claims on the increasingly sparse sections of public land that aren’t already claimed. Anfield continues work on constructing its Velvet-Wood mine in the Lisbon Valley, but it’s still a ways away from production (and its Shootaring mill is still mothballed and unlicensed).
Energy Fuels is about the only firm actually producing conventional ore. According to their SEC filings, they pulled about 1.5 million pounds of uranium from the Pinyon Plain mine near the Grand Canyon and 155,000 pounds from their La Sal Complex in 2025. Their White Mesa Mill recovered 1 million pounds of uranium, which is a heck of a lot more than in the past, but still is far short of the facility’s 8-million-pound annual capacity. Despite all of this, the company still lost $86 million in 2025.
Meanwhile, the silver and gold mining corporations raked in massive profits, including:
Canadian corporation Barrick, which owns major gold mines in Nevada (Fourmile and Nevada Gold Mines) reported an attributable EBITDA of $8.16 billion last year, the “highest shareholder returns” in the company’s history.
Newmont (which jointly owns Nevada Gold Mines with Barrick) reported an adjusted EBITDA of $13.5 billion.
Kinross, owner of Bald Mountain and Round Mountain in Nevada, Fort Knox and Manh Choh in Alaska, and Kettle River-Curew Project in Washington, reported adjusted net earnings of $2.2 billion
Rio Tinto’s “profit after tax attributable to owners of Rio Tinto (net earnings)” $10 billion.
SSR Mining, which owns a big mine in Nevada, only had a net income of $362 million; but that compares to 2024’s loss of $350 million.
Speaking of commodity prices and profits: American oil and gas companies are poised to make out like bandits thanks to the Trump-Netanyahu war on Iran.
Iran produces some oil and gas. But more importantly, it borders the Strait of Hormuz and has threatened any oil and gas tankers that try to pass through it, effectively closing the passage. That could stanch the flow of oil and gas to the global market, causing prices to rise. The West Texas Intermediate, or WTI, crude oil price has shot up to about $76, the highest it’s been since before Trump took office. This will cause gasoline prices to climb, but also make drilling in the U.S. more profitable, and could spur companies to start using the stockpile of public land drilling permits they’ve amassed over the last year or so.
Liquefied natural gas tankers also are unable to get through the Strait to European markets, which will cause prices of the fuel to skyrocket. It could also force European countries to turn to U.S. LNG exporters, which could echo back to natural gas producing states like New Mexico and Wyoming (and also may increase U.S. natural gas prices if the conflict drags on).
Glen Canyon Dam Must Be Modified to Avoid Draconian Water Supply Disruptions
A guest post by Ron Rudolph
Glen Canyon Dam with the river outlets in use as part of the high-flow experimental release. The outlets are only used occasionally and are not engineered for sustained use. Usually, all of the releases go through the penstocks and the hydroelectric turbines. But that won’t be possible if the lake drops below the level known as minimum power pool. Jonathan P. Thompson photo.
Glen Canyon Dam, which impounds the Colorado River to form Lake Powell, is a single point of failure that poses an unacceptable risk to the functioning of the entire river system. Modifying the dam to allow more water to pass through or around it is an essential component of any plan for allocating the river’s dwindling supply.
The dam’s structural flaw limits the amount of water that can pass from Lake Powell downstream to Lake Mead. Lake Mead, the nation’s largest reservoir, is the primary repository of water for the Colorado River’s so-called Lower Basin states: California, Arizona, and Nevada. A paucity of water released from Lake Powell would eventually force reductions in the amount of water extracted from Lake Mead, diminish drinking water supplies for millions, harm agricultural productivity throughout the southwest, and embroil the federal government, seven states, more than two dozen Tribal Nations, Mexico, and others that share the river’s water in a cascade of costly court cases.
The back of Glen Canyon Dam circa 1964, not long after the reservoir had begun filling up. Here the water level is above dead pool, meaning water can be released via the river outlets, but it is below minimum power pool, so water cannot yet enter the penstocks to generate electricity. Bureau of Reclamation photo. Annotations: Jonathan P. Thompson
Due to Glen Canyon Dam’s physical limitations, when the elevation of Lake Powell reaches “minimum power pool” or lower, the only way to release water from the dam is through its river outlet works.1 The persistent drought in the southwest, and continued demand for the river’s reduced water supply, makes it highly likely Lake Powell will fall to minimum power pool this year. The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation estimated this month that Lake Powell could fall to minimum power pool by late July, and remain there or lower through 2027.2
The Bureau of Reclamation’s latest forecast for the Colorado River predicts Lake Powell will “most probably” drop below the critical minimum power pool level before the end of this year, jeopardizing Glen Canyon Dam’s structural integrity. In the worst-case scenario, it would do so before summer’s end. This could force the feds to operate the dam as a “run-of-the-river” operation to preserve the dam’s infrastructure and hydropower output, which would significantly diminish downstream flows and threaten Lower Basin water supplies.
In addition, the agency’s February forecast estimates that under “most probable inflow” conditions, Lake Mead would drop below elevation 1,040 in June. If conditions do not improve by the agency’s August forecast, mandatory reductions in water use would be required in Arizona, California, Nevada, and Mexico.3 If the annual amount of water let out from Lake Powell is restricted to the dam’s outlet works, it would result in less water reaching Lake Mead than any year this century, and could trigger even larger reductions in Lower Basin water consumption.4 Releasing water from reservoirs upstream from Lake Powell could forestall the reservoir reaching minimum power pool, however, that is a non-sustainable solution, that fails to address Glen Canyon Dam’s fundamental plumbing problem.
In January, the Bureau of Reclamation’s draft environmental impact statement — Post-2026 Operational Guidelines and Strategies for Lake Powell and Lake Mead —proposed several options for managing the Colorado River for the next 20 years. None of the alternatives includes remedying Glen Canyon Dam’s structural flaws.
The Bureau’s proposals have been criticized by some of the largest consumers of Colorado River water who have signaled a willingness to challenge the agency in court. For example, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, which serves nearly 19 million people, noted the Bureau’s proposed alternatives “would likely lead to lengthy litigation.”5 The Central Arizona Project, the second largest consumer of Colorado River water, has identified several “legal deficiencies,” including non-compliance with the Colorado River Compact, and failure to adequately disclose and analyze the environmental, economic and socioeconomic impacts.6
Depending exclusively on the river outlet works to release sufficient water through Glen Canyon Dam is bound to fail, like relying on rainfall to grow crops in Arizona or southern California. The Bureau has warned relying on the outlet works would risk water supply disruptions to those who depend on Lake Powell and Lake Mead.7 The Director of the Bureau’s Technical Service Center has advised against using the outlet works as the sole means for releasing water from the dam,8 as previous high-capacity use of them for only 72 hours caused structural damage, which required nine months to repair. Despite the remedial effort, the Bureau concluded the repairs will not prevent future damage.9 The dam’s design flaw led the Arizona Department of Water Resources to conclude the structural limitations of Glen Canyon Dam must be alleviated.10
The calculus for equitably apportioning the diminishing water in the Colorado River is extremely complicated. But one variable in the equation is as obvious as the bathtub ring surrounding Lake Powell: a new system for conveying water sustainably through or around Glen Canyon Dam must be built. Without it, risks to the Colorado River system, and the communities, agriculture and ecosystems reliant on it, will escalate, as will pressure to impose compulsory reductions in consumptive uses throughout the basin.
Ron Rudolph, a former assistant executive director of Friends of the Earth, spent 35 years in various engineering companies, including MWH Global, CH2M Hill, Jacobs Engineering, and Cardno with a career focused on infrastructure development and environmental remediation.
1 U.S.Bureau of Reclamation, Technical Decision Memorandum, Establishment of Interim Operating Guidance for Glen Canyon Dam During Low Reservoir Levels at Lake Powell, March 26, 2024, page 9
3 When Lake Mead drops below elevation 1,040, a “Level 2 Shortage Condition,” mandatory reductions in water use by Arizona, California, Nevada, and Mexico are required by the 2007 Interim Guidelines for managing Lake Powell and Lake Mead, and the 2019 Lower Basin Drought Contingency Plan
4 The Bureau’s guidance for maximum release of water from each river outlet work (ROW) at minimum power pool elevation is 3,185 cubic feet/second (cfs). The agency has determined only three ROWs would be available simultaneously. If three ROWs operate at full capacity, they would release 9,555 cfs. 1 cfs sustained for a year = 724.acre-feet/year. 9,555 x 724.45 = 6,922,000 acre-feet/year. The maximum releases are specified in USBR, Technical Decision Memorandum, Establishment of Interim Operating Guidance for Glen Canyon Dam During Low Reservoir Levels at Lake Powell, March 26, 2024, page 2. The determination that only three ROWs would be available simultaneously in based on USBR, Near-term Colorado River Operations, Final Supplemental Impact Statement, March 2024, page 2-3. The least amount of water released this century was 7 million acre-feet in 2022, based on data from U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Accounting and Water Use Report: Arizona, California and Nevada, 2000-2024
5 Statement of Metropolitan Water District’s General Manager, Shivaji Deshmukh, January 9, 2026
6 Patrick Dent, Assistant General Manager, Water Policy, Central Arizona Project, Report on Post-2026 Draft Environmental Impact Statement, February 5, 2026
7 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Near-term Colorado River Operations, Final Supplemental Impact Statement, March 2024, page 1-9, footnote 10
8 USBR, Technical Decision Memorandum, Establishment of Interim Operating Guidance for Glen Canyon Dam During Low Reservoir Levels at Lake Powell, March 26, 2024, page 9
Central Arizona Project map via Mountain Town News
Click the link to go to the Central Arizona Project website Colorado River Operations where you can find links to the relevant documents with respect to the DEIS.
On behalf of the Central Arizona Project and twenty-two Arizona Participating Entities that rely on the Colorado River, I am submitting the attached comments that express our deep concerns regarding the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for the Post-2026 Operational Guidelines and Strategies for Lake Powell and Lake Mead and the devastating impacts the alternatives therein would impose on Arizona.
All the alternatives proposed in the DEIS disproportionately harm Arizona and are unacceptable. Specifically, the Basic Coordination alternative proposed in the DEIS that Reclamation claims could be imposed without Arizona’s consent all but severs much of Central and Southern Arizona from Colorado River supplies that have been relied upon on for four decades, betraying the promise of sustainable water supplies that underly Arizona’s economy and potentially causing “widespread impacts on social and economic conditions. . . .”that may forcecities and townsto“haul water . . . as an alternative to support continued services.”1 Arizona will not tolerate devastation and destabilization, particularly when the DEIS allows other Basin States to increase their water use.
The waters of the Colorado River are foundational to the economy and people of Central and Southern Arizona, supporting 6 million Arizonans, many tribal communities, a thriving advanced microchip manufacturing industry, and critical mineral and agricultural production. Arizona has cultivated a flourishing desert society over the past 40 years through careful and prudent use of Colorado River water supplied by the Central Arizona Project—more than doubling the State’s population while managing at the same time to use less water. The DEIS alternatives threaten to tear apart a generation of careful water management and topple the architecture supporting Arizona’s economy which is home to the heart of the American semi-conductor manufacturing and AI infrastructure industries.
The DEIS alternatives are not just a failure of policy but also include fatal legal deficiencies, and we respectfully request that the Department of the Interior withdraw the document. The United States must implement a decision that is consistent with the Colorado River Compact of 1922 (Compact), the Law of the River, and wise water policy—the DEIS fails on all counts. The enclosed comments highlight several critical flaws in the DEIS, including but not limited to:
Inconsistency with the Compact and the Law of the River: Absent agreement by the Basin States, the operating criteria for the Colorado River must comply with the foundational authority on the Colorado River: the Compact. All subsequent statutes, regulations, contracts, and other agreements are subject to compliance with the Compact and the DEIS ignores this foundational issue by proposing alternatives that would result in a breach thereof.
Failure to Analyze Upper Basin Delivery Obligations: The DEIS fails to consider or model the impacts of Upper Basin delivery obligations due to a Compact deficiency, including required releases from Colorado River Storage Project Act Upper Initial Units and curtailment in the Upper Basin necessary to prevent a breach of the Compact. This analysis is particularly important at this time, as a breach of the Upper Basin’s Compact delivery obligations could occur within the next 12 months.
Failure to Analyze the Devastating Socioeconomic Impacts to Arizona: The DEIS fails to analyze the widespread destabilizing social and economic impacts on Arizona that would be caused by the deep cuts to Arizona’s Colorado River supplies proposed in the document and could cause Arizona’s economy to lose over $2.7 trillion.
Failure to Evaluate Reasonable Alternatives: The range of alternatives is too narrow and neglects to evaluate the reasonable and feasible Lower Basin Alternative which would equitably share cuts needed to stabilize the Colorado River System among all seven Basin States and Mexico.
Illegal Implementation of the so-called “Junior Priority” on the Central Arizona Project: Arizona never agreed and the law does not make the Central Arizona Project a junior user to the Upper Basin. The DEIS fails by proposing deep cuts to Arizona’s water supplies without Compact compliance or required reductions to the Upper Basin. Further, the “junior priority” described in the Colorado River Basin Project Act and used to distribute the DEIS cuts to the Lower Basin is a facially unconstitutional imposition on Arizona’s sovereignty and illegally attempts to make Arizona a second-class citizen among the other Lower Basin States.
For these reasons and others described in the attached comments, the current DEIS does not provide the “hard look” at environmental consequences required by law. Proceeding with this document is highly likely to lead to legal challenges and long-term environmental damage that has not been analyzed.
We welcome the opportunity to work with the Department of the Interior to ensure the revised DEIS is robust and legally durable. Arizona has been a willing partner in attempting to negotiate a consensus solution to the management challenges facing Colorado River operations and continues to stand ready to find a compromise with the Secretary, the other Basin States, and additional Colorado River stakeholders based on shared sacrifice and a recognition that everyone must reduce their uses to stabilize the system. A revised DEIS is essential to comply with NEPA and properly inform the public and decision-makers and to avoid protracted litigation.
Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0
Interior Department overhauls its environmental review procedures.
GAO says NOAA, which has oversight authority, should do a better job of tracking cloud seeding and other weather modification.
Senate passes a bill to allow southern Nevada’s water authority to build a water-supply pipeline beneath a national conservation area.
EPA staff decreased 7 percent in the nine months through June 2025, GAO found.
Army Corps directive aims to speed up infrastructure work, prioritize projects.
House Democrats from the D.C. region ask Congress to fund the repair of a major sewer pipe break.
And lastly, Bureau of Reclamation officials outline options for propping up a shrinking Lake Powell.
“I think it’s safe for us to assume that unless Mother Nature is uncharacteristically generous, that Lake Powell elevations are going to fluctuate at elevations that we’re not comfortable with.” – Wayne Pullan, Bureau of Reclamation Upper Colorado regional director, speaking about the possibility that Lake Powell drops low enough later this year that Glen Canyon Dam cannot generate hydropower.
7 Percent: Decrease in EPA staff between September 2024 and June 2025, according to a Government Accountability Office audit.
10: States that have weather modification programs, typically cloud seeding to induce rainfall, according to a GAO report.
News Briefs
Interior NEPA Changes The Interior Department overhauled its environmental review procedures, aligning them with recent court decisions, congressional action, and Trump administration priorities.
The final rule sets page limits (150 pages in most cases, up to 300 for actions of “extraordinary complexity”) and time limits (generally two years) on environmental impact statements.
The new rules do not require public comment on draft environmental impact statements. The only mandatory opportunity for public comment is after the department issues a notice that it intends to prepare an EIS.
Reviews already in progress, those with “applications that are sufficiently advanced,” will be held to the previous standard.
Illustration from the report, “Antique Plumbing & Leadership Postponed” from the Utah Rivers Council, Glen Canyon Institute and the Great Basin Water Network. Courtesy of Utah Rivers Council
Lake Powell Options Officials at the Bureau of Reclamation, the federal agency that manages Colorado River dams, outlined several actions they are considering in the coming months to boost water levels in a rapidly shrinking Lake Powell, which could drop to a record low later this year that would halt hydropower production from Glen Canyon Dam for the first time.
The Colorado River’s second-largest reservoir behind Lake Mead is entering one of the most difficult periods in its six-decade history. The basin is drying due to a warming climate. Powell is just a quarter full, and projected to drop lower this year. Winter has been a dud, with warm temperatures and a historically bad snowpack in the Colorado mountains that feed into the reservoir.
Reclamation officials discussed their options during a meeting last week of the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Work Group, an expert committee that advises on the dam’s ecological impacts.
A 2024 decision allows Reclamation to “consider all tools that are available” to keep Powell from dropping below 3,500 feet, an elevation that provides a little wiggle room for maintaining hydropower production. Powell today sits at 3,531 feet.
The tool from the 2024 decision is Section 6(E), which grants Reclamation the authority to restrict water releases from Powell to as low as 6 million acre-feet. The planned release this year is 7.48 million acre-feet, so the Section 6(E) authority represents a potential 20 percent reduction.
A cut of that magnitude might not be necessary because Reclamation has another tool it can use in tandem.
That option is releasing more water from Flaming Gorge and other smaller reservoirs located higher in the watershed. This is called a DROA release after its authorizing document. Pullan said this action, which states in the lower basin are advocating for, is being discussed and the volume of those releases would be determined in the spring, around April or May.
Southern Nevada Water Pipeline The Senate passed a bill that allows southern Nevada’s water provider to tunnel beneath Sloan Canyon National Conservation Area in order to build a pipeline to increase the water-supply system’s reliability. The bill now goes to the president’s desk.
Studies and Reports
‘Army Mode’ for the Army Corps Adam Telle, head of the Army Corps of Engineers, issued a collection of directives aimed at reducing paperwork and speeding up water infrastructure construction.
In one memo, Telle called for an “Army Mode” mobilization. He ordered a bottom-up approach whereby officials will select at least 20 projects nationally to prioritize. The list is due March 20.
A separate memo lists seven focus areas for infrastructure work. In descending order of importance: human life and safety, economically or strategically important infrastructure, efficient navigation and supply chains, human property, aquatic ecosystems, state-level infrastructure, and municipal infrastructure.
In yet another memo, he said that project investigations – part of the planning phase – should take no more than three years and $3 million.
Cost of Natural Hazards for the Defense Department The Defense Department lacks data to understand fully the costs of natural hazards to its installations, according to a Government Accountability Office report.
The GAO made five recommendations, including resilience planning, data collection standards, guidance, and procedures. The Defense Department agreed with all of them.
Weather Modification The GAO also looked into NOAA’s tracking of activities to induce rainfall or otherwise change the weather.
Thanks to a 1972 law, NOAA has oversight authority over weather modification and any entity that shoots silver iodide into clouds to make it rain is required to file a report with the agency. Solar geoengineering, which attempts to reduce air temperatures, is far less common but also covered under this authority.
The GAO found that NOAA’s database is incomplete, inconsistent, and unreliable. One fifth of interim and final reports had at least one error, the GAO estimates.
“Consequently, NOAA is not fully aware of the extent of weather modification activities that have occurred and are occurring within the U.S., how they are being conducted, or potential effects,” the GAO concluded.
On the Radar
How to Sue the EPA The EPA is proposing to change the process for filing citizen lawsuits, moving from mail delivery to electronic submissions.
Public comments are due March 26. Submit them via http://www.regulations.gov using docket number EPA-HQ-OGC-2024-0557.
Water Infrastructure Funding In the wake of a large-diameter sewer line rupture along the Potomac River, House Democrats from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia wrote to leaders of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee asking for funding for repairs.
The letter also asked for the Army Corps of Engineers to prioritize a study of a backup drinking water source for the capital region, which relies on the Potomac.
“Unlike other major metropolitan areas, the region lacks a secondary water supply, which would provide critical redundancy in the event of a future crisis.”
Federal Water Tap is a weekly digest spotting trends in U.S. government water policy. To get more water news, follow Circle of Blue on Twitter and sign up for our newsletter.
Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0
Corn in Baca County. Photo credit: Allen Best/Big Pivots
Click the link to read the article on the Big Pivots website (Allen Best):
February 28, 2026
Study being completed will help guide decisions about continued mining of groundwater in the Springfield area. Ogallala will be gone within 20 years, but deepest formation could last a century.
Before center-pivot sprinklers powered by rural electrification in the mid-20th century, farmers in Colorado’s southeastern corner necessarily relied upon what came from the sky for water. HIgh-capacity pumps, first used in the Springfield area during the late 1940s allowed the farmers to go underground, to more lucratively plumb a series of aquifers and deliver far-higher crop yields.
The Ogallala — also called the High Plains — is the water-bearing geologic formation nearest the surface, followed by the more water-rich Dakota and Cheyenne formations. Underlying both is a far larger reservoir yet called the Dockum Group.
How long will that water last? A new report commissioned by Colorado, still in rough draft stage, finds that a little more than 2,000 wells mine these formations in Baca County and a portion of adjoining Prowers County. The vast majority of the water, 97%, irrigates alfalfa, corn and other crops. Remaining water goes to hog farms, stock ponds, and domestic wells for farmhouses as well as municipal supplies in Springfield and several even smaller towns.
An average 157,000 acre-feet were mined annually from these subterranean deposits from 2020 through 2024. To put that into perspective Denver Water delivers an average 232,000 acre-feet to the 1.5 million residents in Denver and adjoining jurisdictions.
The answer to the question about how long the water will last has not been fully answered. At current rates of pumping, the Ogallala will be gone by 2045, according to this draft study. The next two deeper formations, Dakota and Cheyenne, have been depleted more rapidly but have more water.
The deepest water, in the Dockum, could last a century or more. It depends partly on the quality of water extracted at greater depths. There seem to be some unknowns about this. Cost of extraction is also a factor. Deeper wells cost more money to drill. It also takes more electricity to pump water to the surface. Would crop prices justify the added expenses?
Pueblo can be seen in the upper left-hand corner of this map, and the southern high plains district is designated by lavender.
With those asterisks in mind, the study estimates nearly 33 million acre-feet of water can be economically recovered from the four water-bearing geologic formations in that southern high plains groundwater district.
On average, Colorado consumes 5.3 million acre-feet of water per year, although some of that water gets reused. Think of runoff from farm fields or treated sewage that reenters streams and rivers. When that is added up, Colorado’s total diversions hit 15.3 million acre-feet. This southern plains basin bordering Kansas and Oklahoma is just a small part of Colorado.
Unlike Colorado’s rivers, which are mostly derived from snowmelt and rainfall, the groundwater recharges but much more slowly than the extraction. This study estimates an annual recharge of 32,000 acre-feet compared to the 157,000 acre-feet withdrawn.
Apart from the river valleys, dryland areas of southeastern Colorado were among the last places homesteaded in Colorado. First came the settlements of Denver, Colorado Springs, and Boulder with their access to water from the mountain streams and rivers and proximity to the mountain mining camps. Very quickly, water was diverted to create farms.
Homesteading of the high plains began about 30 years later. By then, the buffalo were gone, and the last battle with Native Americas had occurred in 1869 at Summit Springs. Settlement near Springfield, Walsh and other Baca County towns continued through the 1920s. Peak settlement occurred in about 1930, before the weather turned hotter and drier and the skies filled with dust. Baca County during the decade of the Dust Bowl and the Great Depression lost more than a third of its population.
Baca County since then has continued to lose population as farm sizes have grown. While groundwater extraction has provided a modicum of prosperity, the county ranked 57th among Colorado’s 64 counties in per-capita income as of 2022.
The hydrogeology that is believed to exist in this basin can be seen in this west-east profile. Some formations, including the Graneros and Kiowa shales, contain no water and act as barriers.
The Colorado Ground Water Commission — created in 1965, before groundwater became a common word — has legal purview over extraction. The commission can set limits on the allowable rate of depletion.
The southern high plains district limits new wells within a half-mile of existing high-capacity wells. But it is still possible to get a permit for a new well. That is in dispute. Some think the basin needs to be “closed,” to bar future wells and hence prolong the life of the aquifers.
This groundwater basin in southeastern Colorado is very different from the Republican River Basin of northeastern Colorado in one crucial way. The aquifers do not deliver water to a river subject to a multi-state compact. The Cimarron River nicks the extreme corner of Colorado, but testimony to the poverty of water in this “river” is provided by those traveling to Santa Fe in the 19th century. Nearly all followed the Arkansas River, not the Cimarron, despite the latter route being much shorter.
In contrast, a compact struck in 1943 governs flows in the Republican River. It arises far from Colorado’s mountains and is instead nourished by water seeping out of the Ogallala in places like Holyoke and Yuma and Burlington. Mining of groundwater in the basin to grow crops reduced flows to the extent that Kansas sued Nebraska, which in turn sued Colorado. Now, farmers in the basin are trying to reduce their withdrawals by voluntary retirement of 25,000 acres from active irrigation. The 19,000-plus acres retired so far have been induced by financial incentives that tap federal but also state funds.
Without a compact to force reduced pumping in southeastern Colorado, the state can adopt its own rules.
Residents of southeastern Colorado appear to be somewhat conflicted about whether new rules governing withdrawal are needed and what they should look like. Baca County’s Herald Plainsman in March 2023 reported on a “highly charged” meeting in Springfield called by the state’s Division of Water Resources. Tracy Kosloff, the deputy state engineer, explained that a group from the community had requested a rule change in the previous year.
Their intent was to block the issuance of new permits for high-capacity wells. Kosloff asked for the community to come to a consensus, if possible.
