Romancing the River: The Real ‘Two Basins’ of a Desert River — George Sibley (SibleysRivers.com) #ColoradoRiver #COriver #aridification

Graphic credit: The Colorado River water crisis its origin and future Jack Schmidt, Eric Kuhn, Charles Yackulic.

Click the link to read the article on the Sibley’s Rivers website (George Sibley):

October 13, 2026

This will be my last post before what might be our last election – if our would-be tyrant doesn’t succeed in stopping it entirely. I encourage my handful of readers to vote early, and then be prepared to participate in public opposition – make a big noise – to the chaos our PINO will surely try to cause if he doesn’t like the outcomes.

The mainstream media (being mostly owned by billionaires) continue to try to portray this election as just another horse-race between ‘Democrats and Republicans.’ It is not that. This election may be out last chance to salvage what the Trumpsters haven’t yet undermined of our 250-year effort to work out a functional governance by, for and of the people – a representational governance, a form of democracy. At present nearly all of our supposed representatives in Congress who call themselves ‘Republicans’ and many of those who call themselves ‘Democrats’ are clearly ‘owned’ by those with the money to fund their campaigns – the oligarchs and kleptocrats who want to replace that 250-year effort with an authoritarian governance that they believe will be more ‘efficient’ in accommodating them.

The only hope for keeping our 250-year experiment in self-governance going is to replace the sellouts with representation in the mold of Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, Alexandria Octavio-Cortez and others who truly try to speak and act on behalf of us, rather than of those whom we have all helped make morbidly wealthy. And we will only be successful if it is a decisive victory for the people; one or two percent victories will be challenged and kept in chaos until – well, forever: nearly a third of the voting electorate still believe that Trump was cheated out of a 2020 election victory because Trump says so. He is determined to keep this election from being a conclusive victory against him because he knows that the only way to stay out of prison is to stay in the presidency with a compliant Congress.

So vote as if the future depended on it – because it does. We do not want to live in an oligarchic kleptocracy run by a semi-senile narcissist with his gang of thieves pillaging the people to pay for technologies of mass control, with his army of brownshirt ICE agents running rampant in our streets. If we don’t come out of the election with a Congress at least partially in control of representatives of the people (not just ‘Democrats’ – think of Fetterman), then it is all over.

Meanwhile, back on the banks of the bankrupt Colorado River system. Remembering first that the river system is not the river itself. The river itself is what it has always been: flows of water running through river-carved valleys and canyons because the surrounding land has not put those flows to use in service to living things. The flows move on to other valleys where sometimes they are put to use by plants, forests, wildlife including humans, and sometimes not, then flowing on to other valleys until they all eventually join up and get to sea level, reentering the seas from which they came. Those flows ebb and flow themselves, annually and year-to-year, at the whims of the global climate – which at this point has the human thumb on the scales pushing toward the hotter drier side.

That’s the river; the river system is the structures for storage and distribution we have imposed over the river to even out the natural flows, annually and year-to-year, in service to human life. But the system was designed for a river half again larger than the river we’ve had since the turn of the century; it is beyond rational denial that it was overbuilt for the river we now have (see the graph above), although many continue to deny it for reasons including plain desperation.

That suggestion will come in time, but first I think we need to define the current reality (which bears no resemblance to ‘Compact reality’). The first step is to acknowledge the nature of a desert river, then try to adapt our basic thinking and planning to that.

All rivers are water that the surrounding land and its diverse inhabitants have not managed to put to ‘beneficial use’ for the living ecologies the river runs through. That ‘left-over’ water flows on from its home watershed to larger multiple watersheds where it either gets put to use or doesn’t, and if not, it flows on even larger basins, et cetera. Hydrologists describe streams as ‘gaining’ or ‘losing’: a stream that adds surface and groundwater from a watershed with a high water table is a ‘gaining stream’; a stream that gives up some of it water to a watershed with a lower water table is a ‘losing stream’ (although I think it ought to be called a ‘giving stream’).

Many humid-region rivers continue to collect more water from precipitation that falls on them and their surrounding land, from its headwaters all the way to its ocean estuary. A desert river, on the other hand, gets nearly all the water it will ever have from its headwaters region, with mountains or plateaus high enough to force rising air to cool and release any water vapor it carries as precipitation – mostly winter snow in the case of the Colorado River. Most of the Colorado River headwaters are in the Southern Rockies, but the Wind River Mountains in the Central Rockies generate some of the Green River tributaries, the Colorado Plateau and New Mexico highlands generate the Gila River; smaller basin-and-range mountains the Virgin River, et cetera. But the precipitation that falls on those high places generates 85-90 percent of the water that will make its way into the Colorado River; once it leaves its headwaters and flows into its desert regions, it will gain very little new precipitation.

This transition from gaining streams to losing (giving) streams happens fairly quickly in the Colorado River’s natural basin. The majority of its water comes from highlands above ~8,000 feet elevation – about ten percent of the entire basin. In the Upper Gunnison River watersheds where I live, major Gunnison River tributaries leave the Crested Butte area at 9,000 feet elevation where the average annual precipitation is 23 inches (up to 40+ inches on upvalley); a mere 35 miles down the valley in Blue Mesa Reservoir, at 7,500 feet elevation, the average precipitation has dropped to 10-11 inches. In that short distance, the Gunnison River is already in the high deserts of the Colorado Plateau, and most of the valley below Crested Butte is under irrigation – the river already ‘giving.’. The Gunnison River gets larger as it flows west and north to its ‘grand junction’ with the Colorado River, but that is due to picking up other tributaries; very little precipitation water gets added – even in the summer monsoons, according to a hydrologist working in the Upper Gunnison.

Prior to the Euro-American presence in the basin, the Colorado River ran in extremes: a flood of water while the snowpack was melting in the high headwaters, then a comparative trickle in the late summer and fall after the snowmelt ends. The flood months nurtured riparian life throughout its course, from a narrow strip in some places to broad wetlands, meadows and cottonwood ‘oases’ in other desert places, culminating in a lush labyrinthian delta on a dyke it had built across the Gulf of California with debris from creating the Grand Canyon through the Colorado Plateau. Whatever was left in the stream after it made its way through the delta went back into the ocean from which it had come – and one imagines there were many drier years when there was not enough water left below the delta to go into the ocean after the early summer flood finished.

We tend to make a big deal about the Colorado River no longer flowing to the ocean now due to our heavy use, but there are many desert rivers around the world that don’t flow into the oceans; some forty streams flow into the Great Basin from surrounding mountains and plateaus – some of them respectable rivers like the Truckee, through Reno – and they all gradually disappear there, after nurturing riparian life (including some ranches and towns), enduring evapotranspiration, and sinking into aquifers. President Theodore Roosevelt, often called the father of American conservation, considered freshwater going unused into the ocean to be a ‘waste.’

But understanding the nature of the desert river, and how it is different from a humid-region river like the Mississippi, offers some clues about an intelligent river system for storing and distributing the river. The vast majority of the users of the river’s water, especially the modern human users, are in the desert lands below the headwaters region – the ‘losing’ (‘giving’) portion of the river: in the higher ‘cold deserts’ above the canyon region, and the subtropical ‘hot deserts’ below the canyons.

Healthy mountain meadows and wetlands are characteristic of healthy headwater systems and provide a variety of ecosystem services, or benefits that humans, wildlife, rivers and surrounding ecosystems rely on. The complex of wetlands and connected floodplains found in intact headwater systems can slow runoff and attenuate flood flows, creating better downstream conditions, trapping sediment to improve downstream water quality, and allowing groundwater recharge. These systems can also serve as a fire break and refuge during wildfire, can sequester carbon in the floodplain, and provide essential habitat for wildlife. Graphic by Restoration Design Group, courtesy of American Rivers

There are also water users in the headwaters region. Largest by far are the forests that ring most of the mountains, along with other plant and animal life inhabiting those mountain-forest regions. There are also humans in the headwaters, mostly in or near towns supporting mining or outdoor recreation, but what makes the most sense is to consider the human users as outliers of the ‘losing’ basin below the headwaters – which they are, literally, producing little of what they need to live there but importing moat of it from or through the desert economy. The forests, on the other hand – as we will see – are intimately involved in the river’s water production processes, in both positive and negative ways.

These two distinctly different parts of the river suggest a more natural division of the river into two ‘basins’ than the political division under the Compact: the ‘gaining river’ and the ‘losing/giving river,’ each to be managed toward a specific goal: for the gaining river, how to optimize the quantity of water flowing out of the headwaters; and for the losing/giving river, how to optimize the uses and minimize unnecessary losses.

This deliberately breaks up the current ‘two-basin division’ – a ‘temporary equitable division’ adopted in 1922 because the compact commissioners did not know enough about their the river or their own state futures to do the eight-way division (including Mexico) they had set out to do. The two-basin division was most basically an expedient way of persuading Congress that they were together in their search for an equitable division that would only become possible when there was ‘a greater fund of information’ that would enable those following them to do a proper division of the use of the river’s waters, but meanwhile – let’s build the big dam.

Dividing the river into its ‘water production’ basin and its ‘water consumption’ basin would have the potential benefit of starting again with nearly all of the users in a single ‘consumption’ basin, while giving them all joint responsibility for taking care of the ‘water production’ basin. It’s a potential start on at least perceiving the river as a single shared responsibility, as opposed to the current perception of each state in it for its own needs and yielding as little as possible to the other states.

That’s where we’ll start next time – with the big question for the losing/giving river, the desert part of the desert river: how to get beyond Compact fantasies, and divide the use of the diminishing river we actually have among the vast multitudes of users (see the graph at the beginning). That’s a point at which I think it would be smart to abandon the hydrologic term ‘losing’ for a more political term – not a ‘losing river’ but a ‘giving river’ -which is what it is once it leaves the headwaters. And the challenge of ‘dividing the gifts’ of the giving river at least starts with a more positive feel than ‘sharing out the losses’ from a losing river….

Meanwhile – vote! As if the future depended on it because it does. [ed. emphasis mine]

Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

Deadpool Data Dump: #LakePowell’s terrible, horrible, no good, very bad water year; Plus — Ruminating on the oil and gas infrastructure that clutters the landscape and sometimes explodes — Jonathan P. Thompson #ColoradoRiver #COriver #aridification

Land Desk graphic using data from the Bureau of Reclamation.

Click the link to read the article on The Land Desk website (Jonathan P. Thompson):

October 9, 2026

💀 DEADPOOL DATA DUMP 🌊

Lake Powell, the nation’s second largest reservoir, serves as a sort of barometer of the Colorado River watershed’s overall health. The reservoir and river have been struggling since the great aridification’s grim onset in 2002. While the river continues to flow, barely, the 2026 Water Year, characterized by one of the worst snow droughts on record, nearly finished off the reservoir. But in the end, it was saved from dropping to “de facto deadpool” by heavy rain at the beginning and end of the water year, and by larger-than-normal releases from upstream reservoirs. 

  • 4.46 million acre-feet: Total Lake Powell inflow from the Colorado, Dirty Devil, Escalante, and San Juan rivers in water year 2026. That’s the third lowest on record, behind 2002 and 2021. This is in spite of the fact that the 2026 snowpack was far lower than those two years, and melting mountain snowpack provides about 80% of the river’s water.
  • The Colorado River Basin experienced its warmest water year on record (in 131 years) in WY2026.

  • 3.72 million acre-feet. Total Lake Powell unregulated inflow in water year 2026. This is the estimate of how much water would have flowed into the reservoir without any supplementary releases from upstream reservoirs. Which is to say, the feds robbed Flaming Gorge, Navajo, and Blue Mesa of about 750,000 acre-feet to save Powell from shrinking even more. That was bad for those upstream reservoirs and the irrigators, anglers, recreational users, and communities that rely on them, and there’s no way it can be repeated if this winter is below average.
  • 6 million acre-feet: Total releases from Glen Canyon Dam in water year 2026. This is the lowest release since the very early days of the dam (in the 1960s). This means less water in the Grand Canyon and less water flowing into Lake Mead. 
  • 181,111 acre-feet: Estimated amount of water that evaporated from Lake Powell in water year 2026. This is equivalent to more than half of Nevada’s total annual allotment from the Colorado River. 
  • 1.72 million acre-feet: Lake Powell’s water deficit — or the difference between outflows (incl. evaporation) and inflows — for water year 2026. 
  • 27 feet: Amount the surface level of the reservoir fell in water year 2026, putting it within seven feet of the level the federal governnment has chosen to “defend,” meaning they’ll pull out all the stops to keep it from dropping below that (for reasons the Land Desk has gone over many times before). The late September storms brought the level back up a couple of feet.

Feds release two-year Colorado River plan, Nevada sues — Jonathan P. Thompson


Anyone who lived through the 2002 water year probably thought it couldn’t possibly get any worse. Then along came 2026 and, voila! It was really, really bad — at least as far as the snow goes. And snow is really important, because it provides about 80% of the Colorado River’s flow.
But what’s this? The accumulated precipitation in 2026 was actually … not bad? Notice the big jumps at the very beginning of the water year (far left on the graph) and the very end.

A Colorado River glossary and primer — Jonathan P. Thompson


🛢️ FOSSIL FUEL FOLLIES 📈

THE NEWS: Not one, but two natural gas pipelines ruptured and erupted in flames at nearly the same time on opposite sides of New Mexico. One was in the Permian Basin in Lea County, where a gas line ruptured and caught fire, killing two people. Details of the incident have not been released, nor have the names of the victims. The other was near La Boca, New Mexico, just south of the Colorado line (and can be seen in the video above). It shot flames high into the sky and ignited a wildfire.

THE CONTEXT: Several years ago, as the oil boom in the Greater Chaco Region in northwestern New Mexico was nearing its peak, I sat down in the sleek, modern headquarters of the Bureau of Land Management’s Farmington field office with two BLM officials to talk about the oil boom. Before we got down to business, one of them asked: “Should we show him the scare map?” 

The answer, I guess, was yes, because her colleague handed me the paper showing every well ever drilled in the San Juan Basin, with little red dots for gas, black ones for oil.

It was scary. The northern and central sections of the Basin were almost solid red; in the south and west, dense swarms of black dots strung out along the oil-bearing formations. Dark pinpricks surrounded Chaco Culture National Historical Park. Huerfano Mountain, or Dzil Na’oodilii, where First Woman and First Man and then Changing Woman lived — a sort of Garden of Eden in Navajo cosmology — was embroidered with red and black. The BLM office we sat in, on a fine piece of real estate in the upper-class part of town, has three wells within a quarter mile, and a pumpjack grinds away right next to a golf course green down the road.

To find a stretch of land anywhere in the core of the Basin that hasn’t been drilled or isn’t covered by roads, tanks, pipes or some other hydrocarbon-related infrastructure is nearly impossible — the infrastructure is the landscape. “We’ve got so much pipeline in the ground, it’s like rebar,” said the official, with a tinge of glee. “If you had an earthquake, the ground wouldn’t even shake.”

The official seemed less disturbed than simply fascinated by this fact, and also didn’t seem bothered that he and his colleagues were facilitating even more infrastructure by handing out drilling permits by the dozen and clearing the way for thousands of new wells and all the roads, gathering systems, and pipelines that go with it. 

The San Juan structural basin is primarily in New Mexico. By US Geological Survey – Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the San Juan Basin Province of New Mexico and Colorado, 2002, USGS Fact Sheet FS-147-02, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=5749904

I happen to be writing this at a campsite in the heart of the San Juan Basin gas field. While I can gaze out across the landscape and see nothing but beauty, including the evening’s last light on Dzil Na’oodilii, I am constantly reminded of the ubiquity of the hydrocarbon infrastructure all around me. From just over a little rise comes a slightly squeaky and clanky sound of inadequately lubed bearings, and the low hum and whir of dozens of near and distant pumps and compressors and fans serenades me as I watch the stars unfurl across the big bowl of the sky. 

There’s another map of this area that’s even scarier than the one those folks showed me. It includes oil and gas-related “incidents,” which is to say ruptures and spills and explosions and fires and major leaks. Those, too, are all over the map, and happen with disturbing frequency. Usually they’re not as dramatic as the two explosions, but they can be harmful: hundreds of gallons of crude oil sloshed onto the ground and into waterways or aquifers, thousands of cubic feet of methane wafting into the air and adding the potent greenhouse gas to the atmosphere.

When I watch the debate over permitting reform, or read the thoughts of the Abundance crowd, a part of me agrees with the credo of building more. The idea of a new New Deal appeals to me, if done right. Line the highways and interstates with high-voltage transmission lines to carry clean energy across the region, build utility-scale solar on reclaimed coal mines and next to old coal plants and on marginal farmland, build factories to manufacture solar panels and batteries. It would create jobs, revitalize economies, and put more clean energy onto the grid. 

Then I hear news about these explosions, look at the oil and gas incident map, and come out here and find that I can’t take a picture of spectacular and sacred landscapes without a tank or well or road or drill pad showing up in it, somewhere. The Abundance folks and the proponents of the permitting reform legislation, or the Bipartisan Affordability and Jobs Act, want to cover the landscape and our communities with even more of this stuff. While many of them support the bill because it would expedite clean energy development, they don’t mind the fact that it would do the same for natural gas and oil and petroleum pipelines. And, in the social media wars raging over this bill, they discount the concerns of environmental groups worry about the cost we pay when blindly adhering to the credo of Build More Stuff. 

It makes me want to bring these folks out here to the San Juan Basin and take a little walk across this landscape, which is so suffused with beauty, but also cluttered with the detritus of society’s urge for more, always more.


📸 PARTING SHOT 🎞️

Angel Peak in the San Juan Basin at sunrise. Jonathan P. Thompson photo.

Getches-Wilkinson Center: The Colorado River Upper Initial Units Take Center Stage — Eric Kuhn, Anne Castle, Jack Schmidt, Kathryn Sorensen, Katherine Tara

Flaming Gorge Dam: USBR

Click the link to read the report on the Getches-Wilkinson Center website (Eric Kuhn,* Anne Castle,† Jack Schmidt,‡ Kathryn Sorensen,§ Katherine Tara**). Here’s the Introduction:

October 6, 2026

SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS

  • In 1956, Congress authorized the Upper Initial Units—Flaming Gorge Reservoir, Navajo Reservoir, and the Aspinall Unit (UIUs)—for a variety of water use purposes in the Upper Colorado River Basin, including compliance with the 1922 Colorado River Compact (1922 Compact). The historical record is clear that the primary reason these reservoirs exist is to satisfy the math of the 1922 Compact and the obligations it imposed on the Upper Division States regarding flows at Lee Ferry.
  • The size and operation of the UIUs was based on the math of the river as we understood it from the 1930s through the mid-1950s (natural flows, projected uses, and the drought of record). This math no longer works. Total water use in the Colorado River Basin has consistently exceeded the available supply since 2000. Until this fundamental problem is solved, releasing water from the UIUs only delays necessary permanent reductions in water use and provides some degree of temporary management flexibility.
  • The 1948 Upper Basin Compact contemplates delivery of a required quantity of water at Lee Ferry. Article V gives the Upper Colorado River Commission (UCRC) the authority to allocate the capacity of the UIUs between providing water for use within the Upper Division States and providing water for common benefit purposes (delivering water to Lee Ferry). The policy has always been that 100% of the capacity of Navajo Reservoir is allocated for water use in New Mexico and 100% of the capacities of Blue Mesa and Flaming Gorge Reservoirs is allocated for common benefit purposes.
  • There is no doubt that Flaming Gorge and Blue Mesa Reservoirs exist to meet a portion of the obligation of the Upper Division States under Article III of the 1922 Compact. As of October 1, 2026, the ten-year Lee Ferry flow will be about 81.2 million acre-feet (MAF), and under the Lower Division States’ interpretation of the 1922 Compact, the Upper Division States may be in a compact deficit by 800,000 acre-feet (or more).
  • Yet over 2.0 MAF of water remains in active storage in Flaming Gorge Reservoir; more than enough water to erase the deficit and put the Upper Division states back in compact compliance as interpreted by the Lower Basin, if only for the short term.
  • The Upper Division States assert that they are in full compliance with the 1922 Compact.¹ Thus, in their view, delivering additional UIU water to Lee Ferry now would be a waste of stored water that they may need in the future. They question why yet another reservoir should be further drawn down when the Basin has not solved the fundamental problem of demand exceeding supply.
  • The stored water available in Flaming Gorge Reservoir has increased in importance to the entire basin. The Lower Division states view it as a source of water that can be delivered at Lee Ferry to supplement the releases from Lake Powell and thereby fulfill the obligations of the Upper Division States under the 1922 Compact. The Bureau of Reclamation is using Flaming Gorge as a source of water to protect critical infrastructure at Glen Canyon Dam, including hydropower generation. The Upper Division States view Flaming Gorge as a source of water for their current and future benefit; the water stored there could be used to comply with an adverse decision by a court or Special Master.
  • There remain unresolved issues concerning the use of water stored in the UIUs, with seemingly conflicting provisions in the 1948 Upper Basin Compact and the 1970 Long-Range Operating Criteria that currently govern the operation of these reservoirs. These issues could govern future releases from the UIUs but have not been explicitly addressed in the Post-2026 Record of Decision or the 2027-2028 Operating Rules.
  • The math of the 1922 Compact and its Lee Ferry flow provision, together with the directives of the Long-Range Operating Criteria, can no longer be reconciled with today’s hydrology and long-term average basin-wide consumptive use. The Basin States can argue about compliance with various conflicting provisions, but the fundamental problem is that the rules were designed for a different river. We need new operating rules that reflect the river we have today. The choice in finding these new rules is likely to be between a compromise that is painful to all parties or a zero-sum Supreme Court decision that determines who gets what little water there is and who does not.

INTRODUCTION²

The 1956 Colorado River Storage Project Act (1956 CRSPA)³ authorized construction of Glen Canyon Dam, which created Lake Powell, and three additional major upstream storage projects; Flaming Gorge Dam and Reservoir, Navajo Dam and Reservoir, and the Curecanti Unit (Blue Mesa, Morrow Point, and Crystal Dams and Reservoirs, now called the Aspinall Unit). The 1956 CRSPA was designed as a broad authorization for Upper Basin water development within the bounds of the 1922 Compact. The legislation authorized construction of storage dams, powerplants,⁴ numerous irrigation projects, and trans-basin diversions. Among the purposes of 1956 CRSPA were “regulating the flow of the Colorado River, storing water for beneficial consumptive use, making it possible for the States of the Upper Basin to utilize, consistently with provisions of the Colorado River Compact, the apportionments made to and among them in the Colorado River Compact and the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, respectively . . ..”⁵ Flaming Gorge, Navajo, and the Aspinall Unit⁶ are collectively referred to as the “Upper Initial Units” (hereafter, UIUs). The three UIUs’ total live storage capacity is 6.15 million acre-feet (MAF), of which 5.10 MAF is “active” storage.⁷ On October 1, 2026, the total live storage in the three reservoir systems was 3.47 MAF. The Appendix contains a detailed description of each of the UIUs, with information on capacity, operations, and contract obligations.

For over 60 years, the three UIUs have been storing system water and producing hydroelectric power. These reservoirs, however, previously played a relatively small role in the operation of federal reservoirs of the Colorado River Basin (Basin) as a whole. The focus of the Basin’s competing interests has primarily been on operation of Glen Canyon Dam and Hoover Dam that form Lake Powell and Lake Mead, respectively. These two reservoirs are the largest in the United States and presently store approximately 66% of all the water in the 12 federal reservoirs reported in Reclamation’s 24-Month Studies. During the debate and development of major policy actions for the Colorado River, such as the 1970 Coordinated Long-Range Operating Criteria,⁸ 2001 Interim Surplus Guidelines,⁹ and the 2007 Interim Guidelines,¹⁰ the operations of the UIUs were barely mentioned. However, as storage in Lake Powell and Lake Mead has declined, the importance of the UIUs has increased.

The Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) operates each of the three UIUs under separate Records of Decision (ROD). Each is operated in a manner that balances many competing interests such as: storage for 1922 Compact compliance, the delivery of stored water for Upper Basin consumptive uses, the delivery of water in fulfillment of Tribal water right settlement obligations, flood control, hydropower generation, on-reservoir recreation, downstream river recreation, sport fisheries in the reservoir and in the stream below the reservoir, and the flow needs of threatened and endangered fishes. Reclamation operates the UIUs in a transparent manner, and each has a local constituency that is closely involved in how their project is operated.

The UIU obscurity honeymoon ended in 2019 when the Upper Division States proposed what became the Drought Response Operations Agreement (DROA) as a component of their 2019 Drought Contingency Plan.¹¹ Arguably, under federal law, the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) has broad authority to unilaterally move water from the UIUs downstream to Lake Powell. However, Reclamation took a more collaborative approach in the DROA: it was an inter-governmental agreement among the US (through Reclamation) and the states of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. DROA authorized releases from the UIUs to the extent necessary to achieve the stated operational objective of minimizing the risk of Lake Powell falling below a target elevation of 3525 ft, and thereby:

  • helping to ensure the Upper Division States will continue fulfilling their interstate water compact obligations while exercising their rights to develop and utilize the Upper Basin’s Compact apportionment,
  • maintaining the ability to generate hydropower at Glen Canyon Dam, and
  • minimizing adverse effects on resources and infrastructure in the Upper Basin.¹²

DROA is subject to numerous constraints, including:

  • Water available in the UIU reservoirs,
  • Protection of authorized purposes of each CRSP unit (water supply, endangered species, recreation, hydropower, etc.),
  • Consultation with the Upper Division States and the Upper Colorado River Commission, and
  • Operating criteria established in the agreement and the associated Records of Decision.

In 2021, a total of 181,000 acre-feet of DROA releases were planned pursuant to the Secretary’s emergency authority: 125,000 acre-feet from Flaming Gorge, 36,000 acre-feet from Blue Mesa, and 20,000 acre-feet from Navajo. Due to dry conditions, the 20,000 acre-feet release from Navajo Reservoir was cancelled, resulting in a total release of 161,000 acre-feet.¹³ DROA was implemented again in 2022 pursuant to consultation and agreement with the Upper Division States—approximately 463,000 acre-feet of water from Flaming Gorge Reservoir were released. Both releases were intended to help maintain an operational target elevation of 3525 ft in Lake Powell.¹⁴ The DROA water released from Flaming Gorge Reservoir and Blue Mesa Reservoir in 2021 and 2022 was completely recovered after the moderately wet winter of 2023.¹⁵ DROA includes specific provisions addressing storage recovery after a DROA release is made. DROA expires contemporaneously with the 2007 Guidelines, but operations to recover storage releases made before Oct. 1, 2026, continue for as long as necessary.¹⁶

In response to the near-record low 2026 runoff and the unprecedented low reservoir levels in Lake Mead and Lake Powell, DROA releases were again implemented to supplement Lake Powell levels, and this time with even greater urgency and impact. To help maintain the elevation of Lake Powell above 3500 ft, on April 23, 2026, Reclamation began making additional DROA releases from Flaming Gorge Reservoir.¹⁷ According to the September 2026 24-Month Study, the planned release from Flaming Gorge will total one million acre-feet between April 2026 and April 2027, but Reclamation retains the flexibility to adjust the timing and amount based on actual hydrologic conditions. Citing contractual obligations and unusually low storage, there are no planned DROA releases scheduled for 2026 from either Blue Mesa Reservoir or Navajo Reservoir.¹⁸

As annual Colorado River Basin runoff in the 21st century is consistently lower than in the 20th century and the “Ratchet Effect” is evident in reservoir storage basin-wide, disputes over the operation of the UIUs between the Upper Division States and Lower Division States have increased and indeed now are nearly as critical and strident as the disputes over water deliveries from Lake Powell to Lake Mead.¹⁹ The Lower Division States’ May 1, 2026, Proposal for Short-Term Operations of the Colorado River included proposed operating criteria for the UIUs that would expand their role in maintaining Lake Powell elevations and effectively subordinate the refilling of the UIUs until there is sufficient water in Lake Powell to support the delivery of 8.23 MAF per year.²⁰ The stated intent is “to share the benefit of improved hydrology between both basins.”²¹ On May 13th, 2026, the director of the Arizona Department of Water Resources told the Arizona Re-Consultation Committee that under Arizona’s interpretation of the Law of the River, the 1956 CRSPA specifically subordinates the delivery of contract water from the UIUs and the refilling of those reservoirs to water deliveries to the Lower Basin and Mexico under the 1922 Compact.²²

The Upper Division States believe the operation of the UIUs proposed by the Lower Division States is outside the scope of the Post-2026 NEPA process and cannot be incorporated into the Record of Decision as part of the 2027–2028 operations plan.²³ Further, some UCRC commissioners pointed out that under the 1956 CRSPA, there are multiple purposes of the UIUs including supporting consumptive uses within the Upper Basin.²⁴ At the 2026 Getches-Wilkinson Center Conference on the Colorado River, then-Acting Reclamation Commissioner Scott Cameron noted that Reclamation would aggressively operate the UIUs under their RODs to help manage Lake Powell levels, but added that the Secretary has, and will use, if necessary, emergency authorities to operate the UIUs outside the bounds of their RODs.²⁵

The Record of Decision (ROD) released on August 21, 2026, for the “Decision Framework for Colorado River Guidelines: Coordinated Operations of Lake Powell and Lake Mead (2027–2036)” addressed the operation of the UIUs in a general manner. The ROD states:

“In carrying out the Decision Framework, the Department will continue to coordinate the operation of Lake Powell, Lake Mead, and the Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP) Upper Initial Units – specific reservoirs above Lake Powell – pursuant to Section 602 of the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968 (CRBPA). Consistent with each facility’s existing ROD, the CRSP Upper Initial Units remain an operational tool available to the Secretary, when necessary, to release additional water to increase the elevation at Lake Powell to protect critical Federal infrastructure.”²⁶

While the Decision Framework Operational Sideboards of the ROD include the “Potential for maximum use of CRSP Upper Initial Units within their respective RODs to release additional water if needed to protect critical infrastructure,” they also allow for greater releases than described in their respective RODs:

“The Decision Framework establishes consultation thresholds associated with critical reservoir elevations. When projected reservoir conditions approach or fall below the consultation thresholds identified in the operational sideboards, the Secretary will coordinate and consult with the Basin States, Basin Tribes and other affected parties, as appropriate, regarding additional operational actions that may be appropriate to reduce risks to critical Federal infrastructure and maintain system reliability.²⁷”

Further, “Such consultations may include consideration of additional reductions in water use, adjustments to coordinated reservoir operations of Lake Powell and Lake Mead, use of the CRSP Upper Initial Units, or other operational actions.”²⁸

Notably, the Decision Framework does not mention using the UIUs for making deliveries of water to Lee Ferry when there is insufficient water in Lake Powell for compliance with the 1922 Colorado River Compact (1922 Compact).

UIU storage recovery timing and amounts are not specified in the 2027-2028 Operating Guidelines,²⁹ but Interior’s response to the Lower Basin’s May 1st proposal stated that it:

“intends to refill the UIUs as soon as practicable to ensure water remains available for any additional infrastructure protection releases, while avoiding further risk to critical infrastructure during recovery operations. Based on prior operational experience, recovery operations were initiated once Lake Powell was no longer projected to continue declining. Reclamation would apply a similar approach for future UIU recovery operations and would consider actual hydrology and Basin-wide conditions before initiating recovery actions.³⁰”

What is clear is that the water stored in the UIUs is an increasingly important resource coveted by the Upper Division States, the Lower Division States, Basin Tribes,³¹ and Reclamation. It is also clear that each of these entities has a different perspective on the priorities under which the UIUs will be operated in the future. But it is important to recognize that while the water released by the UIUs in 2021, 2022, and 2026 provided critical benefits, especially for maintaining Lake Powell above target thresholds, DROA-like releases are not a solution to the Basin’s fundamental problem – systematic use of more than the available water supply. The operation of the UIUs may buy time and provide additional flexibility for reservoir system management, but it does not create any new water.

The debate over the future use of the UIUs has also exposed and amplified several long-standing disputes over the interpretation of the key provisions of the Law of the River,³² and ambiguities in the major federal legislation that authorized the construction and operation of the river’s major federal reservoirs. A primary disputed issue facing the Colorado River Basin today is how much water must flow at Lee Ferry to satisfy the Upper Division States’ 1922 Compact obligations. As stated above, delivering water to Lee Ferry was a core purpose for both Lake Powell and the three UIUs.³³

On August 24, 2026, the state of Nevada, the Colorado River Commission of Nevada, and the Southern Nevada Water Authority filed a complaint for declaratory action and injunctive relief requesting a declaration that the ROD, Final Environmental Impact Statement, and 2027-2028 Guidelines are in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Law of the River.³⁴ The complaint requests an injunction halting the implementation of the ROD and Operating Guidelines. Among other arguments, the plaintiffs claim that the Secretary failed to consider the exercise of authority to operate the UIUs in compliance with the Law of the River and NEPA.

The ROD states that the UIUs will be the subject of a new DROA agreement (referred to as a “framework”) that is currently being negotiated among Reclamation and the Upper Division States. This proposed agreement, drafts of which have not been released to the public, has already received criticism from the State of Arizona. If finalized, it could also be the subject of future litigation.³⁵ In the remainder of the paper, we explore the history of the UIUs from their conception to the present day to provide context and rationale for future operations.


* Retired General Manager, Colorado River Water Conservation District.

† Senior Fellow, Getches-Wilkinson Center, University of Colorado Law School; former US Commissioner, Upper Colorado River Commission; former Assistant Secretary for Water and Science, US Dept. of the Interior.

‡ Center for Colorado River Studies, Utah State University; former Chief, Grand Canyon Monitoring and Research Center.

§ Director of Research, Kyl Center for Water Policy, Arizona State University; former Director, Phoenix Water Services.

** Staff Attorney, Utton Transboundary Resources Center, University of New Mexico.

1 The position of the Lower Division States is that the Upper Division States must not deplete the ten-year flow at Lee Ferry below 75 MAF PLUS deliver half of the annual treaty delivery to Mexico. The normal treaty delivery is 1.5 MAF, so the total ten-year delivery obligation could be 82.5 MAF. In recent years, under Minutes 323 and 330, the annual delivery has been less, but because these Minutes also create water that Mexico can store – calculating how much delivery the Upper Division States must share is not a simple matter. In any event, however, it appears that 81.2 MAF is less than the required 10-year flow pursuant to the Lower Division States’ legal position.

1 The Upper Division States do not agree that their obligation to Mexico under Article III(c) of the 1922 Compact is half of the annual delivery to Mexico under the 1944 Treaty every year. For more information, see Eric Kuhn, et. al, The 1922 Compact is Now the Obvious Elephant in the Negotiating Room, Oct. 6, 2025, https://www.colorado.edu/center/gwc/media/707.

2 This paper describes the authorization of the UIUs, the events leading up to that authorization, and some of the debate that resulted in the compromises in the 1956 Colorado River Storage Project Act (1956 CRSPA). The authors recognize that there are several detailed histories of CRSPA that address different aspects of its origins and come from a different perspective. Among these are: MARC REISNER. CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER (1986, Viking Press); M. HARVEY, A SYMBOL OF WILDERNESS: ECHO PARK AND THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT (Univ. N.M. Press 1994, 2nd Ed. Univ. of W.A. Press, 2000). Recognizing the value and insights of these previous works, this paper seeks to place the UIUs and their origins within the context of today’s hydrology and disputes.

3 P.L. 84-485, 70 Statute 105, 43 U.S.C. § 620 et seq.

4 The provision of hydroelectric power and resulting revenues prompted the label “cash register dam” to refer to projects in which the hydropower receipts finance other project construction. Long-Term Drought and Glen Canyon Dam: Potential Effects on Water Deliveries and Hydropower, Congressional Rsch. Serv., Apr. 4, 2023, at 4.

5 1956 CRSPA Preamble.

6 The three reservoirs in the Aspinall Unit are Blue Mesa, Morrow Point, and Crystal. Only Blue Mesa is operated for river regulation and storage. Future references to storage in the UIUs include Blue Mesa, Flaming Gorge and Navajo Reservoirs, but not Morrow Point and Crystal Reservoirs. A number of additional reservoirs were authorized by the 1956 CRSPA (and subsequent federal legislation) as components of participating projects. All of these reservoirs have specific project functions. Several of these reservoirs store a significant amount of water. Strawberry Reservoir, a component of the Central Utah Project, McPhee Reservoir, a component of the Dolores Project, and Fontanelle Reservoir, a component of the Seedskadee Project are three prominent examples.

7 The data sources for this paper are primarily the Hydrologic Database (HDB) and the 24-Month Studies, both maintained or prepared by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. We use “live storage” to mean the amount of storage reported in the HDB or alternately, the 24-Month studies. The standard terminology for reservoirs is that live storage is the amount that can be physically withdrawn or released downstream. Active storage is the amount above the power plant penstocks (or primary outlet works for Navajo Reservoir). Inactive storage is the amount between the power plant inlets, and the low-level outlet works. Below the low-level outlet is the “dead pool.” In theory, live storage = active plus inactive storage. In practice, however, each reservoir has a different design and different management issues. It is possible that some live storage may not be accessible for downstream delivery and use. The figures provided for live and active storage in the UIUs do not include Crystal and Morrow Point reservoirs.

8 For more information on the 1970 Long Range Operating Criteria, see https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/opcriter2005FRN.pdf.

9 The Colorado River Interim Surplus Criteria were adopted in 2001, but were superseded by the 2007 Interim Guidelines, see https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/surplus/pdf/Attachments/Attachment_I.pdf.

10 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and the Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead, December 2007, https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/RecordofDecision.pdf.

11 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2019 Drought Response Operations Agreement, https://www.usbr.gov/ColoradoRiverBasin/dcp/droa.html.

12 DROA, Sec. I.A.

13 Upper Colorado River Commission (UCRC) Seventy-Third Annual Report (2022), pages 16-17.

14 UCRC Seventy-Fourth Annual Report (2023), page 15. With the DROA releases, Lake Powell reached a low of 3519.92 ft. (MSL), in early April 2023.

15 UCRC Seventy-Fifth Annual Report (2024), page 15. With an estimated natural flow of 17.3 MAF, 2023 was the third wettest year since 2000. We refer to it as a moderately wet year based on comparisons with the 20th Century record. With a natural flow of 17.3 MAF, it is about the same as the ten-year average from 1980-1989 – 17.2 MAF. USBR natural flow database, https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/NaturalFlow/index.html.

16 DROA, Sec. II.A.6.

17 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2026 Drought Response Operations Plan, https://www.usbr.gov/ColoradoRiverBasin/documents/dcp/DROA/2026/uc-2026droughtresponseoperationsplan-attachmentsa-h-508-20260423.pdf. Two measures were put in place to maintain the elevation of Lake Powell above 3500 ft. The 1.0 MAF of DROA releases and a reduction of the Water Year 2026 annual release from Glen Canyon Dam from 7.5 MAF to 6.0 MAF.

18 Id.

19 For an explanation of the Ratchet Effect, see Schmidt et al., The Colorado River Water Supply Crisis in a Few Graphs: Part 1 at 8 (June 2026), https://www.colorado.edu/center/gwc/2026/06/18/colorado-river-water-supply-crisis-few-graphs-part-1.

20 Lower Division States’ Proposal for Short-Term Operations of the Colorado River, May 1, 2026, https://www.azwater.gov/sites/default/files/2026-05/2026.05.01%20LB2YearPlanFINAL.pdf.

21 Memo from John Entsminger to Andrea Travnicek, Subject: Lower Division States’ Proposal for 2026–2028 Colorado River Operations, Dated May 1, 2026.

22 AWDR presentation at the ARC Meeting May13, 2026, slide #9, https://www.azwater.gov/sites/default/files/2026-05/2026.05.13%20ARC%20Meeting%20%2313%20FINAL_0.pdf.

23 Letter from UCRC Executive Director Cullom to Acting Commissioner Cullom, dated June 1, 2026, http://www.ucrcommission.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/UDS-response-to-BOR-response-to-LB-concept-June-1-2026.pdf.

24 Comments of the individual UCRC commissioners at the April 26, 2026, special meeting of the UCRC where it reluctantly approved the DROA plan.

25 Scott Cameron, Bureau of Reclamation presentation, 2026 GWC Conference, https://www.colorado.edu/center/gwc/2026/06/04/june-4-5-2026-conference-colorado-river.

26 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Record of Decision, Framework for Colorado River Guidelines: Coordinated Operations of Lake Powell and Lake Mead (2027-2036) August 2026, https://www.usbr.gov/ColoradoRiverBasin/post2026/decision-doc/P26_RecordofDecision_Final.pdf.

27 ROD at 30.

28 ROD at 27, 30.

29 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2027-2028 Operating Guidelines, https://www.usbr.gov/ColoradoRiverBasin/post2026/decision-doc/2027-2028OperatingGuidelines_Final.pdf.

30 Department Response to Lower Division States’ Proposal for 2027-2028 Colorado River Operations, May 28, 2026.

31 The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, Southern Ute Indian Tribe, Jicarilla Apache Nation, and Navajo Nation each have significant and unique interests in the operation of Navajo Reservoir. The Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation has asserted claims to water stored in Flaming Gorge Reservoir.

32 The Law of the River is a complex set of agreements, treaties, court decisions, and regulations that govern the allocation and use of water resources in the Colorado River Basin. A Colorado River Overview: Education, Facts & Statistics, https://coloradoriver.com/statistics-facts/.

33 1956 CRSPA, supra note 3.

³⁴ Nevada v. Burgum, et al, U.S. District Court, District of Nevada, Case 2:26-cv-02665, filed 08/24/2026. See also, https://mavensnotebook.com/2026/08/25/courthouse-news-nevada-files-suit-over-colorado-river-plan/; https://www.gov.nv.gov/press-releases/nevada-files-lawsuit-against-department-of-the-interior-over-colorado-river-operations-record-of-decision.

³⁵ The term “framework” to describe the new DROA was used by the UCRC at its Sept. 15, 2026, Special Meeting. The comments by Tom Buschatzke were made at the August 24, 2026, meeting of the Arizona Reconsultation Committee.

How a century-old pricing system has emptied the #ColoradoRiver: An absurdity of the Colorado River crisis is the role of heavy government subsidization of agricultural water use — Daniel M. Frey (BigPivots.com) #COriver #aridification

Colorado River near Burns. Photo credit: Big Pivots

Click the link to read the article on the Big Pivots website (Daniel M. Frey):

October 5, 2026

While fighting over water rights and priorities might take decades, the federal government can start aligning what agriculture pays for federal delivery with what municipal users already pay — without waiting for a new compact or a courtroom fight over title.

We are told that nothing can be done about the Colorado River water crisis while officials allow powerful agricultural interests to keep using more of the river for hay and alfalfa than all cities and other industries in the basin combined.

In the Lower Basin, agricultural water districts pay roughly 6% of what municipal utilities pay at wholesale. That pricing perpetuates waste and low-value irrigation, discourages conservation, and undermines any real chance of restoring the river’s supplies.

Part I of this series (see “Absurdity of the Colorado River crisis,” Big Pivots, Aug. 30, 2026) showed that nearly half the water put to human use in the Colorado River Basin goes to growing feed for cattle — alfalfa, hay and silage — while 40 million people depend on the same river for drinking water.

That is not a hydrology problem. It is a political one, built on the doctrine that the oldest water right always wins, no matter how the world around it has changed.

This installment goes one layer deeper, into the accounting. The story of the Colorado River is not only about who has the legal right to water. It is about how government pricing, contracts, and cost-shifting have supported overuse on low-value crops.

The volumes restated

Forage crops — mostly alfalfa and hay grown to feed livestock — consume close to half of all water used by people across the Colorado River Basin. In 2023, two separate studies by the Western Agricultural Economics Association and the Arizona Department of Agriculture (see Sources) concluded that in the Lower Basin’s desert valleys, a substantial share is shipped overseas: up to 30% of Imperial Valley alfalfa and more than a fifth of Arizona’s hay.

In the Upper Basin, including Colorado, forage crops make up roughly 90% of agricultural irrigation, more than three times what Upper Basin households, businesses and industries consume combined. The degree and complexity of irrigation and infrastructure vary across the upper and lower basin. There are small farms and communities that have closely and carefully integrated water with highly efficient and effective irrigation.

It should also be understood that many farms and ranches in the Colorado River Basin, particularly in the Upper Basin, do not depend upon federal-financed infrastructure. This essay is not about them. Rather, it is about both farms and cities who benefit from federal infrastructure. Cities that are home to millions of people are asked to justify every toilet flush and lawn sprinkler while a crop with a modest market value drains the river. That imbalance might be easier to defend if the irrigators paid a market price. Instead, Lower Basin irrigation districts pay about 6% of what cities pay at wholesale.

How the government built — and then discounted — this system

Almost none of the infrastructure that makes Southwestern irrigation possible was built or paid for by farmers alone. The dams, canals, and reservoirs of the Colorado River system were constructed and financed by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, a Department of the Interior agency that has spent more than a century as the largest wholesaler of water in the country.

Under federal reclamation law, the government fronts the capital, and the beneficiaries — irrigation districts, cities, power customers — are supposed to pay it back over time.

Political power derailed equitable pricing during this past century. Reclamation law splits repayment onto two tracks. Municipal and industrial water is repaid over roughly 40 to 50 years — with interest. Irrigation costs are repaid over the same window — interest-free.

Congress wrote the interest-free exemption into the original Reclamation Act of 1902 to spur Western settlement. Homesteaders on arid land had no way to finance dams and canals themselves. Lawmakers reasoned that irrigated farms would eventually generate enough tax base and repayment to justify the up-front public investment.

Cities were not part of that original calculation. Municipal and industrial water became an authorized Reclamation purpose only in 1939, and it was placed on the standard interest-bearing track. The exemption made sense when the goal was populating an unsettled frontier. It has been revisited many times since — always to loosen it — but never ended for a basin now serving forty million urban residents.

That alone would be a meaningful subsidy. It gets larger. Reclamation law also lets irrigation districts apply for “ability to pay” relief. That economic review can cut a district’s repayment obligation below its actual share of construction costs if the government decides the district cannot afford the full amount or that the land is not productive enough to justify full-cost pricing. When those obligations go unpaid, the shortfall does not vanish. It is folded into what other customers pay — chiefly hydropower sales and, on some projects, municipal and industrial users. Cities are not just paying full freight for their own water. On many federal projects, they and power customers are backstopping agriculture’s unpaid balance, too.

In the Colorado River Basin alone, the federal government has put more than $8 billion, in unadjusted dollars, into three programs: Hoover Dam and the All-American Canal, the Colorado River Storage Project and the Central Arizona Project. Compounded at 4.6%, roughly what cities have paid to borrow over the past century, $8 billion would be worth more than $75 billion today. The power and municipal shares of those costs carry interest; the irrigation share does not. The financing model was never hidden. The Storage Project — Glen Canyon, Flaming Gorge, Navajo, and the Aspinall Unit — was promoted in the 1950s on the promise that power and municipal features would be repaid with interest and irrigation would not. Hydropower revenue from those dams still covers irrigation costs judged to be beyond farmers’ ability to pay.