No consensus was evident at that meeting. at least according to the Plainsman Herald report. One speaker said that “without high-capacity wells, there will be no people left in the county.” Tim Hume, who is the region’s representative on the Colorado Ground Water Commission, said that without irrigation, two thirds of the people in the room would not be there. He also noted that one of the 67 monitoring wells had actually shown higher levels in the previous 20 years. But another speaker, Jack Dawson, said to keep irrigation going for quite some time, there was a real need to start conserving water.
With aid of a special $250,000 appropriation by state legislators, the Division of Water Resources commissioned a study by Wilson Water Group and HRS Water Consultants to provide new estimates of how much water remains that can be recovered economically. These consultants are also creating a planning tool to allow groundwater basin users to evaluate future groundwater use scenarios.
At a meeting scheduled for March 16 in Springfield, the consultants hope to glean insight from farmers about what constitutes economically viable extraction. How deep into the Dockum can they go and hope to be able to make money? How much water treatment is required and feasible? The big question is whether new rules will be needed to limit extraction.
Also to be determined are the goals under future conditions. How fast should the groundwater be mined? Or should there be limits beyond those few already in place? The consultants are to submit a final report before the end of 2026.
What comes of this new knowledge? It’s possible — maybe even likely — that some residents of southeastern Colorado will then file a petition with the Colorado Ground Water Commission to adopt new rules restricting extraction. This study sets up the facts for helping make that decision of whether to do so, and if so, how.
The draft study says a range of viewpoints can be expected. Some stakeholders will favor the status quo. Others might favor restricted pumping from specific aquifers or even from new wells, conceivably all wells. Expansion of irrigated acreage cold be curbed — although in some cases land has been taken out of irrigated production already.
Also relevant is the shifting climate. The study mentions climate change just once, noting that hotter or drier conditions may occur in 50 years, affecting crop irrigation requirements. Already, however, the hotter temperatures of southeastern Colorado cause crops to need a third more water than those grown 200 miles north.
The most direct parallel to a ban on new wells in southeastern Colorado would be a similar ban on new wells in the upper Crow Creek drainage northeast of Greeley near the Wyoming border. The alluvial, Fan and White River aquifers within the designated basin were declared over-appropriated effective April 14, 2017.
Hydrogeology of Colorado’s southeastern corner has been studied several times. First was a studyby the U.S. Geological Survey in conjunction with the Colorado Water Conservation Board completed in 1954. It recorded springs and creeks and pumping from wells for house and towns and stock ponds, with some of the records gleaned by New Deal workers in the 1930s. It made no attempt to quantify groundwater storage volume. Aquifer mining was non-existent in that area as high-capacity pumps had been created less than a decade before.
A 1967 study by R.W. Beck and Associates did attempt to quantify the groundwater resources. It estimated that groundwater extraction of 13,200 acre-feet in 1950 had grown by 1964 to 118,700 acre-feet.
The study projected that groundwater extraction in the basin would grow to 276,000 acre-feet by 2017. It is somewhat less. That study also projected that population of Baca County would grow to 4,700 by 2017. Actually, it declined to 3,500.
That study made no mention of the Dockum, the formation now believed to have the most water, based on well logs and other lines of evidence.
That study also recommended creation of a groundwater management district to assist in “development” of the extraction. That district was created.
Southeastern Colorado’s groundwater was also part of a six-state study of the Ogallala Aquifer in 1983.
Most recent were two related reports in 2002 by McLaughlin Water Engineers. This new study differs in a substantial way in that it uses data deeper than the 200 feet of the Dockum and hence increases the volume of water that may potentially be extracted. It also employs newer tools to figure out what exactly is going on down there in the dark, although exactly how much sharper insight this report delivers is not yet clear.
The Division of Water Resources also has conducted three studies in this century that define a steady but not dramatic decline of the aquifers in southeastern Colorado.
Last week, the Colorado River District submitted comments and specific recommendations to the Bureau of Reclamation on the recently released Post-2026 Operational Guidelines and Strategies for Lake Powell and Lake Mead Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS). In its comments, the River District calls for future operational decisions that reflect hydrologic realities, address Lower Basin overuse, and move the Colorado River System beyond constant crisis management.
“A core part of our mission is safeguarding, for all Coloradans, the waters of the Colorado River to which our state is entitled under the various laws, agreements and compacts that govern the river,” said Raquel Flinker, Director of Interstate and Regional Water Resources at the Colorado River District. “Our water users have adapted to the reality of variable hydrology. We are living with a river that has 20% less water and this trend is expected to continue. It is past time that our neighbors in the Lower Basin learn how to live within the means provided by the river.”
“What is very clear in these proposals is that we still have a basic math problem,” said Colorado River District General Manager Andy Mueller. “Every year, around 1.5 million acre feet of Colorado River water disappears due to evaporation and transit loss in the Lower Basin, yet this amount is unaccounted for in the Bureau’s water deliveries. If we want to move out of crisis response mode, every proposal must begin by reducing consumptive use in the Lower Basin by this amount every single year before discussing shortages. If we had fixed the math to align with the laws of nature twenty-five years ago, we would have almost 30-million-acre feet of storage still available in the system today.”
The River District’s letter includes 13 specific recommendations organized around several key themes. First, it calls for post-2026 operations that align demand with available supply and put hydrologic reality, not predictability for the Lower Basin, at the center of decision-making. The River District urges Reclamation to evaluate alternatives that perform under critically dry hydrology, provide a fair, transparent analysis of actions and impacts, and clearly disclose Upper Basin shortage risks in the main body of the analysis.
The letter also stresses that Lower Basin use must be reduced by roughly 1.5 million acre-feet at all times, defined as system losses rather than “shortage,” and that Upper Basin conservation assumptions and scale must be re-evaluated. In addition, the River District calls for clear, durable guidelines and definitions, including fully defining and analyzing “gap water” and “additional Upper Basin actions,” and for CRSP initial unit water to remain in Lake Powell. Finally, it raises Law of the River concerns, including that inter-basin transactions must not be allowed.
The River District’s full comment letter is available here:
Reclamation formally published the DEIS on January 16, 2026, opening a 45-day public comment period. The Bureau of Reclamation must consider public feedback when developing a preferred alternative for management of the system, and the basin states will continue their negotiations alongside this process with the hope of reaching a seven-state consensus. The current guidelines expire at the end of September 2026.
Back in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when I lived in Silverton, Colorado, elevation 9,318 feet, we often experienced a “January thaw.” It was a period of a few sunny, warm days between storms that usually fell in January but could also occur in February. If you could find a south-facing deck that was protected from the wind and free of dangling, skull-piercing icicles, you could sit out in shirtsleeves, soak up some vitamin D, and maybe even get a little bit of a suntan. Then winter, below zero temperatures, and super snowy San Juaners would return, finally and grudgingly departing sometime in late May.
A pretty big swath of the Southwest is about to experience a February thaw of its own, according to National Weather Service forecasts, including in these hot spots:
Phoenix’s mercury could climb into the low- to mid-90s this weekend [February 28 – March 1, 2026], with overnight lows in the 60s.
Durango, Colorado, is expecting to hit 66° F on Sunday (with lows staying above freezing).
It will be prime bike-riding weather in Moab, where the highs could climb into the low 70s.
And even Silverton will get up into the 50s, with the overnight lows dipping only a few degrees below freezing — bad news for the snow.
Denver is under a red flag warning for fire danger today, and will see temperatures in the high 60s.
During a “normal” winter, this wouldn’t be alarming in the slightest. In fact, it would be a welcome respite from winter. Now it threatens to wipe out any indication that it even is winter by potentially erasing the snowpack gained during last week’s storms. The Upper Colorado River Basin’s snowpack is exactly at the same level as it was on this date in 2002. Ohhh boy, if those March storms don’t arrive it’s going to be a long, dry summer.
As a deal between the seven Colorado states for how to divvy up massive consumption cuts seems less and less likely, Arizona is getting a bit more aggressive.This week the Protecting Arizona’s Lifeline Coalition launched a PR campaign, complete with videos, attempting to pressure the Upper Basin states to let more water flow downstream to its Lower Basin neighbors.
Arizona is understandably worried: The Central Arizona Project’s water rights are junior to most of the other large users in the Lower Basin, meaning they would be among the first to take cuts if there were a shortage. The window for a dramatic improvement in Upper Basin snowpack is rapidly closing, thereby increasing the likelihood of a shortage later this year.
The campaign includes a series of videos with various officials making their case. There are also a few educational ones that do a nice job of explaining the Colorado River Compact, and are really worth a watch. However, I should warn you that they are coming from a Lower Basin perspective, meaning they interpret one clause of the Compact, Article III(d), significantly differently than the Upper Basin states. And yet, that’s what their entire argument relies on.
That clause states that the Upper Basin must “not cause the flow of the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75 million acre-feet” for any 10-year period.
The Upper Basin sees this as a “non-depletion obligation,” meaning it blocks them from exceeding their 7.5 MAF/year allocation if it causes the Lee Ferry flow to fall below a 7.5 MAF/year average. The Lower Basin sees it as a “minimum delivery obligation,” meaning that the Upper Basin is obliged to send an average of 7.5 MAF past Lee Ferry no matter what, even if that means draining all of its reservoirs and drying out its fields and cities.
In a comment on Tuesday’s dispatch, reader Steve Harris suggested a story on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection fast-tracking a 200-mile segment of border wall through Big Bend National Park.
This is a super important issue. And it’s not only in Big Bend: The entire border wall is an environmental disaster, slashing through biologically diverse, beautiful country and cutting off migratory routes and movement for mountain lions, javelina, coyotes, ocelot, deer, desert bighorns, and even jaguars. Keep in mind that it’s not just a fence, it’s a giant piece of infrastructure that requires bulldozing all the vegetation and even blasting through the landscape. Besides that, we taxpayers are forking out billions of dollars for something that isn’t all that great at doing what it’s supposed to do.
For me it’s especially heartbreaking to see the wall cut through the borderlands south of Tucson, down in the Patagonia Mountains. Many years ago my dad took my brother and I along some little road through there right up against the border, which at the time was just a barbed wire fence. It was incredible country, so quiet and mostly humanity-free.
The stakes are equally as high in the Big Bend area, where both ecological and cultural treasures are at risk. Unfortunately I’ve never been to Big Bend, and it’s a little ways outside the region I normally cover, so I’m not going to try to pretend to know what’s going on there. But a lot of other smart folks have written about it and are trying to block the new stretch of wall, so I’ll share some of that here:
Border Patrol map of existing, planned, and awarded segments of wall, including the stretch through Big Bend — which consists of about 100 miles of actual physical wall plus segments of “detection technology” in the most rugged areas.
The Texas Observer has a good story on the wall plans and the way the “Big Beautiful Bill” not only allocates $46.5 billion to build the monstrosity, but also erased existing protections for some areas.
Environmental groups and environmentally-oriented media outlets are making a pretty big stink over the confirmation hearings for Steve Pearce, Trump’s pick to lead the Bureau of Land Management. There’s a good reason for this: Pearce is well known for his hostility toward the BLM and the public lands it oversees, and he has also indicated a desire to sell off public land — a stance he failed to renounce during this week’s hearings.
Pearce is a bad choice for this job. But is it worth spending a lot of resources to get him ousted? Probably not.
If the Senate does not confirm Pearce, then the administration will just find some other bozo to do the job, which in this case is basically a middle manager tasked with carrying out the agenda of Interior Secretary Doug Burgum. Burgum, in turn, is merely executing the Trump administration’s, i.e. Project 2025, policies.
Which I have to say is disappointing and sad. Before he was a cabinet member, Burgum seemed like a reasonable enough guy. Sure he has ties to oil and gas interests, but he also appeared to be a Teddy Roosevelt Republican — an old school conservative and conservationist who valued public lands. He even managed to garner the endorsement of outdoor retailer REI’s board along with that of the hook and bullet crowd.
Instead, he has prostrated himself to the extractive industries, embraced coal mining and oil and gas drilling, and shattered environmental protections for public lands left and right. His distinguishing features as a cabinet member have been his unwavering sneer-like grin and his tendency to fawn over Trump — and coal.
***
Your energy and outrage might be better spent on convincing Congress to shoot down Sen. Mike Lee’s, R-Utah, attempt to use the Congressional Review Act to revoke the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument management plan. If the “resolution of disapproval” passes both chambers of Congress with a simple majority vote, it would erase the plan and bar the Bureau of Land Management from issuing another plan that is “substantially the same” in the future.
Republicans in the current Congress used the CRA — which allows Congress to revoke recently implemented administrative rules — to do away with resource management plans in Alaska, Montana, and North Dakota. That’s in spite of the fact that RMPs are not considered “rules,” according to a January 2025 opinion by the Interior Department’s Solicitor. National monument management plans aren’t rules, either, but that’s not a hindrance for Lee.
This wouldn’t change the boundaries of the monument, but would likely cause management of the area to revert back to the 2020, Trump I-era plan. That plan was not only less protective than the newer one, but only applied to a much smaller area, since in 2017 Trump had significantly shrunk the national monument. Revoking the current management plan, then, would leave vast areas of the monument in a sort of management limbo.
It would also open the door to revoking other national monument management plans (e.g. Bears Ears), allowing the GOP to carry out Project 2025’s goal of shrinking or eliminating national monuments in a less visible, more underhanded manner.
Just a couple reminders from a few years ago that it does snow, and it will snow again — just maybe not this spring. Jonathan P. Thompson photos.
State Highway 133 crosses the Crystal River several times as it flows downstream to its confluence with the Roaring Fork River in Carbondale. Some proponents of a federal Wild & Scenic designation are pushing for a quick timeline while others want a more cautious approach. CREDIT: HEATHER SACKETT/ASPEN JOURNALISM
Colorado lawmakers are asking themselves: Can they bring more data centers to the state while ensuring the power-hungry facilities don’t burden ratepayers and the environment? Dueling bills in the legislature both claim to have the answer. One would push Colorado to join the ranks of many other states that offer tax breaks to incentivize data centers — the backbone of today’s technology landscape. The other would impose more stringent regulations on the industry to protect consumers and the environment from potential harm. As the debate unfolds, some Western Slope leaders are raising concerns over what the push for data centers could mean for their communities’ most valuable resource — water…
Researchers say a large-scale data center can use up to 5 million gallons of water per day to cool down its systems. That’s enough water to serve a town of between 10,000 and 50,000 people daily, according to reporting by the Washington Post. If Colorado chooses to entice more of the thirsty facilities to set up shop, largely in metro areas, Western Slope leaders say that could mean more water being diverted from mountain communities in an era of severe drought…“We’ve struggled for a couple generations with the water of the Western Slope, which is where the water is in Colorado, moving eastward,” said Eagle County Commissioner Matt Scherr. “This is setting up even more fights with our Front Range friends than I think is necessary.”
Colorado River “Beginnings” where the snow accumulates. Photo: Brent Gardner-Smith/Aspen Journalism
Click the link to read the article on the InkStain website (John Fleck):
February 27, 2026
It is hard to know where to begin. The Department of the Interior’s Post-2026 Colorado River draft environmental impact statement, and the deep questions it raises, is an “everything including the kitchen sink” sort of process.
But at its root, the question it raises is simple: Tell us what you’re going to do.
It is easiest to quote the Draft EIS itself on the central question: “In critically dry periods, all alternatives have unacceptable performance.” Roger that. Tell us what you’re going to do.
In the short run, with a meager snowpack and no clear explanation of how federal and state managers are going to operate the reservoir system, the basin’s dams and diversions now, we have no clear picture of what will happen in 2026. Tell us what you’re going to do.
Some specifics
The ad-hoc collective that Allen Best dubbed “the Traveling Wilburys of the Colorado River” – Anne Castle, Eric Kuhn, Jack Schmidt, Kathryn Sorensen, Rin Tara, and me – took yet another stab at offering our suggestions in comments we submitted yesterday to Interior’s P26 EIS process.
I’ve been mentally largely elsewhere lately, finishing up the book and managing my health (I’m doing great! Thanks for asking!), so I mostly show up at the last minute on these things to dub my vocals, but my friends are very kind and inclusive, and they do good work. In particular, stuff like this full of both useful NEPA-speak and also substance:
As I said: Tell us what you’re going to do.
As I said: Tell us what you’re going to do.
This one’s on you, Secretary Burgum. We do offer suggestions, but if you don’t like ours, then tell us your alternative: Tell us what you’re going to do.
This one has seemed for a long time like a no-brainer to me:
Really?
This one’s on my Upper Basin leaders: Really?
Again, Secretary Burgum: Tell us what you’re going to do.
The colossal failure of the Colorado River Basin leadership is on display in this simple sentence from the draft EIS: “In critically dry periods, all alternatives have unacceptable performance.” [ed. emphasis mine]
You’ve spent the last few years telling us what you can’t do. It’s on you now: Tell us what you’re going to do.
(Lots more in the full comments, it’s a useful primer on the current state of play.)
Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0
Evening light hits the bluffs above the Green River at Fontenelle Reservoir in June 2021. (Ryan Dorgan/WyoFile)
Click the link to read the article on the WyoFile website (Dustin Bleizeffer):
February 18, 2026
Historically bad snow and water conditions raise stakes for Colorado River basin states as feds prepare to intervene.
Wyoming water officials are desperately hoping to avoid a federal intervention into the high-stakes deadlock among Colorado River stakeholders seeking a compromise on shared water appropriation cuts.
Wyoming and the six other Colorado River basin states blew through another deadline Saturday to come to an agreement, raising the possibility that the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation will dictate a new drought response plan — a situation that could dash cooperation and spawn intense legal entanglements, observers say.
Making matters worse is an intense “snow drought” so far this winter that’s compounding a “mega drought” across much of the seven-state basin region that’s lingered for more than two decades. It’s so dry that federal water managers warn Lake Powell — for the first time in 63 years — could drop 50 feet, low enough to no longer produce hydroelectric power at the Glen Canyon dam, according to the Bureau’s latest projections.
The intense situation was a topic of discussion Tuesday as a legislative committee considered a bill — Senate File 84, “Voluntary water conservation program.” The Wyoming State Engineer’s Office hopes it will give the state some negotiating leverage and protection over the state’s share of Colorado River-bound water.
Jim Magagna, the executive vice president of the Wyoming Stock Growers Association, speaks at a September 2025 Wyoming Game and Fish Commission meeting in Lander. (Mike Koshmrl/WyoFile)
“Our governor traveled back and met with other governors in D.C. and gave a somewhat favorable report,” Wyoming Stock Growers Association Executive Vice President Jim Magagna told the Senate Agriculture, State and Public Lands and Water Resources Committee. “The day after that, the state engineer in Arizona announced that they’re willing to go to court and fight to the death to get the water they think they’re entitled to from the upper basin, [which includes Wyoming].
“I would love to be able to sit here and tell you this is totally unnecessary,” Magagna said, adding he’s in favor of the bill. “Unfortunately, the scenario we’re facing in the Colorado River today is that we do believe that the state needs to show some good faith in attempting to address some of those water issues.”
The committee also heard from representatives of Wyoming’s prolific trona and soda ash producers, who rely on water that is subject to the Colorado River Compact.
“We have 2,300 employees at risk in southwest Wyoming if we don’t find a solution,” Jody Levin told the committee, speaking on behalf of the trona industry and the Wyoming Mining Association.
Divvying up shrinking water
Water forecasts were already so dire in January that the Wyoming State Engineer’s Office warned that Colorado River water managers will likely call for a significant drawdown of Flaming Gorge Reservoir this spring. The reservoir, straddling the Wyoming-Utah border, is one of the primary backups in the upper Colorado River system to ensure operational water levels at Lake Powell.
Flaming Gorge’s function as a backup is merely one piece of a complex Drought Response Operations Agreement among Colorado River stakeholders, and it expires later this year. Renewing the DROA, along with other binding agreements that dictate appropriations throughout the river system, requires determining how to share a shrinking water resource that serves 40 million people from the Cowboy State to Mexico. Though Wyoming and other Colorado River stakeholders say they prefer their own compromise over a federal one, they have yet to strike a deal — despite years of negotiations.
The Bureau of Reclamation in January published its own draft environmental impact statement for a new plan, and last week the agency hinted that time is running out for a compromise among states.
The Blacks Fork, a tributary to the Green River, near its confluence at Flaming Gorge Reservoir in May 2018. (Ryan Dorgan/WyoFile)
“The basin’s poor hydrologic outlook highlights the necessity for collaboration as the Basin States, in collaboration with Reclamation, work on developing the next set of operating guidelines for the Colorado River system,” Acting Bureau of Reclamation Commissioner Scott Cameron said in a prepared statement Friday.
Gov. Mark Gordon, along with fellow Colorado River upper basin states’ Govs. Jared Polis, Michelle Lujan Grisham and Spencer Cox, issued a joint statement Friday ahead of the unmet deadline.
“Upper basin water users live within the means of the river by adapting our uses every year based on available supplies,” the governors said. “We continue pursuing a seven-state consensus, which would provide greater opportunity to pursue federal funding supporting conservation efforts and innovative water-saving technologies across the basin.”
The Platte River is formed in western Nebraska east of the city of North Platte, Nebraska by the confluence of the North Platte and the South Platte Rivers, which both arise from snowmelt in the eastern Rockies east of the Continental Divide. Map via Wikimedia.
Though not part of the Colorado River system, the North Platte River, stretching from south-central to eastern Wyoming, is also parched. The State Engineer’s Office issued a “priority administration” order earlier this month, requiring junior rights water holders along the river system to immediately cease diverting water. The order could remain in effect through April.
Water conservation bill
Senate File 84 cleared the Senate Agriculture Committee Tuesday [February 17, 2026] unanimously, with strong support from stakeholders beholden to the Colorado River Compact and some doubters.
It would enshrine a water conservation strategy that’s already been tested for several years in the state. It would allow ranchers and other Colorado River system users in Wyoming to voluntarily use less water without losing their appropriation rights, according to the bill.
“It helps avoid mandatory and uncompensated water use reductions, whether by court order or curtailment, to satisfy compact obligations,” State Engineer Brandon Gebhart said. “It provides a tool for Wyoming to be part of a compromise to address historic drought that has plagued the Colorado River Basin for the last 25 years.”
Kemmerer Republican Sen. Laura Pearson said she has doubts about the practical water conservation claims related to the strategy. For instance, if an irrigator foregoes flooding a field and allows their water to stay in the stream, that means less recharge for aquifers.
Welcome to the Landline, a monthly newsletter from High Country News about land, water, wildlife, climate and conservation in the Western United States. Screenshot from the High Country News website.
This is an installment of the Landline, a monthly newsletter from High Country News about land, water, wildlife, climate and conservation in the Western United States. Sign up to get it in your inbox.
When I was growing up in southwestern Colorado along the banks of a tributary to a Colorado River tributary, I was immersed not only in the quirks of water law, but also in Western water culture — the peculiar mores and customs that come from constantly looming scarcity. One oft-repeated maxim, usually used to justify building a new dam or encouraging inefficient irrigation practices, was: If we don’t use the water, it will just flow downstream to California — where it would presumably be used to water golf courses, fill LA’s swimming pools and serve other nefarious West Coast purposes.
I’m sure the idea arose partly from the animosity — and envy — the Interior West has long harbored toward its largest and wealthiest coastal neighbor. But I also think it comes from our idiosyncratic laws governing water use and the way they pit the headwaters communities against their downstream neighbors.
Whatever its origin, the sentiment endures and in fact has only grown stronger as the river and its reservoirs reach critically diminished levels, while the seven states that rely on them fail to agree on how to manage the issue going forward. Maybe the maxim needs an update. The big question today is: How much of the Colorado River’s water should be allowed to flow downstream to California, Arizona and Nevada?
How did we get here?
Western water law is based on the prior appropriation doctrine, which gives the first entity to make “beneficial use” of water the right to keep on using that amount, even if that means that upstream “junior” users’ spigots will get shut off. By the early 1900s, a rapidly growing California was enthusiastically diverting the Colorado River, with huge irrigation districts gobbling up the senior water rights. Less-populous Colorado, Wyoming and Utah were forced to watch in increasing dismay as downstream users gained control over larger and larger shares of “their” river.
Upper Basin States vs. Lower Basin circa 1925 via CSU Water Resources Archives
To appease these headwaters states — and to garner their support for huge dams and other water projects on the lower river — the seven Colorado River Basin states hammered out the Colorado River Compact of 1922. It divided the states into an Upper Basin (Colorado, Wyoming, Utah and New Mexico) and a Lower Basin (Arizona, California and Nevada), with the dividing line at Lees Ferry, Arizona. It aimed to share the river’s water equally between them, giving each basin the exclusive use of 7.5 million acre-feet (MAF) of water per year.
Climate change causes turbulence
The compact was far from perfect, but the concept of dividing the water equally generally held up, even if the reality didn’t always follow suit: The Upper Basin states have always used far less than their allotted amount (around 4 MAF), while the Lower Basin for years has consumed far more than its share (as much as 11 million MAF). That wasn’t a problem as long as the river had enough water to go around. But for the last 26 years, it hasn’t.
Udall/Overpeck 4-panel Figure Colorado River temperature/precipitation/natural flows with trend. Lake Mead and Lake Powell storage. Updated through Water Year 2025. Note the tiny points on the annual data so that you can flyspeck the individual years. Credit: Brad Udall
Since around the turn of the century, warming temperatures and abnormally dry years have severely diminished the headwaters states’ snowpack, thereby shrinking the river. The annual “natural flow” at Lees Ferry, or the estimated amount of water the river would hold without any upstream diversions or human consumption, has been about 12 MAF on average since 2000, dropping below 6 MAF in 2002, or just over half of what the Lower Basin alone consumed at the time.