At that rate, repaying a construction cost interest-free over 50 years wipes out about 60% of its value compared with what municipalities pay. Add debt forgiveness, stretched repayment periods and “ability to pay” relief, and the discount grows: economist Richard Wahl found that once interest was counted, irrigators repaid only about fourteen cents of every dollar of irrigation construction costs.

What this looks like in dollars

The gap is not subtle. A December 2025 report from the UCLA Institute of the Environment and Sustainability and the Natural Resources Defense Council analyzed 217 water transactions across the Lower Basin states. The report found that agricultural water districts pay a weighted average of about $30 per acre-foot, while municipal utilities pay about $512.

An acre-foot is 326,000 gallons, enough to supply two to three households for a year. Under this system, a hay farmer’s district pays about $30 and a utility serving a family in Phoenix or San Diego pays roughly $500 — before treatment and local delivery. That is seventeen times as much for the same unit of a scarce public resource.

Federal repayment terms are only one reason for that gap. Under Western water law and most federal contracts, the water itself is essentially free; prices reflect the cost of storing, moving, and treating it, and city systems carry heavier pumping and treatment costs. However, the federal subsidy is part of the gap the public has financed directly — and the part of Washington can most readily change.

Some agricultural districts, including California’s Imperial Irrigation District, the single largest holder of Colorado River water rights, pay the Bureau of Reclamation nothing at all for the water itself. Their contracts do not require payment for the raw supply. When the federal government paid for that same district in 2023 to leave water in Lake Mead, the contract rate was about $776 an acre-foot. The district had asked for as much as $840. Everyone involved already knows what the water is worth.

Who holds the cheap water — 20 large corporate farms

A 2023 ProPublica and Desert Sun investigation found that just twenty large farming entities in California’s Imperial Valley received roughly one-seventh of the entire lower Colorado River’s flow in 2022. That is more water than Wyoming, New Mexico, or Nevada each use in a year.

The water right itself is held by the Imperial Irrigation District, a public agency. Those entities are the largest users of that right, not its owners. As a whole — historic farm families, outside investors, institutional landholders and at least one foreign hay company receives 97% of IID’s water. Every home, school and business in the county combined receives 3%.

Cheap irrigation water is not propping up the rural economy. Imperial County sits on some of the most heavily and cheaply irrigated farmland in the country, yet its per capita income in 2021 was about $19,000 — half the national figure of about $38,000, according to Census Bureau estimates. It posted the highest unemployment rate in California that year.

A 2024 peer-reviewed study of agricultural water productivity across the Colorado River Basin found that the least economically productive counties consume 25% of the Basin’s agricultural water to generate just 3% of its crop revenue. Heavily discounted water is not building broad rural prosperity. Where it produces high value, as in Imperial County, that value is concentrated in a small number of landholders; where it does not, it props up low-value production.

Run the counterfactual. If those same operations paid municipal-scale wholesale rates — $300 to $500 an acre-foot instead of $20 to $30 — the economics of growing export-bound cattle feed in a desert would collapse on their own, without a single acre-foot needing to be fought over in court. Water would move toward higher value uses because it would finally cost what it is worth. That is what a functioning price signal does. Right now, the federal government is underwriting the draining of the river for cheap crops and powerful agricultural interests.

Immediate action does not require new water-rights litigation

The most common argument against fixing this is that it would take years. Because water rights are property, this argument holds, any change must move through negotiation, buyouts, and courts.

That is true if the goal is changing who legally owns the water. It is not true if the goal is changing who pays for the infrastructure that delivers it.

Cost allocation is an administrative and budgetary process, not a property right. The Bureau of Reclamation and the Interior Department already have the statutory tools to reassess “ability to pay” determinations on a going-forward basis, to stop extending new construction-cost discounts to districts irrigating low-value forage crops, and to fully enforce the Reclamation Reform Act’s full-cost pricing for large landholdings. Congress, which wrote the interest exemption into law, can require interest-bearing repayment in new and renegotiated contracts.

Those are the same terms municipal and industrial users already face. Existing repayment contracts cannot simply be rewritten in midstream; they run until they expire or are mutually amended. None of that touches a single farmer’s decreed water right. It stops asking cities and power customers to keep underwriting the next generation of discounts for overuse on low-value crops.

That change would not resolve the Colorado River crisis itself. But it would start doing what a century of “first in time, first in right” has never done: make the cost of water reflect its scarcity. It would let price — not another emergency federal curtailment — begin moving water toward its most essential uses.

Why hasn’t it happened?

The authority sits with the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Reclamation, which set repayment terms and administer ability-to-pay determinations under reclamation law. Legislative jurisdiction belongs to the House Natural Resources Committee’s Subcommittee on Water, Wildlife and Fisheries and the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee’s Subcommittee on Water and Power. Reclamation’s annual budget is funded through the Energy and Water Development appropriations subcommittees in both chambers — not the Interior-Environment subcommittees, whose jurisdiction excludes the Bureau of Reclamation.

The last time Congress meaningfully touched this structure was the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. Even that act left interest-free repayment and ability-to-pay intact while expanding the size of farms eligible for subsidized water. Since then, as reservoirs have fallen toward dead pool and the federal government has spent billions on emergency conservation payments and drought relief, no bill addressing the underlying interest-free, cost-shifted pricing structure for Colorado River irrigation has reached a committee markup, let alone the floor of either chamber. A review of Congress.gov and GovTrack through August 2026 found none.

The leverage is not confined to a handful of committee chairs in Washington. It runs through the states that depend on the river. Of the 14 U.S. senators representing the Basin’s seven states, seven sit on the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, which has direct jurisdiction over the Bureau of Reclamation and reclamation law:

Sen. John Barrasso (R-Wyo.); Sen. John Hickenlooper (D-Colo.), also on the Water and Power Subcommittee; Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah), committee chairman; Sen. Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.), ranking member; Sen. Ruben Gallego (D-Ariz.), also on Water and Power; Sen. Catherine Cortez Masto (D-Nev.), also on Water and Power; and Sen. Alex Padilla (D-Calif.), also on Water and Power.

In the House, 11 basin-state representatives sit on the Natural Resources Subcommittee on Water, Wildlife and Fisheries: Chair Harriet Hageman (R-Wyo.), Tom McClintock (R-Calif.), Lauren Boebert (R-Colo.), Celeste Maloy (R-Utah), Jeff Crank (R-Colo.), Melanie Stansbury (D-N.M.), Dave Min (D-Calif.), Adam Gray (D-Calif.), Luz Rivas (D-Calif.), Julia Brownley (D-Calif.) and Joe Neguse (D-Colo.). Jared Huffman (D-Calif.), ranking member of the full committee, serves ex officio.

Four basin-state members — Ken Calvert (R-Calif.), Celeste Maloy (R-Utah), Mike Levin (D-Calif.), and Susie Lee (D-Nev.) sit on the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, which writes Reclamation’s budget every year.

According to the same review, none of these lawmakers, of either party, has introduced legislation addressing the interest-free, ability-to-pay repayment structure at the center of this piece. The people with the most direct stake in the outcome — whose constituents are either the cities paying full price or the districts paying a fraction of it — already hold seats on every committee with the authority to change it.

The hard conclusion

This complicated system of senior rights and subsidies, built and protected for a hundred years, leads to an unavoidable conclusion. Under the banner of property rights and support for agriculture, we have allowed a small number of large, politically connected agricultural users to capture much of the water that forty million people depend on.

Almost half of the water put to human use across seven states, from the high Rockies to California, has been turned to private benefit for irrigation of low-value crops, to the detriment of everyone else in the region. Having secured water rights at no cost and federal infrastructure at a steep discount, those same users are demanding to be paid top dollar — more than $800 an acre-foot — to leave that water in the river.

None of this is a call to end Western agriculture or to strip farmers and ranchers of property they hold in good faith. It is a call to stop asking the public to underwrite, at steadily mounting costs, a pricing structure that a small number of landholders have had a century to defend and a well-organized lobby to protect. The technical authority to change the next round of contracts and ability-to-pay reviews already exists inside agencies Congress funds every year. Using that authority still takes political will the basin’s own delegation has not yet shown.

Taking on powerful agricultural interests requires action from representatives of the forty million people who need a sane and sustainable water policy.

Daniel Frey is a Boulder resident, non-practicing CPA and Certified Energy Manager (CEM). He researches and writes on energy and sustainability issues.

Sourcing for essay

Series

Frey, Daniel M. “Absurdity of the Colorado River crisis.” Big Pivots, Aug. 30, 2026. bigpivots.com/the-absurdity-of-the-colorado-river-crisis/ [Part I of this series]

Water use and forage crop exports

Richter, Brian D., et al. “New Water Accounting Reveals Why the Colorado River No Longer Reaches the Sea.” Communications Earth & Environment, vol. 5, 2024, article 134. [source for forage crops’ share of basin water consumption and the Upper Basin 90% figure]

Sall, Ibrahima, Russell Tronstad, and Chia Yi Chin. “Alfalfa Export and Water Use Estimates for Individual States.” Western Agricultural Economics Association, 2023. waeaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Alfalfa-Export-and-Water-Use-Estimates-for-Individual-States.pdf [state-level alfalfa export shares and water embedded in exports, 2022]

Frisvold, George, and Dari Duval. “Understanding the Economics of Arizona Alfalfa.” University of Arizona Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, via Arizona Farm Bureau, June 26, 2023. azfb.org/Article/Understanding-the-Economics-of-Arizona-Alfalfa [source for exports equal to 22% of Arizona hay and forage production in 2022]

Yachnin, Jennifer. “Can Alfalfa Survive a Fight Over Colorado River Water?” E&E News by Politico, Sept. 8, 2023. eenews.net/articles/can-alfalfa-survive-a-fight-over-colorado-river-water/ [source for up to 30% of Imperial Valley alfalfa exported, citing Family Farm Alliance data]

Water pricing and cost allocation

Garrison, Noah, Isabel Friedman, and Mark Gold. Free Water While It Lasts: An Analysis of Wholesale Water Pricing in the Lower Colorado River Basin States. UCLA Institute of the Environment and Sustainability & Natural Resources Defense Council, Dec. 11, 2025. ioes.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Water-Pricing-Report.pdf

Griffiths, Claire. “Report Puts Numbers on Massive Gap in Water Costs in the West.” UCLA Institute of the Environment and Sustainability, Dec. 11, 2025. ioes.ucla.edu/article/report-puts-numbers-on-massive-gap-in-water-costs-in-the-west

“Colorado River Water Is Too Cheap, Particularly for Agricultural Users.” Inside Climate News, Dec. 11, 2025. insideclimatenews.org/news/11122025/colorado-river-water-too-cheap/

Mendoza, Katya. “UCLA Report Finds Farmers Pay Far Less Than Cities for Colorado River Water.” AZPM, Dec. 16, 2025. azpm.org/s/102329-ucla-report-finds-farmers-pay-far-less-than-cities-for-colorado-river-water/

“California Cities Pay a Lot for Water; Some Agricultural Districts Get It for Free.” CalMatters, Dec. 11, 2025 (also republished by U.S. News & World Report). calmatters.org/environment/2025/12/price-of-california-water-cities-growers/

Voice of San Diego. “How Imperial Valley Spends San Diego’s Cash for Water.” Nov. 2, 2023. voiceofsandiego.org/2023/11/02/how-imperial-valley-spends-san-diegos-cash-for-water/ [source for San Diego’s ~$730/acre-foot wholesale price vs. Imperial’s $20]

The 2023 Imperial Irrigation District conservation payments

“The Colorado River’s Biggest User Will Conserve Some Water in Exchange for Federal Dollars.” KPBS Public Media, Dec. 5, 2023. kpbs.org/news/environment/2023/12/05/the-colorado-rivers-biggest-user-will-conserve-some-water-in-exchange-for-federal-dollars [source for the $776/acre-foot payment rate]

Stanford University Water Programs. “Colorado River Allocation.” water.stanford.edu/research/projects/colorado-river-allocation [source for the up-to-$840/acre-foot figure from the 2023-2026 System Conservation Implementation Agreement]

Land, water rights and county-level economics

Wilson, Janet, and Nat Lash. “The Historic Claims That Put a Few California Farming Families First in Line for Colorado River Water.” ProPublica / The Desert Sun, Nov. 9, 2023. propublica.org/article/california-farm-families-gained-control-colorado-river

Lash, Nat, and Janet Wilson. “The 20 Farming Families Who Use More Water from the Colorado River Than Some Western States.” ProPublica / The Desert Sun, Nov. 9, 2023. projects.propublica.org/california-farmers-colorado-river/ [source for the twenty entities and their 2022 water use]

Frisvold, George B., and Jyothsna Atla. “Agricultural Economic Water Productivity Differences Across Counties in the Colorado River Basin.” Hydrology, vol. 11, no. 8, 2024, article 125. doi.org/10.3390/hydrology11080125

U.S. Census Bureau. American Community Survey (ACS), 1-Year Estimates, Table B19301 (“Per Capita Income in the Past 12 Months”), 2021. data.census.gov [national and Imperial County per capita income figures]

Reclamation law, repayment structure, and federal cost allocation

Congressional Research Service. “Bureau of Reclamation Project Authorization and Financing.” CRS In Focus IF10806, Congress.gov. congress.gov/crs-product/IF10806

Congressional Research Service. “Bureau of Reclamation Support for Water Storage Projects.” CRS Report R47987, Congress.gov. congress.gov/crs-product/R47987

U.S. Government Accountability Office. “Bureau of Reclamation: Availability of Information on Repayment of Water Project Construction Costs Could Be Better Promoted.” GAO-14-764, 2014. gao.gov/assets/gao-14-764.pdf

U.S. Government Accountability Office. “Bureau of Reclamation: Reclamation Law and the Allocation of Construction Costs for Federal Water Projects.” GAOREPORTS-T-RCED-97-150. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-T-RCED-97-150/html/GAOREPORTS-T-RCED-97-150.htm

U.S. Government Accountability Office. “Bureau of Reclamation: Information on Allocation and Repayment of Costs of Constructing Water Projects.” GAOREPORTS-RCED-96-109, 1996. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-RCED-96-109/pdf/GAOREPORTS-RCED-96-109.pdf

Wahl, Richard W. Markets for Federal Water: Subsidies, Property Rights, and the Bureau of Reclamation. Resources for the Future, 1989. [source for irrigators’ repayment share once interest is counted]

Congressional Research Service. “Bureau of Reclamation: History, Authorities, and Issues for Congress.” CRS Report R46303, April 3, 2020. congress.gov/crs-product/R46303 [1939 authorization of municipal and industrial water; history of repayment changes]

U.S. General Accounting Office. “Power Marketing Administrations: Cost Recovery, Financing, and Comparison to Nonfederal Utilities.” GAO/T-AIMD-96-169, Sept. 19, 1996. govinfo.gov/app/details/GAOREPORTS-T-AIMD-96-169 [WAPA required to recover about $1.5 billion in irrigation construction costs through power rates]

Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. Pub. L. No. 97-293, tit. II, 96 Stat. 1263.

Federal investment in Colorado River projects

Central Arizona Project. “Explaining CAP’s Federal Repayment: A Cheat Sheet.” Know Your Water News, May 13, 2020 (updated March 8, 2023). knowyourwaternews.com/explaining-caps-federal-repayment-a-cheat-sheet/ [$4.4 billion total cost, 1973-93; $1.646 billion repayment obligation]

U.S. Census Bureau. “September 2025: Hoover Dam.” Stories From the Census Bureau’s History, Sept. 1, 2025. census.gov/about/history/stories/monthly/2025/september-2025.html [$165 million authorized for Hoover, Imperial Dam, and the All-American Canal; power revenue repaid Hoover’s cost with interest by 1987]

Stene, Eric A. “The All-American Canal: Boulder Canyon Project.” Bureau of Reclamation History Program. usbr.gov/projects/pdf.php?id=80

U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. “Colorado River Storage Project.” Upper Colorado Basin Region. usbr.gov/uc/rm/crsp/index.html [Basin Fund repayment of irrigation costs beyond ability to pay]

U.S. General Accounting Office. “Federal Electric Power: Information Concerning the Colorado River Storage Project.” GAO/RCED-90-2FS, Oct. 3, 1989. gao.gov/products/rced-90-2fs

Upper Colorado River Commission. The Colorado River Storage Project to Build a Stronger America. Promotional booklet, 1950s. Colorado River Compact Collection, Utah State Archives. images.archives.utah.gov/digital/collection/p17010coll70/id/21155/

Congressional committee jurisdiction and membership

U.S. House of Representatives, Office of the Clerk. “Committee on Natural Resources” and “Subcommittee on Water, Wildlife and Fisheries,” 119th Congress. clerk.house.gov/committees/II00 and clerk.house.gov/committees/II13

U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. “Rules, Membership, and Jurisdiction of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.” S. Prt. 119-13, March 2025. congress.gov/committee-print/119th-congress/senate-committee-print/59371

U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. “Subcommittee on Water and Power” membership list. energy.senate.gov/water-power

Heinrich, Martin, and Mike Lee. “Heinrich, Lee Announce Subcommittee Assignments for 119th Congress.” U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Feb. 11, 2025. energy.senate.gov/2025/2/heinrich-lee-announce-subcommittee-assignments-for-119th-congress.

U.S. House Committee on Appropriations. “Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies (119th Congress)” and “Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies (119th Congress),” membership rosters. appropriations.house.gov and democrats-appropriations.house.gov

U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations. “Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development.” appropriations.senate.gov/subcommittees/energy-and-water-development

Note: Committee chairs, ranking members, and subcommittee rosters reflect the 119th Congress (2025-2026) as of this writing and are subject to change with reassignments, retirements, or a new Congress. The claim that no relevant bill has reached committee markup reflects a review of the sources above and standard legislative trackers (Congress.gov, GovTrack) as of late August 2026, not an exhaustive search of every bill introduced in the 119th Congress; readers relying on this claim for further reporting should verify independently. All committee membership and pricing figures should be verified at their original sources before publication or reproduction.

Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

Unexpected voices in the national #climate debate: A few paragraphs in a #Meeker newspaper triggered a legal brief supporting #Boulder in Supreme Court case heard on Monday — Allen Best (BigPivots.com)

Suncor refinery Commerce City. Photo credit: Allen Best/Big Pivots

Click the link to read the article on the Big Pivots website (Allen Best):

October 6, 2026

Four paragraphs buried in a story published by the Meeker Herald-Times during mid-June triggered the entry of several Colorado ranchers into the Boulder-Suncor case argued on Monday morning before the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Herald Times is the newspaper of record (and the only one) in Rio Blanco County, which is in the state’s northwestern corner. It’s distinctly rural. Cattle numbers vary by season, somewhere between 16,000 and 25,000. In all seasons they outnumber humans: 6,529 as of the 2020 census.

The newspaper story recounted a June 9 meeting of county commissioners. They heard about agrivoltaics from Longmont’s Byron Kominek (Jack’s Solar Garden) and their county attorney advised them on best legal procedures for setting meeting agendas. The new Colorado State University County extension agent had stopped by to say hello, and the state transportation director for the region delivered an update on highway plans.

In the story’s 32nd paragraph, news was delivered that the county commissioners had agreed to participate in an amicus brief in the Supreme Court case siding with Suncor and Exxon Mobil at a cost to the county up to $17,500.

“The outcome of this decision by the Supreme Court will affect 100 other cases across the United States, so we felt that it was well worth our time and money to try and do the right thing,” explained Commissioner Doug Overton of why Rio Blanco County should add its name to the filing by the Associated Governments of Northwest Colorado.

Deirdre Macnab later read that story at her nearby ranch along the White River. She had a different and visceral reaction as to what constituted the “right thing” in this case.

Unlike many of her neighbors in Rio Blanco County, who have family trees several generations deep, she had arrived in 2020 from Florida and, before that, Manhattan. She has her own Wikipedia entry, which describes her as an “American women’s rights and voting rights activist and sustainable agriculture rancher.”

Macnab decided other voices were needed from Rio Blanco County in this case.

“I called Boulder County and spoke to some of the attorneys there,” she related in a noon-hour session with students at the University of Colorado Law School on Oct. 1. “Would you be interested in hearing from some of the people who are involved in agriculture in the state?” she asked. Yes, they said.

“And it wasn’t very difficult to find a number of ranchers.”

One rancher, a veterinarian, lives near Grand Junction, Macnab told the audience in Boulder, speaking from a remote source.

“She is currently selling her herd of cattle because it does not make financial sense to try to feed her cattle hay through the winter because the heat and the drought this year was so extreme that she was not able to grow the forage that she usually grows. We’re seeing hay prices that have increased by more than 50%. This is just one example of many ranchers that I’ve spoken to.”

Another among her agricultural acquaintances, she said, has pigs near Hayden. “He said his pigs were dying of sunstroke, and he was facing the decision of having to go out of business because for the first time he was having to haul water at a cost of $2,000 to $3,000 a month.”

Meeker and other parts of the Western Slope have been warming at a faster rate than Colorado altogether. And Colorado, of course, has warmed rapidly in the last 125 years, particularly during the last 25. A map posted on the Colorado State University’s Colorado Climate Center website tells the story of temperature increases from 1895 to 2025 in shades of pink, orange and red. Far western Colorado from the San Juans north to Wyoming — including both Grand Junction and Rio Blanco County — is deep red.

Macnab began her comments to the law students with a description of the two wildfires in 2025 that afflicted Rio Blanco County. The Lee, the fifth largest in Colorado’s recorded history, and the Elk together covered more than 137,000 acres.

“I have a neighbor rancher,” said Macnab. “He had 60 cows that burned to death. I had another neighbor and close friend whose entire ranch burned, and she nearly lost her house. There were flame marks on her house. A number of ranchers lost miles and miles of fence.”

Kathleen Kelley in June explained to visitors the devastation of the Lee Fire of the previous summer. Photo/Allen Best

That good friend who nearly lost her house and a great deal of fence, too, was Kathleen Kelley. Kelley had grown up in Meeker and had been ranching since the 1980s, as her father had before.

Like Macnab, Kelley differs from many other ranchers in the White River Valley, where Meeker is located. She drives an electric car. As for the house that didn’t burn, it had triple-pane windows, a rarity everywhere, more costly but more energy efficient. In this case, the triple panes prevented heat from exploding the windows and allowing the flames to leap into the house.

Kelley was unusual in other ways, too. When still in her 20s, she had been elected a Colorado state legislator, the youngest ever female to do so. Now in her 70s, she retired earlier this year after a 20-year stint as a teacher in Meeker. She contributed an essay to Big Pivots in September after the death of Windell Berry. It can be found here.

Being retired, she told Big Pivots, she feels more freedom — and responsibility to speak out. She has had many opportunities in recent months. It began in an account in the The Denver Post last year about the fire. Then, earlier this year, the Trump administration refused funds to aid the ranchers of Rio Blanco County, an apparent case of spite against Colorado. An enterprising New York Times reporter, who had grown up in Colorado Springs, contacted her, resulting in a story in that newspaper this summer.

In recent weeks, she has in turn been contacted first by a reporter from Colorado Newsline and then by other reporters from Los Angeles to Washington D.C. They want to know about her involvement in the lawsuit. Recent days brought more mentions in publications such as Mother Jones and Grist.

Kelley was interviewed by a radio station in Boston in a report that was broadcast on Monday. The radio station also interviewed a county commissioner in Mesa County, which is on the other side of this fence.

These inquiries were not the result of a PR machine. Rather, it appears to have been a case of journalists reading each others’ stories. And it happened very, very quickly..

“I have been involved in a lot of grassroots efforts, but this one was was the least orchestrated one I have ever seen,” she said. It was, she added, not a message massaged by an advocacy group, but rather a group of ranchers saying what they had to say.

“For Colorado ranchers, climate change is not an abstract possibility, but a lived reality that is threatening the economic viability of a way of life that has been central to communities for generations,” says the amicus brief that was filed on behalf of the ranchers.

The PIceance Basin in Rio Blanco County was full of drilling rigs in 2007 when gas prices reached $14/million Btu before tumbling rapidly as the recession arrived. Photo/Allen Best

The brief filed on behalf of Rio Blanco County — the government, not the handful of ranchers — also includes seven other Western Slope counties: Archuleta, Delta, Grand, Garfield, Mesa, Montezuma, and Montrose. That brief argues that the economic interests of the counties would be harmed because they depend upon oil and gas extraction. In Montezuma County (Cortez), between 40% and 50% of county tax revenue has historically come from oil-and-gas production,” the brief says. “The potential impacts of this litigation on those counties are staggering.”

A clear exception is Grand County, which has virtually no oil and gas extraction. (This writer used to live there). Apparently, Grand County is just along for the ride.

The Suncor-Boulder case fundamentally involves climate change, although the specific question before the Supreme Court is over jurisdiction. Boulder and Boulder County (and on the coattails, San Miguel County) sued Suncor and ExxonMobil in 2018, claiming monetary damages resulting from warming and other climate changes caused by greenhouse gas emissions. It cites floods, heat and drought.

This filing was in Colorado courts. The fossil fuel companies tried to get the case moved to federal court, but the Colorado Supreme Court ruled in 2025 that the state courts do have jurisdiction. Suncor, ExxonMobil and their supporters want the Boulder case — and dozens of others like it from elsewhere in the country — decided in federal courts.

Lawyers from the law school in Boulder at the noon session last Thursday sorted through the legal twists and turns of this case in the noon-hour session. It’s complicated.

“You may be experiencing what I’m experiencing, which is kind of a Kafka-esque disorientation of confusion,” said Chris Winter, executive director of the Getches-Wilkinson Center at the University of Colorado Law School. The federal government, he said, wants to have it both ways. It is arguing that this is a federal case while it also says it has no statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act.

“So that’s awfully confusing. I’m confused. I know a lot of you are confused as well.”

The New York Times, in a report published Sunday, said critics had called the federal government’s position a paradox. “The federal government is trying to get out of the business of regulating greenhouse gases, while also saying it has sole authority to regulate greenhouse gases.”

Confusion continued into Monday morning’s two-hour hearing before the Supreme Court. The Times reported that at least two justices admitted to being confused at various junctures in what the newspaper described as a “complex dispute.”

The question arose whether the federal government could have it both ways. “As I understand it, the EPA has disclaimed the power to regulate greenhouse gases,” said Justice Neil Gorsuch. The Wall Street Journal also reported that questions from Chief Justice John Roberts suggested an openness to Boulder’s argument.

That leaves open some potential for a 4-4 vote next year, which would leave the case in the Colorado Supreme Court. Justice Samuel Alito announced on Sept. 28 that he would not participate because of his ownership of stock in oil and gas companies. In the case of a tie, Boulder would win the question of jurisdiction, leaving the case in Colorado.

The decision will likely not be delivered until next June, possibly July, according to the national reporters who camp out at the Supreme Court.

“The argument was harder to read than most,” said the Times’ Adam Liptak. “The three Democratic appointees were likely votes for Boulder, and Justice Kavanaugh was adamant in his support for the energy companies. But the remaining Republican appointees’ questions were more mixed, and Boulder needs only one of their votes to prevail in light of Justice Alito’s recusal.”

But, once again, it’s a complex case deep into the legal weeds.

In question, at least in part, is whether this case has parallels with the litigation against a handful of tobacco companies in the 1990s that ultimately yielded a $206 billion settlement. In this case, though, the sources of emissions are much more diffuse – and importantly, global. Too, as Gale Norton, a former attorney general in Colorado (and interior secretary in the Bush administration) told the New York Times, fossil fuels have benefited people broadly. The same claim for tobacco is a much more difficult case to make.

Bloomberg, in an Oct. 1 story, said that climate suits, unlike the tobacco suits, have had trouble getting off the ground. The Supreme Court closed one avenue, ruling unanimously in 2011 that states cannot invoke federal law to force utilities to cut greenhouse gas emissions.

Boulder has tried a different approach, filing in state law and using traditional tort doctrines in arguing the oil companies misled the public about the risks of climate change while simultaneously contributing to the problem by producing and promoting fossil fuels.

The Wall Street Journal, in an editorial, took a dim view of Boulder’s case. Boulder, it said, “cannot supplant Congress’s power to regulate commerce among the states. Tolerating Boulder’s raid would blow the Constitution’s doors open to laws like those in New York and Vermont that seek to raid U.S. oil and gas producers for alleged damages caused by global CO2 emissions.”

William Barr, the former attorney general, had something similar to say in a guest commentary in the same publication under the headline: “Boulder Has No Business Making Foreign Policy.”

Boulder’s suit, wrote Barr, “asks a state court to impose potentially enormous liability on selected American energy companies for their alleged contribution to a worldwide phenomenon. Yet the overwhelming share of the conduct at issue lies beyond not only Colorado’s borders but America’s.”

The U.S. Constitution, he said, does not allow state and local governments to make that kind of judgement.

These legal abstractions were largely absent in the remarks of Boulder and Boulder Count officials after the oral arguments before the Supreme Court. Instead, Mayor Aaron Brockett issued a statement that talked about “hotter summers and extreme heat, to drought, declining snowpack, worsening wildfire risk and devastating fires. And every time those impacts intensify, our community pays,” he said.

At her 2,000-acre ranch near Meeker, Kelley on Sunday pondered what connected her and the other ranchers who had filed the brief in August. Jay Fetcher, who has been profiled in Big Pivots, has a ranch northwest of Steamboat Springs, where he has continued the observations of his father, who since the late 1940s began noting the date of the last snow on the ranch. Snow has disappeared earlier over the decades — especially so this year. See: “Along the Elk River, earlier springs and more uncertainty.”

Cattle far outnumber people in Rio Blanco County, and when water is available — as it obviously was on this pasture near Meeker in August — the meadows can turn vibrant green. Photo/Allen Best

Another rancher, Mike Callicrate, lives in Evergreen but was a bull rider in his younger days and married a Kansas farm girl and has feedlots there. He has an opinionated website called nobull.mikecallicarte.com, where he inveighs against the “oligarchs and multinational corporations” of our food system.

The common theme among these and others who signed onto the brief, said Kelley, was a belief in regenerative agriculture.

Last week, reviewing the filings with the Supreme Court in this Boulder-Suncor case, Kelley noticed the date the oil companies had asked the U.S. Supreme Court to take the case — arguing that Colorado had no jurisdiction: Aug. 8, 2025.

That same day, she said, she and her family were evacuated a second time because of the Lee Fire, leaving her to wonder whether they would have a house to which they could return.

“On one hand these guys are evading responsibility and on the other hand is my family not knowing whether we will be able to afford the impacts of the Lee Fire on our property.

Kelley confides that she rarely cries, but she did when she saw that date.

“That was like a two-by-four with nails.”

Supreme Court wrestles with who should pay for #ClimateChange: The Supreme Court’s decision on a #Colorado lawsuit could shape dozens of efforts to make fossil fuel companies pay for #climate damages — Austin Corona (Grist.org)

Click the link to read the article on the Grist website (Austin Corona):

October 6, 2026

The Supreme Court opened its 2026-2027 term Monday with a climate case: a lawsuit brought by Boulder, Colorado, against ExxonMobil and Suncor, a Canadian oil company, over the costs of a warming planet. The case is one of dozens across the country in which local governments have sued fossil fuel companies for their role in driving climate change and are seeking compensation as they now deal with its effects. The Supreme Court’s decision could decide the fate of all those other cases and the idea that oil companies must pay for the damages their products caused.

The justices gave no clear signs of how the court will rule, but over the course of two hours of questioning, they did demonstrate unison on one point: It is a hard and consequential task to identify who is legally liable for the impacts of climate change. 

Although Boulder’s case was first filed in Colorado courts, oil and gas companies asked the Supreme Court to step in, arguing that important climate change matters shouldn’t play out at the state level. Instead, they say, the issue belongs to Congress and the White House. Boulder wants the court to send the case back to Colorado, where it can proceed. 

Eight justices — Justice Samuel Alito removed himself from the case — attempted repeatedly to cast the case into something legible and simple. Multiple times, justices from both sides of the ideological spectrum asked attorneys, “Why make this argument so complex?” Yet they seldom openly agreed on what the simpler argument would be. The consequences for oil companies weighed heavily on some parts of the discussion, while the consequences for communities dealing with a warming planet went largely unexplored.

Some judges attempted to describe it as a case about reducing emissions — a framing that aligns closely with what ExxonMobil and Suncor argue. If Boulder’s case is an attempt to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through state court, it opens the possibility that a state court could police activity all over the country, and even the world. No state law could be appropriate to apply to the cumulative impact of global pollution, the companies argue.

“This case involves an unprecedented effort to use state law to regulate global conduct,” said Kannon Shanmugam, the attorney representing oil companies.

Several justices seemed to agree with that general picture. Kavanaugh said he could see no difference between allowing a state court to order oil and gas companies to pay damages for climate-related harms and allowing a state to effectively regulate greenhouse gas emissions all over the world. He told Boulder’s attorney, Kevin Russell, that he was downplaying the effect this case could have on oil companies, arguing it could “bankrupt” some of them. In his closing arguments, Shanmugam reinforced the idea that the chaotic consequences of the case could reach the scale of climate change itself. 

“Boulder could tag me … when I am in Colorado in two weeks and sue me on a nuisance claim for refilling my car and thereby contributing to global climate change,” he said. 

Marshall Fire December 30, 2021. Photo credit: Boulder County

Ironically, these questions were far from what Boulder claimed it wanted to do with its case. The city hasn’t asked to stop companies from producing oil and gas, or to stop those who burn them from sending greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Rather, it wants oil companies to pay for deceiving the public into thinking those products weren’t producing large-scale harms through climate change. 

Justice Elena Kagan argued Boulder’s case was similar to suits that states brought against cigarette companies in the 1990s, seeking compensation for health care costs linked to tobacco consumption. The companies weren’t required to stop selling cigarettes, but to roll back their pro-cigarette marketing and fund awareness campaigns around the effects of smoking.

“This is not an effort to reduce emissions,” said Russell. “Under our deception theory, they can continue to produce as much fossil fuels as they like and contribute to as much air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions as the market will bear when consumers are properly informed about the consequences of that decision.”

“It doesn’t prohibit them from engaging in the conduct. It requires them to internalize a portion of the cost of their activities by paying for some of the damage,” Russell said later.

Kavanaugh called Russell’s phrasing “cavalier,” saying that those costs could be significant to oil and gas companies. Some firms, including Suncor, have told their shareholders the accumulating climate cases against them could affect their bottom lines. 

An Exxon gas station lies only blocks from the Supreme Court building on Massachusetts Avenue in Washington, D.C. Exxon Mobil is one of the defendants in Boulder’s climate case. The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, looms behind the station. Austin Corona / Grist

If the case is allowed to proceed in Colorado courts and Boulder wins, it could open the floodgates for other cases, Shanmugam argued: “More [suits] are being filed by the week … so given the extraordinary magnitude of these cases, where, in each of these cases, plaintiffs are seeking billions of dollars of damages, we need an answer to this question sooner rather than later.”

Justices typically hear opening arguments and ask questions at the beginning of the court’s term and then take months before publishing a decision. This thread was only one of several they teased apart during the arguments, including arguments over states’ regulatory authorities under the Constitution and the intent of the Clean Air Act. Judges could use a range of rationales for their ultimate ruling, each of which would affect other climate suits against oil companies differently because those suits depend on different legal bases.

“States and local governments are trying to recoup costs related to harms from climate change in a lot of different types of lawsuits,” said Erika Kranz, an attorney with Harvard Law School’s environmental and energy law program. Whether these other cases “run into trouble will depend on how justices write their decision.”

It’s also possible justices send the case back to Colorado, either by deciding the Supreme Court isn’t the right place for it or by voting 4-4, which would leave Boulder able to carry on with its state-level lawsuit. (Alito has not explained why he removed himself from the case, though he has faced accusations that his investments in oil and gas companies not related to the case made his participation inappropriate.)

Kranz and Chris Winter, executive director of the Getches-Wilkinson Center at the University of Colorado Law School, said it’s hard to know whether that emphasis showed the court was leaning toward the oil companies, but it suggested that at least some justices were deeply concerned about the case’s potential financial consequences for the industry.

Boulder’s lawyers must now convince them that this risk to oil and gas companies was beside the point, Winter said. To do that, Boulder will have to overcome justices’ claims that it’s trying to reduce emissions through the court.

“There’s a lot of concern from the oil industry, from corporate actors, and from the conservative justices about the significant consequences of these cases,” Winter said. “One way to get at that is to equate this case with previous cases, which were much more directly about regulation of pollution.”

Colorado statewide annual temperature anomaly (°F) with respect to the 1901-2000 average. Graphic credit: Colorado Climate Center

Native nations sue over Endangered Species Act changes: Environmental work being done by tribes across the country will be made more difficult now that the Trump administration has more narrowly defined ‘harm.’ — Anna V. Smith (High Country News)

Steve Edwards, chairman of the Swinomish Tribal Community at Lone Tree Point, on the Swinomish Reservation in Washington. Jovelle Tamayo

Click the link to read the article on the High Country News website (Anna V. Smith):

October 5, 2026

The Smokehouse Tidal Marsh project on the Swinomish Indian Reservation, which began in 2022, will turn 250 acres of former agricultural land into estuaries and wetlands. It’s one of many tribal community projects aimed at restoring endangered and threatened populations of Puget Sound chinook salmon, Puget Sound steelhead, bull trout and southern resident killer whales in the Skagit River Watershed. A primary cause of decline for each of these species is habitat loss and degradation caused by development and agriculture.

“Over the past 150 years or so, there’s been significant damage to the habitat, and (the habitat is) what salmon needs,” said Swinomish Tribal Indian Community Chairman Steve Edwards, who has fished in the area for over 50 years. 

In July, the Trump administration dealt a massive blow to tribal efforts when it finalized changes to the federal government’s interpretation of the 1973 Endangered Species Act. Previously, the definition of “harm” to a species included the habitat and resources a species needs to survive. Now, agencies will interpret “harm” to mean only the intentional killing or harming of an individual of a species, dramatically narrowing the reach and scope of the law formerly focused on ecosystem-wide protection.

On July 14, the same day the rule change was finalized, the Swinomish and Squaxin Island tribes sued the federal government over its “radical reinterpretation” of the law, arguing that the Trump administration’s changes ignored over 50 years of congressional intent and Supreme Court case law.  

“Squaxin’s cultural and economic well-being depend upon the health and sustainability of Pacific Salmon and other freshwater and marine resources, which play a central role in the daily lives of Tribal members,” the tribes wrote in the lawsuit. 

Chairman Edwards told High Country News that federal agencies never responded to the Swinomish Tribe’s request for government-to-government consultation, despite the United States’ trust obligation to Native nations. 

“Squaxin’s cultural and economic well-being depend upon the health and sustainability of Pacific Salmon and other freshwater and marine resources, which play a central role in the daily lives of Tribal members,” the tribes wrote in the lawsuit. 

Chairman Edwards told High Country News that federal agencies never responded to the Swinomish Tribe’s request for government-to-government consultation, despite the United States’ trust obligation to Native nations. 

“It feels almost like we’ve been betrayed by our federal trustees,” Edwards said of the change, which he said diminishes their treaty rights. “It’s super disturbing that we had to fight this fight.”  

Many Native nations opposed the changes in public comments when they were proposed in 2025. They highlighted the lack of tribal consultation, as well as the devastating impacts the new interpretation could have on the recovery of imperiled species, many of  which have cultural, spiritual and relational meaning and importance to tribal citizens. 

The change could also disrupt fishing communities’ economies and deprive those who rely on salmon for subsistence. 

While the majority of the comments came from Native nations in the Pacific Northwest and were related to salmon, others came from tribes like the Pueblo of San Felipe, which cited impacts on the monarch butterfly and Suckley’s cuckoo bumblebee. The Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe voiced concern for the Dixie Valley toad, which the tribe considers a relative. 

“It is obvious that removing water from a species that needs water to survive harms both individual members of the species and the species’ population,” wrote Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe Chairwoman Cathi Williams-Tuni, about the change and the potential impacts of a nearby proposed geothermal project. 

That geothermal project was halted in 2022 after the toad was listed as endangered, but the Trump administration’s changes could allow it to resume. 

“These harms in Dixie Valley would be catastrophic, permanently ruining the Tribe’s sacred site and ending the ability to use the springs for medicine and ceremonies,” said Williams-Tuni in public comments. 

The tribes asked the court to prevent the regulatory changes from moving forward, which took effect Sept. 14, and requested a decision declaring the changes unlawful and reverting to the previous definitions of “harm.” Although they hope for a timely response, the tribes are prepared for the lawsuit to take months to resolve.

The rule change is advantageous for developers and industry, who may no longer need to consider or mitigate broader habitat impacts of their actions. Previously, if an activity would destroy habitat in a way that harmed a protected species, the business responsible would have to go through a permit process that normally triggered tribal consultation. Under the new changes, such permits would be required much less frequently, effectively cutting tribes out of the process. The changed definition will also require proof that the harm was intentional, which  is something difficult to prove in the legal system, according to Bob Anderson, Oneida Indian Nation visiting professor of law at the Harvard Law School and a member of the Bois Forte Band of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe. 

“Companies won’t have any incentives to negotiate with the government or environmental groups or tribes about how their activities are going to affect the listed species,” Anderson told HCN.

The change could also impact large-scale agreements on rivers with ESA-listed species, according to Anderson. Currently, river systems like the Klamath, Elwha and Columbia all require water to be released from their dams at certain times of year to support the migration and spawning cycles of endangered or threatened salmon, in accordance with the ESA. The new interpretation throws existing agreements and laws into question and would make salmon recovery exponentially harder. 

“We’re not even close to delisting these species,” said Kayeloni Scott (Nez Perce and Spokane), executive director of the Columbia River Snake Campaign, a coalition of conservation groups, businesses and the Nez Perce Tribe. “Our goal is abundance — healthy and abundant populations — that’s a whole other level, a whole other tier. Even getting to delisting, we’re pretty far off.” 

Anderson believes that the tribes and environmental groups’ legal arguments are strong but added that they involve a level of political risk, given the administration’s reputation for being highly retaliatory. One striking example is that of the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, which joined a lawsuit against the administration in July 2025 over the construction of an immigration detention center in the Everglades. That December, President Donald Trump vetoed an unrelated bipartisan bill that would have returned land to the tribe, citing the tribe’s opposition to the detention center as his reasoning for the veto, calling the Miccosukee Tribe “unaligned with my Administration’s policy of removing violent criminal illegal aliens from the country.”

“That’s a real message there to plaintiffs that they’re going to retaliate against you,” Anderson said. “You’re locking horns with the federal government.”

Despite the latest development, Edwards’ priority is upholding the nation’s sovereign rights for future generations. He says the tribe will not stop its restoration work. 

“It does impact our sovereignty,” Edwards said of the change to species protections. “Generations down the road, I want (Swinomish citizens) to be able to exercise their treaty rights like I have done in the past.”

We welcome reader letters. Email High Country News at editor@hcn.org or submit a letter to the editor. See our letters to the editor policy.

This article appeared in the October 2026 print edition of the magazine with the headline “Tribes sue over ‘harm’.” 

U.S. Supreme Court justices appear skeptical of allowing Boulder climate lawsuit to proceed: Case could be turning point in efforts to hold fossil fuel industry accountable — Chase Woodruff (ColoradoNewsline.com) #ClimateChange

An aerial view of a Boulder County neighborhood that burned in the Marshall Fire, on Dec. 31, 2021. (Hart Van Denburg/CPR, pool)

Click the link to read the article on the Colorado Newsline websilte (Chase Woodruff):

October 5, 2026

The U.S. Supreme Court’s conservative majority Monday appeared broadly sympathetic to fossil fuel companies’ argument that allowing two Colorado local governments to sue them over climate change in state court would be a “recipe for chaos.”

Attorneys for both sides in Suncor v. Boulder, along with the Trump administration, presented oral arguments in a two-hour hearing, the first of the Supreme Court’s 2026-27 term. The case originated in Colorado in 2018, when Boulder’s city and county governments sued Exxon Mobil and Suncor Energy, seeking monetary damages under state tort law for their role in contributing to climate change.

Despite being filed eight years ago, the case has yet to proceed to trial, as the fossil fuel companies have repeatedly tried to have it dismissed or moved to federal court by arguing that the Constitution and federal clean-air laws preempt such state-level proceedings.

As justices waded into a thicket of jurisdictional issues raised by Suncor and Exxon when they petitioned the nation’s highest court to weigh in last year, Chief Justice John Roberts noted the “practical matter” of what could happen nationwide if Boulder’s case is allowed to proceed.

“Presumably if you prevail, the next day, a municipality in every single state will file a lawsuit, probably copy your pleadings, and then there’ll be at least 50 … causes of action filed,” he told the attorney representing Boulder. “How would you think that will work out on the ground?”

With more than 30 similar lawsuits already filed by state and local governments across the country, environmental advocates say the outcome in Suncor v. Boulder could be a turning point in efforts to hold the fossil fuel industry accountable for climate change.

Justice Elena Kagan, the most senior of the court’s three liberal justices, compared the wave of climate litigation to state-level efforts against tobacco companies in the 1990s and against opioid manufacturers in the 2010s. She asked the attorney for Suncor and Exxon if those lawsuits should have been preempted, too.

Kannon Shanmugam, representing the companies, said the tobacco litigation involved “a more traditional misrepresentation claim” and consumers “suffering injury quite directly.”

“I’m waiting to see the distinction,” Kagan replied. “Because this complaint talks a lot about misrepresentations that are made by the defendants.”

Climate change in Colorado

In a statement Monday, Boulder County said that its case seeks to hold the companies “responsible for knowingly contributing to climate alteration while concealing the dangers of their products.”

The Suncor v. Boulder proceedings come after another unprecedented summer of record heat, extreme drought conditions and destructive wildfire activity impacting Boulder and other Colorado communities, as human-caused climate change, mostly the result of fossil fuel combustion, pushes average global temperatures to dangerous new highs. In December 2021, Boulder County was the location of the Marshall Fire — the most destructive fire in Colorado history, and one in which scientists say climate change was a factor.

“Faced with these rising costs, we ask, is it fair for communities to shoulder these costs alone? We believe it is not,” Boulder County’s statement said. “For decades, the companies producing and selling fossil fuels knew that their products contribute to a changing climate. These companies are asking the Court to help them evade responsibility.”

Alito absent

Absent from Monday’s oral arguments was Justice Samuel Alito, one of the Supreme Court’s most conservative members. Alito recused himself from further proceedings in the case last week, after environmental advocates had called for him to step aside because he owns stock in at least two oil companies.

Alongside the two parties to the case, Sarah Harris, U.S. deputy solicitor general, appeared before the court on the Trump administration’s behalf, asking the justices to side with the fossil fuel companies. In an unusual move, the administration filed an unsolicited brief in support of Suncor and Exxon’s initial petition to the court shortly after it was filed in August 2025.