The meager flows simply do not jibe with the numbers in the compact. And that makes it virtually impossible for the Upper Basin to comply with the compact’s “non-depletion clause,” which dictates that the Upper Basin “will not cause the flow of the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75,000,000 acre feet for any period of ten consecutive years.” There are different interpretations of this provision, but it appears to say the Upper Basin states has no option but to allow the water to flow down to California — even if it means they come up short themselves.
The back of Glen Canyon Dam circa 1964, not long after the reservoir had begun filling up. Here the water level is above dead pool, meaning water can be released via the river outlets, but it is below minimum power pool, so water cannot yet enter the penstocks to generate electricity. Bureau of Reclamation photo. Annotations: Jonathan P. Thompson
Glen Canyon Dam and Lake Powell were supposed to make things easier by acting as an Upper Basin savings account that could be drawn from during dry years. But withdrawals have greatly exceeded deposits more often than not in recent decades, leaving Lake Powell at about one-third of its full storage capacity and bringing its surface level critically close to hitting minimum power pool, the point at which water can no longer be released through the hydroelectric turbines.
When this happens — possibly as early as this fall, according to current federal forecasts — the dam will stop generating hydropower for Southwestern utilities. It will also force all releases to go through the outlets lower in the dam, which were not engineered for such sustained use. This would compromise the outlets and possibly the dam itself, and Bureau of Reclamation engineers have strongly warned against it, meaning that minimum power pool becomes the de facto deadpool.
If current climate trends continue, the only way to avoid reaching minimum power pool — aside from re-engineering the dam on a very short timeframe — is either to substantially increase flows into Lake Powell by curtailing Upper Basin water use and draining upstream reservoirs, or else significantly reduce releases from Glen Canyon Dam, forcing the Lower Basin — and the river through the Grand Canyon and its endangered native fish — to take major cuts.
On a day in late May [2022] when wildfire smoke obscured the throat of an ancient volcano called Shiprock in the distance, I visited the Ute Mountain Ute farming and ranching operation in the southwestern corner of Colorado. Photo credit: Allen Best/Big Pivots
The solution is simple; consensus is not
In 2022, the Interior Department told the seven states to broker a plan to balance demand with diminishing supplies by cutting overall consumptive use by 2 million to 4 million acre-feet per year. So far, however, the states have failed to reach consensus.
The Lower Basin states, which have maxed out their allotment and then some, have taken some cuts already and have agreed to accept more, if the Upper Basin agrees to mandatory, verifiable cuts of its own. Meanwhile, the Lower Basin wants to see some version of the non-depletion provision remain in place.
Upper Basin negotiators argue that they haven’t even come close to using all of the water they’re entitled to, and besides, they don’t use nearly as much as the Lower Basin does anyway. So why should they be forced to reduce even more? Furthermore, Upper Basin water users, especially those with junior water rights, are already struggling with drastic reductions during dry years because the region lacks large reservoirs for storing water, meaning their water use is dictated by the rivers’ flows. In 2021, for example, many southwestern Colorado farms had their ditches cut off as early as June, forcing them to sit the season out, while the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe received only about 10% of its allocation.
It’s also simpler logistically to reduce consumption in the Lower Basin, where huge water users are served by a handful of very large diversions, such as the Central Arizona Project canal, which carries water to Phoenix and Tucson; the All-American Canal, which serves the Imperial Irrigation District (and its gigantic alfalfa fields) — the largest single water user on the entire river — and the California Aqueduct, which serves Los Angeles and other cities, all of which are fed by Lake Mead and other reservoirs. The Upper Basin, on the other hand, pulls water from the river and its tributaries via hundreds of much smaller diversions. Achieving meaningful cuts would require shutting off thousands of irrigation ditches to thousands of small water users under uncertain authority.
The Upper Basin negotiators have suggested a “supply driven” plan that would base releases from Lake Powell on the amount of water in the river and the reservoir, thereby honoring the spirit — if not the actual figures — of the Colorado River Compact. While Lower Basin negotiators have expressed interest in the idea, the two sides have yet to agree on details, such as the percentage of flows that would be released or whether a non-depletion minimum-flow requirement would remain in place.
Deadpool doesn’t care about deals or deadlines
In the end, the river basin’s climate and hydrology are likely to decide the issue. As Lake Powell inevitably sinks this summer, the BuRec will probably drain upstream reservoirs — Flaming Gorge, Blue Mesa and Navajo — to delay its decline. But when the reservoir drops to minimum power pool, dam operators must decide whether to release water through the river outlets and hope they don’t fail, or else shift Glen Canyon Dam to a “run-of-the-river” operation, which would keep the reservoir level from falling further by making releases equal to reservoir inflows minus evaporation and seepage. The relatively scant outflows from the dam would cause Lake Mead’s levels to plummet, forcing the Lower Basin states to accept potentially calamitous cuts. The Central Arizona Project, one of the basin’s most junior rights holders, would almost certainly lose some of its water, imperiling all the cities and farms that rely on it.
If the diminished releases were to persist for several months or more, it would likely put the Upper Basin in violation of the non-depletion clause, triggering litigation from downstream users, and throwing the entire watershed back in time to the anxious and combative pre-compact days.
The end of a boat ramp in Antelope Canyon was high above the water of Lake Powell in May 2022, Photo/Allen Best
I used to wonder why folks worried so about Colorado’s water running downstream to California, as if letting it go were some sort of sin. I can understand not wanting to lose the water that originates in your state, but to prefer wasting it or locking it up in reservoirs to sharing it didn’t seem right. After all, every drop that Colorado sends to California and Arizona is another drop that stays in the river for that much longer, benefiting fish and the other critters and boaters that rely on its waters.
I suspect that the most egregious flaw of the Colorado River Compact wasn’t that it overestimated the amount of water in the river, but that it pitted one group of states, tribes and other water users against another, rather than creating a framework in which they could all work together for the benefit of the entire watershed. Maybe it’s time to scrap the compact altogether and, while we’re at it, do away with the whole prior appropriations doctrine on the Colorado River — starting over again from scratch, in other words.
After all, as the climate keeps getting warmer and drier, there will be less and less water to argue about. If there’s nothing left to send downstream, the Colorado River Compact will soon be worth less than the paper it’s printed on.
The Colorado River Compact, signed in 1922. Public domain
Spud Valley Energy Center’ would be built on 2,578 acres near Mosca and Hooper; it would ultimately develop 600 megawatts of solar energy and 600 megawatts of battery storage.
‘Spud Valley Energy Center’ would be the largest ever conceived for the Valley, and one of Colorado’s biggest solar projects, at a time when ag producers are being forced to reduce their footprint to save on the water
It is an agricultural corridor in Alamosa County that is drying faster and seeing more buy-and-dry deals than other parts of the San Luis Valley due to the scarcity of water from the Upper Rio Grande Basin.
On 2,578 acres of private land off State Highway 17 leading into Mosca and Hooper, a number of families are entering into contracts with NextEra Energy and its bid to ultimately develop 600 megawatts of solar energy and 600 megawatts of battery storage on the fields that once grew crops.
The solar project, dubbed the “Spud Valley Energy Center,” is the largest ever conceived for the Valley and one of Colorado’s biggest. It comes at a time when ag producers in Subdistrict 1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District are being forced to reduce their footprint to save on the water. Solar development then, in a Valley plentiful with sunshine, becomes an alternative for the land and a company like NextEra Energy has the means to make it happen.
“A number of the landowners we’re working with have already either retired their wells or they’re participating in CREP (Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program) to rest their lands for longterm,” said Evan Reimondo, the project manager, in an interview with Alamosa Citizen.
Spud Valley is perfectly sited when you consider the other solar development already in the corridor, the Public Service Co. substation near the project site, the water conservation subdistrict it is in, and Alamosa County’s own interests for solar development through its 1041 permit process.
A different solar development proposal — Korsail Energy’s Cornflower Solar project — had its permit application denied by the county commissioners last year after it met a headwind of resistance from locals concerned about the location of the project that was within a migratory range of sensitive wildlife areas in west Alamosa County.
Korsail was seeking to build 90 megawatts of solar and 80 megawatts of battery storage on 986 acres, but was doomed because of the location it selected. NextEra Energy’s Spud Valley doesn’t seem to carry that burden with its location, and at 600 megawatts puts the Valley on the map for solar generation to support Colorado’s goal of a state power grid built on 80 percent renewable energy by 2030.
“Colorado’s demand for electricity is going to keep growing as the population grows and technology develops and all of those things,” said Reimondo, Spud Valley’s project manager. “So we’re preparing for the future when we over-permit. By permitting for 600, it gives us that future flexibility.”
The plan is to build an initial 200 megawatts of solar and 200 megawatts of battery storage, and then stage to 600 megawatts of each from there. The transmission bottleneck — bringing power in and out of San Luis Valley — presents the biggest challenge.
“As the grid is built out, as network upgrades are completed in the future, new (transmission) lines are built, and we’ll be ready to take advantage of that,” Reimondo says.
Alamosa County is currently reviewing NextEra Energy’s 1041 permit application and eventually will hold public hearings at the county planning level and then before the county commissioners.
Reimondo says the company hopes to begin construction in 2027, with the first 200 megawatts of solar and battery storage built and tied into the neighboring Public Service Co. substation by the end of 2029.
Juniata Reservoir, located near Grand Mesa, is where the city of Grand Junction stores water coming off Grand Mesa in the Kannah Creek watershed. That water flows down Kannah Creek and eventually into the taps of Grand Junction residents. Photo courtesy of City of Grand Junction
The City of Grand Junction is planning to fully drain Juniata Reservoir, one of two reservoirs that store the city’s water coming off Grand Mesa, later this year, after a leak was discovered during a routine inspection that will require a multi-year effort to fix. During an inspection, a crack in the outlet structure pipe that allows water to leak into the pipe going through the dam was discovered, according to the City of Grand Junction. Grand Junction Utilities Director Randi Kim said the crack and the slow seepage of water was discovered over the last few years and has been monitored by the city. The most recent inspection happened over the summer, she said.
“There’s a crack in the outlet pipe on the interior of the dam, and then that’s leaking along the pipeline, to the exterior,” Kim said. “Right now, there’s no concern about dam safety at present.”
Kim said the project is budgeted in the city’s long-term capital plan for just under $1.6 million. Construction will take place in 2027 and fully replace and upgrade the outlet pipe.
“We’re going to be replacing that whole outlet structure and providing a new valve system and all of the apparatuses that go along with that outlet structure,” Kim said.
The city has worked with an engineer to determine if the cracked pipe could be replaced without draining the reservoir, Kim said. However, the State of Colorado is requiring the city to fully drain the reservoir to “ensure the structural integrity of the dam can be properly addressed.”
Water inflow to Juniata Reservoir will be shut off beginning this November and is expected to be fully drained by September 2027, according to the city. Kim said the city is working with Clifton Water to provide it with raw water during the draw down to still utilize the water. Clifton will be able to help backfill the reservoir as it refills after the project is completed, she said…Kim said the city is also looking into potentially leasing some of the water during the reservoir’s draw down to agricultural users who may also be able to utilize it. Any un-utilized water from Juniata will be stored at the Purdy Mesa Reservoir, she said. During the drawdown and construction, Kim said the city will still be able to utilize Kannah Creek for its water needs. The city has 17 reservoirs on the Grand Mesa, which flow down Kannah Creek and provide water to the city.
“We have direct flow rights off of Kannah Creek,” Kim said. “So we can continue to divert our direct flow rights from the Kannah Creek to our water treatment plant.”
Grand Junction back in the day with the Grand Mesa in background
A new global water report offers a framework for understanding risk, resilience, and why protecting streamflow is critical now more than ever.
Water management has long depended on the assumption that systems will rebound after stress. New research suggests that, in some places, recovery may no longer be guaranteed and that risk may now be accumulating faster than it can be relieved.
A recent report from the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health introduces a term for this emerging condition: water bankruptcy. The report argues that many human–water systems are now living beyond their hydrological means. We are drawing not only on the water that is replenished each year through snowpack and rainfall, but also borrowing against long-term ‘savings’ stored in aquifers, glaciers, wetlands, soils, and river ecosystems. Over time, that continual drawdown does more than strain sustainability. It degrades the natural capital that makes water available and stabilizes the hydrologic cycle.
The Arkansas River, near Salida, CO. Credit: Ken Lund
When Recovery Can No Longer Be Assumed
Unlike stress or crisis, which assume eventual recovery, water bankruptcy describes a system that has moved beyond short-term disruption into a condition where loss accumulates faster than it can be repaired.
According to the report, the defining features of water bankruptcy are insolvency and irreversibility. Insolvency describes a condition in which a system can continue to function only by drawing down its remaining assets, rather than living within what can be replenished. Irreversibility refers to the loss of natural capital that cannot be fully restored within realistic planning horizons, even if conditions later improve.
A simple illustration of water income and water expenses in a human–water system. Water bankruptcy is the outcome of both insolvency and irreversibility conditions, i.e., when water use (expenditure) exceeds water supply (renewable and non-renewable assets) for an extended period resulting in irreparable damages to the underlying natural capital that contributes to water production and stability of the hydrological cycle.
Implicit in this framing is an important insight: water systems falter not only when too much is withdrawn, but when patterns of use become misaligned with the processes that renew and sustain them. When water is consistently removed without regard to its timing, location, or ecological role, the system’s ability to regenerate weakens. The system-scale consequences often appear as instability, loss of function, and shrinking margins for recovery, rather than as immediate shortage. And those consequences affect more than just natural systems; they increase risk for everyone who depends on them.
Colorado Through the Lens of Water Bankruptcy
Across the state, many rivers now experience earlier runoff, longer low-flow seasons, and reduced resilience. In some reaches, the question is no longer whether the river will be stressed in a given year, but whether it will even have enough functional flow, at the right times, to sustain the processes that keep it a river rather than just a delivery canal for downstream consumption.
One of the report’s most useful contributions (and one that might resonate in Colorado) is its emphasis that water availability is not just a quantity problem, but a problem of depleted natural capital. This refers to the physical and ecological conditions that allow water systems to function, replenish, and recover over time. Rivers, aquifers, and ecosystems are not simply “external” values weighed against human needs; they are part of the underlying system that sustains reliable supply. When a river’s ability to do its ecological work is degraded year after year, the system’s capacity to recover shrinks, and management options shrink with
In that sense, building resilience into our rivers is a form of system-wide risk management. Streamflow protection creates margin—margin for drought, future pressure, and operational uncertainty—by helping rivers retain enough function to recover through dry periods. Seen this way, adding water to streams is not just an ecological goal but a practical investment in long-term system reliability; it treats rivers as essential natural infrastructure rather than as luxuries. Streamflow protection is capital preservation that helps rivers absorb future stress, recover more quickly, and retain the capacity to respond when conditions change. In a system where recovery can no longer be assumed, that margin is essential. Moreover, protecting streamflow today helps preserve the system’s ability to serve future beneficiaries, not just current ones.
The case for streamflow is often strongest when supply is tight. The costs of losing river function are rarely evenly distributed, and they tend to show up first where flexibility is lowest: among junior users, smaller operators, and rural communities with fewer alternatives. Once function is lost, recovery is uncertain, even if water returns later. Supporting streamflow during critical periods can therefore reduce the need for more disruptive and costly interventions later, helping scarcity be managed through foresight rather than crisis.
A view of Willow Creek, a Tributary of the Rio Grande, in Creede, Colorado. The creek is channelized and flows through the central part of town. Credit: Jeffrey Beall
Helping Rivers Helps Us All
This is where the Colorado Water Trust’s work fits. For more than two decades, the Water Trust has worked within Colorado’s prior appropriation system to restore and protect streamflow through voluntary, compensated, and collaborative agreements with water users. The aim is not to recreate historical conditions wholesale. Instead, projects are designed to support rivers through critical periods by adding flow where and when it can help streams move through their natural cycle, maintain function during vulnerable seasons, and reduce the risk of long-term system failure.
On the Upper Colorado River, for example, the Water Trust has partnered with agricultural producers and reservoir operators to temporarily reduce diversions or strategically release stored water during late summer and early fall, when stress is highest and recovery windows are narrowest. These agreements do not resolve long-term imbalances in the watershed. What they do is slow the loss of system capacity. They help the river retain enough function to buffer key habitat, move sediment, regulate temperature, and remain connected through critical reaches.
Seen through the lens of water bankruptcy, this work more closely resembles debt management than debt elimination. It helps preserve the natural capital that remains, keeping options open and reducing the risk that today’s imbalances become tomorrow’s irreversible losses.
The Animas River in early fall, flowing from the mountains, past Durango, and beyond. Credit: Mike McBey
Streamflow restoration is not a substitute for hard conversations about demand, growth, or allocation. It is a complementary tool for managing risk in the meantime. The point here is not to fatalistically diagnose Colorado’s water system as “bankrupt,” but to ask whether the conditions the report describes are becoming more familiar—and what that implies for how we think about risk, resilience, and responsibility in a future where recovery can no longer be assumed. If rivers and snowpack are the foundations of our water system, then maintaining their ability to function is not a luxury. It is a prerequisite for long-term success.
The report itself emphasizes that responding to water bankruptcy requires more than finding new supplies or engineering around scarcity. It calls for protecting and restoring the natural systems that underpin water availability, managing within ecological limits, and prioritizing actions that preserve long-term system function. In that sense, the most effective responses are those that stabilize capacity before losses become irreversible. For Colorado, that insight reinforces the importance of streamflow protection as a practical resilience strategy, and it’s one that helps maintain the functional integrity of rivers even as pressures increase.
For the Colorado Water Trust, that is the core takeaway. Streamflow restoration and protection are not just about helping rivers survive. They are about building the buffers that make Colorado’s entire water system more resilient and more secure.
By prudently “re-investing” today’s water back into the stream, we can help ensure that future Coloradans will inherit capacity. Not crisis.
EPA asks federal court to pause part of its regulations for PFAS in drinking water.
EPA also says it will uphold Biden-era lead pipe replacement requirements.
DOE once again orders a Michigan coal plant to continue operating.
Congress will hold hearings this week on safe drinking water, water-related legislation, and an Army Corps authorization bill.
U.S. Supreme Court will hold oral arguments this week for the Line 5 oil pipeline case.
EPA seeks comments on ways to reduce regulatory burden for hazardous substance spill response plans.
FEMA continues to be slow in approving disaster declarations in Democratic-led states.
And lastly, the White House promotes domestic phosphorus mining and glyphosate production by conferring “immunity” under the Defense Production Act.
“Consistent with these findings, I find that ensuring robust domestic elemental phosphorus mining and United States-based production of glyphosate-based herbicides is central to American economic and national security. Without immediate Federal action, the United States remains inadequately equipped and vulnerable.” – President Trump’s executive order that grants these activities (phosphorus mining and glyphosate production) immunity from “damages or penalties” for any activity related to the order. The underlying law is the Defense Production Act. Phosphorus and glyphosate are foundational elements of modern American agribusiness. They are in fertilizer and the weedkiller Roundup. But they are also primary water pollutants that contribute to harmful algal blooms or are linked to cancer and other illnesses.
EPA PFAS Lawsuit The EPA is continuing to make its case in court that the agency’s Biden-era regulation of four PFAS in drinking water should be paused while it works on a new regulation that would officially rescind them, Bloomberg Law reports.
Two of the regulated chemicals – PFOA and PFOS – have standard numerical limits. The four others – PFNA, PFHxS, PFBS, and GenX – would also be regulated as a group, using what’s known as a “hazard index.” This is the first time the agency has used such an approach for drinking water regulation.
The court in January rejected the EPA’s request to vacate the hazard index component. The agency now wants to separate the hazard index from the rest of the litigation.
Two water utility groups – the American Water Works Association and Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies – filed the lawsuit in June 2024 in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
In the court filing, the agency says that it has drafted a notice of rulemaking to rescind the hazard index and plans to “commence the rulemaking process imminently.”
Lead Pipe Replacement In a separate lawsuit, the EPA said it would uphold the Biden administration’s 10-year timeline for most cities to replace lead drinking water pipes, the Associated Press reports.
The lawsuit challenging the timeline was also brought by the American Water Works Association, which argued that it was not feasible.
Michigan Coal Plant Operating Order Extended The Department of Energy once again extended the life of a Michigan coal-fired power plant.
This is the fourth 90-day order to keep the J.H. Campbell Generating Plant operating. The DOE argues that closing the plant is a threat to grid reliability. It is also costing Consumers Energy, the plant owner, a lot of money – at least $80 million through last September. The company will likely recover costs through customer rate increases or surcharges.
Consumers intended to shut down the plant in May 2025.
The EPA, at the prompting of regulated facilities, is considering changing federal requirements for hazardous substance spill plans, which are authorized under the Clean Water Act to guide emergency response in case a large volume of toxic chemicals is released into waterways.
The requirements in questions were established in 2024 during the Biden administration and apply to onshore non-transportation facilities – things like chemical manufacturers, oil and gas operators, gas stations, hospitals.
The agency is seeking comment on whether it should simplify the rules for determining which facilities are required to file response plans. Public comments are due March 20 and can be submitted via www.regulations.gov using docket number EPA-HQ-OLEM-2025-1707.
Studies and Reports
Disaster Declarations and Approvals FEMA approved a disaster declaration for Louisiana, which the state requested on February 5 following a late-January storm. And it approved a declaration for a Washington, D.C. sewer line that collapsed on January 19.
The federal disaster agency, meanwhile, has rejected or has been slow to approve requests from Democratic-run states. FEMA has not acted on Washington state’s January 21 request.
Arizona and Illinois are appealing requests from last fall that were rejected. Colorado is appealing two requests from January 16 that were denied.
Chinook Salmon Decision The National Marine Fisheries Service decided against listing the Washington coast segment of Chinook salmon as endangered or threatened, saying the population faces low extinction risk.
This is the result of the agency’s 12-month review, an in-depth assessment of the threats to a species. In response to a petition from the Center for Biological Diversity, the agency had made a preliminary, 90-day decision during the Biden administration that listing the species may be necessary.
Washington coast Chinook salmon spawn north of the Columbia River and west of the Elwha River, a geography that includes the Olympic peninsula.
On the Radar
Line 5 in the U.S. Supreme Court On February 24, the nation’s high court will hear oral arguments in a case involving the controversial Line 5 oil pipeline that crosses the Straits of Mackinac between lakes Huron and Michigan.
The case centers on a jurisdictional matter: should the lawsuit seeking to shut down the 73-year-old pipeline be heard in state or federal court?
Dana Nessel, the Michigan attorney general, filed the case in state court in 2019 alleging that Enbridge’s continued operation of the pipeline violated state law.
Colorado River DEIS Comments Due The Bureau of Reclamation is accepting public comments through March 2 on its draft plan for managing the Colorado River reservoirs after current rules expire at the end of the year.
Also on February 24, a Senate Energy and Natural Resources subcommittee will discuss 18 water-related bills, including rural water supply systems, snow water forecasting, and water recycling.
There are two hearings this week on the next Water Resources Development Act, the legislation that authorizes Army Corps projects for dams, levees, ports, and ecosystem restoration.
The action starts on February 24 with a House Transportation and Infrastructure subcommittee. The head of the Army Corps will testify, as will the chief of engineers.
Then on February 25, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works holds its own hearing.
Federal Water Tap is a weekly digest spotting trends in U.S. government water policy. To get more water news, follow Circle of Blue on Twitter and sign up for our newsletter.
Udall/Overpeck 4-panel Figure Colorado River temperature/precipitation/natural flows with trend. Lake Mead and Lake Powell storage. Updated through Water Year 2025. Note the tiny points on the annual data so that you can flyspeck the individual years. Credit: Brad Udall
Click the link to read the article on the AZCentral website (Brandon Loomis). Here’s an excerpt:
February 23, 2026
Key Points
A coalition of cities and water providers, led by the Central Arizona Project, has launched a media campaign targeting proposed Colorado River cuts.
The campaign includes a TV ad that claims Arizona “is being unfairly targeted” by some water management alternatives outlined in a federal document.
After the seven Colorado River states failed to reach an agreement on shortage sharing, the federal government turned to its own set of proposals.
A Central Arizona Project-backed advocacy group called the Coalition for Protecting Arizona’s Lifeline has begun rolling out television ads and online videos defending the water supplier’s rights to a Colorado River that is under serious hydrological and political strain.
“Arizona is being unfairly targeted for reductions of Colorado River water that would cripple our state, flatten our economy and weaken our nation’s defense,” an ad aired by the coalition warns. It goes on to note that Arizona communities have done their part, committing more water for conservation in Lake Mead than those in other states, and that several options that the federal government is weighing for managing the river would fall hardest on the state.
One such alternative under review, CAP General Manager Brenda Burman recently said, would essentially dry up the agency’s canal from the river to Phoenix and Tucson…The alternatives Burman was referring to were never stated as the Trump administration’s preference, but rather as ideas from which the seven states that share the river water might draw from in writing an agreement for sharing in its worsening shortages. Now that the states have failed to reach such an agreement, though, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation is faced with either enacting something like them or rapidly developing a new federal plan in time to replace river guidelines that expire this autumn…While the materials don’t directly state members’ intended method of securing water, some of the videos lean heavily on the so-called Law of the River and its guarantee of water from the four headwaters states to Arizona, California and Nevada. This theme reiterates a point that CAP and Arizona water officials have stressed over the last year or so, that if push comes to shove in a legal battle, they have the 1922 Colorado River Compact on their side.