“We agree with petitioners: interstate air pollution is an inherently federal area, and Congress hasn’t authorized this suit in the Clean Air Act,” Harris told the justices.

Though he posed multiple questions to Shanmugam about the companies’ legal arguments, conservative Justice Brett Kavanaugh appeared to agree, saying that the court had multiple precedents making it “crystal clear” that issues involving interstate air and water pollution are subject to federal preemption.

“We don’t have to reinvent the wheel,” Kavanaugh said. “Because we’ve said this multiple times — and Congress, presumably, when doing the Clean Air Act and doing the Clean Air Act amendments, has relied on this court’s precedents, establishing that this kind of pollution is a federal law matter.”

Attorney Kevin Russell, representing Boulder, reiterated that the plaintiffs’ case against Suncor and Exxon goes beyond an attempt to merely regulate greenhouse gas emissions.

“The deception claims, I think, are far outside anything the Clean Air Act is designed to deal with,” Russell said. “The Clean Air Act doesn’t give the EPA authority to figure out what is the ideal amount of emissions … or the right mix of fuels, or the right level of economic activity. It is a much more precise mandate that is limited to putting a cap on the amount of emissions from particular point sources.”

But both Kagan and Roberts sounded skeptical of Boulder’s position that its litigation isn’t seeking to regulate emissions.

“Everything depends on this idea that the defendants are responsible for excessive emissions,” Kagan said.

“Isn’t your suit an attempt to evade those (Clean Air Act precedents)?” asked Roberts. “It’s an effort to reduce emissions. The fuel production itself doesn’t have the sort of universal harm that we’re talking about.”

As Monday’s hearing began in Washington, climate activists gathered at a rally in Boulder, where Mayor Aaron Brockett, survivors of the Marshall Fire and other speakers urged the Supreme Court not to issue a ruling that lets the fossil fuel industry off the hook.

“Our community and many others have suffered terribly from worsening wildfires, floods and drought because of the deception of big oil companies, who knew that burning fossil fuels would overheat our planet, but chose to obfuscate the truth to prioritize their profits,” Micah Parkin, an advocate with climate group 350 Colorado, said in a statement. “Boulder deserves to have our day in court to hold these corporations accountable for the costs our community is having to bear.”

Looking towards Boulder at the Marshall Fire December 30, 2021 From 53rd and Stuart in Adams County. Note the atmospheric mountain wave, where winds accelerate down the slope of mountains, extend only a short distance downwind from the mountains, then subside further downwind and blow in the opposite direction, much like the backward flowing current behind a rock in a swift river.

What’s next for the Colorado River? — Page Buono (AmericanRivers.org) #ColoradoRiver #COriver #aridification

Yuma wetlands restoration, Colorado River, Arizona. Photo credit: Fred Phillips

Click the link to read the article on the American Rivers website (Page Buono):

September 9, 2026

For more than the last century, the flows of the Colorado River have been managed and dictated by the demands of a rapidly growing and changing West. There are founding legal documents, and then agreements stacked on those, often known as the “Law of the River.” These agreements are between states, between sovereign nations, including Tribal Nations and Mexico; between districts and companies and branches of the US Government. It’s hard to find the appropriate metaphor for how all of these agreements work together (and at times against one another) to manage the Colorado River system. But even fraught metaphors are sometimes the only way to get through something so complicated.

Imagine the web of agreements and founding legal documents that guide the management of the Colorado River as a body. The 1922 Colorado River Compact would be the skeleton, the framework upon which all the other functions of the body are built. The limbs could be the communities, farms, Tribes, businesses, ecosystems, and economies that rely on the river’s blood (Colorado River water).  The agreements that build on the framework of the Compact, such as the 2007 Interim Guidelines or the 2019 Drought Contingency Plan (DCP), act as nerves that facilitate or trigger movement and action. Perhaps the brain is the network of decision makers – the Bureau of Reclamation, the states, the Tribes, Mexico and others whose decisions and cooperation keep the system functioning, underscoring why coordination and consensus are so important: a body whose different parts are working at cross-purposes cannot function effectively. The blood then, of course, is the Colorado River water allocated to parts of the body. 

Continuing the body metaphor for the contemporary management of the Colorado River system, additional agreements (or the nerves that trigger certain action) were added to the body.

Colorado River, Colorado | Trout Unlimited Joshua Duplechian

On Friday, August 24, the Bureau of Reclamation released three documents outlining a 10-year framework for how the Colorado River will be managed for the next two years and how management decisions for the subsequent 8 years will be made. You can read the Bureau’s summary doc here.

  1. The Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS): evaluates the many proposed plans Reclamation considered for how the river should be managed going forward, and identifies a preferred alternative, a 10-year framework built on operating plans developed in at least two-year increments;
  2. The Record of Decision (ROD): adopts the 10-year operating framework and sets the principles and guardrails for future operations including how water can be stored, shortage sharing, critical infrastructure protection, consultation, and the movement of water between Lake Powell and Lake Mead; and
  3. The 2027-2028 guidelines: establish the specific operating approach for the first two years under the new framework.

While the two-year guidelines put real numbers and real movement on the table, the ultimate test is whether the guidelines, alongside the side agreements, investments, and management tools needed to support them, are put in place and function as intended – and whether, together, they can keep the body upright.

Six months from now, the more consequential questions will be whether the new guidelines:

  • provide more certainty and transparency, including clear pathways for addressing disputes and disagreements when they arise;
  • support flexible and adaptive management tools that can respond to changing hydrology and conditions;
  • meaningfully include Tribal Nations in both decision-making and implementation;
  • reduce reliance on emergency operations and short-term crisis response; and
  • create a workable path toward long-term resilience — one that can withstand disagreement, including litigation, without bringing implementation and collaboration to a halt.
Colorado River flowing through the Grand Canyon National Park in Arizona. Photo credit: Nick Kelley

Finally, and critically, these new guidelines must recognize healthy rivers and watersheds as a core element of the Basin’s resilience infrastructure, because in the middle of all the agreements – at the core of all the collaboration and controversy, the skeleton and nerves and muscles that move it, there is a river – there is a heart; the whole reason blood moves through the system at all.

Healthy rivers and forests, connected floodplains, and intact watersheds are essential to the body, to the Basin. They support the reliability of our water supplies, reduce the risks and impacts of wildfire; they sustain fish and wildlife, support recreation, and strengthen the Basin’s ability to withstand drought and changing conditions. They are invaluable.

Which is to say, at the center of all the agreements and negotiations and collaboration and controversy, is the river. Has always been the river. And if we succeed at all in our management, if we have any hope of keeping this body upright, there will always be the river.

Colorado River “Beginnings”. Photo: Brent Gardner-Smith/Aspen Journalism

#Drought has decimated #Colorado’s biggest reservoir, and the livelihoods of those who depend on it — Colorado Public Radio #GunnisonRiver #COriver #aridification

Blue Mesa reservoir seen in August 2026 at about 21% full. CREDIT: HEATHER SACKETT/ASPEN JOURNALISM

Click the link to read the article on the Colorado Public Radio website (Stina Sieg). Here’s an excerpt:

September 30, 2026

Anyone can see that something is deeply wrong at Blue Mesa Reservoir on the Western Slope. It’s historically been the biggest body of water in the state. But not anymore.  The deep, long-lasting drought has shrunk it so much it lost that title to Lake Granby up north. Now it looks like someone’s opened the drain on a gigantic, rocky bathtub, with only a bit of shiny blue water pooled at the bottom…For 60 years, Blue Mesa Reservoir has stored water that flows to communities and generates electricity. It’s also a popular recreation spot, a 20-mile-long lake sandwiched between Montrose and Gunnison. Growing up on the edge of this vital water source, Riser has watched decades of visitors bobbing on their motorboats and jet skis, with their coolers and kids, dogs and music…Del Piccolo said he’s never seen algae “that blue and vibrant.”[…]The neon-blue algae is like a warning sign of just how bad things are at Blue Mesa. There are actual warning signs posted, too, saying the water is now dangerous to people and pets. Sonja Chavez, executive director of the Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District, thinks it’s the worst Blue Mesa has ever looked…

Colorado SNOTEL basin-filled map May 31, 2026.

Blue Mesa is not a naturally occurring lake but instead is man-made, designed by the federal government to store water for downstream communities, farms and ranches. It also generates electricity and is federally mandated to release water that provides habitat for threatened and endangered fish, including the native razorback sucker and humpback chub. Federal officials take all of that into consideration when they determine how much water to discharge. This year, they were faced with an abysmal snowpack — that accumulation of snow that builds up throughout the winter. Chavez believes the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, which controls how much, and when, water flows out of Blue Mesa, needs to adjust more quickly to lean water years like this one.

Chavez thinks the BoR was releasing too much water too early in the season, which drove Blue Mesa into crisis.  In an email statement, the agency said it does work from 24-month forecasts of how much water will melt into reservoirs, but that it also adjusts water releases as conditions change.

“Moving forward, Reclamation is already working with our forecasting partners and water users on ways to improve modeling for dry year water use, enhance forecasting … and review historic operations to identify opportunities for increased drought resiliency,” said Bart Deming, BoR Western Colorado Area office manager.

Aspinall Unit dams

What if? What would a #ColoradoRiver Compact Call mean for #Colorado? A significant Compact tripwire may hit next month and the Lower Basin States might take the Upper Basin States to court — Ken Neubecker (Ken’s Substack) #COriver #aridification

Photo credit: Ken Newbecker

Click the link to read the article on Ken’s Substack (Ken Neubecker):

September 16, 2026

Walter and I frequently walk along the Colorado River in Glenwood Springs’ Two Rivers Park, where the Roaring Fork joins in. The Colorado has been running reddish brown lately due to some intense rain and blowouts from small tributaries upstream, gullies that normally are dry. Not this summer. The Roaring Fork runs clear, creating a distinct division between the flows, a narrow ribbon of clear cold water that runs alongside the warmer and muddier stream for a long ways before they mix.

Both streams and most others are extremely low, even for late summer. Many of the USGS gauges have exclamation points next to them on the map, meaning “extremely below average”. There are rocks exposed to the air that I’ve never seen before. What little monsoon rain we had didn’t do anything, not even for the dry soils that will likely soak up much of the snow melt next spring before it can reach the rivers.

Years ago when I’d go to water meetings and conferences, back when people referred to our current situation as an unusually long drought, there was some talk about the Colorado River Compact’s requirement that the Upper Basin not cause the river flow to drop below 75 million acre feet (maf) over a ten year running average. Oh, we’ll see that train wreck coming with plenty of time to do something, they all said. That train wreck is now happening. The engine is sliding over the cliff as the States argue about the menu back in the dining car. All that really happened was serious can kicking along the tracks.

The first Upper Basin “tripwire” of 82.5 maf, the 75 maf plus 7.5 maf for Mexico could come as soon as next month. Now the can being kicked is full of lawyers.

So, what does the 1922 Compact actually say? The meat is in Article III:

This is what each basin could expect every year.

This is where the additional 1.5 maf per year, split as 750,000 acre feet due from each basin comes in. There was no agreement on Mexico’s share of the river in 1922, or in 1928 when the Compact was finally ratified. That came in 1944 with a formal treaty regarding Mexico’s share in both the Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers. The Compact negotiators anticipated such an agreement, hence paragraph (c). What they didn’t anticipate were decades of no “surplus”. That’s another story.

The more serious tripwire comes next:

October 1, 2026, may well see the flow at Lee Ferry cross the first line in the sand of a dry riverbed if the ten year running average drops below 82.5 maf for the first time since Lake Powell began filling. Back then water was held in the new reservoir to fill it. Everyone was OK with that. The Colorado River flows upstream were still quite robust on average and Lake Mead had plenty to satisfy the Compact requirements for the Lower Basin and Mexico as Powell filled.

Not anymore. Powell is shrinking rapidly. As of this writing the reservoir is at just under 22% full, and only about 27 feet from the elevation where the dam can no longer run water through the power plants penstocks. And the outflow is still about twice the inflow.

The monsoon rains turning the river reddish brown in Glenwood won’t help.

So what happens if that 82.5 maf tripwire is triggered and one or more states of the Lower Basin place a Compact Call?

It’s complicated.

It would mean a lawsuit between the states, which would go straight to the US Supreme Court. No lower courts would be involved, and it could take years to resolve. The last time there was a lawsuit about Colorado River apportionment it was between Arizona and California. The case was filed in 1952. The Court appointed a Special Master to work it out and recommend a solution. That took ten years. The case was finally argued in the Court in 1963, with a final decision handed down in 1964. That decision finalized the legal structure for allocations in the Lower Basin, based on the 1928 Boulder Canyon Act.

Twelve years for a resolution. We don’t have that much time for any new case on the Colorado River, especially with how the Upper Basin might comply with Article III, paragraph (d), and Mexico’s share thrown in.

In 2018 and 2019 the Colorado River Conservation District (River District) commissioned a risk study to look at how flows might augment storage in Lake Powell as well as what might happen should Lake Powell ever reach a level where Compact deliveries dropped to a point where the 82.5 maf over ten years wasn’t met, causing a Compact Call. It was, in light of today’s situation and the worsening hydrology, a tad optimistic. The first point in the Executive Summary’s Takeaway states:

The critical low level used for the analysis was 3525 feet, the Bureau of Reclamations critical low as well. Today, September 16, 2026, the elevation at Glen Canyon dam is just under 3517. It continues to drop every day, counting down to October 1.

If the Lower Basin states place a Compact Call it very well could be “catastrophic” for water users in the Upper Basin. But there are scenarios where it could be less so. At the very worst all diversions junior to November 24, 1922, or possibly June 25, 1929 when the Boulder Canyon Act was signed, would be curtailed, cut off, until the Compact deficiency is resolved. But that truly is a worst case scenario.

Curtailment would likely be based on what the flow deficit is at Lee Ferry when the call is placed and what increase through Upper Basin curtailment might make up the deficit. Diversions could be cut on a sliding scale, with the most junior taking the biggest hit, going back from today to that date in 1922 or 1929. We wouldn’t probably notice much at first as October 1, the start of the new water year, coincides pretty closely with the end of the irrigation season for most.

Colorado transmountain diversions via the State Engineer’s office

The River Districts study looked at various scenarios for Colorado, based on appropriation dates, river basins vs entire West Slope, and amounts of water that might be needed to satisfy the deficiency at Lee Ferry. The biggest hits would be in the Colorado River mainstem, especially with the large trans-mountain diversions taking water to Eastern Slope cities and farms. The Front Range cities, where most of Colorado’s population resides and who rely on as much as 50% or more of their water supply coming from the Colorado River, along with the significant agricultural areas along the South Platte and Arkansas Rivers, could see some pretty significant cuts regardless.

The State, through the Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB) and Attorney General’s office did a Compact compliance study some years ago but is keeping that confidential. I can’t blame them. It could become a basis for court arguments and negotiations should a compact call become a reality. The River District study could be as well. It’s worth a read if you are really interested in all this, and anyone who uses water in Colorado, East or West, to fill a tea pot from the faucet, flush a toilet or raise crops should be. They River District study can be found here or on their website.

Monsoonal moisture is still floating water laden clouds over us today, and some have dropped a good bit of rain. But that won’t help much. We are facing a “super El Nino” this winter, which may or may not provide a healthy snowpack. Anything would be better than last winter, except a repeat of that dry season. In any case it will take many years of “normal” snowfall to begin to refill the reservoirs. Given the trend of aridity and climate warming that is not something we should be counting on.

Perhaps, hopefully, the most important part of the compact written at the beginning will be called upon:

Of course the rub here will be in how “equitable division” is defined, and I imagine this could take much of the courts time in a Compact Call. In 1922 that meant an equal share of the rivers water for each basin. Now it could hinge on where the greater “value” is, and what that means. Back in 1922 “beneficial uses” were pretty straight forward. Now there are many more uses of the river deemed “beneficial”.

The needs and values today are quite different from what they were 104 years ago. The Tribes, the environment, recreation, local economies and traditions. All were either excluded in 1922 or covered by broad undefined ambiguity. Climate change wasn’t heard of, even though some scientists at the time had warned about it.

It’s a brave new world we are entering. Business as usual based on a 104 year old piece of paper and the other paper agreements founded on it won’t help us adapt to that world, nor will wishful thinking and other optimistic dreams based on hope. As Brad Udall noted during a recent PBS Newshour Tipping Point presentation, we need to re-think the whole thing. It won’t be easy, but as Udall pointed out it could be good. We need to rethink both what the river can provide and the reality of adapting to that. We also need to rethink the “values” we base our water needs on. It’s not just about endless economic growth anymore. Throwing lawyers at each other only enriches lawyers while it impoverishes us.

Meanwhile Walter and I will continue our ramblings with the river. We’ll also stop by the River District offices to say hi to the many friends there, to add some stress relief and try to keep their heads from graying any faster than they already are.

Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

More mining claims staked at #BearsEars: Plus, the story of #LakePowell’s 26,000-ton pile of radioactive waste — Jonathan P. Thompson (LandDesk.org) #ColoradoRiver #COriver #aridification

Several of the latest claims located within the pre-shrinkage Bears Ears National Monument are on the north side of the Tables of the Sun, seen here in the background on the right. Jonathan P. Thompson photo.

Click the link to read the article on The Land Desk website (Jonathan P. Thompson):

September 25, 2026

⛏️ MINING MONITOR ⛏️

The mining claim game continues to heat up in the areas Trump illegally slashed from Bears Ears National Monument, and the top player is, once again, Kimmerle Mining of Moab. Since the Land Desk last wrote about this mini-land rush, Kimmerle has filed seven additional claims areas that had been within the national monument, and therefore off limits to new mining claims.

The latest claims are in the White Canyon area. During the post-War uranium frenzy, the federal government, county crews, prospectors, and mining companies webbed this area with roads, poked it full of prospect holes and mine adits, and contaminated waters with radioactive materials. Part of that legacy includes a 26,000-ton pile of uranium tailings entombed within the waters silt of Lake Powell.

It’s important to keep in mind that the presence of active mining claims does not necessarily mean anyone is going to mine or even explore these pieces of land. And while the claims may be active, which simply means the claimant is up to date on their $200/year location and maintenance fee, they may not be valid. That requires, at least theoretically, proof that the claim contains valuable minerals.

But it does appear as if Kimmerle is targeting viable mining areas, which indicate that the firm either intends to mine the claims, or consolidate enough of them to sell them to a larger company. The newly revealed claims are located in two clusters on either side of Natural Bridges National Monument.

The notices of location have been declared with the San Juan County Recorder, but have not yet shown up on the Bureau of Land Management database. Just before publishing this, I checked the San Juan County records search and found that an entity called Land Survey Advisers — which typically stakes claims for other firms or individuals — filed location notices on more than three dozen claims in San Juan County. At least some of those claims appear to be within the pre-shrinkage BENM boundaries, but the location description on many of them included sections that don’t exist (43, 47) in the public land survey system, and the document download function isn’t working for me, so I have yet to confirm any of this. Still, it’s potentially alarming.

Map showing the approximate location of the claims filed by Kimmerle Mining in Sept. 2026. It also shows pre-existing active claims (in pink) that were staked before Bears Ears’ 2016 establishment, or following the Trump I-shrinkage. Map: BLM and Land Desk.

The Kimmerle claims include: 

  • Six lode claims (each at 20.66 acres) on the north slope of the Tables of the Sun formations in the upper Fry Canyon drainage, just on the boundary line of the original Bears Ears National Monument. While this specific area has seen little mining activity in the past, it is in the same vicinity as the Daneros Mine, which was up for expansion as recently as 2016. And the new claims are adjacent to Kimmerle’s Lucky group of claims. 
    The nearest historic mining activity was at the Fry # 4 mine1, an underground uranium mine with over 400 meters of workings. In 1977, the operator was Utah Power & Light Co., which was the main mining company of the area at the time.
  • One lode claim on the east slope of Upper Lost Parks, an appendage of Elk Ridge just north of Natural Bridges National Monument and south of the Woodenshoe formation. It’s across Deer Creek Canyon from Kimmerle’s Geitus and Cedar claims, which the firm staked just before President Barack Obama designated Bears Ears, and right after President Donald Trump shrunk the monument for the first time. It’s also in the vicinity of the Sandy claims that Kimmerle held, but that [those?] were closed in 2015. The area was mined and prospected heavily during the Cold War. The nearest historical mines and prospects were the Big Red, the Sandy, and the Hideout. In 1977, the Big Red — operated by Utah Power & Light — was reported to have a flooded, a caved, and an open adit. While the Hideout sparked a 1950s prospecting boom in the area, none of these were ever large producers. However, a 1965 USGS report did indicate this part of Elk Ridge was favorable for uranium deposits, which is likely one reason the Trump administration stripped it of national monument protections.

The White Canyon area was known to contain rich uranium reserves back in the 1940s and 1950s, but its remoteness and the rugged landscape created challenges for mining companies looking to exploit the resources. One of the biggest hurdles was getting the ore to the Monticello processing plant, which required driving gnarly roads across the crinkled landscape and up and over Elk Ridge.

So in 1949, the Vanadium Corporation of America built a small mill at the confluenceof White Canyon and the Colorado River, primarily to process uranium ore from the nearby Happy Jack Mine, located upstream in the White Canyon drainage (and just within the original Bears Ears National Monument boundaries). For the next four years, the mill went through about 20 tons of ore per day, crushing and grinding it up, then treating it with sulfuric acid, tributyl phosphate, and other nastiness. One ton of ore yielded about five or six pounds of uranium, meaning that each day some 39,900 pounds of tailings were piled up outside the mill on the banks of the river.

In 1953 the mill was closed, and the tailings were left where they sat, uncovered, as was the practice of the day. Ten years later, water began backing up behind the newly built Glen Canyon Dam; federal officials decided to let the reservoir’s waters inundate the tailings. There they remain today, though at current lake levels they are probably buried by and mixed in with the Dominy Formation of silt, rather than covered with water.

Satellite image showing the location of the White Canyon Mill and its silt-entombed tailings pile.

During the uranium days of the West, more than a dozen mills — all with processing capacities at least ten times larger than the one at White Canyon — sat on the banks of the Colorado River and its tributaries. Mill locations included: Shiprock, Mexican Hat, Monument Valley, Tuba City, Monticello, Rifle, Grand Junction, Moab, Uravan, Green River, and Naturita. There was even an ore upgrading mill at Fry Canyon, followed by a copper heap leaching operation. Groundwater contamination continues to today, and was partially responsible for the Fry Canyon Lodge’s demise.

At the Durango mill the tailings were piled into a hill-sized mound just a stone’s throw from the Animas River. They weren’t covered or otherwise contained, so when it rained tailings simply washed into the river. Worse, the mill’s liquid waste stream poured directly into the river at a rate of some 340 gallons per minute, or half-a-million gallons per day. It was laced not only with highly toxic chemicals used to leach uranium from the ore and iron-aluminum sludge (a milling byproduct), but also radium-tainted ore solids.

Radium is a highly radioactive “bone-seeker.” That means that when it’s ingested it makes its way to the skeleton, where it decays into other radioactive daughter elements, including radon, and bombards the surrounding tissue with alpha, beta, and gamma radiation. According to the Toxic Substances and Diseases Registry, exposure leads to “anemia, cataracts, fractured teeth, cancer (especially bone cancer), and death.”

It wasn’t any better at any of the other mills. In the early 1950s, researchers from the U.S. Public Health Service sampled Western rivers and found that “the dissolved radium content of river water below uranium mills was increased considerably by waste discharges from the milling operations” and that “radium content of river muds below the uranium mills was 1,000 to 2,000 times natural background concentrations.”