“The Lower Basin has paper water, uses wet water, and wants the Upper Basin to deliver ghost water” — Kevin Pilgrim
Water levels were low at Lake Powell’s Wahweep Marina in November 2021. Recent worst-case projections from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation show the reservoir declining below power pool by July. CREDIT: HEATHER SACKETT/ASPEN JOURNALISM
The Colorado River crisis is no longer part of some hypothetical future — it’s here.
Fueled by one of the worst snowpacks on record, the “most probable” February projection from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation estimates 5 million acre-feet flowing into Lake Powell this year, which is 52% of average. A more grim estimate puts that number at just 3.5 million acre-feet, or 37% of average.
Forecasts show the nation’s second-largest reservoir could fall below the minimum level needed to make hydropower at Glen Canyon Dam as soon as July under the worst-case scenario, or by December under the “most probable” forecast. Reservoir levels are projected to fall to their lowest elevation on record in March 2027, threatening the water supply for millions in the Southwest.
But the increasingly dire projections, this winter’s historically bad snowpack and the growing gap between supply and demand haven’t yet pushed the seven states that share the river to come to an agreement on its future management.
Last week, state negotiators blew past a second federally set deadline to find a consensus plan on how to share shortages and manage Lake Powell and Lake Mead after the current guidelines expire at the end of the year. They have been stuck at an impasse for two years.
The need for a new management paradigm that adapts to a shrinking water supply has never been more urgent. So why isn’t the crisis forcing a deal?
“We’re at a moment where we really need something different that responds to our current hydrology, our current demands, and we’re not seeing a development of that kind,” said Elizabeth Koebele, a professor of political science and associate director of the graduate program of hydrologic sciences at the University of Nevada, Reno. “You’d think that all of these signals would be pointing to the fact that we really need to do something different, but we’re not.”
Anne Castle, a former federal representative to the Upper Colorado River Commission and a Colorado River expert, co-authored a paper in 2021 that said successful negotiations of new Colorado River agreements tend to be triggered by very dry conditions, and that federal directives and deadlines also play an important role. But the current stalemate amid worsening drought throws those findings into question.
“Our premise was that a crisis in terms of water supply and reservoir levels and snowpack and expected runoff can prompt creative compromise,” Castle said. “But we have all those underlying conditions, and we don’t have a compromise.”
The scale of the problem could be part of what’s making consensus difficult between the Upper Basin (Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming) and the Lower Basin (California, Arizona and Nevada). As a junior water user on the river, the Central Arizona Project, which supplies the metro Phoenix and Tucson areas, could face the deepest cuts.
“I think if this had been a 2 million-acre-foot problem, the states probably could have solved it, but it’s potentially a 4 million-acre-foot problem,” said Kathryn Sorensen, a researcher and professor at Arizona State University’s Kyl Center for Water Policy. “There’s so little water to go around that positions have become hardened as a result. We’re not just talking about inconvenient cuts; we’re talking about severe pain to economies at this point.”
Federal involvement
Some of the normal levers that have been pulled to force action in the past — such as directives and deadlines from the federal government — don’t seem to be effective in the current situation. There have been no apparent consequences for the states missing both the Feb. 14 deadline and an initial Nov. 11 deadline set by the feds for the states to present the outline of an agreement.
The seven state negotiators and their governors were summoned to Washington, D.C., the last week of January for a meeting with Department of Interior officials. That, too, failed to result in a deal.
In a Feb. 14 news release, Interior Secretary Doug Burgum thanked the governors for their engagement and said a fair compromise with shared responsibility remains within reach.
Koebele said when the states were hashing out the 2007 guidelines, which currently govern the river and are just months from expiring, the threat of federal action was part of what spurred the states to come up with a plan.
“There’s a little bit less of this idea of a single or central federal leader in the negotiation process,” Koebele said. “And they’re also still saying, ‘Hey, states, please come up with your own option too.’ I’m not really sure how credible threats are from the federal government when we’re in this sort of context.”
Reclamation has presented five options for managing the river, but although the federal government owns and operates the infrastructure such as dams and reservoirs, it doesn’t have the authority to implement all of the actions outlined in the options. The new, innovative and collaborative actions would need an agreement among the states.
Absent that, federal officials believe the only tools at their disposal, which allocate cuts based on prior appropriation and existing water law, could see Arizona take up to 77% of total shortages, yet they “may not provide adequate protection of critical infrastructure or the system and may be viable only in the short term given current reservoir conditions,” according the bureau.
The federal management options are part of a draft environmental impact statement, which is required as part of the National Environmental Policy Act review for new guidelines. This process is moving forward on a separate, parallel track to negotiations among the states. If the states agree on a plan, it could be plugged into the EIS and become the “preferred alternative.”
“We’re sort of at a key moment for those two processes coming together,” Koebele said. “But the EIS and the state negotiations are not really intersecting in a way that we have seen them intersect in the past or that we hoped they would.”
Federal officials are accepting comments on the draft EIS until March 2.
Lake Pleasant, seen in April 2025, is a storage bucket for Colorado River water and is part of the Central Arizona Project that delivers water to the Phoenix and Tucson areas. According to one river management option from the federal government, Arizona would take the majority of shortages in dry years. CREDIT: HEATHER SACKETT/ASPEN JOURNALISM
Blame to go around
In a series of news releases on February 13, 2026Upper Basin and Lower Basin officials blamed each other for the continuing standoff.
“We’re being asked to solve a problem we didn’t create with water we don’t have,” Colorado’s representative, Becky Mitchell, said in a prepared statement. “The Upper Division’s approach is aligned with hydrologic reality, and we’re ready to move forward.”
The crux of the issue is who should take shortages in drought years. The Lower Basin has committed to 1.5 million acre-feet of reductions annually and wants cuts beyond that to be shared by the Upper Basin. The Upper Basin says their water users already take cuts in some years because streams run dry by midsummer and any contributions they make through conservation must be voluntary.
Water managers upstream of Lee’s Ferry would note that they were promised an equal amount of water as the Lower Basin was in the 1922 Colorado River Compact, although they use about 4 million acre-feet a year, while the Lower Basin — whose flows are backed up by releases from the country’s two largest reservoirs — regularly uses all of the annual 7.5 million acre-feet to which it’s entitled. The Lower Basin’s position points to its larger population and economic output, and that their water users, already subject to mandatory cutbacks, tend to be more aggressive in their conservation measures.
“It’s the fundamental disagreement that we’ve had for the past many years,” Castle said. “The Upper Basin doesn’t want to agree to any enforceable reductions in use. And that is something that the Lower Basin, and Arizona in particular, don’t feel like they can live with.”
The states appeared to be on the verge of a breakthrough last summer, when representatives from both basins indicated a willingness to consider a supply-driven approach, where reservoir releases are more directly tied to the natural flow of the river. But hashing out the details is complicated, and a plan that all parties can agree to has yet to emerge.
Note the dotted red line. If says that it’s possible that power production at Glen Canyon Dam could end by August.
A new management plan would need to be in place by the start of the new water year on Oct. 1. And if the states can’t reach an agreement by then, the federal government will impose its own management rules, doling out cutbacks that could trigger lawsuits from the states but would not go far enough to prevent the system from crashing.
Even if the states come to an eleventh-hour agreement, federal action will be needed in the immediate future to protect levels at Lake Powell and the ability to produce hydropower. The dire projections showing Powell dropping below minimum power pool assume that the feds would release 7.48 million acre-feet from Powell this year, but under a short-term agreement that also expires at the end of the year, they could reduce releases down to as little as 6 million acre-feet. The Bureau of Reclamation is also holding back about 600,000 acre-feet in Lake Powell through April, which will be released later in the year.
The last time Lake Powell was projected to drop below system-critical thresholds after the 2021 spring runoff, Reclamation conducted emergency releases from upstream reservoirs. The chance that the bureau will again release additional water from those federally controlled reservoirs — Flaming Gorge, Blue Mesa and Navajo — to boost Powell in the coming months is “about 100%,” according to Colorado River expert and author Eric Kuhn.
“Just how much is going to be up in the air, but right now, it looks like they need a million to a million-and-a-half acre-feet based on the current projections,” Kuhn said.
John Fleck, an author, writer and University of New Mexico professor, was the co-author with Castle on the 2021 paper, titled “Green Light for Adaptive Policies on the Colorado River.” He said that in previous negotiations, state representatives not only had a sense of responsibility to protect water for their own communities, but were also looking out for the health of the entire interconnected basin.
“What we have seen in the last few years is a shift to a leadership that is made up of people who are solely looking out for the interests of their own community,” Fleck said.
Experts say the Colorado River needs a new and different management plan that responds to dwindling flows, rebuilds reservoir storage and creates a resilient system in the face of climate change. The current leadership is failing to provide that, Fleck said. The solution is a shift in mindset for water managers to start playing not for the Upper Basin or Lower Basin, but for Team Colorado River Basin, he said.
“There’s a moral question involving the obligations we have to one another in shared river basins,” Fleck said. “I would not be at all happy to win the litigation and see the Central Arizona Project shut down. I would see that as a failure even though my community’s water supply might be protected.”
Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0
Dark Skies Over Bears Ears, Valley of the Gods, Utah, This photo was taken late at night in the middle of the desert. Over the Fourth of July, I traveled to Southeast Utah to interview people and take some final light readings in Blanding and Monticello Utah while working for the State of the Rockies Project Dark Skies Team. The whole summer I had been trying to get a reading within the “no visible light” range. This night I was able to do so. It was so dark that my light meter didn’t even work, but once I switched out my lens to a fisheye, the whole sky appeared on my camera in front of me. For me, this image represents something I had been looking for all summer. I had heard people speak about the sky in Bears Ears and why it was so worth protecting, but to see the stars for myself was something else entirely. Photo by Megan O’Brien, ’25
Mountain West Voters Show Growing Concerns Over PublicLand Protections Heading into 2026 Elections
State of the Rockies Project survey shows tension over direction of land management andenergy priorities, and desire for conservation of scarce water resources and public lands.
COLORADO SPRINGS—Results from Colorado College’s 16th annual State of the Rockies Project Conservation in the West Poll released today show widespread concern among Western voters about rollbacks of protections for land, water, and wildlife and cuts to funding for public land management.
The poll, which surveyed voters in eight Mountain West states—Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming—found that Western voters across party lines are prioritizing conservation, recreation, and renewables over fossil fuel development heading into this year’s midterm elections.
Highlights from the Poll
84% of Western voters say that the rollback of laws that protect our land, water, andwildlife is a serious problem, a sharp increase from prior years.
85% of respondents say issues involving public lands, waters, and wildlife are important in deciding whether to support a public official.
86% of Western voters deem funding cuts to public lands a serious problem, including 76% of Republicans.
70% of respondentsoppose fast-tracking oil, gas and mining projects on national public lands by reducing environmental reviews and local public input.
72% of Westerners prefer expanding renewable energy over drilling and mining for more fossil fuels.
76% of Western voters—more Western voters than ever before—say they would prefer their member of Congress to place more emphasis on conservation and recreationon public lands over maximizing energy production.
74% of Western voters oppose selling some national public lands for oil and gas development.
91% of Western voters say existing national monument designations should be kept in place.
As policymakers look ahead to the upcoming midterm elections, 85% of voters in MountainWest states say issues involving public lands, waters, and wildlife are important indeciding whether to support a candidate.
“At a time of growing pressure on land and water in the West, the call to action from voters is clear and bipartisan: Westerners want funding and stewardship for public lands and natural resources, ” said Ian Johnson, Director of Strategic Initiatives & Sustainabilityat ColoradoCollege.
Voters want to prioritize renewable energy sources. When asked to prioritize energy sources, voters across party lines selected solar as their top choice, while coal was the least desired, with only 7% of respondents listing coal as a first or second priority.
Funding cuts to public land management have proven unpopular with Western voters. Recent funding cuts have reduced the number of firefighters, park rangers, scientists, and other employees working to protect public lands, water, and wildlife over the last year. These cuts to public land management have 86% of voters across party lines concerned, including 75% of MAGA supporters.
Western voters also oppose the sale of public lands and the elimination of public landprotections. Even with rising housing costs, 76% of Western voters oppose selling public lands for housing. Additionally, 74% of Western voters oppose selling public lands to private companies for oil, gas, and mining development.
Scarce water resources continue to be a concern for Westerners, particularly in states that have experienced droughts. Westerners consider scarce water resources a serious problem, with 87% of Western voters concerned about inadequate water supplies. Accordingly, 83% of voters in states along the Colorado River or its tributaries would support an agreement requiring all states to reduce their use of the Colorado River to preserve its health. This emphasis on water protection is particularly salient, as 80% of Westerners say data centers are a threat to water quality and supply in the West.
This is the sixteenth consecutive year Colorado College gauged the public’s sentiment on public lands and conservation issues. The 2026 Colorado College Conservation in the West Poll is a bipartisan survey conducted by Republican pollster Lori Weigel of New Bridge Strategy and Democratic pollster Miranda Everitt of Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin, Metz & Associates. The survey is funded by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.
The poll surveyed at least 400 registered voters in each of eight Western states (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, & WY) for a total 3,419-voter sample, which included an over-sample of Black and Native American voters. The survey was conducted between January 2-18, 2026 and the effective margin of error is +2.4% at the 95% confidence interval for the total sample; and at most +4.9% for each state. The full survey and individual state surveys are available on the State of the Rockies Project website.
About Colorado College
Colorado College is a nationally prominent four-year liberal arts college that was founded in Colorado Springs in 1874. The College operates on the innovative Block Plan, in which its 2,200 undergraduate students study one course at a time in intensive three and a half-week segments. For the past eighteen years, the college has sponsored the State of the Rockies Project, which encourages students to conduct interdisciplinary investigations around the region to build on and deepen what we know about the challenges we face living in the Rocky Mountain West, and what to do about them.
About Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin, Metz & Associates
Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin, Metz & Associates (FM3)—a national Democratic opinion research firm with offices in Oakland, Los Angeles and Portland, Oregon—has specialized in public policy oriented opinion research since 1981. The firm has assisted hundreds of political campaigns at every level of the ballot—from President to City Council—with opinion research and strategic guidance. FM3 also provides research and strategic consulting to public agencies, businesses and public interest organizations nationwide.
About New Bridge Strategy
New Bridge Strategy is a Colorado-based, woman-owned and operated opinion research company specializing in public policy and campaign research. As a Republican polling firm that has led the research for hundreds of successful political and public affairs campaigns, New Bridge has helped coalitions bridging the political spectrum in crafting winning ballot measure campaigns, public education campaigns, and legislative policy efforts.
About Hispanic Access Foundation
Hispanic Access Foundation, a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization, connects Latinos with partners and opportunities to improve lives and create an equitable society. Our vision is that one day every Hispanic individual in America will enjoy good physical health and a healthy natural environment, a quality education, economic success, and civic engagement in their communities with the sum of improving the future of America. For more information visit http://www.hispanicaccess.org.
If drought conditions do not significantly improve by the end of the winter, the city of Aspen may enter a stage 3 water shortage for the first time. The city’s drought response committee is anticipating recommending a stage 3 water shortage declaration based on the latest snowpack, drought data and outlooks for Aspen and the Roaring Fork watershed, according to an informational memo sent to Aspen City Council this week. But the city is hoping for more precipitation to stave off more stringent water restrictions, Megan Killer, a plans review technician with the city’s water department, said.
“We are hoping to see more precipitation in the coming months and this memo serves to raise awareness that we are seeing record low snow accumulation and much higher than average temperatures, and if things do not significantly change, we might have to increase water restrictions,” Killer told the Aspen Daily News in an email.
If the city were to enact stage 3 water restrictions, it would use its drought mitigation response plan, which was adopted in July 2020. It outlines restrictions the city could enforce to conserve water under different stages of water shortages. The declaration indicates extreme drought. Under stage 3 water restrictions, irrigation of existing lawns could be limited to one day per week based on a customer’s address. Athletic fields, trees and golf course greens could be irrigated by a mandatory schedule or water budget only. Car washing and filling or refilling of water features and swimming pools may not be allowed. Under those conditions, the city would “work to sustain mature trees to the extent possible but recognizes that there may be a major loss of lawns, gardens, some trees and some shrubs,” the plan says. The city also may pursue supply-side response measures, including operating its physically available senior water rights to divert water, “even though they deplete the decreed instream flow,” according to the plan.
Glen Canyon downstream from Glen Canyon Dam. Photo credit: Allen Best/Big Pivots
Click the link to read the article on the Big Pivots website (Allen Best):
February 17, 2026
Sitting in the audience at the Colorado Water Congress in January, I was reminded of the days, weeks and months after 9/11. The impulse –– fueled by rage, was to punch back — at somebody, somewhere. The result, as we saw in Afghanistan after 20 years and three presidents, was far from satisfying. Osama bin Laden died, but the Taliban prevailed.
At the conference, a new state legislator from the Western Slope was full of righteous indignation about the Colorado River dispute. Colorado and other upper basin states were right, and those in the lower basin were wrong. We will prevail in court, he insisted. That would be the Supreme Court, where all disputes among states must go. And Colorado, legislators had been told, is preparing for just that possibility.
Much is at stake here. It’s not just ranches on the Western Slope but nearly all the water rights allocated since 1922. Roughly half of water for Front Range cities comes from the Colorado River headwaters and for towns on the eastern plains as far east as Fort Morgan. The mountains towns at the Colorado River headwaters, most of their water rights are post-1922. The list goes on and one.
No wonder Colorado has its fur up.
Speaking later in the morning, Jim Lochhead, a figure prominent in Colorado water affairs since the 1970s, did not disagree with Colorado’s fundamental position.
Colorado insists that Arizona and California, especially, have caused the big reservoirs, Powell and Mead, to decline. The states — together, with Nevada, they constitute the lower basin — have reduced their water use substantially since 2002 — but not in proportion to the declines caused by warming temperatures and declining snowfall. The lower-basin states created the problem of the reservoirs now at perilously low levels. They bear the heaviest burden of refilling reservoirs by simply agreeing to take less water.
Lochhead also warned of inflexibility. “The upper basin cannot bail out the lower basin,” he said. “But (negotiators) have to be given room to compromise.”
“If the negotiators are forced to focus only on protecting what each of them thinks is legally theirs on paper, they can’t work on identifying and building the tools and strategies needed to make sure we can get away from crisis management and secure our future,” he said that January morning in Aurora.
Upper-basin states say that because they are at the headwaters, they have nothing equivalent to Powell and Mead upstream to provide certainty. If it rains and snows, there is water. If not, then water users have less or none. Colorado water officials say some with water rights dating to the 1880s have already had to go without.
My kids and their friends built a small terrain park in front of their house near Sloans Lake after the March 2003 St. Patrick’s Day blizzard.
The year 2002 was seminal. Modest snowfall was followed by an early and unusually warm spring. Peak runoff was barely noticeable. In Denver, a city that gets half its water from the Colorado River headwaters, sprinklers were turned off, green grass turned brown. Aurora, also heavily dependent upon Colorado River water, was within a few months of crisis in 2003 when a miracle occurred –– three feet of snow on St. Patrick’s Day.
Downstream in Arizona and California, far from this drama in the headwaters, life continued with no fear and little change. The upstream reservoirs, Powell and Mead, had water.
We have another dry year, and the Colorado River right now is expected to deliver less than the 3.8 million acre-feet at Lee Ferry, just below Glen Canyon Dam, than it did in 2002. Flows were 17 to 18 million acre-feet in the 1920s, when the Colorado River Compact was created and adopted. The long-term average was less, 14.6 to 15.1 million acre-feet. In this century, it has dipped to 12.1 to 12.5 million acre-feet. Some expect this trend to continue amid the warming and drying now underway in the basin. Might it go below 10 in a few more decades?
The lower basin until relatively recently used 10 to 11 million acre-feet. As for the upper basin, states — Wyoming, Utah and New Mexico, in addition to Colorado —they have used 3.5 to 4.5 million acre-feet. It depends upon whether it snows.
The end of a boat ramp in Antelope Canyon was high above the water of Lake Powell in May 2022, and water levels have dropped more now. Photo/Allen Best
“Everyone knows Lake Powell is now in a dire situation,” said Lochhead in a panel after the state legislators had left. “We have gone from 86% full to I think around 25% full today. Powell is in danger of being over a million acre-feet below deadpool next year. That should scare all of us.”
Deadpool is when the water level in a dam-created reservoir drops so low that water cannot be released and used for drinking, irrigation and power. In the last several years, at least one book, Zak Podmore’s Life After Dead Pool, has been written about the Colorado River with that threshold in mind. Other books and thousands and thousands of newspaper, magazine and website postings have mentioned it.
The back of Glen Canyon Dam circa 1964, not long after the reservoir had begun filling up. Here the water level is above dead pool, meaning water can be released via the river outlets, but it is below minimum power pool, so water cannot yet enter the penstocks to generate electricity. Bureau of Reclamation photo. Annotations: Jonathan P. Thompson
Lochhead warned against hardened positions that put the Colorado River problems in front of the Supreme Court. Colorado has not fared well in water cases there the last 100-plus years.
For several decades, Lochhead was a water attorney for Holland and Hart, working from an office across from the post office in Glenwood Springs. It was a good place to raise a family of skiers, he once told this writer.
During that time on the Western Slope, Lochhead represented Colorado on Colorado River affairs in several capacities. Then, from 2010 until 2023, he was CEO of Denver Water, the state’s largest water utility. In the last few years, his life has been lower profile. But, as his remarks at the Water Congress demonstrated, he is still paying close attention.
Litigation in the Colorado River Basin, said Lochhead, is a “worst-case scenario, resulting in economic and political disruption and uncertainty no matter the outcome.” This message, he said, would be the same whether given to audiences in Arizona or Colorado.
“There are tens of millions of dollars of taxpayer dollars that will be spent on litigation over a 10- or 20-year period, and the outcomes will be uncertain. The upper basin has a lot of good arguments, and so does the lower basin.”
Colorado appeared before the Supreme Court in 1907. It claimed full use of the Arkansas River. The Supreme Court disagreed.
Delphus Carpenter. Picture courtesy Colorado State University library
In 1922, Colorado lost to Wyoming in a case involving the North Platte River. Colorado has insisted upon prerogatives because it was the source of the water. That defeat caused Colorado’s lead negotiator, Delph Carpenter, to conclude it must shelve the idea that being at the headwaters would trump the claims of downstream states on the Colorado River. Carpenter became the most important figure in crafting the Colorado River Compact of 1922.
“But of course, litigation under the compacts continued, and Colorado was ordered to pay some $34 million to Kansas in 2001 and to dry up Bonnie Reservoir and undertake the process of drying up 25,000 acres of farmland in the Republican River Basin,” Lochhead continued.
The headwaters of Whiskey Creek, between Minturn and Avon, in the Eagle River Valley, had plentiful snow in the mid-1990s. Photo/Allen Best
Lochhead described several layers of complexities.
“This isn’t litigation just between two or three states. This is litigation between four states that have a common obligation under the compact (the Upper Basin) versus three other states requiring coordination on strategy, negotiating remedies and settlement between the states,” he said.
Nor is it simple a matter of the two basins, upper and lower, in conflict. The 30 federally recognized tribes in the Colorado River Basin have their interests, and they are not all the same. They also have rights that in most cases supersede those of the states. Public interest groups can have different interests. And, if the federal government makes the decisions about future uses of the Colorado, each and all may “sue the federal government over any unilateral federal action or decision, and that litigation can take all kinds of different forms.”
“Other entities may seek to intervene in the litigation. The United States certainly would, as we have seen in Texas versus New Mexico. But when tribes seek to intervene, if the country of Mexico seeks to intervene — what happens during litigation?”
Mexico, under a 1944 compact, is to get 1.5 million acre-feet annually.
Plus, the three other upper-basin states may disagree with Colorado. Colorado uses by far the most water of the four, as a compact among them reached in 1948 specified. Alone, though, it has pushed that limit.
In other words, going to water war sounds vaguely patriotic. The reality of the courtroom may be less heart-thumping.
Boulder has very good water rights but depends somewhat on imported Colorado River water. Photo/teofilo and Wikimedia Commons
Consider what if Colorado did lose? Here’s where the story gets grim. The Front Range cities, the ski towns, even farmers in the South Platte and Arkansas valleys to the Nebraska and Kansas borders.
Lochhead described the stakes involved, the gamble of letting the black-robed justices in D.C. decide the fates of the seven base states. “Do we find ways to work together across the basin to address the crisis together?”
He asked that question more than two weeks before Valentine’s Day, the deadline set by the Bureau of Reclamation without obvious irony. Without agreement by the seven states about how to share the diminished river, it is now up to the federal government to step in. On Friday, after the states had reported still no break-through, I asked Lochhead by e-mail if his remarks from January were still appropriate. They were, he said.
“It seems as I write this, that — as for the last two years — the states remain stuck in political talking points and the federal government is not applying necessary pressure. And, in the meantime, Lake Powell is headed toward run-of-the-river operations, which precipitates crises on all kinds of different levels,” he replied. “This will lead to the federal government having to make decisions that will severely impact both upper and lower basin economies and the environment, not to mention endless, expensive and risky litigation. This all could have been avoided but here we are.”
“Wow!” said Eric Kuhn, a former general manager of the Colorado River District in Glenwood Springs, in a LinkedIn post over the weekend. “The secretary (of Interior) needs to step up and make some hard decisions!”
Sparking Kuhn’s remarks was a new Bureau of Reclamation report on Friday of probable flows in the next two years. The best of them leaves Powell in bad shape. In fact, the bureau’s “probable” flows have frequently been too optimistic. The dimmer view, called “probable minimum,” sees Powell levels dropping below the elevation needed to produce hydropower as early as August. Minimum power pool is above deadpool.
Note the dotted red line. If says that it’s possible that power production at Glen Canyon Dam could end by August.
From a Colorado perspective, lower-basin states have a sense of entitlement that defies common sense. Whether it defies the law is another matter. Kuhn told me years ago that the key provision in the 1922 compact that can be interpreted in two very different ways.
It says: “The States of the Upper Division will note cause the flow of the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75,000,000 acre feet for any period of ten consecutive years…”
But as to that disagreement: Upper-basin states see this meaning that they have no control over the weather. They did not cause the reduced flows. Hang the weather, says the lower-basin state. The “do not cause” clause means that if only 7.5 million acre-feet is all that is in the river, it all has to flow downstream.
Typo or not, the lower-basin perspective sees this as a cut-and-dried issue. If Denver must go without transmountain diversions or taps in Winter Park or Vail must go dry, so be it. Not their problem.
JB Hamby, California’s representative on Colorado River affairs, articulated exactly that sentiment on Friday. “The 1922 Colorado River Compact requires the Upper Basin to deliver an average of 8.25 million acre-feet annually to the Lower Basin and Mexico,” he said in a statement. “That delivery obligation is fixed in law, even when the river produces less water.”
At the January forum, Amy Ostdiek, who heads the legal team for the Colorado Water Conservation Board in interstate and federal matters, laid out the basic numbers Colorado puts front and center: The 1922 compact laid out a split of roughly 7.5 million acre-feet for each, the lower and upper basins, with the upper basin required to allow another one million acre-feet to flow down river to account for evaporation and losses.
“We have to be honest about what has caused the threat that Lake Powell might not be able to make the releases that the lower-basin states believe they are entitled to. It was directly caused by their overuse of Lake Mead, which drew down Lake Powell to the point it is today,” said Ostdiek.
Again, the upper-basin states insist upon lower-basin states sharing the uncertainty of snow and rain. To rebuild the storages will mean they take less water.
“This is going to be hard for those who are not accustomed to taking less in dry years, but the benefit of reaching a state-state deal is that if we’re able to do that, it provides an opportunity or a gradual and softer landing — and more likely federal dollars for those who need that support as they adapt to this reality.”
The upper basin, though, refuses to budge on the idea that it can develop all 7.5 million acre-feet of water apportioned it by the compact — if the water is there, of course.
In their January remarks, neither Lochhead nor Ostdiek offered thoughts about on-the-ground solutions. Ostdiek pointed to programs in both the upper and lower basin with varying success. In their defense, they only had an hour.
Can the lower-basin negotiators truly misunderstand Colorado’s position? Ken Neubecker, of Glenwood Springs, formerly of environmental groups, thinks so.
“They have been accustomed, some would say addicted, to the reliable delivery of stored water for all their needs since Hoover Dam was built and began releasing stored water some 90 years ago,” he wrote in a post on Substack. “Only until very recently, even in the face of an unrelenting drought, have they had to deal with shortages. For the Upper Basin, shortage is an annual reality.”
Arizona Navy photo via California State University
Rod Proffitt, from Pagosa Springs, (and a board member for Big Pivots) points to Arizona’s history of going to courts to resolve river issues. “They even sent out the National Guard one time” (in a dispute with California),” he observed. And now Arizona, more than any other state, has its back to the wall.
Phoenix had native water, but expansive growth, among the fastest in the nation, has been enabled by imported Colorado River water since the 1990s. Photo/Allen Best
Most instructive, at least as understanding Arizona, may be George Packer’s 25,000-word piece, “What Will Become of American Civilization,” in the July/August 2024 issue of The Atlantic. During the prior year, Packer had spent several weeks or more, winter and summer, primarily in the Phoenix metropolitan region, to analyze its politics and people.
Most perplexing, he found, was the perfervid belief in population and commercial expansion that defies limitations of a climate where a simple fall onto concrete during summer can produce second-degree burns.
Colorado, of course, has its own love of economic expansion. It is dwarfed by Arizona. The latter grew 824% in population from 1950 to 2016 while Colorado grew 318%.
Water is crucial to these expansions, and Arizona has tried to disregard limits. Packer explicitly uses “water” 158 times in his report and implicitly so elsewhere. He started out with a description of the Hohokam Indians and their water infrastructure that can still be seen in Phoenix. He barely mentioned climate change but did use “heat” 32 times. He talks about water for data centers and the suburban sprawl.
“Phoenix makes you keenly aware of human artifice—its ingenuity and its fragility,” he says.
We’ve seen the ingenuity of water delivery systems in the broader Colorado River Basin, a region that extends from Colorado’s borders with Nebraska and Kansas to the Pacific Ocean. We now understand the fragility, and it makes us very, very uncomfortable.
Anything that forces change can bring out our worst, but then sometimes it can bring out our best. Can it get any worse on the Colorado River?
And also:
The five alternatives
The Bureau of Reclamation issued five alternatives in its draft environmental impact statement for how it will operate Glen Canyon Dam. The federal government, said Lochhead, can only implement two of them.
The first two, said Lochhead, are deeply flawed: No action and the second would impose shortages on Arizona and Nevada approaching 7 million acre-feet. Both alternatives would almost certainly be challenged in court. Both would quickly result in Powell reaching deadpool with compact litigation and unspecified federal actions in the upper basin to protect Powell.
The three other alternatives contain the essential elements of an agreement among the states, he said, including up to four million acre-feet of shortages in the lower base, but not by priority, and leaving pools in the two big reservoirs for conserved water by both upper and lower basins.
“Not surprising, the alternatives with the highest shortages in the two basins and the greatest flexibility perform the best again potential hydrology that illustrates the magnitude of the problem we’re in, and the actions required by both upper and lower basins to address it,” he said. For any of this to work, he added, “we need long-term funding to mitigate the impacts and build resilience in both basins.
A brief recent history:
Lochhead also sketched a brief history of agreements during recent decades on the Colorado River. His excerpted comments follow:
This slide shows the combined contents of lakes Powell and Mead for the last 25 years juxtaposed against some of the key events and agreements that have occurred during that 25-year period.
Despite the best efforts of the states, reservoir levels have continued to decline over time. The states, though, have made important agreements and have significantly reduced uses in response to changing conditions on the river. But clearly, much more needs to be done.
Starting in the early 1990s we had 10 years of negotiations that led to Federal Surplus Guidelines in 2001. You can see, at the beginning of this century, the reservoirs were virtually full, and we were arguing about surpluses.
Those guidelines also contained a deadline for California to finalize and implement the Quantification Settlement Agreement among California agencies to define priorities and implement ag-urban transfers necessary to get California’s water use from 5.3 million acre-feet a year down to 4.4 million acre-feet a year. The negotiations were driven by the direct involvement and pressure from Secretary (Bruce) Babbitt and his team at the Department Interior. That’s a theme — federal pressure being necessary to agreements of the Basin States over the last 25 years.
The California agencies had to come together and agree on how they were going to reduce their use by 800,000 acre-feet. They couldn’t reach agreement, and so Interior imposed limitations on water use in the Imperial Valley, prompting litigation that was eventually settled in 2003.
Lochhead credited Interior Secretary Gayle Norton and Bennet Raley, the assistant secretary for water, for pushing California to this agreement. Both, incidentally, were Colorado natives, Norton from Denver’s northern suburbs and Raley from southwest Colorado. Upon Raleys’ departure from the Interior in 2004, the Los Angeles Times had this to say:
“Raley may be remembered best as the folksy but firm bureaucrat who finally made good on the federal government’s long-standing threat to put California on a water diet. He did it by forcing the state to agree to stop using more than its share of the Colorado River, freeing up water for other Western states.”
Despite the arguments about surplus waters in the 1990s, some observers could see troubles ahead of a river overcommitted. Troubles arrived in a big way with the water-poor year of 2002 — a runoff that may turn out better than this year’s.
Lochhead recalled that the upper-basin states, wanting to maintain storage in Lake Powell, asked the Interior Department — the operator of the dam — to release less than 8.23 million acre-feet from the reservoir. Lower-basin states, primarily Arizona, resisted. Difficult meetings ensued, litigation was threatened, legal war chests were readied — then Norton interceded, issuing a deadline by the end of 2007 for an agreement about lower basin shortage guidelines and operational guidelines for releases of water from Powell and Mead.
The states met that deadline — unlike those of the last year — and the guidelines helped. But, said Lochhead, they have proven, over time, to be inadequate. It seemed like every year we were one foot over or under, those triggers that caused distrust and accusations between the upper and lower basins of gaming the system.
Meanwhile, the river produced less than anybody had expected. The states agreed to additional interim measures, and they, too, proved inadequate.
In 2019, the states agreed to a drought contingency plan and drought response agreement, more interim measures designed to protect the system’s major reservoirs from falling to critically low levels. The lower-basin states agreed to plan that added an extra layer of protection. The goal was to maintain a half million acre-feet of water in Lake Mead.
Declines in lower basin
Lochhead showed a chart of water use in the lower basin but with caveats. It did not include the tributaries, including the Gila River —- a conversation unto itself. Nor does it show reservoir evaporations and losses, which add up to about 1.5 million acre-feet annually, what is often called the structural deficit.
The blue line at the top showed a significant reduction in use starting in 2001, then a fairly steady use of about 7.5 million acre-feet until about 2017, when withdrawals begin to drop due to shortages.
Uneven use in upper basin
The next slide showed the variations of use by the upper-basin states. The chart shows ups and downs, which can be attributed to wetter and dryer cycles. Overall, though, water use in the upper-basin states has remained fairly constant. Those uses, he added, do not include reservoir evaporation — because those losses are explicitly included in upper-basin consumptive use.
“Part of the argument, part of the confusion, comes from these different accounting methodologies in the upper and lower basins,” he said.
The upper basin has made a couple of arguments. One is that the upper basin has the right to develop more water, up to 7.5 million acre-feet, but also that hydrology is the limiting factor. Users suffer shortages every year. I’m not sure you can have both.”
Again, hydrology is the limiting factor.
Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0
The rules that control releases from Lake Powell and Lake Mead are very different. Lake Powell’s releases are determined by an Annual Operating Plan that has little flexibility during the year. Lake Mead’s releases change each month in response to changing delivery requirements to Lower Basin users. The impact of these different release rules on each reservoir’s storage was illustrated this autumn and early winter when Lake Powell steadily declined and Lake Mead steadily increased. The magnitude of Powell’s decline and Mead’s increase compensated for one another, and the total combined storage in Lake Powell and Lake Mead did not change.
During the four months between October 1 and February 1, Lake Mead’s releases were reduced in response to decreasing Lower Basin demands, but Lake Powell’s releases were not similarly reduced. Lake Powell lost 615,000 af during the four-month study period, and Lake Mead gained the same amount.
On February 1, Lake Mead had 2,714,000 af more water than Lake Powell, the largest difference between the two reservoirs since April 2022.
Modest flood inflows in early October delayed drawdown of Lake Powell by six weeks. Releases during the four-month study period were the second smallest since at least 2010[1]. Releases from Lake Mead were the smallest since at least 2010. Despite the small inflows to Lake Mead, the increase in storage in Lake Mead during the study period was the largest since 2019.
The four-month delay in depletion of the combined storage in Lake Powell and Lake Mead saved between 400,000 to 900,000 af.
Forecasts for spring snowmelt inflow to Lake Powell are not encouraging and have been declining all winter, because Rocky Mountain snowpack remains meager.
[1]We compared the inflows, outflows, changes in storage, and Lower Basin consumptive uses between 2010 and 2026.
Briefly
In mid-September 2025, we noted that if the 2026 snowmelt was as little as in 2025, the total realistically accessible combined storage in Lake Mead and Lake Powell reservoirs (hereafter referred to as Powell+Mead) would likely fall to less than 4 million acre-feet (af) by early autumn 2026, less than the 21st century minimum of March 2023. At the mid-point of winter 2025-2026, where do we stand?
Despite the bad news associated with this winter’s meager Rocky Mountain snowpack and the prospect of insignificant spring inflow to Lake Powell, unusually large autumn rainfall, alongside involuntary shortages and compensated system conservation efforts, reduced the need for deliveries to Lower Basin users, resulting in a significant increase in storage in Lake Mead that matched the drawdown of Lake Powell. As a result, total combined storage In Powell+Mead did not change in October, November, December, and January[1]. This is a helpful and important outcome.
Total inflow to Lake Powell and from sources between Glen Canyon Dam and Lake Mead totaled 1.72 million af during the four-month study period (Table 1). Outflows from Lake Mead, including consumptive use by Nevada and estimated evaporation losses from Lake Powell and Lake Mead, were 1.75 million af. Because the combined storage of Powell+Mead did not change, the Inflows and the outflows, including losses must have been equal. The small discrepancy between inflows and outflows from this two-reservoir system (last two rows of Table 1) remind us of the inherent uncertainty and imprecision of some measurements. In this case, the sources of uncertainty include unmeasured inflows, unmeasured gains and losses of bank storage, and uncertainty in measurements, especially of evaporation.
Table 1. Inflows, outflows, and evaporation losses in Powell+ Mead between October 1, 2025, and February 1, 2026. Blue colors highlight terms used to calculate inflows to the Powell+Mead system. Red colors highlight terms used to calculate outflows and losses from Powell+Mead.
Even though the total amount of water in Powel+Mead did not change, Lake Powell dropped and Lake Mead rose during the study period resulting in transfer of water from Lake Powell to Lake Mead. Lake Powell lost 615,000 af during the four-month study period, and Lake Mead gained the same amount. Autumn rains modestly augmented inflows to Lake Powell, and Reclamation significantly reduced releases at Hoover Dam, such that inflows and outflows to Powell+Mead approximately balanced each other.
On February 1, Lake Mead had 2,714,000 af more water than Lake Powell, the largest difference between the two reservoirs since April 2022[2] (Fig. 1). Divergence in the amount stored in each reservoir resulted from different operating rules. Releases from Lake Powell in the Upper Basin are established in an Annual Operating Plan intended to meet the Upper Basin’s delivery obligation to the Lower Basin. This plan has little flexibility to adjust releases in response to unexpected changes in inflow. In contrast, releases from Lake Mead are adjusted to the changing delivery requirements to Lower Basin users. As demand in the Lower Basin decreased in autumn and early winter, releases from Lake Mead were significantly reduced.
Figure 1. Graph showing active storage in Lake Mead and Lake Powell since January 1, 2022.
Details
Although October flood inflows to Lake Powell were modest, this short period of augmented inflow delayed the long-term decline in storage by six weeks, an important respite for the reservoir. Inflow to Lake Powell from the Colorado River, the largest source of inflow, was only 75% of average in November, December, and January but exceeded the three-year average between October 12 and 19[3]. Inflow from the San Juan River, the second largest inflow source, exceeded the long-term daily average between October 11 and 22 and between November 15 and 24[4]. As a result, storage in Lake Powell increased by 105,000 af between October 9 and 20, the period when inflow exceeded reservoir release (Fig. 2). The rate of subsequent reservoir decline was much slower than the initial rise, and it was not until late November that Lake Powell returned to the elevation it had been just before the onset of the October floods.
Figure 2. Graph showing Lake Powell inflows and releases. Inflows were calculated as the sum of stream flow measured at USGS gages on the Colorado River above Gypsum Canyon, the Dirty Devil River above Poison Springs Wash, the Escalante River near Escalante, and the San Juan River near Bluff. Releases measured at Lees Ferry represent the sum of actual releases and ground-water seepage from Lake Powell.
The drop in Lake Powell that began in late October occurred despite Reclamation’s decision to delay release of approximately 600,000 af until summer 2026.[5] Total release from Lake Powell during the study period was 2.106 million af, the second smallest fall and early winter release since 2010 (Table 2).
Table 2. Releases from Lake Powell and inflow, change in storage, and releases from Lake Mead in October, November, December, and January.
1Colorado River at Lees Ferry 2Colorado River above Diamond Creek near Peach Springs 3Reclamation, Lower Basin Accounting Reports. Hydrodata for 2025-26.
Reclamation reduced releases from Lake Mead beginning in mid-November. In response, storage increased, because inflows exceeded releases (Fig. 3). Recovery of Lake Mead during these months was the largest since 2019 and was 5% greater than the median autumn and early winter recovery since 2010 (Table 2). Releases from Lake Mead were the smallest since at least 2010 and were 30% less than the median total release for those years. The increase in Lake Mead occurred despite the small releases from Lake Powell.
Figure 3. Graph showing Lake Mead inflows and releases since October 1, 2025. Inflows were calculated as the sum of stream flow measured at USGS gages of the Colorado River upstream from Diamond Creek, Diamond Creek, and the Virgin River downstream from Muddy Creek.
The small demand for water from Lake Mead was due to a combination of significantly reduced agricultural demand caused by abundant autumn precipitation in California’s Imperial and Coachella Valleys, the Yuma area, and elsewhere in Arizona and southeastern California as well as ongoing Lower Basin programs including involuntary shortage cuts (mostly) to Arizona, Drought Contingency Plan (DCP) contributions, and reductions in water use from compensated system conservation. Although agricultural consumptive use in Arizona and the Imperial Valley is always smallest between November and February, demand in fall 2025, especially in November, was unusually small (Table 3). Withdrawal of water by the Central Arizona Water Conservation District (CAWCD) into the Central Arizona Project (CAP) canal and consumptive use by the Imperial Irrigation District (IID) in November 2025 was less than in any previous November since at least 2010 and was 26% and 54% of the median November use[6], respectively, by those districts. Consumption in October and November by other Arizona users of mainstem Colorado River water was the second smallest since at least 1979 and CAWCD use in October was the second smallest since 1995. Only in 2024 was use less. Use by the Metropolitan Water District in January was the second smallest of the study period.
Table 3. Monthly consumptive use in parts of the Lower Basin in October, November, December, and January.
1Lowest monthly use since at least 2010 2 Second lowest monthly use since at least 2010 3Median monthly use computed for 2010-2026
A Bit of a Silver Lining
What was the significance of the four-month delay in depletion of Powell+Mead? Combined Powell+Mead storage increased between October 1 and February 1 twice since 2010, in the large runoff years of 2011 and 2019 (Table 4). In all other years, storage declined during these four months, and this year’s decrease of 200 af was the smallest decline among those 12 recent years of decline. The median drawdown of the 12 years of decline was 660,000 af and ranged between this year’s tiny drawdown and drawdown of more than 1 million af in 2012 and 2020. It is beyond the scope of this paper to estimate what the drawdown of Powell+Mead would have otherwise been, but a reasonable estimate of the water savings caused by the delayed drawdown of Powell+Mead this year is between 400,000 to 900,000 af[7]. To this small degree, the autumn rains and programs and policies to reduce Lower Basin demand allowed the Basin’s water managers to take one small step back from the edge of the cliff.
Table 4. Change in the combined storage in Lake Powell and Lake Mead between October 1 and February 1 in indicated years.
1The combined contents of Lake Powell and Lake Mead began to increase on January 13, 2016. Between October 1 and January 13, the two reservoirs lost 655,000 af.
But, the Bad News
Bad news looms in the future, especially for Lake Powell. The January 2026 24-Month Study’s most probable forecast predicts that in March 2027, storage in Lake Powell will drop to 4,382,000 af of active storage, of which only 150,000 af is realistically accessible (3 ft above reservoir elevation 3500 ft).[8] When Lake Powell is at or below elevation 3500 ft, reservoir releases are complicated by the risk of cavitation in the Glen Canyon Dam turbines and the inability to constantly use the river outlet works. Under the minimum probable inflow forecast, the predicted elevation of Lake Powell is 3476 ft in March 2027, an elevation in which no water could be released through the penstocks and no hydropower would be produced.
Even the minimum probable forecast may be overly optimistic, because the forecast for April – July unregulated inflow to Lake Powell has been progressively decreasing, because the winter’s snowpack remains meager. The Colorado River Basin Forecast Center’s official February 1 forecast is that the 50th percentile prediction (considered the most probable forecast) is 2.4 million af, significantly less than the January forecast of 3.65 million af (Fig. 4). The 90th percentile prediction (considered the minimum probable forecast) has dropped from 2.1 million af to 950,000 af. If the actual unregulated inflow were to be that of the minimum probable forecast, 2026 would replace 2002 as the lowest April to July inflow on record. Reclamation’s February 24-Month Study will be released in mid-February, and those results will certainly draw considerable attention.
Figure 4. Graph showing forecast of unregulated inflow to Lake Powell made by NOAA’s Colorado Basin River Forecast Center. The dark blue line is the median forecast. The downward trend of the forecast means that more recent forecasts are predicting smaller inflows to Lake Powell. The redlines are the official CBRFC forecasts that the USBR uses as input for the 24- Month Studies.
Unless the snowpack significantly improves between now and early April, Reclamation will have difficult choices to make. Ideally, the agency could use a combination of a large release from Flaming Gorge Reservoir coupled with an additional reduction in releases from Lake Powell to keep the elevation of Lake Powell above 3500 ft. Unless Flaming Gorge Reservoir releases are implemented using the Secretary of the Interior’s emergency authority, however, consultation and agreement with the Upper Basin states will be required. This was the strategy used in 2022, and Reclamation has indicated that even with a release of water from upstream reservoirs, there may still be a need for reductions in Lake Powell releases.[9] However, if the annual release from Lake Powell is reduced to 7 million af or less, the 10-year delivery of water from the Upper Basin to the Lower Basin will be less than what some states consider the delivery obligation of the Upper Basin (i.e., the Compact tripwire). In such a circumstance, interstate litigation might ensue.
Until basin-wide uses are reduced to meet the available supply, there are no good choices!
[1] Combined active storage in Lake Mead and Lake Powell was 14,974,197 on October 1, 2025. Combined storage on February 1, 2026, was 14,973,991af. [2] The disparity between storage in the two reservoirs has continued to increase. On February 8, Lake Mead had 2,810,000 af more water in storage than Lake Powell. [3] Average flow of the Colorado River at Gypsum Canyon near Hite was calculated between June 30, 2023, and January 31, 2026. https://waterdata.usgs.gov/monitoring-location/USGS-09328960/statistics/. [4] Average flow of the San Juan River near Bluff was calculated between October 30, 1914, and January 31, 2026. https://waterdata.usgs.gov/monitoring-location/USGS-09379500/statistics/. [5] The goal of delayed release was to protect a target elevation at Lake Powell of 3525 feet. Adjustments to Glen Canyon Dam monthly releases were adjusted to hold back 598,000 af in Lake Powell between December 2025 and April 2026 (Reclamation, January 2026 24-Month Study). https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/24mo.pdf. [6] 2010-2025 [7] This is the interquartile range of the 12 years when Powell+Mead declined in storage. [8] For an explanation of “realistically accessible storage” see Schmidt et al., Analysis of Colorado River Basin Storage Suggests Need For Immediate Action, Sep. 11, 2025, https://www.inkstain.net/2025/09/analysis-of-colorado-river-basin-storage-suggests-need-for-immediate-action/. [9] Reclamation, 2024 SEIS ROD: Section 6(E) Monthly Meeting, Jan. 22, 2026.
Authors:
[1] Director, Center for Colorado River Studies, Utah State University, former Chief, Grand Canyon Monitoring and Research Center. [2] Retired General Manager, Colorado River Water Conservation District. [3] Getches-Wilkinson Center, University of Colorado Law School, former US Commissioner, Upper Colorado River Commission, former Assistant Secretary for Water and Science, US Dept. of the Interior. [4] Kyl Center for Water Policy, Arizona State University, former Director, Phoenix Water Services. [5] Staff Attorney, Utton Transboundary Resources Center, University of New Mexico.
You’ve seen that quote here before – and you’ll probably see it again; if this were a Wagnerian opera, that line would be a lietmotif, a recurring musical thread associated with a particular character or place or idea in the story being told musically. And who’s to say, ‘The Romance of the Colorado River,’ Frederick Dellenbaugh’s title, might make a grand opera.
But before launching into the next chapter in the ‘Romance of the Colorado River,’ there are some items of news to note. The no-news item of course continues to be the ongoing stalemate in the ongoing negotiations between the Upper and Lower Colorado River Basins. On the eve of their Valentine’s Day deadline, there is talk of new ‘interim interim guidelines,’ two to five years, for at least a nominal state presence as the Bureau of Reclamation tries to keep the lights on and some water flowing.
The bigger news is the extent to which the Colorado River Basin continues this winter to experience the reality we have created: an ongoing anthropogenic ‘heat drought’ (February temperatures in the 50s to 8,000 feet elevation this past week), coupled with a ‘dry drought’ – probably also caused by anthropogenic warming-induced changes over the Pacific Ocean. Snowpacks in the mountains from whence the river’s waters flow range from 35 to 85 percent of normal in mid-February; we may be heading for new records in low runoff.
The biggest news, but probably less noted, is a new take on the larger reality we have created globally. Late in January, the United Nations headquarters came out with a fairly astounding announcement:
“Amid chronic groundwater depletion, water overallocation, land and soil degradation, deforestation, and pollution, all compounded by global heating, a UN report today declared the dawn of an era of global water bankruptcy, inviting world leaders to facilitate honest, science-based adaptation to a new reality.” (Emphasis added)
This announcement was generally ignored, in the world’s morbid fascination over ‘what the Trumpsters are breaking today.’ But the scientists who generated this report claim that phrases like ‘water stress’ and ‘water crisis’ are too hopeful, suggesting deviations from a normalcy that we might somehow be able to get back to. Today, they say, ‘many rivers, lakes, aquifers, wetlands, and glaciers have been pushed beyond tipping points and cannot bounce back to past baselines.’ Bankruptcy.