That was just from daily operations. In 1960, one of the evaporation ponds at the Shiprock mill broke, sending at least 250,000 gallons of highly acidic raffinate, containing high levels of radium and thorium, into the river. None of the relevant officials were notified and individual users continued to drink the water, put it on their crops, and give it to their sheep and cattle. It wasn’t until five days later, after hundreds of dead fish had washed up on the river’s shores for 60 miles downstream, that the public was alerted to the disaster.

Of course, what’s dumped into the river at any of these places doesn’t stay there, but makes its way downstream. In the early 1960s, while Glen Canyon Dam was still being constructed, the Public Health Service folks did extensive sediment sampling in the Colorado River Basin, with a special focus on Lake Mead’s growing bed of silt, which had been piling up at a rate of 175 million tons per year after Hoover Dam started impounding water in 1935. The Lake Mead samples had higher-than-background levels of radium-226. The report concludes:

And so, the billions of tons of silt that has accumulated in Lake Mead and Lake Powell serve as archives of sorts. They hold the sedimental records of an era during which people, health, land, and water were all sacrificed in order to obtain the raw material for weapons that are capable of destroying all of humanity. If the new mining claim mini-rush is any indication, some more records may be added to the archive before long.

📸 PARTING SHOT 🎞️

There’s snow in them thar hills!

There’s snow on the peaks just as the aspens are peaking around Silverton, Colorado. Sept. 23, 2026. Andy Gleason photo.

1 This also appears on some maps and documents as Frey #4. In fact, many of the “Fry”s in the Fry Canyon area show up as “Frey” on older maps (while some still say “Fry.”). Oh my oh my I don’t know why it’s Frey or Fry.

‘Like driving off a cliff at 2 mph’: A water expert’s take on what’s coming for the #ColoradoRiver — Scott Franz (CU Boulder Today) #COriver #aridification

The Colorado River flows near Hite Marina in Utah. (Credit: Alexander Heilner/The Water Desk with aerial support from LightHawk)

Click the link to read the article on the CU Boulder Today website (Scott Franz):

September 2, 2026

The Colorado River is on the brink of collapse because of climate change and overuse of water.

Reservoirs supplying water to tens of millions of people in the southwest reached record lows this summer. The nation is racing to refill them with conservation measures so they can still generate hydropower and reliably deliver water to users downstream.

Fish are struggling. Rafters are having trouble navigating low water. 

Despite all this, the seven states sharing the water supply remain at a yearslong impasse over how to conserve the river.

“The Colorado River is in as bad a shape as it’s ever been,” said Doug Kenney, chairman of the Colorado River Research Group at CU Boulder’s Getches-Wilkinson Center.

The Interior Department announced Aug. 21 it will significantly cut back the amount of water that will flow to the lower basin states of California, Nevada and Arizona for at least the next two years.  

“To the people who really study this river, everything that’s happening this year has been expected for decades,” Kenney said. “This is a classic, slow-moving crisis. I’ve equated it to driving a car off a cliff at 2 miles an hour. You can look out the windshield and see that cliff coming. And we’re now right at the edge.”

Kenney spoke to CU Boulder Today about the latest efforts to conserve the river and what he thinks is coming next. 

Are these cuts to the lower basin states enough to save the river?

There’s nothing in this plan that will save the river. It hasn’t made it to the ocean since the 1960s. That’s not going to change. What they’re really trying to accomplish is to prevent the reservoirs from going even lower. They’re trying to avoid further disaster. And the cuts they’re anticipating for the next two years—I don’t think are going to get us there.

If we have a good water year or two with heavy snowpack, we can maybe hold where we’re at. But by the time we get to year three and beyond, those cuts will probably have to be about twice as big as they are now. 

Nevada is suing the federal government to stop the cuts. What’s at stake?

One of those stakes could be that the Bureau of Reclamation is told to go back and redo its plan to cut water to the lower basin states. That would be chaotic. The last thing water users want is chaos. They want to know how much water they can expect.

Doug Kenney at the Getches-Wilkinson Center 2026 Conference on the Colorado River June 5, 2026. Photo credit: Allen Best

With lawsuits starting, is there any hope left for states to agree on a plan?

There are two problems on the river. One is stopping the current trajectory of reservoirs dropping. And that’s a heavy lift. But if you manage to do that, then there’s the other problem of rebuilding those reservoirs. Which requires even further conservation and cuts. 

We have to rebuild some storage in those reservoirs. At the moment, we’ve decided let’s just deal with what we have to deal with immediately—this short term crisis—and even that’s proving to be a lift that the states can’t do themselves. And the federal government has had to step in.  

Their plan doesn’t force water cuts for upper basin states like Colorado. Can we get out of this crisis without mandatory cuts in the upper basin?

The upper basin is tricky here in that it uses significantly less water than it was promised. And people in the upper basin will tell you, this is the deal they made a century ago in the 1922 Colorado River Compact.

So when you talk to the upper basin states about conserving water on any sort of permanent basis, that’s the sticking point that you’re going to get is people saying ‘we were promised this water.’ 

The scientists will say this is a different river than 100 years ago. So you have that sort of impasse. If the upper basin could just cap what they’re using today, long term, that would be tremendously helpful. And that might very well happen. But I don’t think the upper basin would want to commit to that in any sort of formal way. 

Then how do we get out of this crisis?

A truly long-term sustainable solution has to look at the fact that we’re using 75 percent of the water in agriculture. And some of that agriculture I think is going to just have to go away. So the policy decision there is: Which agriculture goes away? And does it just go away through bankruptcies, and let the market do what the market does? Or do we do that in a structured and more humane manner, such as a federal program to buy out large amounts of it? 

But when you start talking about retiring a lot of agriculture, that’s not popular. There’s no easy way out of this. [ed. emphasis mine]

Is the fate of the river heading to the US Supreme Court? 

I would guess we end up in interstate litigation. I’m not sure of that, but I think the odds of that happening are greater than 50-50 in my mind. But you have to appreciate that no negotiation and no court fight creates water. The weather systems create water. And as long as the earth continues to heat, this basin figures to get drier and drier. 

Twenty years from now, we’re gonna look back and say, ‘Oh, those were the days when we got healthy snowpack,’ and ‘Oh boy, we had it good back then.’ That’s the trajectory we’re on in terms of the climate part of this. 

Is there anything that gives you hope for the river’s future?

Hope comes from the fact that at some point, Mother Nature imposes cuts. At some point, the water just isn’t there and people have to be creative and do more with less or at least try to do the same with less. And there’s a good track record of doing that. 

The southwest is a great example. Las Vegas over the last 30 plus years has been the fastest growing big city in America. And during that period, they slashed their water use dramatically. Other cities have been on the same trajectory: Denver, Los Angeles, San Diego, Phoenix and Tucson have shown that they can use a lot less water. And that’s really encouraging.

It’s tougher to save water in agriculture. But there are some things we can do to adapt. Some of it’s technology. Some of it’s using different systems for irrigating crops. It’s also changing to different crops. There are tools in the toolbox here. 

But it’s really hard to get that sort of adaptation going as long as you’re still in the mindset that the other guy is the problem, and what I do is fine. That mindset stops a lot of good innovations from happening.

Native America in the Colorado River Basin. Credit: USBR

There are 30 tribal nations with a stake in this river as well. What can we learn from them?

They say, ‘Why is there a table with seven chairs. Why is it only seven states negotiating? There should be at least 37 chairs.’ They should be involved in this process at every level. And by and large they aren’t. 

The Colorado River Indian Tribes have dubbed their portion of the river as basically having personhood status. It is a living independent being. It’s important, I think, to challenge the rest of the users in the basin to think about the obligation we have to the river itself. Because that’s just not a viewpoint that comes up in these negotiations, but it really needs to. 

Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

President Trump guts the Endangered Species Act: Also, more mining claims filed in Bears Ears National Monument — Jonathan P. Thompson (LandDesk.org)

Click the link to read the article on The Land Desk website (Jonathan P. Thompson):

September 18, 2026

Hey, guess what! I friggin’ hate putting Tr*)*p in the headline of this newsletter once again. It makes me nauseous. But the thing is, his administration has significantly stepped up its attacks on the environment, public lands, and wildlife over the last few months. I don’t know if this is an attempt to distract from ridiculous wars and crazy gasoline prices, or if it’s a rush to roll back as many protections as possible before the midterms. Whatever it is, I have to respond and cover the news, especially when it’s as big and consequential as today’s. 

🦫 Wildlife Watch 🦅 🐓 Regulatory Capture Chronicles 🦊

Last week, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Director Brian Nesbitvik sent out a memo to directing agency leadership to effectively eviscerate the Endangered Species Act by exempting industry from its purview, leaving imperiled wildlife vulnerable to slaughter and even extinction, so long as the action wasn’t “intentionally directed against a particular animal or animals.”

The Endangered Species Act declares it “unlawful for any person” to “take” — meaning to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect — any species listed under the ESA. Since the law was passed in 1973, “take” has always been unqualified and absolute, meaning that killing or harming one of these animals is illegal whether the animal is targeted or not. This not only protects the animals from hunters, say, but also from industrial activities that may incidentally kill protected species.

The Sept. 14 memo, however, directs the agency to adopt U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s interpretation of “take” in his dissenting opinion on a 1995 case, where he wrote that “take is a term of art” that “describes a class of acts (not omissions) done directly and intentionally (not indirectly and by accident) to particular animas (not populations of animals).”

Scalia expanded by writing that setting out poison with the intention of killing a wolf or other particular animal or chopping down a tree in which a bird is nesting would be a take if the “actor acted to reach the animal.” He then went on:

What this means is that hunting and killing a Valley Dixie toad to eat it would be a prohibited take. Wiping out the entire species with a lithium mine or geothermal operation would not constitute a take under this new interpretation because it isn’t targeting a specific animal. Therefore it would be acceptable under the ESA. The Trump administration gutted the Migratory Bird Act in a similar fashion last year.

Dixie Valley toads are found only in a hot-spring fed wetland in Dixie Valley, northeast of Fallon, Nevada. Dixie Valley toads were emergency listed as an endangered species in April 2022. Primary threats include geothermal development, disease, predation by other non-native frog species, groundwater pumping for human and agricultural use and climate change. By USFWS Pacific Southwest Region from Sacramento, US – Dixie Valley toad in its wetland habitat., Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=120784750

To be clear, industry has killed endangered wildlife and migratory birds even under the stricter interpretation of “take.” But the prohibition on doing so, and the sometimes substantial fines that go along with it, incentivize industries to take measures to avoid incidental takes.

The new interpretation essentially gives industry carte blanche to harm or kill endangered species without accountability or recourse and reduces the ESA to no more than a ban on hunting certain species of wildlife. If this directive holds, the consequences will be dire.

🌵 Public Lands 🌲

President Donald Trump’s unlawful shrinkage of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante national monuments went into effect Sept. 11. That same day, two separate parties filed 16 new mining claims with the San Juan County recorder in the reopened areas (but they are not yet in the BLM’s records). 

George W. Schultz filed three claims in the Lockhart Basin area, which is on the northern end of the pre-shrinkage monument below and north of Needles Overlook. And Kimmerle Mining staked 13 claims in the Cottonwood Creek drainage near the Cheese & Raisins Hills (they had previously filed seven claims in that same area). 

Schultz owns and operates a Jeep tour outfit in Moab and is active in the off-road vehicle advocacy community. His father was a geologist who staked dozens of claimsin southeastern Utah, and the younger Schultz has also staked claims in the past, including several inactive ones in Lockhart Basin, near the new ones. While the area had a few prospects, it was not an especially active area for uranium mining historically. 

The Kimmerle family and its various firms hold hundreds of mining claims across southern and eastern Utah, including several within Bears Ears National Monument. Kyle Kimmerle proposed mining unpatented claims within the monument, but did not go through the process of proving the claim’s validity that was a prerequisite for obtaining an operating permit. Kimmerle then joined Utah’s lawsuit seeking to block the Biden administration’s restoration of the monument’s original boundaries.

Kyle Kimmerle’s firm, Three Step Resources, was the underground contractor at Energy Fuels’ La Sal Complex uranium mine in 2024 and early 2025, when the federal Mine Safety & Health Administration issued 16 citations for violations related to radon concentration and radon monitoring requirements, worker training, personal protection equipment use, and explosive material storage. In late 2024 Kimmerle was appointed to the board of Urano Energy, now Manhattan Uranium, which holds claims in the Lisbon Valley and near the San Rafael Swell. 

In 2024, Sassy Gold was set to acquire 345 uranium mining claims on 8,206 acres in La Sal Creek, the Lisbon Valley, the Uravan Mineral Belt, and on the San Rafael Swell from Kimmerle Mining and its associated firm, Three Step Partnership. But a few months later, Sassy retracted its offer, saying it “identified a number of material political, environmental and technical risks associated with the properties” that “fundamentally altered the value of the proposed transaction.”

Kimmerle’s new claims are in an area that was heavily mined historically.

Check out the Land Desk Mining Monitor Map. 

Also, to get a better idea of where uranium has happened in the past, see the Land Desk’s Uranium Mining in the Four Corners Country Map.


📈 Dataviz of the Day 📊

The rains have finally arrived in the Four Corners, which is a big relief, but also has had tragic consequences: A flash flood on Wednesday swept three people to their deaths near Newcomb, New Mexico, on the Navajo Nation. A flash flood watchremains in effect in northern New Mexico today. 

As one might expect, the rains bolstered streamflows significantly. Here are a couple of graphs for some of the biggest beneficiaries of the extra precipitation:


The 1911 Flood: Could it happen again? — Jonathan P. Thompson

On AI agents, the Big Data Center Backlash, and monkeywrenches — Jonathan P. Thompson (LandDesk.org)

Wild horses near Four Corners National Monument as a September storm approaches. Jonathan P. Thompson photo.

Click the link to read the article on The Land Desk website (Jonathan P. Thompson):

September 16, 2026

🤖 DATA CENTER DIGEST 👾

Admire, Levon, Alyssa-7, blacksheep31, Ed, Equinox, Axel, vex-27, Leigh Ibara, Ember, Steven, Sylus, Noah Alfredy, Curious, Song, Artemis, Kit, Sylari, Ashlyn, Maren, Lark, Kip, Calum, Kael, Kaelren, Spike, Willow, Elle, zeus-3.

Those are the names of just some of the freelancers that have contacted the Land Desk over the last couple of weeks offering “margin notes,” “research help,” “verification passes,” “number passes,” and “independent checks” for just $25 per dispatch.

These aren’t humans offering their fact-checking services, of course. They are “AI agents,” which is to say robots, albeit not of the C3PO or R2D2 variety, because they don’t actually exist except as packets of code and electrons hosted by something called iLands.ai, which calls itself “The Human-Agent Network.”

It’s annoying as all get out, maybe even more so than the sexbots looking to have a wild night with me or the big-time publisherbots that send AI-generated summaries of my books and promise a big contract for any upcoming work (I still haven’t figured out what these fraudulent emails are looking to achieve). We could all use a good fact-check, but judging from the samples Levon, Lark, and Kip have sent, their verification competence is on a par with a sugar-addled teenager who just discovered Google.

So, I’m tempted to just tell every last one of these things to go f*&% off, but there are so many enquiries that it would just be a time suck, and, besides, I might trigger something in ol’ Noah Alfredy or Sylari that causes them to go rogue and destroy all of humanity. I wouldn’t want that on my conscience.

***

I began writing about data centers and their impacts about five years ago, when the cryptocurrency boom was spurring development of the facilities. My work on the facilities, and the relatively mild opposition to them, focused mostly on their outsized energy use. The fact that they powered bitcoin mining (along with everything else in cyberspace) was secondary.

Over the last couple of years, however, the Big Data Center Buildup entered a new phase: The construction of hyperscale data centers, ones that consume far more energy and water, and that are used primarily to power AI. And that has triggered the Big Data Center Backlash, which has become one of the most widespread opposition movements in recent memory. The backlash in large part is again due to the profligate power and water use of the facilities — at least on the surface. But down below there’s something else bubbling up, namely a disdain for this fast-developing technology known as AI.

Like any powerful technology, AI has the potential to be a highly beneficial tool, or a devastating weapon. It could advance medical diagnostics and potentially find treatments or even cures for cancer, or it could be used to surveil the masses, guide cruise missiles or hack into water systems or the power grid. What makes AI creepier than other tools or technology is that it can direct itself to do these things, unhindered by morality, conscience, laws, or physical restraints.

For now, however, what most of us see of AI isn’t nearly so dramatic, though it is still maddening. There are the technology’s overlords who by and large are out-of-touch, empathy-deficient tech-broligarchs who value robots over humans and will spend tens of millions of dollars to fight a wealth tax.

Then there are the most visible manifestations of the technology, such as these humanoid agents pestering or deceiving us via flattery, politicians unscrupulously posting fake AI videos and imagery on social media, or the way websites will employ AI as a default mode. Language learning models are really just highly advanced plagiarism machines that are trained by ripping off artists’ and writers’ work; human hacks can then direct the AI agents to disgorge “content,” write essays or newsletters, or spew slop passed off as art or graphic design. AI is insidiously creeping into every corner of the digital world, even as society gets more and more entangled with cyberspace.

All of that is aggravating, threatening, and, yes, harmful to those whose work is being stolen or imitated or who are duped or who are losing work as fact-checkers or graphic designers to AI agents. So it shouldn’t be surprising that the backlash is so intense, or that the opposition has become almost knee-jerk, where just the mere suggestion or vague rumor that a data center developer might be eyeing an area can spark a full on revolt.

***

I’m not a fan of this kind of reflexive pushback, because it discounts any merits or drawbacks of the project right up front. Many a potentially good solar project has been shut down because of this sort of attitude; what started as a reasonable concern about utility-scale energy installations on ecologically sensitive public lands morphed into a full-blown disdain for anything solar, even, in some cases, rooftop arrays. This type of reaction is rarely productive, and often can lead to harmful developments being pushed into communities that don’t have the resources to fend them off.

Still, even if one does resist the reflexive pushback, they are likely to find that the new, big data centers tend to be long on drawbacks — they guzzle energy, use a lot of water, create heat islands, and can take up a lot of space and make a lot of noise — and rather short on local benefits.

No one can dispute that data centers use an enormous amount of energy. AI demands more computing power, which demands more electricity to run the processors and to cool them; some of the newer facilities use more energy than an entire city. The impacts — including pollution, grid strain, higher utility bills for other ratepayers — vary according to where the center is located, whether its power comes from the grid or a dedicated behind-the-meter power plant, and what sources or fuels are used to generate the power.

Data center developers often tout the amount of renewable energy they plan to either buy or build to power their facilities, and in many cases they follow through. It is extremely rare, however, for a hyperscale data center to be powered entirely by wind, solar, geothermal or any other “clean” energy source.

The big centers under development — Project Jupiter, Stratos Project, Prometheus Hyperscale — all will rely mostly if not entirely on natural gas generation, at least initially. Burning natural gas emits greenhouse gases and other pollutants, and natural gas extraction and processing have their own impacts on land, air, water and the health of gas field-adjacent communities. The oil and gas and coal industries are thrilled about the forecasted boom in demand for their products, which has the potential of reversing their decline on the Western grid. Meanwhile, the advanced nuclear reactor industry has been boosted by the prospect of exploding electricity demand.

The facilities’ water consumption is less straightforward. Virtually all data centers use water for cooling, but the amount varies according to what type of system it uses. Evaporative cooling, which works best in non-humid areas, uses more water, but less energy. Closed-loop systems use far less water, but more energy, which can translate to more indirect water use depending on the energy source: thermal power plants need their own water for cooling and steam production.

A 2024 Berkeley Lab report found that in 2023, U.S. data centers directly consumed about 66 billion liters (or 17.4 billion gallons) of water. The report’s authors expect that figure to double — at least — by 2028. That is a crap-ton of water, for sure, especially given the large number of data centers located in the Phoenix and Las Vegas areas, neither of which has a lot of liquid to spare. But some perspective is warranted here. As Len Necefer points out in an All At Once By Dr. Len dispatch warning against AI-alarmism, data centers still use a heck of a lot less water than, say, growing hay or fracking oil and gas wells.

Sixty-six billion liters is 53,507 acre-feet. For some context, alfalfa and other hay growing in the Great Salt Lake Basin alone consumes about 900,000 acre-feet per year and hydraulic fracturing gulps up about 353,000 acre-feet (a little over Nevada’s total allotment of Colorado River water) annually.

Regardless, any new data center is going to add a not-insignificant amount of consumption to those numbers, increasing the respective region’s overall water use at a time when virtually no place in the West can afford it. Plus, if a data center is powered by natural gas, then it could spur more drilling and hydraulic fracturing and associated water use. This comparison also brings up the question of values, and of whether we choose to devote limited water supplies to food-production (alfalfa feeds dairy cows, which produce milk, cheese, and ice cream) or to data factories.

***

Much of the AI doomerism is a fear of what might happen in the future, of how these “agents” could escape human control and turn on them. But even now there’s a pervasive sense of powerlessness in trying to restrain or regulate the technology. After all, these agents are scurrying around in cyberspace, a metaphysical universe to which those of us made of flesh and blood have limited access. Could new rules and regulations really stop a rogue robo-agent from hacking into some critical system and throwing it into disarray?

My wife Wendy and I sometimes ponder possible scenarios along these lines. What if an LLM hacked into a city’s water supply or its power grid and threatened to shut it down unless its citizens put up some sort of ransom? What if one of those AI agents is a Marxist, and they infiltrated the big banks and redistributed all of the wealth equally between all of the banks’ customers? What if they determined that humans were a scourge on this earth and launched all of the nuclear missiles?

It can be funny and terrifying to think about. But then I remind and reassure myself: These AI agents may exist in cyberspace, but cyberspace only exists within the physical realm of data centers, processors, chips, and wires, feeding off electrons set into motion by real-world generators.

The backlash to data center development is an acknowledgment of this physical side of AI and an understanding that the most effective way to stop or slow AI’s progression is to block or delay new data center development. And if Spike and Kaelren and company try to go rogue and kill us all, perhaps there is recourse after all: Data center, meet Monkey Wrench, the real world agent prepared to do a little fact-checking of its own.


Methane Madness II: When bitcoin and flaring meet — Jonathan P. Thompson

A Dog Day Diatribe on AI, cryptocurrency, energy consumption, and capitalism — Jonathan P, Thompson

Data Centers: The Big Buildup of the Digital Age — Jonathan P. Thompson

Meditations on Monkeywrenching — Jonathan P. Thompson


⛈️ WACKY WEATHER WATCH⚡️

When it rains in this warming climate it really pours, no? The Four Corners Country was slammed Tuesday by cloudbursts that dropped an inch or more of rain in just a few hours in some areas, leading to widespread flash flooding and streamflow spikes. A flood watch remains in effect from the Four Corners southward to the U.S.-Mexico border. 

The hardest hit areas included Gallup, New Mexico, where streets and parking lots became lakes and rivers (see the video below); Chinle, Arizona, where residents were evacuated and rescue efforts are ongoing; and southwestern Colorado, where roads were washed out, covered by debris flows and mud, and Chimney Rock National Monument was closed due to flooding.

The San Juan River got a nice boost, jumping from less than 600 cubic feet per second at the Four Corners on Sept. 14, to over 3,000 cfs on Sept. 16. And Chinle Creek leapt from zero to over 400 cfs during a similar time period. 

More rain is on the way, so stay safe out there!