A short list of global ‘hotspots’ included the American Southwest, where ‘the Colorado River and its reservoirs have become symbols of over-promised water,’ with no reasonable hope of ever fulfilling those promises. Nothing new there – but calling it a state of bankruptcy bumps the desperation level up a little.
Now, back to the ‘Romance of the Colorado River.’ Do remember that when we talk about ‘romancing’ here, we are not talking about a sappy love story; we are talking about people muscling up to take on a challenge that is beyond or below the mundanity of life. In the last post on this site, we looked at ‘the Colorado River and the Romance of Exploration.’ Dellenbaugh’s Romance of the Colorado River was published in 1903, and covered the adventures of everyone from the early Spanish conquistadores trying to sail up the river from its delta, to the trappers strip-mining the beavers from its upper tributaries, with a final focus on the explorations of John Wesley Powell who first sketch-mapped the unknown area between the upper river and the lower.
Dellenbaugh pulled no punches in describing his sense of the river and the challenge it represented. After noting in his introduction that ‘in every country, the great rivers have presented attractive pathways for interior exploration—gateways for settlement,’ serving as ‘friends and allies’ – he launches into his initial impressions of the Colorado River:
“By contrast, it is all the more remarkable to meet with one great river which is none of these helpful things, but which, on the contrary, is a veritable dragon, loud in its dangerous lair, defiant, fierce, opposing utility everywhere, refusing absolutely to be bridled by Commerce, perpetuating a wilderness, prohibiting mankind’s encroachments, and in its immediate tide presenting a formidable host of snarling waters whose angry roar, reverberating wildly league after league between giant rock-walls carved through the bowels of the earth, heralds the impossibility of human conquest and smothers hope.“
Opposing utility everywhere? Refusing absolutely to be bridled by Commerce? Heralding the impossibility of human conquest, smothering hope? Could he have said anything more stirring in throwing down the gauntlet to an adolescent civilization?
Dellenbaugh’s Romance does sort of follow the formula of today’s sappy romance novel, but on the grand scale of the romantic adventure: first you establish the object of the protagonist’s ‘dangerous’ love as arrogant or disturbed or otherwise undesirable or unattainable – but therefore… irresistibly attractive. Why are we drawn to such hard cases? Why wouldn’t we leave such an angry and extreme river alone, like countless generations of First Peoples had done, settling riparian along its tributaries and even the mainstream, but just living with the ‘veritable dragon’ as it was, and doing nothing to confront or challenge it? Or to bend it to their perceived needs? But we Euro-Americans are a civilization in which ‘love conquers all’ – or else. Love or its simulacra – lust for wealth, for power, for knowledge, whatever. Come not between a woman and her lust for impossible men – or a civilization and its lust for everything it doesn’t already control.
So it almost seems more destiny than coincidence that when Dellenbaugh wrapped up the ‘Romance of Exploration’ in 1903, that was also the year the U.S. Reclamation Service went to work, following the Reclamation Act of 1902, to reclaim and conserve the river.
Theodore Roosevelt and John Muir at Glacier Point. By Underwood & Underwood – This image is available from the United States Library of Congress’s Prints and Photographs division under the digital ID cph.3g04698. See Commons:Licensing for more information., Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=3517191
We call Theodore Roosevelt ‘the father of American conservation,’ but he did not have the commonly accepted sense of conservation that we have today. Conservation to Roosevelt and his sidekick Gifford Pinchot was the full and efficient development of resources otherwise wasted. Freshwater running off to the ocean in an unmanageable spring flood was a prime example of profligate ‘waste’; they took it on through a Reclamation Service charged with working with farm communities, to develop irrigation systems to get water out of the rampant river and on to the dry land, thus conserving for human use both the land and water, each ‘useless’ until combined with the other.
The Reclamation Service was created as a division of the U.S. Geological Survey, which was still a bulwark of John Wesley Powell’s disciplined science in the otherwise freewheeling Interior Department, aka General Land Office, charged primarily with privatizing the public lands through the Homestead Act and other laws. From the start, the Reclamation Service was filled with idealistic young engineers infused with the spirit of Rooseveltian conservation – the kind of idealism that could gradually transmogrify into the unconscious arrogance of those who Know They Are Doing Good and are therefore Always Right.
Their idealism is reflected in an article written in 1918 by C.J. Blanchard of the U.S. Reclamation Service, for The Mentor, an educational publication:
“A vein of romance runs through every form of human endeavor…. In the desert romance finds its chief essentials in adventure, courage, daring and self-sacrifice. For more than half a century man has been writing a romance of compelling interest upon the face of the dusty earth. Irrigation, with Midas’ touch, has changed the desert’s frown to smiling vistas of verdure.“
In a section titled ‘The Romance of Reclamation,’ Blanchard described the reclamation engineers as men not concerned about ‘large emoluments, for government salaries are notoriuously meager’; instead, ‘as they toiled in the fastness of mountains, an abysmal canyons or far out in the voiceless desert, through the blazing heat of the Southwest or the fierce blizzards of the northern plains, this thought was uppermost, “By this work we shall make the desert bloom.”’
But the reclamation engineers quickly found working at the farm end of irrigation systems drawing water from the wildly varying flows of the Colorado River frustrating at best, impossible at worst. And they were engineers, not scientists – engineers with a brave new world of technology unfolding; fellow engineers were building the Panama Canal (1904-1914) using steam trains and steam shovels that could move more dirt in an hour than a hundred farmers with shovels could move in a day. Scientists just figure out how the world works; engineers figure out how to make it work better. (or so they hope).
So within their first half-decade the Reclamation Service engineers were drawn toward larger projects that, in effect, would ‘correct’ the inefficiency and maddening variability of the river: the Roosevelt Dam up in the Salt River canyons storing the spring flood for release to irrigators throughout the whole growing season; a concrete weir dam all the way across the lower Colorado River to keep the late summer flows up to the headgate of the Laguna Irrigation Project near Yuma; a five-mile tunnel from the Black Canyon of the Gunnison River to the water-short (or over-developed) Uncompahgre Valley – all three projects begun in 1905-6.
Gunnison Tunnel via the National Park Service
Evolving concrete technology, and the evolving internal combustion engine made them dream of even larger projects, addressing all the natural challenges posed by Dellenbaugh’s ‘veritable dragon.’ In 1907 the Reclamation Service separated from the U.S. Geological Survey and became an independent bureau in the Department of Interior. This separation was more than just a name change; they also began to work independently of John Wesley Powell’s scientific rigor practiced in the Geological Survey.
U.S. Geological Survey hydrologist Eugene Clyde La Rue takes notes (top) while in camp on Diamond Creek, a tributary to the Colorado River in Arizona, in 1923. La Rue (bottom; standing in water) measures river discharge along Havasu Creek, another tributary in Arizona, also in 1923. Click image for larger version. Credit: Both: U.S. Geological Survey
This became a background issue when the seven states of the Colorado River Basin gathered in 1922 to try to work out an equitable division of the river among themselves. Knowledge of the actual flow of the river was sketchy. Rough measures of the flow at a Yuma gauge only went back to the mid-1890s, and gave an average in the wild annual fluctuations of just under 18 million acre-feet (maf). But a Geological Survey scientist, E. C. LaRue, had studied tree rings and other evidence, and argued that the river was just in a very wet spell, that the longer-term average flow of the river was probably well under 15 maf, maybe as low as 10-12 maf (what it appears to be today). He also cautioned that extensive storage in desert reservoirs would exact a large toll in reservoir evaporation; there would be more water available for use, but the tradeoff would be less water overall.
LaRue – John Wesley Powell’s kind of scientist – offered to consult with the Compact Commission; but nobody really wanted to hear what he was known for saying, and his offer was ignored by Chairman Herbert Hoover (an engineer). But a constant advisory presence at the compact planning meetings was Reclamation Commissioner Arthur Powell Davis, another engineer and an active participant in discussion leading to the commission accepting the Bureau figures, and deciding that a ‘temporary equitable division’ of 15 maf between an upper and lower basin was a reasonably conservative division, leaving enough uncommitted water for ‘those men who may come after us, possessed of a far greater fund of information, [to] make a further division of the river.’
Current water mavens Eric Kuhn and John Fleck wrote a well-researched book,Science Be Dammed: How Ignoring Inconvenient Science Drained the Colorado River, detailing this decision to ignore solid USGS science in drafting the compact. A more mythic summary of what happened probably lies in desert poet Mary Austin’s recollection of a legend about the Hassayampa River, a Colorado River tributary; if anyone drinks its water, according to the legend, they will ‘no more see fact as naked fact, but all radiant with the color of romance.’ Whatever was in the Hassayampa’s water may have infiltrated the entire Colorado River in the 20th century.
Basically, the Bureau of Reclamation, with all the emerging technology and its vision of ‘making the desert bloom,’ was itching to take on the ‘veritable dragon.’ The ‘Romance of Exploration’ had uncovered a rampaging river whose waters were needed for American advancement; the ‘Romance of Conquest’ was the obvious next step, and science just based on the ‘naked facts’ no longer seemed to dictate the limits of the possible. We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. That may not have been so baldly stated until 2004, but it was the driving theme of the 20th century – first in America, then globally.
President Franklin Roosevelt at dedication of Boulder (now Hoover) Dam, September 30, 1935
The Romance of Conquest began with the three 1905-6 projects, but shifted into high gear with the Boulder Canyon Project, created by Congress in 1929 following ratification of the Colorado River Compact – almost simultaneously with the onset of the Great Depression. The Project became practically the nation’s only bright light in the early 1930s, and became a template for much of Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal.’
The centerpiece of the Boulder Canyon Project was Hoover Dam, the largest dam project ever undertaken anywhere, capable of storing almost two years of the river’s flow, and as it released water on demand from the ‘desert bloomers’ downstream, it would generate enough electricity to handle most of the Southwest’s power demand at that time. But while the big dam was being built, the Bureau was also building the Imperial Weir Dam 180 miles downstream, to diverting more than three million acre-feetof water into the All-American Canal for an 80-mile trip to the Imperial Valley where crops could be grown year round. And between those two huge works, the Bureau was also overseeing construction of Parker Dam (not officially part of the Boulder Canyon Project) to pool up water for a 250-mile aqueduct a Metropolitan Water District was building to carry domestic water to California’s burgeoning south coast cities.
All of that was completed by 1941 – a massive coordinated regional development: food, water and power for cities that quickly became an industrial force in the winning of World War II. And it was all done on budget, and on time, organized by an agency created only forty years earlier to help small new farming communities build local irrigation systems.
And I’m going to pause there, at the moment of the Bureau’s triumph, and pick up the rest of the story of the Romance of Conquest in the next post here. Stay tuned.
The California Aqueduct, San Joaquin Valley, California. Sources/Usage: Public Domain.
The Bureau of Reclamation’s latest forecast for the Colorado River predicts Lake Powell will “most probably” drop below the critical minimum power pool level before the end of this year, jeopardizing Glen Canyon Dam’s structural integrity. In the worst-case scenario, it would do so before summer’s end. This could force the feds to operate the dam as a “run-of-the-river” operation to preserve the dam’s infrastructure and hydropower output, which would significantly diminish downstream flows and threaten Lower Basin water supplies.
Lake Powell could receive only half the normal amount of water from upstream rivers and streams this year, according to a recent federal study.
The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation releases a monthly study that forecasts good, bad and most likely storage conditions for the Colorado River Basin’s key reservoirs over the next two years. The February forecast expects about 52%, or about 5 million acre-feet, of the normal amount of water to flow into Lake Powell by September. The more grim outlook says Powell’s inflows could be 3.52 million acre-feet or 37% of the average from 1991 to 2020.
It’s enough to spike concerns about hydropower generation at Glen Canyon Dam — which controls releases from Powell — prompt discussions about emergency releases from upstream reservoirs and trigger federal actions to slow the pace of water out of the reservoir.
“I think they’re going to be nervous about operating the turbines,” said Eric Kuhn, former general manager for the Colorado River Water Conservation District.
In January, about 79% of the 30-year average flowed into Lake Powell — which is on the Utah-Arizona border — from upstream areas of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming, according to the federal February 24-month study, released Friday.
The February projections also showed even less water flowing into Lake Powell, a decline of about 1.5 million acre-feet since January.
The Colorado River Basin, which provides water to 40 million people, has been plagued by a 25-year drought that drained its main reservoirs — the largest in the nation — to historic lows amid unyielding human demands.
And that stress is going to continue. The most probable forecast shows nothing but below-average flows in February — 71% of the 30-year average — and for April through July, when flows are likely to be 38% of the norm.
Feds take action to boost Powell
Upstream states like Colorado do not get a drop of water from Lake Powell, Kuhn said. Coloradans rely mostly on local reservoirs to help pace the spring runoff and support year-round water use.
But the reservoir’s status can impact whether upstream reservoirs, like Flaming Gorge in Wyoming and Blue Mesa in Colorado, will have to make emergency releases to elevate water levels in Lake Powell.
In response to the dry and warm winter, the federal government is trying to keep the water in the reservoir above certain critical water levels, according to the study.
At 3,490 feet in elevation, Glen Canyon Dam can no longer send Powell’s water through its penstocks and turbines to generate hydroelectric power — that would remove a cheap, renewable and reliable power source for communities across the West.
Lake Powell is projected to drop below the critical elevation by December, or as soon as August in one scenario, according to the 24-month study.
Federal officials are likely to call for emergency water releases from upstream reservoirs to keep Powell’s water level from falling to that point. They’re working to maintain a cushion by keeping Powell’s water level above 3,525 feet, or at the very least 3,500 feet in elevation, according to the study.
Lake Powell’s elevation was just over 3,532 feet as of Monday, but it’s expected to drop to 3,497 feet by Sept. 30 under the most likely forecast. (The minimum forecast puts it closer to 3,469 feet.)
Putting himself in the Bureau of Reclamation’s shoes, Kuhn would be looking upstream to fill that gap.
“Where do they plan for it?” he said. “I would be looking to get a lot of water if I’m going to keep Lake Powell above 3,500. … 3,525 may not be possible. There just may not be enough water in the system.”
Facing new lows
That is partly because the Bureau of Reclamation is required by a 2007 agreement, which expires this fall, to release certain amounts of water each year based on reservoir elevations. Replacing these rules is the focus of ongoing high-stakes — and deadlocked — negotiations among states.
Powell’s releases are expected to be 7.48 million acre-feet between Oct. 1, 2025, and Sept. 30, according to the February 24-month study.
To try to keep reservoir levels up, the Bureau of Reclamation has adjusted its normal releases since December to keep about 600,000 acre-feet of water in the reservoir. That water will eventually be released downstream as required by the 2007 rules.
Federal officials could also release less than 7.48 million acre-feet this year to keep more water in Lake Powell, according to the study. A 2024 short-term agreement allows the officials to release as little as 6 million acre-feet of water this year to avoid Lake Powell falling below 3,500 feet.
Lake Powell’s lowest release was about 2.43 million acre-feet in 1964, when the reservoir was first being filled. Since 2000, when the basin dipped into the ongoing 25-year drought, Powell’s average annual release has been 8.69 million acre-feet, according to The Sun’s analysis of water release data.
“I don’t think they’re going to release 7.48 this year. I think they have to cut the flow down to 7 (million acre-feet) or even below,” Kuhn said.
The Bureau of Reclamation’s latest forecast for the Colorado River predicts Lake Powell will “most probably” drop below the critical minimum power pool level before the end of this year, jeopardizing Glen Canyon Dam’s structural integrity. In the worst-case scenario, it would do so before summer’s end. This could force the feds to operate the dam as a “run-of-the-river” operation to preserve the dam’s infrastructure and hydropower output, which would significantly diminish downstream flows and threaten Lower Basin water supplies.
Valentines Day wasn’t so lovey-dovey on the Colorado River.
First, the Bureau of Reclamation (BoR) released a grimmer-than-ever spring runoff forecast for the Colorado River and its two big reservoirs. Then the seven Colorado River Basin states announced that they once again had failed to reach an agreement on a plan to bring demand into line with diminishing supplies by the Feb. 14 deadline. While the states have blown by other deadlines since negotiations began in 2022, this time was different in that it triggered the federal government to move forward to impose a post-2026 management plan of its own.
On paper, the states still have until the end of the water year, or Oct. 1, to come up with a deal or to implement an alternate plan. But that may be too little too late to keep Lake Powell’s surface level from dropping below minimum power pool — otherwise known as de facto dead pool — later this year. While the negotiations are over the Colorado River, or rather the water in the river, in many ways they pivot around the need to keep Lake Powell’s surface level above 3,500 feet in elevation. That can only be done by releasing less water out of Glen Canyon Dam, or increasing flows into the reservoir, or a bit of both.
The sticking point in the negotiations hinges upon whether the Upper Basin states will take mandatory and verifiable cuts in water use. The Lower Basin states have already taken cuts, and have agreed to take more, but only if the Upper Basin does the same.
The Upper Basin (aka the Headwaters states) points out that while the Lower Basin has maxed out and even exceeded its Colorado River Compact allocation of 7.5 million acre-feet per year, the Upper Basin hasn’t even come close to using all of the water it’s entitled to. Furthermore, Upper Basin water users, especially those with more junior water rights, have grappled with drastic reductions during dry years because the Upper Basin lacks large reservoirs for storing water, meaning their water use is dictated in large part by the rivers’ flows. In 2021, for example, many southwestern Colorado farms had their ditches cut off as early as June, forcing them to sit the season out.
The Lower Basin states long used their entire 7.5 MAF allocation and then some, while the Upper Basin states use only about 4 MAF per year. In recent years, Arizona and California have cut consumptive use. Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
It’s also far simpler logistically to reduce consumption in the Lower Basin, where huge water users are served by a handful of very large diversions, such as the Central Arizona Project canal (which carries water to Phoenix and Tucson), the All-American Canal (serving the Imperial Irrigation District — the largest single water user on the entire river), and the California Aqueduct (serving Los Angeles and other cities), all of which are fed by Lake Mead and other reservoirs. Dialing back those three diversions alone could achieve the necessary water use reduction. The Upper Basin, on the other hand, pulls water from the river and its tributaries via hundreds of much smaller diversions; achieving meaningful cuts would require shutting off thousands of irrigation ditches to thousands of small water users under dubious authority. (ed. emphasis mine]
Also, proposals to divert and consume more of the Colorado River’s water — such as the Lake Powell pipeline — remain on the table, albeit tenuously. If that project were to be realized, which is a big if these days, it would further drain Lake Powell and result in even less water flowing down to the Lower Basin.
The Imperial Irrigation District is the largest single water user on the Colorado River by far. Most of that water goes to irrigating agriculture, including a fair amount of alfalfa and other forage crops. Las Vegas uses about one-tenth the amount of water as the IID. Source: Bureau of Reclamation.
Environmental groups tend to side with the Lower Basin on this issue. If the Upper Basin is forced to pull less water from the river, it would leave more water for the river, riparian ecosystems along the river, and aquatic critters. The Upper Basin’s proposal to release a percentage of the river’s “natural flow” from Glen Canyon Dam would leave less water in the Colorado River through the Grand Canyon, possibly imperiling endangered fish and rafting.
Meanwhile, the states’ lack of consensus pushes Glen Canyon Dam closer to the brink of deadpool.
The BoR’s “Post-2026 Operational Guidelines and Strategies for Lake Powell and Lake Mead” offers five alternative scenarios for how to run the river. While it doesn’t give a “preferred” alternative, officials have indicated that without all of the states’ approval or congressional action, they are only authorized to go with the Basic Coordination Alternative. That would include a minimum annual release of 7.0 million acre-feet from Glen Canyon Dam, with the largest mandatory cuts being borne by Arizona. But according to the BoR’s latest 24 month projection, that release level would lead to Lake Powell’s surface level dropping below minimum power pool by the end of this year, which is a really big problem.
The back of Glen Canyon Dam circa 1964, not long after the reservoir had begun filling up. Here the water level is above dead pool, meaning water can be released via the river outlets, but it is below minimum power pool, so water cannot yet enter the penstocks to generate electricity. Bureau of Reclamation photo. Annotations: Jonathan P. Thompson
Back in 2022, as climate change continued to diminish the Colorado River’s flows and Lake Powell shrunk to alarmingly low levels, the dam’s operators were faced with the prospect of having to shut down the penstocks, or water intakes for the hydroelectric turbines, and only release water from the river outlets lower on the dam. Not only would this zero out electricity production from the dam, along with nixing up to $200 million in revenue from selling that power, it might also compromise the dam itself. “Glen Canyon Dam was not envisioned to operate solely through the outworks for an extended period of time,” wrote Tanya Trujillo, then-Interior Department assistant secretary for water and science, in 2022, “and operating at this low lake level increases risks to water delivery and potential adverse impacts to downstream resources and infrastructure. … Glen Canyon Dam facilities face unprecedented operational reliability challenges.”
In March 2024, a BoR technical decision memorandum verified and clarified those risks, and recommended that dam operators “not rely on the river outlet works as the sole means for releasing water from Glen Canyon Dam.”
The only way to do that is to keep the water level above 3,490 feet in elevation, which could mean shifting Glen Canyon Dam to a run of the river operation — where releases equal Lake Powell inflows minus evaporation and seepage — as soon as this fall. That, most likely, will lead to annual releases far below 7 million acre-feet, which will then lead to Lake Mead’s level being drawn down considerably as the Lower Basin states rely on existing storage to meet their needs, thereby threatening Lower Basin supplies. Such a scenario is clearly not sustainable, would put the Upper Basin states in violation of the Colorado River Compact1, and would almost certainly lead to litigation.
An irony here is that Glen Canyon Dam’s primary purpose is to allow the Upper Basin to store water during wet years and release it during dry years, enabling it to meet its Compact obligations. Hydropower, silt control, and recreation were secondary purposes. Now the need to preserve the dam could cause the Upper Basin to run afoul of the Compact. Aridification is rendering the dam obsolete, at least as a water storage savings account. Meanwhile, low levels are diminishing hydropower and recreation. It seems that soon, the dam’s main purpose will be to prevent Lake Mead from filling up with silt. [ed. emphasis mine]
Mother Nature, or Mother Megadrought, if you prefer, has left few options for moving forward. The states still could come to an agreement, but it’s difficult to see how, given the long-running stalemate so far. The feds could reengineer Glen Canyon Dam to allow for sustained, low-water releases. That would only be a temporary fix, however, unless climatic trends reverse themselves and the West suddenly becomes much wetter and cooler. Somehow, that doesn’t seem too likely.
🥵 Aridification Watch 🐫
Is all of this Colorado River talk a bit confusing? Do you find yourself lost in the water-wonk weeds? Yeah, me too. That’s why I put together the Land Desk’s Colorado River glossary and primer. It’s not behind the paywall yet, so even you free-riders can take a look for the next few days. It’s worth looking at even if you already received the email edition last month, because it is now updated with new terms and more graphics (it didn’t all fit in the email version). I’ll keep updating it, too, as new questions about what it all means come up. And if you’re not already, you should consider becoming a paid subscriber and break down the archive paywall, allowing you to read the whole list of analysis, commentary, and data dumps I’ve done on the Colorado River over the last five years.
1 The Upper Basin and Lower Basin generally disagree on how to interpret the Colorado River Compact’s provision dictating that the Upper Basin “not cause the flow of the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75 million acre-feet” for any 10-year period. The Upper Basin sees it as a “non-depletion obligation,” meaning they can’t exceed their 7.5 MAF/year allocation if it causes the Lee Ferry flow to fall below a 7.5 MAF/year average. The Lower Basin believes it’s a “delivery obligation,” and that the Upper Basin must deliver 7.5 MAF/year no matter what. Which interpretation is correct determines whether run-of-the-river would violate the Compact or not.
The Colorado River Basin spans seven U.S. states and part of Mexico. Lake Powell, upstream from the Grand Canyon, and Lake Mead, near Las Vegas, are the two principal reservoirs in the Colorado River water-supply system. (Bureau of Reclamation)
The Government Highline Canal, near Grand Junction, delivers water from the Colorado River, and is managed by the Grand Valley Water Users Association. Prompted by concerns about outside investors speculating on Grand Valley water, the state convened a work group to study the issue. CREDIT: BRENT GARDNER-SMITH/ASPEN JOURNALISM
Click the link to read the article on The Denver Post website (Elise Schmelzer). Here’s an excerpt:
February 17, 2026
Negotiators from the seven states along the Colorado River blew past yet another federal deadline over the weekend without reaching a compromise on how to share its water — even as this winter’s dismal snowpack could spell immediate disaster for the river system.
Westwide SNOTEL basin-filled map February 18, 2026.
Years-long discussions about how to split the river’s shrinking water supply, which is relied upon by 40 million people, remained deadlocked as the Saturday deadline for a final deal came and went. It was a deadline set by the U.S. Department of the Interior. The seven basin states are split into two factions that have not agreed on how to divvy up cuts to water supplies in dry years. The Lower Basin states of Arizona, California and Nevada lie downstream of Lakes Powell and Mead and rely on releases from those reservoirs for water. The Upper Basin states — Colorado, Wyoming, Utah and New Mexico — are upstream of the reservoirs and primarily depend on mountain snowpack for their water supplies. Leaders from each basin pointed fingers at the other as the deadline passed. Lower Basin negotiators have repeatedly said that Upper Basin states must “share the pain” and take mandatory cuts in dry years, which have become increasingly common in recent decades. But the Upper Basin states say their water users already take cuts every year because their supplies depend on the amount of water available and are not propped up by supplies in Lakes Powell and Mead. Repeated overuse in the Lower Basin has drained the two reservoirs, they’ve argued.