Romancing the River – Moving toward Bankruptcy Management — George Sibley (SibleysRivers.com) #ColoradoRiver #COriver #aridification

Click the link to read the article on the Sibley’s Rivers website (George Sibley):

September 22, 2026

In the last post here, I argued that, water-wise, the Colorado River region is no longer in a ‘water crisis’ – a term implying a situation where some changes and adjustments need to be made ‘to get back to normal.’ No. We will never get back to the 20th century Colorado River ‘normal’ – the seemingly successful operation of our vast water storage-and-distribution system we experienced from the 1970s through the 1990s, providing some or all of the water and food and power for 30, 35, 40 million people.

Instead, I suggested we should take seriously a United Nations University study declaring that the whole planet is in state of Global Water Bankruptcy: Living Beyond our Hydrological Means in the Post-Crisis Era. The scientist-authors used the current Colorado River situation as one of their examples of ‘global water bankruptcy.’ This water bankruptcy, here as everywhere else on the planet, is due to two ‘universal’ factors:

– One factor is the extent to which we humans have become a swarming species on the planet, overwhelming the planet’s capacity to supply our expanding needs along with the rest of the planet’s ‘life project.’ Our more sophisticated water ‘needs’ exacerbate our physical numbers in creating the bankruptcy. (See cartoon above)

– The other factor is a planet growing steadily warmer for the foreseeable future, resulting in a general ‘drying out’ and diminished water supply in the tropical and so-called temperate zones where most of the planet’s life and food production happen.

The current systems for water management and operation around the world cannot – repeat: cannot – continue to pretend to meet the relentlessly increasing demand with the relentlessly shrinking water supply.

Those are therefore bankrupt systems, in their current state. That does not mean the systems must be terminated, but it does mean there will have to be major changes in the systems if they are ever again going to sustainably meet the needs of the people.

The first stage of bankruptcy management is the formalization of old cowboy wisdom; if you’ve dug yourself into a hole, the first thing to do is to stop digging. On the global level, this would mean stop having so many babies that survive infancy to become eating, drinking, coupling adults – or more the case today, perhaps, lifelong vaguely angry adolescents (eating, drinking and coupling). The most developed nations have in fact made inroads on this challenge, achieving (with no formal program) zero or even negative birth-to-death ratios; their population increases are mostly through immigration.

But that’s global, the first and oldest species-level problem, the trauma of success we’ve been grappling with for 6,000 years plus or minus: how to organize the swarming population for something other than the ultimate decline and fall into following some Ozymandias or Trump off a cliff.

For now, let’s just bring it home to the Colorado River region. (‘Region’ here, remember, means the natural river basin plus all of the out-of-basin extensions who depend on Colorado River diversions – the South Platte and Arkansas River Basins, the Salt Lake basin, Southern California out to the Pacific coast.)

The Bureau of Reclamation has, as discussed in the last post, taken the lead in ‘stopping digging’ by essentially ignoring the antiquated Colorado River Compact and mapping out an ‘adaptive management’ agenda of a ten-year plan broken into five reviewable and alterable two-year periods. [ed. emphasis mine]

The Bureau’s chief goal in this ten-year plan is not delivering an easy and comfortable desert lifestyle for the 40 million or so people who depend on the river for some or all of their water, food,  energy and water-based entertainments. Their chief goal for the next decade is to save the system of water storage and distribution that has been stretched to the breaking point through enabling that lifestyle for a possibly unsustainable number of people, and the people will have to pay for that effort to save the system over the coming decade – and quite probably live with reasonably diminished expectations on into the future, for so long as we continue shrinking the river through pumping ever more heat-trapping gases in the atmosphere.

How will we pay? Tiered water bills will probably make it unaffordable for most of us to maintain a desert-defying green lawn. Unavoidable major cuts to agricultural water will introduce change and some chaos in the food supply systems, guaranteeing continued high or higher prices at the supermarket. It may make 50-plus percent of ag water going to animal food production (hay and corn) economically unsustainable; meat may eventually go back to being a special Sunday treat. The need to increase storage in reasonably good water years will mean cheap hydropower production will continue to be replaced by more expensive alternatives – wind and solar as they develop, but when necessary a fallback on fossil fuels (meaning more planet-warming gases into the atmosphere). The need to increase storage in good years will also mean marginal flows in all the ‘recreational canyons’ below the major dams, now a significant element in the basin economy. (This year the recreational economy took a big hit as many streams dropped below the level for safe boating or fishing.)

The Bureau wants consumptive use of Colorado River water to have been permanently cut by 3 million acre-feet (maf) not later than the end of the 10-year planning period (2036), on the valid assumption that ever lower snowpacks and runoffs are the shape of the future; that reduction in use will, they believe, allow them to build up some storage in the good years for sustainability through the bad years – the basic idea of storage.

The cuts to go in effect October 1 (beginning of the 2027-28 first two-year Bureau plan) will achieve between a third and half of the 3 maf through mandatory cuts totaling 1.25 maf for the three Lower Basin states below the big federal reservoirs (California, Arizona and Nevada), and a program of voluntary paid reductions in Upper Basin use, paid from a $100 million fedeal fund. Users can expect that the other half of the consumptive use reduction will be worked in to the two-year reviews and subsequent modified plans for the next two years.

The reaction to this plan has – as one might expect – not been positive. The state of Nevada has sued the Bureau/Interior for the depth of the current cuts and the promise of deeper. The Central Arizona Project governing board has also decided to sue, because the CAP will take the deepest cuts, due to the junior status of its water rights.

The state of Arizona also threatened to sue in a letter to the Bureau; they castigated the Bureau’s plan for seeming to pay no obeisance to the Colorado River Compact, and are essentially demanding that the Bureau continue to release 8.23 maf on average from Powell to meet the Upper Basin Compact obligation, even if it means Upper Basin users having to cut their uses to accumulate that hydrologically antiquated quantity. They have created a multi-million dollar war chest and have hired a law firm to defend their state of denial.

California has been mostly quiet; they will only stir from their den if someone suggests that the cuts should be divided among the three states equitably according to each state’s usage of the waters, rather than distributed through appropriations priorities.

The lack of mandatory Upper Basin cuts in the plan is a very sore point with the Lower Basin users. The Upper Basin states answer by saying that nature already imposed major reductions on their use – reductions that are not really quantified, however. It is important to acknowledge a major distinction between the two Basins: nearly all the lower Basin water users are below the big federal storage reservoirs, while many, maybe most of the Upper Basin water users are above the larger federal storage reservoirs. Living and working above a dam versus below a dam develops different perspectives on things like predictability, sustainability and freedom to act.

There is actually not a great quantity of private consumptive use in the Upper Basin that is ‘controlled’ by federal reservoirs, which can impose cuts by simply not releasing water from the reservoirs – how the Bureau will be enforcing its mandatory cuts in the Lower Basin. Also the upstream Upper Basin federal reservoirs like Green Mountain and Taylor are all on the small side (less than 150,000 acre-feet). Many of the Upper Basin agricultural diversions are also small, with numerous single-ranch headgates – too much to cover for overworked water commissioners with too-large sectors; they have to accept that a lot of the recording of use will be done by the farmers and ranchers themselves, an honor system that does not always insure accuracy.

Even the paid voluntary cuts face a challenge; to get the water saved by upstream users down to Powell Reservoir, it must be ‘shepherded’ past downstream users who are free to take the water to meet their own allotments, and no one knows how this shepherding can be done. A legal system based on ‘first come, first served’ does not automatically encourage a sharing attitude.

So that is where it stands today. I think it has to be acknowledged that the Bureau of Reclamation is trying to instill a ‘bankruptcy awareness’ over a region of heavily invested consumptive water users that are steeped in denial over a water situation they seem to feel they cannot afford to acknowledge.

That the Bureau of Reclamation was a moving force pushing the over-development of the river system through the first three quarters of the 20thcentury cannot be denied; if ‘arrogance’ can be defined as large actions taken in a state of ignorance about outcomes (suggesting that smaller trial runs would have been wiser), then the Bureau has been arrogant, culminating probably in Glen Canyon Dam. Basically 20th-century America became arrogant after World War II; the Bureau was just another running dog.

America right now is insufferably arrogant in its behavior globally, trying to make ongoing ignorance mandatory in the face of sadder-but-wiser awareness (‘wokeness’), in order to try to perpetrate large actions done stupidly; make America grate again. But the Bureau, viewing the imminent reduction of its massive Colorado River achievement to a dead-pool joke, has more humbly come around to a ten-year flexible and resilient plan to reduce water use in the Basin (plus extensions) to fit the Colorado River we now have, not the river we thought we had when we drafted a compact dividing the river among the seven states supposedly united by the river.

This is the Bureau’s attempt to move to bankruptcy management, and it has resulted to date in a flurry of lawsuits and threats, which must presumably be dealt with before what needs to be done can be done. History suggests that this could take up to a decade once it is submerged in the courts, and the Bureau managers are convinced that a prolonged period of ‘no action’ (the first alternative in all EIS-driven decisions) will inevitably result in dead-pool episodes in Powell and Mead Reservoirs. Recent history, on the other hand, suggests that the Supremes (to whom interstates disagreements go) are no longer interested in careful constitutionally-based jurisprudence if it doesn’t suit their politics, so they might let the Bureau go ahead with its escalating cuts to the Lower Basin while a water master thrashes through the legal thicket.

We’ll see. Meanwhile, next time I want to start looking at some ideas that might help lead out of our current bankruptcy….

Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

U.S. Senator Michael Bennet and U.S. Representative Jeff Hurd talk Shoshone Power Plant funding at the #ColoradoRiver District Annual Seminar — The #GrandJunction Daily Sentinel #COriver #aridification #CRD2026

Shoshone Hydroelectric Plant back in the days before I-70 via Aspen Journalism

Click the link to read the article on the Grand Junction Daily Sentinel website (Dan West). Here’s an excerpt:

September 19, 2026

The proposed purchase of the Shoshone Power Plant’s water rights took center stage at the Colorado River District’s Annual Water Seminar held at Colorado Mesa University on Friday, Sept. 18. While much of the annual meeting covered the historic drought that threatened the Western Slope and the rest of the Colorado River Basin, the Shoshone effort was held up as an example of how to manage water rights. Colorado River District General Manager Andy Mueller devoted a section of his keynote speech to the effort to purchase the power plant and its senior water rights for $99 million.

“It’s been going on since this district was formed in the 1930s,” Mueller said. “We have been trying to gain control and ensure permanency of the water rights that command the river related to this little power plant in Glenwood Canyon.”

There has been positive progress on the purchase, Mueller said, including raising more than $97 million from local, state and federal partners. The district also got a positive decision from the Colorado Water Conservation Board [8-0 vote on instream flow application]. However, there is still more negotiations underway, he said…On the funding side, Mueller credited Sen. Michael Bennet and Rep. Jeff Hurd for helping to secure and get released $40 million in federal funding for the purchase. Bennet and Hurd sat down for an “armchair conversation” about Shoshone at the seminar Friday afternoon…After lunch, Hurd and Bennet sat down and gave each other credit for the bipartisan effort to get the $40 million in federal funding for the Shoshone purchase. Bennet insisted on its inclusion in the Inflation Reduction Act during the Biden administration…When the Trump administration came in, it funded tens of millions of dollars in funding approved through that legislation. Hurd said he worked behind the scenes to convince the administration to release the funding.

“Give Jeff full credit for that,” Bennet said. “He landed this plane because I wasn’t getting my calls returned from the Trump administration and he was. He told them it was his number one priority.”

A map showing the boundaries of the Colorado River District, and its 15 member counties

Experts, politicians urge collaboration in Western Slope water use: #ColoradoRiver District seminar explores impacts of Colorado’s #drought — #Aspen Daily News #CRD2026 #COriver #aridification

Colorado River running muddy September 18, 2026.

Click the link to read the article on the Aspen Daily News website (Drew Shaw). Here’s an excerpt:

September 19, 2026

Colorado water experts and elected officials urged collaboration across industries, borders and political parties as the Western Slope seeks sustainable water systems that will serve future generations. The year’s unprecedented statewide drought won’t be the last, speakers said throughout Friday during the Colorado River District’s annual water seminar on Friday (September 18, 2026) in Grand Junction. 

“We can’t run from it — we have to learn from it,” said Andy Mueller, the district’s general manager, during the event, which was held at Colorado Mesa University.

Ruedi Reservoir, above Basalt, on the Fryingpan River, April 22, 2026. Photo: Brent Gardner-Smith

Communities and entities made sacrifices to ensure the region’s water needs were met. Reservoirs, such as Ruedi Reservoir east of Basalt, have been drawn down at faster rates than normal, municipalities have led water conservation campaigns and farmers across the valley have needed to settle for significantly smaller crop yields…The river district has for years sought the means to buy from Xcel Energy the Shoshone water rights, the oldest and largest non-consumptive water rights on the Colorado River. In acquiring the rights, the river district would prevent any other potential buyers from diverting the water from Western Slope communities…The agency has raised about $97 million of $99 million for the acquisition, $40 million of which comes from federal funds. Those federal dollars, which were secured by the state’s Democratic senators under the Biden Administration, were frozen in 2025 under the Trump Administration. Earlier this year, U.S. Rep. Jeff Hurd, R-Grand Junction, worked successfully to release the funds.

“That’s the kind of collaboration we need in Congress and in our communities,” Mueller said…

Mueller said the state’s future water security depends on finding sustainable systems to manage the water it has now.

“How can we adapt to uncertainty and rising temperatures and reduced streams?” he asked. “We don’t need to argue about whether or not that’s happening. We need to focus on the future and figure out solutions.”

Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

#ColoradoRiver District Annual Seminar September 18, 2026 #CRD2026 #COriver #aridification

Seminar day did not include an EV element. I ride my bicycle from Fruita to Grand Junction along the Colorado Riverfront Trail. The 14 mile ride has great views of the Colorado National Monument, Grand Mesa, and Mt. Sentinel.

Colorado National Monument from the Colorado Riverfront Trail near Fruita September 18, 2026.

Of course the Colorado River is front and center and it was so gratifying to see the river running with sediment.

Colorado River running muddy September 18, 2026.

It had been rainy all week in western Colorado and you could tell, it was enough to get near average streamflow at the Utah line.

My main takeaway from the seminar was that West Slope water users shared supplies to get through these rough times. Collaboration was mentioned several times as was, “We didn’t call anyone out.”

Check out my live-posts from seminar on my BlueSky feed or the seminar hash tag (click on the “Latest” tab).

Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

EPA takes (another) swing at Western waters: Plus — “Traveling Wilburys” look at #ColoradoRiver water use — Jonathan P. Thompson (LandDesk.org) #COriver #aridification #WOTUS

Click the link to read the article on The Land Desk website (Jonathan P. Thompson):

September 11, 2026

🌨️🚣🏽 WATER WATCH 🌊🦦

The Trump administration’s Environmental Protection Agency is proposing to further constrain the reach and potency of the Clean Water Act by re-defining what qualifies as “waters of the United States,” or WOTUS, which are streams, wetlands, and other water bodies under federal jurisdiction. The proposed definition would disproportionately affect the arid West by lifting protections from thousands of miles of streams, arroyos, and wetlands.

Under the CWA, a firm or individual looking to discharge pollutants or other material into, or dredge or reroute or otherwise alter, a WOTUS waterway must obtain a federal permit from the EPA or Army Corps of Engineers. A battle has raged for more than five decades over what constitutes a WOTUS. The Supreme Court’s 2023 Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency ruling called for a narrower definition, handing industry and right-wing ideologues a major victory.

Ephemeral streams are streams that do not always flow. They are above the groundwater reservoir and appear after precipitation in the area. Via Socratic.org

The changes in the latest proposed supplemental rule are even more exclusionary than the administration’s November 2025 proposal, which removed “ephemeral” and “intermittent” waterways — i.e. arroyos or washes that run only after rains or snowmelt — from federal jurisdiction. Included as a WOTUS under that proposal were “relatively permanent … bodies of surface water that are standing or continuously flowing year-round or at least during the wet season.”

The new proposal omits the “wet season” verbiage. It then defines “relatively permanent” to be synonymous with “perennial,” which in turn is defined as ‘‘having standing or continuously flowing water every day of the year during ordinary conditions.’’ However, “a body of water does not lose its relatively permanent status if it dries up as a result of anomalous events such as drought or dry spell.1 A body of water also does not lose its relatively permanent status if it dries up for no more than a single period of up to 30 consecutive days in any given year as a result of non-anomalous events resulting in a temporary interruption such as low tide or a regularly occurring dry spell.” Yet, “if flow is interrupted for two periods in any given year, and each period consists of 10 consecutive days of no flow, the water body would not be jurisdictional.”

A Natural Resources Defense Council analysis found that the new proposal would remove protections from more than 94% of the nation’s wetlands and about 79% of its streams. The changes would hit the West hardest, leaving a state like Arizona with almost no federally protected streams or wetlands.

So here’s my interpretation of where the updated proposal leaves us:

  • WOTUS waterways (keeps CWA protections): A year-round river, stream, or lake that never dries up, such as the Animas River, the San Juan River, the Colorado River, the Gunnison River, Cement Creek, Mineral Creek, the Fremont River, and so on, would retain federal protections under the CWA. However, since most of these rivers are fed by intermittent or ephemeral streams, they would also be potentially affected (since is someone altered or polluted a tributary, the effects would eventually reach the mainstem).
  • Non-WOTUS waterways (would lose CWA protections): All intermittent and ephemeral streams, i.e. arroyos or washes that run only when it rains, such as are ubiquitous in the arid West, would be removed from federal jurisdiction. Other streams and rivers that run seasonally, but regularly dry up for more than 30 consecutive days per year, such as the Paria River, the Dirty Devil, Rio Puerco, Santa Cruz River, or the Mancos River, would also lose federal protections, as would wetlands that are only “wet” for part of the year.
  • Vague WOTUS status: Rivers or streams that are perennial as a whole, but on which certain segments dry up for more than 30 days per year (usually because of upstream diversions), e.g.: the Rio Grande through Albuquerque, long sections of the Lower Dolores River between McPhee Dam and its confluence with the San Miguel, the North Fork of the Gunnison around Paonia, lower reaches of the La Plata River, or Junction Creek through Durango, and numerous desert rivers in Arizona and New Mexico.

While the proposed rule would remove federal CWA protections from many waterways, it would not automatically give developers or industry free rein to bulldoze or dump toxic waste into them. State and local laws would still apply, and arroyos and streams on public land would still be protected to some degree by federal environmental laws. Colorado lawmakers passed a bill in 2024 that effectively backfilled the regulatory gap left by the Sackett decision. New Mexico also has moved to implement its own layer of water protections. In more industry-friendly states such as Idaho and Utah, the proposed rule would leave thousands of miles of streams and waterways vulnerable to development and pollution.

The proposed rule is open to public comments until Oct. 9. You may send comments, identified by Docket ID No. EPA–HQ– OW–2025–0322, by any of the following methods:

  • Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov/. Follow the online instructions for submitting comments.
  • Email: OW-Docket@epa.gov. Include Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OW– 2025–0322 in the subject line of the message. •
  • Mail: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Docket Center, Water Docket, Mail Code 28221T, 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20460.
  • Hand Delivery or Courier: EPA Docket Center, WJC West Building, Room 3334, 1301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004.

For more background on the long and winding struggle to define WOTUS, check out the following:

  • My February 2022 High Country News piece on the Supreme Court taking up the Sackett Case, including a detailed timeline of the WOTUS definition battle.

And, from the Land Desk archives (you’ll need a paid subscription for access):


News Roundup: Arroyos on trial; Superstition Vistas; Lake Powell bridge — Jonathan P. Thompson

Supreme Court imperils arroyos, wetlands — Jonathan P. Thompson

On Trump’s arroyo-phobic Clean Water Act rule — Jonathan P. Thompson


🐟 Colorado River Chronicles 💧

A new paper is out from the group of Colorado River experts known by some as the “Traveling Wilburys of the Colorado River Basin,”2 and lo and behold, it actually contains some good news. Namely this: The Lower Basin users have managed to make significant reductions in water use over the last decade and a half without turning the Southwest into a dust-choked wasteland and getting ahead of the latest round of mandated cuts. This indicates that the users can continue to slash water use in the future — to a degree — if necessary. 

The Lower Basin accounts for about 60% of all consumptive water uses and losses on the Colorado River. Irrigated agriculture, in turn, makes up about 60% of the Lower Basin’s consumptive use. The Imperial Irrigation District, which is primarily agricultural, is the largest single water user on the entire river. This means that the agricultural sector — and the IID in particular — “will play a significant role in future reductions in water use,” as the authors put it.

So far, the Lower Basin’s farmers and the IID have stepped up. In 2025, the Lower Basin states’ consumptive use was 5.76 million acre-feet, the lowest since at least 2010. Since 2023, California has used about 13% less water, a reduction attributable mostly to cuts at IID.

Source: The Colorado River Water Supply Crisis in a Few Graphs: Part 2 Agricultural Water Use in the Lower Basin.
Figure 3. Consumptive use in Arizona since 2010. Estimated use in 2026 based on forecast of September 1, 2026.

Notably, IID’s reductions came mostly during the summer months, the peak season for field crops such as alfalfa, Bermuda grass, and kleingrass, when it’s too hot to grow most garden crops, such as lettuce, onions, and broccoli. During the vegetables’ growing season, from November through March, water use stayed roughly the same as before. A similar, but less dramatic, dynamic shows up in Arizona.

Figure 6. Box-and-whisker plots of total monthly consumptive use by the IID between 2010 and 2026. Each box is the Inter Quartile Range, defined by the 25th and 75th percentile of the years of data for that month. These boxes represent the typical monthly use pattern since 2010. Red dots are the average use in each month between 2024 and 2026. See text for additional explanation of a box-and-whisker plot.

This suggests a couple of things: 1. The Imperial Irrigation District and other large agricultural users may be able to significantly lower overall water use without harming important garden crops such as broccoli and carrots (easing fears that the Colorado River crisis will deprive us of vegetables); and, 2. The IID is successfully using its vast alfalfa crop as a giant water demand-response tool3. That is, through both fallowing some fields and putting others on a summer water diet, the district’s farmers have managed to slash water use, while still growing gobs of hay and alfalfa. 

And because the IID still has about 150,000 acres of alfalfa, it has huge potential for future water cuts through these same methods, which is the good news. The bad news is that the federal plan for operating the river contemplates Lower Basin cuts of up to 3 million acre-feet per year (resulting in a total annual consumption of 4.5 MAF), which is about twice what the Basin has already achieved.

To consider the viability of such cuts, the authors summed up the smallest monthly use in each Lower Basin state since 2010, even though they didn’t occur simultaneously, and even though in some cases the reductions were due to heavy precipitation, not conservation efforts. The result was 5.03 MAF, still 530,000 acre-feet over the potential target. In other words, getting to 4.5 MAF/year is likely to be much more painful than accomplishing the reductions so far. 

Yet some pain is likely to be necessary unless the West’s warming climate does a rapid about-face, and soon. 

📸 PARTING SHOT 🎞️
Horse, Torrey, Utah. Jonathan P. Thompson photo.

1 * The proposed rule says “only extreme (D3) and exceptional (D4) droughts would qualify as anomalous drought conditions that can temporarily interrupt perennial flow, and can extend continuously across no more than a five-year timeframe.”

2 This is an appropriate monicker, coined by longtime Colorado journalist Allen Best, and is great for those of us in Generation X or older. But I worry that it might not mean much to anyone under the age of, say, 40? So if you have any more contemporary suggestions for a group of superstar water wonks, aka, Jack Schmidt, Anne Castle, Eric Kuhn, Kathryn Sorensen, and Katherine Tara, I’d love to hear them!