“We’re being asked to solve a problem we didn’t create with water we don’t have,” Colorado’s negotiator, Becky Mitchell, said in a statement Friday. “The Upper Division’s approach is aligned with hydrologic reality and we’re ready to move forward.”
The Bureau of Reclamation’s latest forecast for the Colorado River predicts Lake Powell will “most probably” drop below the critical minimum power pool level before the end of this year, jeopardizing Glen Canyon Dam’s structural integrity. In the worst-case scenario, it would do so before summer’s end. This could force the feds to operate the dam as a “run-of-the-river” operation to preserve the dam’s infrastructure and hydropower output, which would significantly diminish downstream flows and threaten Lower Basin water supplies.
As political leaders unleashed a series of pointed statements Friday, the Bureau of Reclamation released new projections that show one of the river system’s major reservoirs could be in peril as soon as this summer. The bureau’s new projections show that, if drought conditions remain dire, Lake Powell could fall so low by the end of July that water would no longer flow through Glen Canyon Dam’s hydropower system — a level called “dead pool.” Even if snow conditions improve, the reservoir could still reach dead pool in November — a scenario the bureau dubbed its most probable outcome. The Colorado River District, an agency created by the Colorado legislature that’s based in Glenwood Springs and advocates for Western Slope water needs, said it was disappointing that Lower Basin negotiators walked away from discussions on the day the projections were released.
“With Lake Powell now quickly approaching dead pool, that decision reflects a continued disconnect from hydrologic reality and a clear refusal to confront the core problem: longstanding Lower Basin overuse,” the district said Monday in a statement.
Snowpack across the mountains that feed the Colorado River remained dismal in early February. Above Lake Powell, snowpack on Feb. 1 sat at 47% of the median recorded for that time of year between 1991 and 2020. The water year — which began Oct. 1 — has so far featured record-setting warmth and limited precipitation, according to the National Weather Service’sColorado Basin River Forecast Center. That could translate to water supplies at 38% of normal, according to the center. Current projections show inflow into Lake Powell will total a meager 2.4 million acre-feet — far less than the 7.5 million acre-feet allocated to the Lower Basin in the 1922 Colorado River Compact.
Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0
Like much of the West, Colorado’s water future will be shaped by a warming climate, population growth, and subsequently increasing competition for finite supplies. In conversations about managing our coveted Colorado River headwater resources, it is easy to assume the most influential voices belong to the well-represented on the population-dense Front Range or the well-funded interests far downstream. Yet some of the most consequential water decisions play out in small mountain valleys, often with limited staff, limited funding, and limited political clout.
It was in that context, despite the Great Recession of 2008, that voters approved the creation of Pitkin County Healthy Rivers that November, a sales tax-funded program with a simple but ambitious mandate: protect and enhance the rivers and streams of the Western Slope’s Roaring Fork Watershed on behalf of the people and the environment.
What few imagined at the time was that this small, locally funded program would become such an effective way to ensure the people and their cherished rivers had a seat at the table in complex, high-stakes water discussions. A “seat” that is not symbolic; it’s practical, persistent and sometimes uncomfortable. Because having local voices is not a luxury — it is essential.
The Power of Showing Up
Healthy Rivers’ influence begins with showing up. Showing up ready to listen and engage, recognize partners and advance and fiscally sponsor new alliances, all while emphasizing local knowledge, data, and community-backed priorities. In basin-wide planning efforts, feasibility studies, and project negotiations, Healthy Rivers represents local, place-based interests that might otherwise get overshadowed by far more powerful players, be they up or downstream.
This has meant actively seeking valuable connections, therefore knowledge, daresay wisdom, with hopes of earning a voice that ensures headwaters perspectives are considered at these tables. Think Colorado Basin Roundtable, U.S. Forest Service, Colorado Parks and Wildlife, the Colorado Water Conservation Board, local and nearby watershed groups, and other environmental non-profits. This outreach has led to critical partnerships and heightened transparency and inclusivity on many water matters. It has also meant supporting technical analyses and funding early-stage studies — most recently for water-quality monitoring on Lincoln Creek, a tributary to the Roaring Fork — so local conditions and risks are understood before decisions are made elsewhere.
And because our funding comes directly from local voters, Healthy Rivers advocates from the position of our constituents who overwhelmingly supported its creation. That matters in rooms where water is discussed in acre-feet and complex legal terms, often far removed from community-specific values. This has allowed Healthy Rivers to elevate community priorities in negotiations around watershed health, elevating environmental values like instream flows.
Small Programs, Real Influence
One misconception about many local programs is that they are too small to matter. In practice, Healthy Rivers has demonstrated that being nimble is an advantage. Healthy River’s contributions are rarely flashy, but they have been catalytic, having a role in everything from diversion arbitration, instream flow protections, riparian habitat restoration, and water-quality monitoring.
It has done this by supporting projects like technical studies, restoration efforts, and infrastructure improvements that likely wouldn’t have happened otherwise. And by convening unlikely partners, and stepping into conversations early, before positions harden and options narrow.
For example, Healthy Rivers helped support the pursuit of a Recreational In-Channel Diversion (RICD) on the Roaring Fork River, recognizing instream flow rights alongside recreation as legitimate, community-defining values worthy of legal protection. It is supporting a Wild & Scenic designation for the Crystal River, and investing in beaver-related studies in order to inform projects that restore wetlands, reconnect floodplains, and improve late-season flows.
Translating Complexity for Communities
Another core part of having a seat at the table is translation. Colorado water law, hydrology, and planning processes are famously complex. Without intentional effort, these processes can leave local communities feeling confused, disengaged, or shut out of decisions that directly shape their rivers.
Healthy Rivers sees its role as a bridge. It translates technical concepts into plain language, not to oversimplify, but to make participation possible. This has included helping residents understand what designations like “Wild & Scenic” actually do — and don’t — mean, or explaining how instream flow rights function alongside agricultural and municipal uses.
This two-way translation strengthens outcomes. Decision-makers gain local context. Communities gain confidence. And water decisions become more durable because they reflect shared understanding, not just legal compliance.
Collaboration Over Confrontation
A seat at the table does not guarantee agreement. Some of the most meaningful work Healthy Rivers does happens in moments of tension, usually when water supply, ecological health, recreation, and private property interests collide.
Our approach is rooted in collaboration, not advocacy for advocacy’s sake. That means listening carefully, acknowledging tradeoffs, and being honest about constraints. But it also means pushing back when local values are at risk of being overlooked. In projects like renovating the Sam Caudill State Wildlife Area, Healthy Rivers worked alongside CPW, Garfield County, and development partners to balance recreation access, public safety, and river protection, demonstrating how infrastructure investments can serve both people and rivers.
Lessons for Other Communities
This role requires patience. Water decisions typically move slowly, and progress often comes in inches rather than miles. And in a basin as complex as the Colorado River system, no one wins by going it alone. Our experience has reinforced a simple truth: collaboration works best when local voices are present early and consistently, not as an afterthought.
While not every community can replicate Pitkin County’s funding model, the underlying principles are transferable:
Local funding creates legitimacy. Voter-backed programs carry weight because they represent collective priorities.
Consistency builds trust. Showing up over time and building long term relationships matters.
Data and stories belong together. Technical rigor and real-world experience are stronger together than apart.
Early engagement saves time later. Investing upstream — literally and figuratively — reduces conflict downstream.
Healthy Rivers exists to ensure that when decisions are made about the Roaring Fork Watershed, the people who know and love these rivers are part of the conversation. That seat at the table does not guarantee outcomes, but it guarantees presence. And in water, as in so many things, presence is power.
Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0
Click the link to read the article on the AZCentral.com website (Branson Loomis). Here’s an excerpt:
February 13, 2026
Key Points
The seven Colorado River Basins states failed to reach a shortage-sharing agreement in time for a Feb. 14 deadline set by the federal government.
State officials say negotiations have yielded “almost no headway” toward a compromise over who will give up water.
The Interior Department has said it will impose its own plan, but that prospect could trigger a lengthy legal battle as states move to protect their water allocations.
The prospect of a costly and prolonged interstate lawsuit over rights to the Colorado River looms now that the states using the water are blowing past a Valentine’s Day deadline with no water-sharing deal in hand. With no agreement among the states, Interior Secretary Doug Burgum said the federal government could no longer delay action and would move forward with work on a set of alternatives outlined late last year.
“Negotiation efforts have been productive,” Burgum said in a statement Feb. 14. “We have listened to every state’s perspective and have narrowed the discussion by identifying key elements and issues necessary for an agreement. We believe that a fair compromise with shared responsibility remains within reach.”
[…]
The dispute has largely hinged on whether states in the headwaters region would agree to mandatory cuts [ed. no one has the authority to order mandatory cuts in Colorado and likely in the entire upper basin] to their overall supply in especially dry years — a commitment they have so far rejected in part because they do not use their full allocation as the more developed Southwest does…
“As I talk with people throughout Southern Nevada, I hear their frustration that years of negotiations have yielded almost no headway in finding a path through these turbulent waters. As someone who has spent countless nights and weekends away from my family trying to craft a reasonable, mutually acceptable solution only to be confronted by the same tired rhetoric and entrenched positions,” [John] Entsminger said, “I share that frustration.”
The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation has released a February 24-month study showing inflow to Lake Powell declining by 1.5 million acre-feet since January as the federal agency highlights the worsening hydrologic conditions across the Colorado River Basin.
The study of the most probable forecast for the Colorado River under current conditions was released on Friday, just as the seven compact states remained at a stalemate and failed to meet a Feb. 14 deadline for agreement on how to reduce their own usage of water to save the river.
U.S. Interior Secretary Doug Burgum announced on Saturday, Feb. 14, that the federal government is moving forward with finalizing operating guidelines for the Colorado River reservoirs by Oct. 1. His announcement adds pressure to Colorado and the other compact states to find compromise or face guidelines forced onto them by the federal government.
“While the seven Basin States have not reached full consensus on an operating framework, the Department cannot delay action,” the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation said in its announcement that the federal government was moving forward.
Colorado River Basin. Credit: USGS
The lack of agreement among the compact states and the idea of federal intervention raises the prospect of litigation that would be drawn out and ultimately end with the U.S. Supreme Court. The current Rio Grande Compact dispute between Texas and New Mexico that has taken 12 years to reach a proposed settlement, now filed with the U.S. Supreme Court, gives an indication to the slow-evolving nature of U.S. water law.
“I am disappointed that the seven Basin States could not reach a consensus agreement on the future management of the Colorado River by the U.S. Department of the Interior’s Feb. 14 deadline,” said Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser, who added that Colorado is prepared for litigation to protect Colorado’s rights and interests.
“Colorado will continue to work with our fellow Upper Division States to provide comments on the federal government’s draft environmental impact statement, which sets forth a range of possible solutions. The Upper Division States will have to cut back their usage of water from the Colorado River — by 40 percent or more — in the face of an historic drought,” he said.
U.S. Sen. John Hickenlooper said the low snowpack this winter is adding an exclamation point to the dire conditions of the Colorado River Basin. “If we don’t address this problem together — head-on and fast — our communities, farms, and economies will suffer,” Hickenlooper said.
“The best path forward is the one we take together. Litigation won’t solve the problem of this long-term aridification. No one knows for sure how the courts could decide and the math will only get worse.”
BLM’s February 24-month study shows a loss of 1.5 million acre-feet is equivalent to approximately 50 feet in elevation in Lake Powell.
“The basin’s poor hydrologic outlook highlights the necessity for collaboration as the Basin States, in collaboration with Reclamation, work on developing the next set of operating guidelines for the Colorado River system,” said Acting BLM Commissioner Scott Cameron. “Available tools will be utilized and coordination with partners will be essential this year to manage the reservoirs and protect infrastructure.”
The water year inflow is now estimated at just 52 percent of average, and as a result, the February 24-Month Study projects, for the first time, that Lake Powell could decline (based on most probable projections) to:
“The basin’s poor hydrologic outlook highlights the necessity for collaboration as the Basin States, in collaboration with Reclamation, work on developing the next set of operating guidelines for the Colorado River system,” said Acting BLM Commissioner Scott Cameron. “Available tools will be utilized and coordination with partners will be essential this year to manage the reservoirs and protect infrastructure.”
The water year inflow is now estimated at just 52 percent of average, and as a result, the February 24-Month Study projects, for the first time, that Lake Powell could decline (based on most probable projections) to:
3,490 ft – minimum power pool in December 2026; below this level Glen Canyon Dam’s ability to release water is reduced and it can no longer produce hydropower.
3,476 ft – in March 2027; the lowest elevation on record since filling further constraining the ability to release water from Glen Canyon Dam.
Colorado River managers estimate that around 4 million acre-feet of cuts are needed to bring the basin back into balance – an amount equal to more than a quarter of the Colorado River’s annual average flow.
“There needs to be unbelievably harsh, unprecedented cuts,” Brad Udall, a senior water and climate research scientist at the Colorado Water Center, told The Guardian media outlet.
“Mother Nature is not going to bail us out,” Udall said.
Udall/Overpeck 4-panel Figure Colorado River temperature/precipitation/natural flows with trend. Lake Mead and Lake Powell storage. Updated through Water Year 2025. Note the tiny points on the annual data so that you can flyspeck the individual years. Credit: Brad Udall
Flows in the Colorado River are down 20 percent over the last century and precipitation has shrunk by about 7 percent with rising temperatures as aridification takes hold across the southwest.
“The chickens are coming home to roost,” Udall said. “Climate models have underestimated how much warming we are going to get, and humans are not stepping up.”
Jack Schmidt, director of the Center for Colorado River Studies at Utah State University, likened the negotiations among the seven compact states to the final scene in “Thelma and Louise.” “Seven people have their hands on the steering wheel driving toward the edge of a cliff — and no one is working the brakes,” he reportedly said.
Udall/Overpeck 4-panel Figure Colorado River temperature/precipitation/natural flows with trend. Lake Mead and Lake Powell storage. Updated through Water Year 2025. Note the tiny points on the annual data so that you can flyspeck the individual years. Credit: Brad Udall
The Department of the Interior is moving forward with the Post-2026 NEPA process to finalize operating guidelines for Colorado River reservoirs by Oct. 1, 2026. While the seven Basin States have not reached full consensus on an operating framework, the Department cannot delay action. Meeting this deadline is essential to ensure certainty and stability for the Colorado River system beyond 2026.
“Negotiation efforts have been productive; we have listened to every state’s perspective and have narrowed the discussion by identifying key elements and issues necessary for an agreement. We believe that a fair compromise with shared responsibility remains within reach,” said Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum. “I want to thank the governors of the seven Basin States for their constructive engagement and commitment to collaboration. We remain dedicated to working with them and their representatives to identify shared solutions and reduce litigation risk. Additionally, we will continue consultations with Tribal Nations and coordinate with Mexico to ensure we are prepared for Water Year 2027.”
Prolonged drought conditions over the past 25 years and the most recent forecast showing inflow to Lake Powell declining by 1.5 million acre-feet since January underscore the ongoing challenges. The inflow reduction could result in Lake Powell dropping to an extremely low level, threatening water delivery and power generation.
The Colorado River is managed and operated under compacts, federal laws, court decisions and decrees, contracts and guidelines known collectively as the “Law of the River.” This apportions the water and regulates the use and management of the river among the seven Basin States – Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming – and Mexico. The Colorado River Compact is the cornerstone of the “Law of the River.” The 1944 Treaty with Mexico governs the sharing of the Colorado River between the two nations.
The Colorado River is a vital resource as it provides economic stability and enhances the quality of life across the basin. The river:
provides water to approximately 40 million people for municipal use.
supports the generation of hydroelectric energy, producing more than 8 billion kilowatt-hours annually powering the needs of approximately 700,000 homes.
sustains 5.5 million acres of farmland and agricultural communities where a significant share of the fruit and vegetables consumed in the United States are grown.
serves as a vital resource for 30 Tribal Nations and two Mexican states.
supports seven National Wildlife Refuges, four National Recreation Areas, and 11 National Parks.
“Through collaboration among the Department and Reclamation, states, Tribal Nations, Mexico and other key partners, we can create more opportunities for innovation and develop stronger tools to address drought and growing water demands,” said Assistant Secretary – Water and Science Andrea Travnicek. “Working together ensures that we combine expertise and resources to build solutions that benefit everyone and secure the future of the Colorado River.”
To learn more about this initiative, please visit the Colorado River Post-2026 website.
The operation of Lake Powell and Lake Mead in the February 2026 24-Month Study is pursuant to the December 2007 Record of Decision on Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and the Coordinated Operations of Lake Powell and Lake Mead (Interim Guidelines),1 the Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for Near-term Colorado River Operations Record of Decision (2024 Interim Guidelines SEIS ROD),2 and reflects the 2026 Annual Operating Plan (AOP). Pursuant to the Interim Guidelines, the August 2025 24-Month Study projections of the January 1, 2026, system storage and reservoir water surface elevations set the operational tier for the coordinated operation of Lake Powell and Lake Mead during 2026.
The August 2025 24-Month Study projected the January 1, 2026, Lake Powell elevation to be less than 3,575 feet and at or above 3,525 feet and the Lake Mead elevation to be at or above 1,025 feet. Consistent with Section 6.C.1 of the Interim Guidelines, and Section 6.E of the 2024 Interim Guidelines SEIS ROD, the operational tier for Lake Powell in water year (WY) 2026 is the Mid-Elevation Release Tier and the water year release volume from Lake Powell is projected to be 7.48 million acre feet (maf). To protect a target elevation at Lake Powell of 3,525 feet, adjustments to Glen Canyon Dam monthly volume releases have been incorporated into the December 2025 24-Month Study and include an adjusted monthly
release volume pattern for Glen Canyon Dam that will hold back a total of 0.598 maf in Lake Powell from December 2025 through April 2026. 3 That same amount of water (0.598 maf) will be released later in the water year. Given the hydrologic variability of the Colorado River System, the actual WY 2026 operations, and being consistent with Section 6.E of the 2024 Interim Guidelines SEIS ROD, the projected release from Lake Powell in WY 2026 may be less than 7.48 maf. Consistent with Section 6.E of the 2024 Interim Guidelines SEIS ROD, Reclamation will consider all tools that are available during the interim period to avoid Lake Powell elevation declining below 3,500 feet. The August 2025 24-Month Study projected the January 1, 2026, Lake Mead elevation to be below 1,075 feet and above 1,050 feet. Consistent with Section 2.D.1 of the Interim Guidelines, a Shortage Condition consistent with Section 2.D.1.a will govern the operation of Lake Mead for calendar year (CY) 2026. In addition, Section III.B of Exhibit 1 to the Lower Basin Drought Contingency Plan (DCP) Agreement will also govern the operation of Lake Mead for CY 2026. Lower Basin projections for Lake Mead take into consideration additional conservation efforts under the LC Conservation Program.
Current runoff projections into Lake Powell are provided by the National Weather Service’s Colorado Basin River Forecast Center. The observed unregulated inflow into Lake Powell for the month of January was 0.265 maf or 79% of the 30-year average from 1991 to 2020. The February 2026 unregulated inflow forecast for Lake Powell is 0.260 maf or 71% of the 30-year average. The 2026 April through July unregulated inflow forecast for Lake Powell is 2.40 maf or 38% of average. The WY 2026 unregulated inflow forecast for Lake Powell is 5.02 maf or 52% of average.
Due to changing Lake Mead elevations, Hoover’s generator capacity is adjusted based on estimated effective capacity and plant availability. The estimated effective capacity is based on projected Lake Mead elevations. Unit capacity tests will be performed as the lake elevation changes. This study reflects these changes in the projections.
For questions on Upper Colorado River Basin (UCB) reservoir operations, please contact Alex Pivarnik, the UCB River Operations Group Supervisor at apivarnik@usbr.gov. For questions on Lower Colorado River Basin (LCB) reservoir operations, please contact Noe Santos, the LCB River Operations Manager at nsantos@usbr.gov.
Hoover, Davis, and Parker Dam historical gross energy figures come from Power, Operations, and Maintenance reports provided by the Lower Colorado Region’s Power Office,
Bureau of Reclamation, Boulder City, Nevada. Questions regarding these historical energy numbers can be directed to Rebecca Rogers (rrogers@usbr.gov) or Kyra Cubi(kcubi@usbr.gov).
1 For modeling purposes, simulated years beyond 2026 assume a continuation of the 2007 Interim Guidelines including the 2024 Supplement to the 2007 Interim Guidelines (no additional SEIS conservation is assumed to occur after 2026), the 2019 Colorado River Basin Drought Contingency Plans, and Minute 323 including the Binational Water Scarcity Contingency Plan. With the exception of certain provisions related to Intentionally Created Surplus recovery and Upper Basin demand management, operations under these agreements are in effect through 2026. Reclamation initiated the process to develop operations for post-2026 in June 2023, and the modeling assumptions described here are subject to change.
The controversy surrounding Glen Canyon Dam’s River Outlet Works (ROW) centers on a critical design vulnerability: the dam may soon be unable to reliably release water if Lake Powell drops below the minimum power pool (3,490 feet). 1
Aerial photo of the Glen Canyon Dam near Page, Arizona. Photo by Alexander Heilner/The Water Desk, with aerial support by LightHawk.
While the dam usually releases water through high-elevation penstocks to generate hydropower, the ROW—four 8-foot-wide steel pipes—is theonly way to move water once levels drop too low for the turbines. Recent inspections by the Bureau of Reclamation revealed significant damage to these pipes, including cavitation—a process where high-velocity water creates vapor bubbles that implode, eroding the steel.2
Reliability Gap: The ROW was designed for temporary use (e.g., flood control), not for the continuous, long-term operation that a “dead pool” scenario would require. A March 2024 memo from the Bureau of Reclamation warned that they should not be relied upon as the sole means of sustained water delivery.3
Legal & Economic Threat: If the ROW fails or its capacity is restricted to prevent further damage, the Upper Basin states may be unable to meet their legal obligation to deliver water to 30 million people in the Lower Basin (Arizona, Nevada, California).4
Safety Buffer: Due to the damage, the Bureau recently determined they can only safely operate the ROW at levels at least 24 feet above dead pool (3,370 feet), effectively raising the “failure point” of the dam’s plumbing.5
Proposed Fixes: Environmental groups, such as the Utah Rivers Council, advocate for drilling new, lower-level bypass tunnels around the dam to ensure water can flow even at riverbed levels. However, these modifications are costly and could take over a decade to implement.6
Meadows in north Routt County, Colorado, were bare in spots on Feb. 9 after a slow start to this winter’s snowpack. Scott Franz/KUNC
Click the link to read the article on the KUNC website (Scott Franz):
February 13, 2026
This story is part of ongoing coverage of the Colorado River, produced by KUNC in Colorado and supported by the Walton Family Foundation. KUNC is solely responsible for its editorial coverage.
Jay Fetcher and other ranchers in northwest Colorado measure snowpack each winter using their barbed wire stock fences.
A healthy level is called a three wire winter, when the snow piles up past the third wire above the ground. But on Feb. 9, the region was experiencing a zero wire winter.
“We just have no snow, and I have never seen it, in my 75 years here, I have never seen this,” Fetcher said Monday as he navigated patches of mud on his ranch in the Elk River valley north of Steamboat Springs.
Jay Fetcher poses on his ranch in northwest Colorado on Feb. 9. Low snowpack is adding pressure to negotiations on how to conserve the dwindling Colorado River. Scott Franz/KUNC
Many of the hills and meadows surrounding his ranch were brown and bare. The thermostat on Fetcher’s truck read 50 degrees, and the last patch of snow was melting fast off the roof of a barn.
This year, Fetcher’s ranch is on the frontlines of record-low snowpack across the West that is adding a sense of urgency among seven states to finalize a plan for how to conserve the dwindling Colorado River.
The snow in the nearby Zirkel wilderness melts into the Elk River and irrigates Fetcher’s fields before the water eventually joins the Colorado River and flows to millions of people downstream.
But things have been changing near Fetcher’s ranch over the past decade, and it could have implications for states competing for the water supply.
Since 1951, the Fetchers have tracked how long the snow stays on their meadows by marking the date in a little red journal. The data shows the snow is melting sooner in the valley.
“In the past 10 years, the snow leaving the meadow has moved up by 12 days,” he said. “This winter is a real indication of climate change, with bare meadows in the middle of February. I mean, what date am I going to write down for (when) snow left the meadow this year? Did it ever come?”
Jay Fetcher walks through a barn door on his ranch in Routt County, Colorado. Scott Franz/KUNC
The dwindling water supply in the Colorado River basin is driving intense negotiations among the seven states over how to share it in the future. Some forecasts predict water levels at Lake Powell could get so low this year that its dam would stop producing electricity. States have until Saturday to come to an agreement and the pressure has been building.
If they don’t, they might end up fighting each other in the Supreme Court.
Downstream states, including California and Arizona, say Colorado and states in the upper basin should pitch in with mandatory water restrictions during dry years.
But leaders in the Rocky Mountains are digging in.
They say ranchers and cities are already enacting conservation plans, and more cuts should not be forced on them.
“If we don’t choose how to live within the river’s limits, the river will choose it for us, and she will not be gentle,” Becky Mitchell, Colorado’s top river negotiator, said in a speech to a water conference in January. “Operations (of the river’s reservoirs) must be supply based, not demand based, not entitlement justified, and not built on a hope that the next big year will save us.”
Negotiators in the lower basin are calling for compromise. J.B. Hamby is California’s water negotiator.
“It’s going to take everyone chipping in and making the necessary (water) reductions to balance the supply with the demand we have moving forward,” he said during a speech last month.
The Yampa River in downtown Steamboat Springs was mostly ice free on Feb. 9 as temperatures rose above 50 degrees. Scott Franz/KUNC
Sitting on a patio on his ranch in northwest Colorado, Fetcher said Monday he’s not confident the lower and upper basins will resolve their differences anytime soon.
He said he’s willing to donate some water he doesn’t use each year downstream to California, but under current regulations, he would risk losing his water rights under a ‘use it or lose it’ system.
“I know that we will be able to irrigate these meadows just fine, because of our water rights, because of where we are, because of the ranch being on the Elk River. So from a personal standpoint, I’m okay with it,” he said. “The challenging question is, what happens with the lower basin? They’re just going to have to think about how to get by with less water and not have so many golf courses out there.”
The deadline for the seven states to agree on a long-term plan for how to conserve the Colorado River is Saturday.
Westwide SNOTEL basin-filled map February 12, 2026.
A photo of Glen Canyon Dam from 2022, when the dam’s intake points were 33 feet away from minimum power pool. The top of the grate-like penstocks can be seen in this photo. Luna Anna Archey / High Country News
Floyd Dominy, the commissioner of the federal Bureau of Reclamation in the 1960s, was largely responsible for the construction of Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River. In 1963, when the dam was completed, he could not have foreseen the climate situation we find ourselves in today, with declining snowpack, record-high temperatures and alarmingly low water levels in Lake Powell, year after year. But he and his engineers could have, and should have, foreseen that the way they designed the dam would leave little room to maneuver should a water-supply crisis ever impact the river and its watershed.
Indeed, a state of crisis has been building on the Colorado for decades, even as the parties that claim its water argue over how to divide its rapidly diminishing flows. Lately, things have entered a new and perilous phase. Last Nov. 11 was a long-awaited deadline: Either the states involved — California, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, Colorado and Wyoming — would have to agree on a new management plan, or else the federal government would impose its own, something none of the parties would welcome. Meanwhile, the 30 tribes that also hold claims to the river have historically been and continue to be excluded from these negotiations.
Udall/Overpeck 4-panel Figure Colorado River temperature/precipitation/natural flows with trend. Lake Mead and Lake Powell storage. Updated through Water Year 2025. Note the tiny points on the annual data so that you can flyspeck the individual years. Credit: Brad Udall
That deadline came and went, and instead of acting, the government punted, this time to Feb. 14. Nobody was surprised: Unmet deadlines and empty ultimatums have been business as usual on the river for years. Decades of falling reservoir levels and clear warnings from scientists about global warming and drought have prompted much hand-wringing and some temporary conservation measures, but little in the way of permanent change in how water is used in the Colorado River Basin.
The downstream face of Glen Canyon Dam, which forms Lake Powell, America’s second-largest water reservoir. Water is released from the reservoir through a hydropower generation system at the base of the dam. Photo by Brian Richter
For decades, the seven Basin states have used more water than the river delivers by drawing their entitlements from surpluses banked in reservoirs during the wet 1980s and ’90s, chiefly in Lake Mead and Lake Powell. Never mind that those entitlements were based on an over-estimate of river flows in 1922, when the Colorado River Compact was established, rendering the “paper” water of the entitlements essentially a fiction, not to mention a source of continual conflict. That savings account has now been drained: Mead and Powell are each below 30% full, and the trend is steadily downward. Global warming has only accelerated the decline: So far this century, the river’s flow has fallen 20% from its long-term annual averages, and scientists forecast more of the same as the climate continues to heat up.
The back of Glen Canyon Dam circa 1964, not long after the reservoir had begun filling up. Here the water level is above dead pool, meaning water can be released via the river outlets, but it is below minimum power pool, so water cannot yet enter the penstocks to generate electricity. Bureau of Reclamation photo. Annotations: Jonathan P. Thompson
Meanwhile, the physical infrastructure that enables Colorado River water management is on the verge of its own real and potentially catastrophic crisis — and yet Reclamation has barely acknowledged this, with the exception of an oblique reference in an unposted technical memorandum from 2024. The falling reservoir levels reveal another, deeper set of problems inside Glen Canyon Dam, which holds back the Colorado and Lake Powell. The 710-foot-tall dam was designed for a Goldilocks world in which water levels would never be too high or too low, despite the well-known fact that the Colorado is by far the most variable river in North America, prone to prodigious floods and extended droughts. But the Bureau, bursting with Cold War confidence — or hubris — chose to downplay the threat. In the record-breaking El Niño winter of 1983, the Bureau almost lost the dam to overtopping, due to both its mismanagement and its design, because the dam lacks sufficient spillway capacity for big floods. Only sheets of plywood installed across its top and cooler temperatures that slowed the melting of that year’s snowpack saved Glen Canyon Dam.
The four 96-inch diameter steel pipes of the River Outlet Works. If the dam’s penstocks are closed, these pipes are the only remaining way to pass water through the dam, and are unsafe to use for extended intervals. Luna Anna Archey / High Country News
Gus Levy, Glen Canyon Dam’s plant facility manager, walks past hydropower turbines. In 2022, due to the low water level of Lake Powell, only five of the eight turbines operated on a daily basis, though all eight were kept in working order. Luna Anna Archey / High Country News
Today, the dam is threatened not by too much water but too little. In March 2023, the water level of Lake Powell dropped to within 30 feet of the minimum required for power generation, known as “minimum power pool.” At 3,490 feet above sea level, minimum power pool is 20 feet above the generators’ actual intakes, or penstocks, but the dam’s eight turbines must be shut down at minimum power pool to avoid cavitation — when air is sucked down like a whirlpool into the penstocks, forming explosive bubbles which can cause massive failure inside the dam.
Even more worrisome is what would happen next. At minimum power pool, the penstocks would have to be closed, and the only remaining way to pass water through the dam is the river outlet works, or ROWs: two intakes in the rear face of the dam leading to four 96-inch-diameter steel pipes with a combined maximum discharge capacity of 15,000 cubic feet per second. However, the ROWs, also known as bypass tubes, have a serious design flaw: They are unsafe to use for extended intervals, and start to erode when the reservoir is low.
In 2023, when the ROWs were used to conduct a high-flow release into the Grand Canyon at low-reservoir levels, there was, in fact, damaging cavitation, and the Bureau has warned that there would likely be more in the event of their extended use. In practice, safe releases downstream may only be a fraction of their claimed capacity — and if the tubes begin to experience cavitation, flows may need to be cut off entirely. Such a scenario would compromise the dam’s legal downstream delivery requirements, or, to put it bluntly, its ability to deliver enough water to the 25 million people downstream who rely on it — as well as the billions of dollars’ worth of agriculture involved. This means that Lake Powell — and with it, the entire Colorado River system — is perilously close to operational failure.
If reservoir levels drop to the ROWs’ elevation of 3,370 feet above sea level, Lake Powell would reach “dead pool,” where water would pass through the dam only when the river’s flow exceeded the amount of water lost to evaporation from the reservoir. No other intakes nor spillways exist below the ROWs. There is no “drain plug.” Yet there is more dam — 240 feet more before the bottom of the reservoir, effectively the old riverbed. This not-insignificant impoundment — about 1.7 million acre-feet of water — would be trapped, stagnant and heating in the sun, prone to algal blooms and deadly anoxia. The lake would rise and fall wildly, as much as 100 feet in a season, because of the martini-glass shape of Lake Powell’s vertical cross section.
Illustration from the report, <a href=”https://utahrivers.org/blog-post/2022/8/9/lenapost“>Antique Plumbing & Leadership Postponed</a> from the Utah Rivers Council, Glen Canyon Institute and the Great Basin Water Network. Courtesy of Utah Rivers Council
Insufficient or no flows through Glen Canyon Dam would be a disaster of unprecedented magnitude, affecting vast population centers and some of the biggest economies in the world, not to mention ecosystems that depend on the river all the way to the Gulf of California in Mexico. The Lower Basin states of California, Arizona and Nevada warned as much in a recent letter to Interior Secretary Doug Burgum, saying that Reclamation’s failure to mention the dam’s plumbing problems in its current environmental impact statement for post-2026 operations is against federal law. The letter reads: “Addressing the infrastructure limitations may be the one long-term measure that would best achieve operation and management improvements to the Glen Canyon Dam.”
To date, however, the Bureau has made no formal response.
One thing is clear: Glen Canyon Dam will need to be modified to meet its legal and operational requirements. In the process, the health of the ecosystems in Glen Canyon, above the dam, and in Grand Canyon, below it, must be considered. The best way to avoid operational failure and the economic and ecological disasters that would follow is to re-engineer the dam to allow the river to run through it or around it at river level, transporting its natural sediment load into the Grand Canyon.
Sketches by Floyd Dominy show the way he’d end the Glen Canyon Dam. From the article “Floyd Dominy built the Glen Canyon Dam, then he sketched its end on a napkin” on the Salt Lake Tribune
As it happens, Floyd Dominy himself provided us with a simple and elegant plan for how to do it. In 1997, the former commissioner sketched on a cocktail napkin how new bypass tunnels could be drilled through the soft sandstone around the dam and outfitted with waterproof valves to control the flow of water and sediment. What it prescribes is treating the patient — the Colorado River, now on life support — with open-heart surgery, a full bypass. Dominy’s napkin, which he signed and gave to my colleague Richard Ingebretsen, the founder of Glen Canyon Institute, is effectively a blueprint for a healthier future for the Colorado River and the people and ecosystems that depend on it.
But the window for action to avoid dead pool is dauntingly narrow and closing fast, especially given the time that would likely be required for the government to study, design and implement a fix. The Trump administration’s gutting of federal agency expertise and capacity adds yet more urgency to the issue. Whatever may or may not get decided on Feb. 14, the feds and the basin states need to look beyond the water wars and start building a lasting, sustainable future on the Colorado River.
The seven states that take water from the Colorado River have a deadline of February 14 to come up with a river management plan that they can all agree on. And every day that passes it looks as if that deadline, not the first one they have faced, will also be missed. Valentines Day may not be one of shared love by all.
The Colorado River basin is experiencing the greatest drought and loss of flows in the past 1200 years and the various agreements crafted to deal with deepening drought, particularly the 2007 Interim Guidelines and subsequent Drought Contingency Plans, are set to expire at the end of this year.
The major sticking point is centered around how water diversions from the river will be cut, and there will be substantial cuts. Most of that burden will fall on the Lower Basin states of California, Arizona and Nevada. They are the largest users of Colorado River water. Cuts for the four Upper Basin states; Colorado, Wyoming, Utah and New Mexico are not considered in either the previous guideline and agreements nor in the recently released Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for Post-2026 Operational Guidelines and Strategies for Lake Powell and Lake Mead by the Bureau of Reclamation. The DEIS only looks at the river below the upper reaches of Lake Powell.
This has the Lower Basin up in arms. They are demanding mandatory, verifiable and enforceable cuts by the river diversions in the Upper Basin. The Upper Basin is refusing this demand, and Arizona in particular is threatening to unleash its historical use of litigation to try and get what it wants.
Underlying this, however, is a very fundamental misunderstanding of how water diversions work between the Lower and Upper Basins. I’m starting to think that misunderstanding is deliberate, primarily to mislead the public constituents within the Lower Basin states. [ed. emphasis mine]
Tom Buschatzke, director of Arizona’s Department of Water Resources, has said, “We need certainty there are reductions in upper basin usage because that is one of the two tools that we have… You can’t make it snow or rain. But you can reduce your demand”.
But in the Upper Basin that is not as easy as it sounds.
I have read that the true skill of a good negotiator is in being able to truly understand the other sides position. There are skilled and knowledgeable negotiators in the Lower basin, but I don’t think that they truly understand the Upper Basins position. They have been accustomed, some would say addicted, to the reliable delivery of stored water for all their needs since Hoover Dam was built and began releasing stored water some 90 years ago. Only until very recently, even in the face of an unrelenting drought, have they had to deal with shortages. For the Upper Basin shortage is an annual reality.
The Lower Basin takes water from the Colorado River mainly through a small handful of very large diversions such as the All American Canal, which provides water for Imperial and Coachella Valley agriculture, the Central Arizona Project (CAP) providing water for Pheonix, Tucson, Tribes, and Arizona agriculture and the California Aqueduct, which provides water for Los Angeles, San Diego and most Southern California cities. While distribution from these few large diversions to individual contract uses may be complicated by drought, reducing the intake at their diversion points isn’t.
That situation is very different in the Upper Basin. In Colorado, Wyoming and New Mexico there are many thousands of small diversions taking water from the Colorado River, the Green River and their myriad headwater tributaries. There are a few large diversions in the Upper Basin, primarily for water taken out of the basin to Colorado’s East Slope cities and farms and to Utah’s Wasatch Front, but these diversions are still quite small compared to those in the Lower Basin.
The largest reservoirs in the Upper Basin are those built through the Colorado River Storage Act (CRSP, 1956), such as Flaming Gorge, Blue Mesa and Navajo. These reservoirs were not built to supply Upper Basin water needs, but to provide a “bank account” for Colorado River Compact compliance. In other words, for the benefit of the Lower Basin. Releases from these reservoirs are contemplated in the Post-2026 DEIS to maintain water elevations in Lake Powell that protect vital dam infrastructure and hydropower generation.
Lake Powell is also an Upper Basin reservoir in the CRSP Act of 1956. It was built entirely for Compact compliance and water deliveries to the Lower Basin. It has no water supply benefit to the Upper Basin other than as a Compact savings account.
A major wrinkle in any mandatory curtailments in Upper Basin diversions is simply in administrative logistics. It would be a complete nightmare for water administration and the State water engineers offices. And in Colorado it would be in the Water Courts as well.
A little legal background is needed here as well.
See Article 6.
All of the Colorado Basin states have Prior Appropriation as the bedrock doctrine for their water laws. California has a bit of a mix with Riparian law, but as far as the Colorado River diversions are concerned prior appropriation rules. Prior appropriation is the doctrine of “first in time, first in right” to divert the available water. Colorado was the first to codify prior appropriation in its state constitution, in 1876. Article 16, Section 6:
“The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied. Priority of appropriation shall give the better right as between those using the water for the same purpose; but when the waters of any natural stream are not sufficient for the service of all those desiring the use of the same, those using the water for domestic purposes shall have the preference over those claiming for any other purpose, and those using the water for agricultural purposes shall have preference over those using the same for manufacturing purposes.“
In Colorado you don’t actually need a court decreed right to divert water to a beneficial use. Just a shovel and a ditch. However, you are still subject to prior appropriation and can be the first cut off if a call is placed on the stream. There are a lot of such small diversions without an adjudicated right. I used to water my lawn in Eagle that way.
The Colorado River Compact of 1922 was created to avoid prior appropriation between the states. The US Supreme Court had decided that when there is a dispute over water between States that held prior appropriation as their foundational water law, seniority applies across state lines. Southern California was starting to grow at a much more rapid pace than the other states, greatly alarming the headwater, Upper Basin states. The Compact was crafted so that water from the river could be allocated “equitably”, allowing each state to grow and develop its water at its own pace. The Compact became the foundation of what is now known as the Law of the River. Laws based on prior appropriation still govern water use and administration within each State.
Arizona and California began arguing and litigating almost immediately, with Arizona usually on the losing end. That changed in 1963 when the US Supreme Court handed down a decision that once and for all set the water allocations for the Lower Basin, based on the allocations created in the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act, which finally ratified the Compact and paved the way for Hoover Dam, Lake Mead and the All American Canal.
Then the seniority picture between states changed with the passage of the 1968 Colorado River Projects Act that authorized construction of Arizona’s long fought for dream of the Central Arizona Project. To get passage, Arizona had to subordinate its water rights to California, making it the junior and first to take cuts in times of drought.
Upper Colorado River Basin map via the Upper Colorado River Commission.
None of that extended into the Upper Basin, where the States had been getting along just fine, mostly, since the Compact was signed. These four states drafted their own Upper Colorado River Basin Compact in 1948, mainly so they could get more money from the Federal Government to build water storage and delivery projects. They did something novel, allocating each states share by a percentage of the rivers flow, not by set volumes of water as the 1922 Compact had done.
Udall/Overpeck 4-panel Figure Colorado River temperature/precipitation/natural flows with trend. Lake Mead and Lake Powell storage. Updated through Water Year 2025. Note the tiny points on the annual data so that you can flyspeck the individual years. Credit: Brad Udall
Everything was fine so long as the major reservoirs of Lakes Mead and Powell were full. That has changed considerably since the onset of the current mega, or Millennial drought began in 2000. The two reservoirs have dropped to very low levels, levels never anticipated or planned for.
Here is the crux of the matter. The Lower Basin is demanding mandatory cuts from Upper Basin uses so that more water can flow downstream for their use. The 1922 Compact says clearly that the Upper Basin states “will not cause the river flow at Lee Ferry to be depleted below and aggregate of 75,000,000 acre feet for any period of ten consecutive years…”. The Lower Basin states argue that this constitutes an “obligation” to deliver that much water to them. The Upper Basin states say no, there is no delivery obligation. It is a non-depletion requirement, that through diversions and actual consumption the states can’t let those flows drop below 75 million acre feet (maf) in a ten year running average.
That has never been a problem, until now. The 1922 Compact and its non-depletion requirement is a priority right in itself. Any water right in the Upper Basin that was adjudicated, perfected by actual use and consumption, after 1922 is subject to curtailment for fulfilling the non-depletion requirement. Any and all rights perfected prior to November 1922 are exempt.
So far, as of 2026, the required flows over a ten year running average have not yet hit that non-depletion trigger of 75 maf running average over ten years. Not yet, but it could be getting close.
The Upper Basin states live by a “run of the river” system as there are no large storage units dedicated to their use as the Lower Basin has with Powell and Mead. There are many small reservoirs used for a single irrigation season, filled with the spring runoff and then empty by the end of the growing season. But they also are subject to how much water comes in the spring and downstream senior calls.
Every year, especially since this mega drought and increased aridification began, Upper Basin irrigators are curtailed each summer as the streams shrink and the small reservoirs are drained. Some years this curtailment includes water rights that are senior to the Compact as well.
The Upper basin, in short, is forced to live within its means, with what it has and no more than Mother Nature provides with the winter snowpack. As Tom Buschatzke said, “You can’t make it snow or rain. But you can reduce your demand”. The Upper Basin does exactly that every year, especially in years like this with a record low snowpack.
The mandatory, verifiable and enforceable cuts demanded by the Lower Basin would be more than difficult to achieve. And again, it would be an administrative and legal nightmare for those assigned the task on the thousands of relatively small, individual diversions that make up the Upper Basin’s water use from the Colorado River. There are those larger trans-basin diversions to the Colorado East Slope and cities, but even if they took substantial cuts, it would still be a pretty small amount of water. No where near the amounts that the Lower Basin has become accustomed to.
Right now the Upper Basin uses roughly half their Compact allocation, roughly around 4 maf a year, while the Lower Basin has historically used more than their full Compact allocation. To their credit, the Lower Basin has made substantial cuts, some voluntary and some enforced by agreements and obligations. California was forced to cut their water use by 800,000 acre-feet with the 2007 Interim Guidelines, back to their actual decreed limit, a cut some claim as an example of how much “sacrifice” they have made. They and Arizona have made additional cuts as well, now taking around 6 maf, from a historic high near 10 maf per year.
I agree that the Upper basin needs to work harder at conservation, and they have been trying hard over the last few years. They haven’t been hording water or ignoring the needs of the Lower Basin or those spelled out in the Compact and subsequent agreements as some in the Lower Basin claim. But “mandatory” cuts beyond those already happening each and every summer will require significant changes with state water law and administration. In Colorado’s case it could well require a change to Article 16, Section Six, of the state’s constitution which has held unaltered since 1876.
We live now in a very different world from the 1800’s and 1922 when the Compact was drafted, using highly optimistic flow calculations that they already knew were wrong. But the men who drafted it were boosters, as were their fathers, seeing the West as they wanted to, not as it really was. America’s westward expansion has always been driven by dreams of abundance, and for a while the river was able to provide that through massive engineering, a still small but growing population and some pretty wet years. Many still hold on to that misguided dream of abundance in an increasingly arid region.
That has all evaporated. All water users in the West, especially the Colorado River basin, expect certainty and reliability, as Tom Buschatzke declared. We’ve built an entire system, and an entire economy based on those principals. Certainty and reliability are now fading rapidly in the rear view mirror, if we dare to look. Many won’t. The Colorado River has made the desert bloom and let us build great cities. But its dwindling supply is placing all that in jeopardy. We need to adapt. The only certain and reliable future is one with less water, greater aridity and warmer and much drier climate.
Maybe our great civilization built on a desert river will go the way of the Hohokam who filled the valley Pheonix now inhabits with irrigation canals and a thriving population. Maybe. We can change that scenario if we adapt to the new reality. That will be both hard and painful. Parochial self-interest must be balanced with regional ties and interests, and that is never easy. Nor is it politically palatable. The Lower Basin is railing against the Upper Basin’s refusal to provide water it just doesn’t have. The Upper Basin is living within its means while honoring its commitments to the Compact as best it can.
The Bureau of Reclamation in its DEIS for Post-2026 river management introduced a new concept, at least new for Colorado River management. Decision making under Deep Uncertainty, or DMDU. Many, seemingly, aren’t familiar with that concept. Even the Bureau’s recommendations may not go far enough with that concept. They don’t seriously engage the reality that both Powell and Mead are headed for deadpool, meaning that the only water available from either reservoir will be what flows in. There will be no storage to rely on. None. That will have far more devastating impacts than what any of the alternatives contemplate. [ed. emphasis mine]
But when the well runs dry there isn’t much we can do. A few years ago the concept of stationarity in climate norms, basing predictions within the parameters of historical extremes, was declared dead. The ideas of certainty and reliability are now headed for the same graveyard.
Colorado River “Beginnings”. Photo: Brent Gardner-Smith/Aspen Journalism
A 2013 complaint that Texas was being deprived by New Mexico of its equitable apportionment of Rio Grande Compact water has finally been resolved and the compact decree approved by the special master in the case.
In a Fourth Interim Report dated Feb. 6, Hon. D. Brooks Smith agreed with the negotiated settlement by the states and the federal government that specifies how much compact water released by Colorado ends up with New Mexico and how much with Texas.
The proposed compact decree, which has to be accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court, employs use of the “Effective El Paso Index (‘Index’),” which provides a means of tracking the movement of water below Elephant Butte Reservoir for Texas’ accounting.
“Much like the river whose water the parties have quarreled over for decades, this original action has proceeded in a meandering fashion. First articulated by Texas in its 2013 Complaint, the dispute, in some sense, began about 8,000 years ago, in ancient Mesopotamia, when the Sumerians invented the concept of irrigation and incited a run on Earth’s navigable waterways,” Smith wrote in his report to the U.S. Supreme Court.
For its part, New Mexico countered that it was “excess water consumption in Texas” that interfered with the compact reporting. The standoff between the two states, with Colorado as a third party, lasted until July 3, 2023, when then-Special Master Michael J. Melloy issued a Third Interim Report (“TIR”) on the matter, which began: “Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado . . . have filed a joint motion to enter a consent decree compromising and settling ‘all claims among them arising from the 1938 Rio Grande Compact.’”
The proposed 2023 compact decree was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court, which rejected it at the request of the federal government, and appointed a new special master in Smith. He brought the states and federal government back together for another round of talks, and in June of 2025 visited the lower Rio Grande to talk to farmers and to familiarize himself with the features of the basin.
“I am grateful to the parties, the amici, and all of counsel for their cooperative efforts in organizing and carrying out what was a highly informative and comprehensive real-time view of both the waters of the Lower Rio Grande and the Project,” Smith wrote in his report.
The Effective El Paso Index (“Index”), which is a feature of the proposed compact decree, measures compliance based on the amount of water that actually passes through the El Paso Gage.
“I am pleased that the Special Master has recommended the U.S. Supreme Court accept the parties’ proposed settlement of the Rio Grande Compact litigation. The settlement is the result of collaboration between Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, and the United States; it includes entry of a proposed Compact Decree and dismissal of the United States’ claims,” said Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser. “I appreciate the Special Master’s thoughtful engagement in the matter and his recommendation supporting this collaborative result. His recommendation gets even closer to the finish line.”
The last step will be a decision from the Supreme Court, which Weiser said he hopes to receive by June.
Map showing new point to deliver Rio Grande water between Texas and New Mexico, at an existing stream gage in East El Paso. (Courtesy of Margaret “Peggy” Barroll in the joint motion)
The outflow at the bottom of Navajo Dam in New Mexico. Photo: Brent Gardner-Smith/Aspen Journalism
From email from Reclamation Western Colorado Area Office:
The Bureau of Reclamation has scheduled a decrease in the release from Navajo Dam from 350 cubic feet per second (cfs) to 300 cfs for Tuesday, February 10th, at 8:00 AM.
Releases are being made through the 4×4 gates while the powerplant is down for maintance.
Releases are made for the authorized purposes of the Navajo Unit, and to attempt to maintain a target base flow through the endangered fish critical habitat reach of the San Juan River (Farmington to Lake Powell). The San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Program recommends a target base flow of between 500 cfs and 1,000 cfs through the critical habitat area. The target base flow is calculated as the weekly average of gaged flows throughout the critical habitat area from Farmington to Lake Powell.
This scheduled release change is subject to changes in river flows and weather conditions. If you have any questions, please reply to this message, call 970-385-6500, or visit Reclamation’s Navajo Dam website at https://www.usbr.gov/uc/water/crsp/cs/nvd.html
Map of the San Juan River, a tributary of the Colorado River, in Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico and Utah, USA. Made using USGS National Map data. By Shannon1 – Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=47456307