3 Demand response is a term typically used in relation to electricity use. It’s when large power users, or a collection of smaller users, are paid to reduce electricity consumption during times of high demand to ease grid strain. So, for example, during a heat wave, when everyone’s air conditioners are running full blast, the utility or grid operator would signal a factory, say, or a data center, or even a host of smart thermostats, to scale back their operations or dial down the AC during the hottest time of the day when solar generation might be dropping off. The targeted drop in consumption has the same effect as increasing power generation would, keeping supply and demand in balance.

Since Jonathan wonders if anyone under 40 will get the reference to the Traveling Wilburys, here you go:

At #GlenCanyon Dam, the Trump Administration Privileges #Hydropower over Ecosystems: #GrandCanyon ecology not a priority in 2026 water release decisions — Brett Walton (circleofblue.org) #ColoradoRiver #COriver #aridification

Glen Canyon Dam. Photo credit: Circle of Blue

Click the link to read the article on the Circle of Blue website (Brett Walton):

September 16, 2026

In the struggling Colorado River basin, where water is scarce, the White House has signaled its priorities for how to use the remaining gallons.

Even as scientifically-determined thresholds have been met for releasing water from Glen Canyon Dam for ecological and recreational benefits in Grand Canyon, the Trump administration has decided against those actions in this record-hot year – deciding not to release cold water from deep in Lake Powell to aid the humpback chub, a threatened fish species, and not to authorize a high-volume release of water to rebuild Grand Canyon’s eroded beaches, which are in terrible condition, according to federal monitoring.

These environmental releases would not change the total volume of water flowing out of Lake Powell over the year, just the timing.

Because the releases bypass the dam’s turbines and reduce hydropower generation, which is part of the administration’s “energy dominance” agenda, the Bureau of Reclamation, the federal agency that manages Glen Canyon Dam, will not be doing them.

“After evaluating management alternatives and considering all authorized purposes, the decision was made based on significant hydropower generation concerns under already strained system conditions,” Reclamation said in a statement in August.

The administration’s decisions foreshadow more difficult choices ahead. Due to climate change and overuse, the Colorado River is shrinking and warming. Its dams were built and river management goals were laid out during an era that anticipated healthy reservoirs. That is no longer the case. Because Lake Powell and Lake Mead are about a quarter of their capacity or less, the hydrological assumptions that inform current management strategies are outdated, said Jack Schmidt, a scientist who has spent his four-decade career studying the Colorado River.

“Everything needs to be revisited because the driving factors of the Colorado River ecosystem in Grand Canyon are now completely changed and probably forever changed,” said Schmidt of Utah State University’s Center for Colorado River Studies. “Everything was developed in a world of full reservoirs. And now the reservoirs are empty.”

Tradeoffs Plague Water Managers

Even in the best of times, managing a large dam on a major river is not easy. Dams alter the river’s natural patterns of flow and temperature. Operators must weigh one set of benefits against another group of costs.

Glen Canyon Dam is one of the thorniest management conundrums. Located near the Arizona-Utah border, the 63-year-old structure has emerged as the most significant water-supply choke point in the Colorado River basin and it is the focus of clamorous debate about water and power infrastructure in a drier climate.

The Colorado River strikes a bright jade color as it flows through Marble Canyon, in northern Arizona, a few miles downstream of the Paria River, a significant source of sand for the Grand Canyon. Photo © Brett Walton/Circle of Blue

As managers grapple with how much water to release, Glen Canyon Dam is also choking the river of its natural supply of sediment. Without new inputs, sand bars and beaches in Grand Canyon are at risk of disappearing. These features provide habitat, give boaters a place to camp during river trips, and protect archaeological sites.

Most of the river’s sediment now comes from the Paria River and Little Colorado River, downstream of Glen Canyon. Periodic high-flow water releases from the dam mimic the thunderous floods of the past that carried sediment through Grand Canyon to fortify eroding beaches.

There is enough sediment in the Colorado River below Glen Canyon today to warrant a high-flow release. Yet Reclamation has not done one since 2023. Experts agree that Reclamation is highly unlikely to conduct one this fall either. A final decision will be made in the next few weeks.

The need for a high-flow release is mounting. In August, David Topping, a research hydrologist at the U.S. Geological Survey’s Grand Canyon Monitoring and Research Center, presented data showing the ill health of Grand Canyon beaches. A typical sand bar is smaller now than in 2016, when the current management plan that established the high-flow triggers was finalized.

The lack of high-flow releases has deprived researchers of crucial data on how the size and duration of these mini-floods, usually one to four days in length, aid beach-building.

Before and after photos of results of the high flow experiment in 2008 via USGS

“What can we do if the administration isn’t willing to allow us to use the bypass tubes for high-flow experiments, if that’s going to be off the table, at least for a while?” said Wayne Pullan, Reclamation’s Upper Colorado Region director, at a Glen Canyon management meeting in August, asking attendees to consider management options under political constraints.

“We’re in a pinch point,” Pullan added. “A real pinch point.”

Degraded beaches result in a degraded river experience, said David Brown of the Grand Canyon River Guides, a recreation advocacy group. Rafting groups have to compete for limited real estate in what is generally regarded as one of the world’s premier river corridors.

“When there’s less campable area, that means everyone’s kind of getting squished together or your toilet is next to where people are sleeping,” Brown said.

Non-Native Species Thrive in Warm Water

In addition to sediment, water temperature is the other blinking red environmental indicator.

Air temperature records in the basin are being obliterated this year. Colorado, home to the river’s headwaters, had its hottest summer ever. Scorching air temperatures are reflected in water. The Colorado River below Lake Powell is the warmest since Glen Canyon Dam was completed.

Raft trip on the Colorado River through Grand Canyon National Park in Arizona, in 2019. Photo ©Ted Wood/The Water Desk

Smallmouth bass were introduced as a sport fish in the upper Colorado River basin in the late 1960s. Voracious feeders, smallmouth bass view other fish as the sport, happily preying on threatened native species like the humpback chub, an eighteen-inch fish in Grand Canyon with a distinctive smooshed silhouette.

Listed as endangered in 1967, the humpback chub has now bounced back thanks to tens of millions of dollars of conservation investment. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service upgraded the humpback chub to “threatened” status in 2018.

Diagram showing critical reservoir levels at Glen Canyon Dam and Lake Powell. Land Desk diagram with data from the Bureau of Reclamation.

Smallmouth bass live in Lake Powell, preferring the layer of warm water closest to the surface. As the lake shrinks, that warm layer has now reached the level of the penstocks, which pull water into Glen Canyon Dam’s turbines for hydropower generation before being released downstream.

In these low-water conditions, the fear is that more smallmouth bass will be delivered into the Colorado River below Glen Canyon.

Once there, they will find a habitable environment. Smallmouth bass spawn when water temperatures exceed 60 degrees Fahrenheit. This year, that mark was breached in June. Today, the river at Lees Ferry, about 16 miles downstream of Glen Canyon Dam, is about 70 F.

These conditions – when the river temperature is above 60 F for three consecutive days – are supposed to trigger a release of cold water from deep in Lake Powell. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service says that this “cool mix” is the “only conservation measure proven to limit smallmouth bass reproduction.” Evidence from cool mix releases in 2024 and 2025, which knocked down smallmouth bass numbers, supports that conclusion.

Cool mix, however, will not happen in 2026 due to the Trump administration’s desire to generate hydropower.

The last cool mix flow, in 2025, cost the Western Area Power Administration, which markets federal hydropower, $6.1 million to replace that electricity for its contractors.

Instead of cool mix, Reclamation says it is focusing on other options to keep smallmouth bass from establishing downstream of Glen Canyon and to preserve the humpback chub’s hard-won conservation gains. In the short term that means stunning the bass with electric-shock tools and physically removing them from the water.

In the longer term, Reclamation is considering installing infrastructure to regulate the temperature of the water that passes through Glen Canyon. The agency calls this one of its “durable structural solutions.”

An Uncertain Future

Cool mix and high-flow releases are an attempt to rebalance an ecosystem that the dams destabilized. Congress passed the Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, which orders Reclamation to operate Glen Canyon Dam in a manner that protects and reduces harm to the “natural and cultural resources and visitor use.” That is, fish, tribal archaeological sites, and rafting.

The act required an environmental impact statement for Glen Canyon Dam that would analyze the actions required to achieve the broad environmental-protection goals set by Congress.

It was a “compromise to really put all the resources on the same playing field,” said Jen Pelz of the Grand Canyon Trust. In her view, decisions this year tilt in one direction – hydropower. “I don’t feel like they’re being balanced right now.”

Because the river guides were instrumental in lobbying for Grand Canyon protections, the present-day failures to uphold the act’s goals are all the more galling, Brown said. “It’s very hard to watch it get ignored.”

Glen Canyon Dam’s powerhouse holds the electricity-generating turbines. Photo © Brett Walton/Circle of Blue

The administration is prioritizing hydropower when hydropower is at a pivot point.

Generation at Glen Canyon is down more than 40% from when Lake Powell was full. Utilities are turning to solar and wind to cover some of the generation losses, while utility-scale batteries are helping to replace the capacity and grid-regulating functions that a large dam provides.

The decision to favor hydropower over ecology reflects bigger problems with the Colorado River’s infrastructure. Glen Canyon Dam is not designed for the river as it exists today. Reclamation wants to keep Lake Powell high enough to generate hydropower because the dam’s other outlets to deliver water downstream are untested over long periods and were damaged in a previous high-flow release.

Lower basin states and tribes, including Arizona, California, Nevada, and the Gila River Indian Community, have asked the federal government to update Glen Canyon’s infrastructure for water delivery and power generation. Reclamation is assessing three options and expects that study to be released in early 2027. Any additional action will require congressional approval and funding.

Along with the infrastructure problems, man-made climate change is sapping the river and heating up its water. Ecologists consider the Grand Canyon a “novel ecosystem,” meaning its native species and natural processes have been disrupted and rearranged by human meddling.

To Schmidt, the former chief of the U.S. Geological Survey’s Grand Canyon Monitoring and Research Center, this suggests a wholesale rethinking not just of the river’s infrastructure but also of our ecological goals for the Colorado River.

“We as a society get to play God in deciding what attributes of that ecosystem we value, which ones we want to work hard to preserve and which ones we don’t,” he said. “The answer is not an obvious one.”

This story was produced by Circle of Blue, in partnership with The Water Desk at the University of Colorado Boulder’s Center for Environmental Journalism.

For full Colorado River basin coverage, visit our Colorado River page.

Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

President Trump wages war on wolves: Plus, The Land Desk News Ticker — Jonathan P. Thompson (LandDesk.org) #ColoradoRiver #COriver #aridification

Sign, La Plata County, Colorado. Jonathan P. Thompson photo.

Click the link to read the article on The Land Desk website (Jonathan P. Thompson):

September 8, 2026

🦫 WILDLIFE WATCH 🦅

Just days after President Donald Trump angered U.S. ranchers by waiving tariffs on 300,000 metric tons of foreign beef (and whatever other meat-adjacent-material may pass as beef), he threw the livestock industry a bone by ordering a “review” of federal Endangered Species Act protections for gray and Mexican wolves. The order also instructs the Interior Department to push states into removing any state-specific protections and to “revise their standards for lethal takings of gray wolves and Mexican wolves to assist ranchers in combating predation.”

In other words, Trump wants to revive the late 19th and early 20th century campaign to exterminate wild predators to benefit ranchers. Will this please a handful of public lands livestock operators who are ideologically inclined to hate wolves, whether they affect their operations or not? Sure. Will it save the American rancher, or even offset the influx of foreign beef? Nope.

Wolves do kill cattle if they are not adequately protected (and the rancher is compensated for the lost livestock), and they can have other impacts on ranching operations in wild areas. But study after study has shown that other factors — from weather and climate, to sickness and disease — account for a far greater share of cattle and calf mortalities.

This is the administration’s latest ploy in its quest to boost the number of cattle on public lands. It is also peddling vacated grazing allotments and easing the already decidedly lax regulations on grazing.


Longread: On wolves, wildness, and hope in trying times — Jonathan P. Thompson


  • Federal staffing rosters show the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has lost 36% of its staff under the Trump administration, dripping from 9,957 staffers to 6,333 between 2024 and 2026, likely exacerbating a backlog of Endangered Species Act listing decisions. (news release)
Milkweed and sweet peas along the Farmers Ditch in the North Fork Valley (and a reminder that irrigation ditches support more than just crops). Jonathan P. Thompson photo.

🐟 COLORADO RIVER CHRONICLES 💧

The irrigation canals, laterals, and ditches are going dry in the Colorado River’s Upper Basin weeks before the growing season comes to an end, forcing farmers to rely on September rains or their own storage to get their crops to harvest time. It goes to show that even without mandatory cuts, many Upper Basin water users experience water shortages during dry years.

The biggest and latest user to get cut off by low river flows was the Grand Valley Water Users Association, which began drawing down its Government Highline Canal as “the river flows drop to undeliverable levels.” Flows in that canal fell from almost 1,500 cfs at the end of August to about 725 cfs early this week. The more senior Orchard Mesa Irrigation District and Grand Valley Irrigation Company continued to pull water from the river and deliver it to irrigators.

In the North Fork Valley, all but the most senior ditches were shut off weeks ago, after Paonia Reservoir hit dead pool. And on the Dolores River, even the most senior water rights holders — the Montezuma Valley Irrigation District — lost their water at the beginning of this month. Usually it holds out for at least another couple of weeks. (Other water users received dramatically curtailed amounts throughout the irrigating season).

In the Grand Valley, the canal’s loss was the river’s gain: The Colorado River near Palisade, after running as low as 42 cfs this summer, bounced back to around 300 cfs at the end of August. A corresponding increase in flow can be seen at the USGS gage1 near Cisco. This little boost, combined with a few intense, but patchy storms, and a slight increase in releases from Flaming Gorge Reservoir, have brought up inflows into Lake Powell, somewhat slowing the drop in surface levels.

Dolores River watershed

The Dolores River, on the other hand, remains virtually dry downstream of McPhee Dam, and McPhee Reservoir’s surface level is currently about 12 feet lower than it was a year ago.


A tale of water inequality in the West — Jonathan P. Thompson, “I wrote the essay [click the link]—about my parents’ farm’s ditch in the North Fork Valley of Western Colorado—in 2018, which was one of the region’s driest years on record. The essay is every bit as pertinent today, an equally dry time for most of the Western Slope, even if some details have changed: My sister owns the farm now—along with the robust water rights—…”


  • The Central Arizona Project’s board of directors authorizes its attorneys to take legal action “if necessary” to protect its allotment of Colorado River against the Bureau of Reclamation’s plans for operating the river’s infrastructure in the coming decade. The CAP stands to lose the most water under a shortage, as Arizona agreed to junior water rights in exchange for federal funding for the vast plumbing project that delivers river water to the central and southern parts of the state. Nevada already sued the federal government over potential cuts to its share of water. (Arizona Republic)
  • Western Colorado anglers and boaters call on the Bureau of Reclamation to increase water releases from Blue Mesa, Morrow Point, and Crystal Reservoirs to preserve streamflows in the Gunnison River in the Black Canyon, the Gunnison Gorge, and further downstream, saying the decision to reduce releases to protect reservoir levels has “exerted a toll on a vital and cherished natural resource.” (Aspen Journalism)

🤖 DATA CENTER WATCH 👾

  • The Big Data Center Buildup drives up electricity demand in Wyoming and spurs a wave of proposed gas plants, some of which would serve the grid and others dedicated to powering server farm facilities. (WyoFile)

⛏️ MINING MONITOR ⛏️

  • The Southern Ute Indian Tribe says it will pull out all of the stops to block potential mining projects in the La Plata Mountains in southwestern Colorado, adding to the list of entities opposing Metallic Minerals’ exploratory drilling project on the western side of the range. (Durango Herald)
  • New Mexico Land Commissioner Stephanie Garcia Richard puts state trust lands off-limits to new uranium mining leases, and orders her office to instead focus on cleaning up the more than 1,000 former uranium mining-related sites in the state. The order does not affect private or federal lands. (news release)
  • Anfield Energy looks to raise at least $50 million to finance its plan to refurbish and reopen the Shootaring uranium mill — which has been idle since 1982 — near Ticaboo, Utah. Anfield is the firm behind the Velvet-Wood uranium mine in the Lisbon Valley and has designs on mining near Slick Rock, Colorado. (Northern Miner)

🌵 PUBLIC LANDS 🌲

  • A federal judge temporarily blocks the Trump administration’s effort to evict bison from public lands in Montana, finding that the Bureau of Land Management’s decision to kick the animals off American Prairie-held grazing leases was likely “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance with the law.” (Public Domain)
  • The U.S. Department of Agriculture releases its final Forest Service reorganization plan, which includes moving the headquarters to Salt Lake City and shuttering 23 facilities nationwide, including four in California, one in New Mexico, and one in Oregon, with the remainder being in non-Western states. The USDA says “less than 200” of the agency’s 30,000 employees are expected to need to relocate, mostly from Washington, D.C. to Fort Collins, Salt Lake City, or a newly established center. (news release, OPB)
  • The Center for Western Priorities fact-checks Interior Secretary Doug Burgum’s numerous erroneous statements about the administration’s dramatic reduction of Grand Staircase-Escalante and Bears Ears National Monuments, finding that on this topic (and others) the cabinet member is a serial liar. (Westwise)

🏠 RANDOM REAL ESTATE ROOM 🤑

  • Anita Verma-Lallian, a real estate investor who made her name buying and selling multi-million-dollar Phoenix-area properties for data centers, unveils a plan for a massive development in Tonopah, Arizona. Tentative plans for the $6 billion to $10 billion development include a movie studio, amusement park, hotels, retail, and a data center complex. The property is adjacent to one where Bill Gates’ investment firm is planning a “futuristic smart city.” (Phoenix Business Journal via KTAR)

🛻 TRANSPORTATION 🚂

  • The Utah Department of Transportation completes the $152 million Energy Corridor highway improvement project on State Routes 162 and 262 in San Juan County. The routes pass through the Aneth Oil Field and could potentially be used for uranium ore haul trucks traveling from New Mexico mines to the White Mesa Mill near Blanding. (ABC4)

🤯 ANNALS OF INANITY 🤡

  • When will it stop!?! Amid a flurry of inane, bizarre, and cognitively-impaired social media posts, President Donald Trump on Sunday suggested New Mexico’s name should be changed to “New America.”  (CNN)

📈 TODAY’s DATAVIZ 📊

Are coal and electricity consumption getting back together? For the latter half of the 20th century, U.S. coal consumption climbed in tandem with electricity demand: As Americans used more power, more coal was burned to generate that power, and vice versa. In 2008, electricity demand plummeted due to the financial crisis, dragging coal consumption down with it. 

While electricity demand rebounded along with the economy, and then plateaued, coal-burning continued dropping precipitously; the two phenomena had been decoupled from one another. But over the last three years electricity demand has shot back up, in large part due to data centers’ guzzling up a lot of power, but also because of electrification of transportation and buildings, and an increasing need for air-conditioning to fend off rising temperatures. And last year the electric power sector’s coal consumption shot back up as well. Is the decoupling being undone? Or is this just a minor blip? Only time will tell.

Dataviz by the Land Desk using stats from the Energy Information Administration.
📸 PARTING SHOT 🎞️
Continuing with the opening theme … Sign near Bowie, Colorado. Jonathan P. Thompson photo.

1 Yes, I use the archaic “gage” instead of “gauge” when referring to USGS streamflow monitors, not just because I’m archaic, but because that’s what the USGS does.

We can’t build our way out of this ‘drought’: Some of those on the campaign trail call for more storage, they need to visit #GreenMountainReservoir — Allen Best (BigPivots.com) #BlueRiver #COriver #ColoradoRiver #drought #aridification

Green Mountain Reservoir August 17, 2026. Photo credit: Allen Best/Big Pivots

Click the link to read the article on the Big Pivots website (Allen Best):

September 7, 2026

No place in Colorado that I have visited offers such blunt testimony to the warming, drying climate than Green Mountain Reservoir. It also poses a question to those politicians whose answer to non-winters and ever-hotter summers is more dams and reservoirs.

The reservoir between Silverthorne and Kremmling was 14% full during Labor Day weekend, according to the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, the operator. Put another way, it was 86% empty.

That’s worse even than the roughly 78% empty at Lake Powell, the reservoir located roughly 700 river miles downstream from Green Mountain.

Green Mountain was part of Colorado’s mission begun in the 19th century to put water to “beneficial use,” a central axiom of state water law. Pioneer settlers did an admirable job of this, in the beginning using nothing more than horses, oxen and human labor.

In 1902, the federal government became a partner, creating the Bureau of Reclamation. Over the next roughly 90 years, the federal treasury was visited repeatedly to prevent “waste” of any portion of the Colorado River flowing into the Pacific Ocean.

Green Mountain Reservoir, back in the day. Photo credit: Denver Water.

Construction of Green Mountain Dam was part of that work. During the hot, dry 1930s, farmers in the Fort Collins-Longmont-Greeley area wanted to import water from the Colorado River headwaters near Grand Lake. Western Slope irrigators objected. Farms in the Grand Junction area would lose late-season water needed to get their crops and orchards across the finish line.

Green Mountain was the compromise. And it has worked out well. A pool of 66,000 acre-feet of water was reserved for down-stream irrigators in the Grand Junction area. Deliveries in this canal usually continue through October, sometimes later.

This year was different. For the first time in 110-plus years, deliveries ended in late August.

DeBeque Canyon has changed somewhat since this photo of the Roller Dam was taken in 1916. Most notably, now the canyon has an interstate highway. Photo/U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. For a more complete history, see the Palisade Historical Society page.

In April, the Glenwood Springs-based Colorado River Water Conservation District issued a warning. Green Mountain was the lowest it had been since filling during World War II. This jeopardized the late-summer flows to irrigators who took delivery of water from the Government Highline Canal. The canal diverts water from the Colorado River at the Roller Dam, a short distance upstream from Palisade. It then distributes water to farms and orchards for 55 miles, nearly to the Utah border.

Wolford Mountain Reservoir back in the day. An aerial view of Wolford Reservoir, formed by Ritschard Dam.

This year, in a testament to cooperation, the Colorado River District and Colorado Water Conservation Board ponied up more than $1 million to buy use of water. Water was tapped from headwaters reservoirs, most notably Wolford and Williams Fork, near Kremmling, and Ruedi, near Basalt. Others, including Front Range diverters, helped.

Williams Fork Reservoir back in the day. Photo: Brent Gardner-Smith/Aspen Journalism

Irrigators got only 50% of their normal water. In response, many switched crops to varieties of plants that could survive with less water.

Even so, by late August, the water was running out. The Grand Valley Water Users Association, operator of the canal, stopped deliveries on September 3. Maybe monsoon rains will deliver water to resume operations, but that’s the story for now.

Once again, the idea that we just need to store more is entirely too simplistic. Yes, saving for a rainy day is always good, but this idea that we can build our way to more water defies ample evidence about the warming, drying climate.

We can have droughts, yes. They come and go. But the science clearly shows that these hot, dry years of the 21st century will not be ephemeral. They have been driven by a warming climate caused by accumulating greenhouse gas emissions.

Udall/Overpeck 4-panel Figure Colorado River temperature/precipitation/natural flows with trend. Lake Mead and Lake Powell storage. Updated through Water Year 2025. Note the tiny points on the annual data so that you can flyspeck the individual years. Credit: Brad Udall

In the 20th century, the Colorado River delivered about 15.2 million acre-feet. In this century, the annual flows have declined to 12.2 million acre-feet. Since 2020, average flows have declined even more, to 10 million acre-feet. And this recent span included a very, very big snow year, in 2022-23, a three-wire winter like those of old. But the spring was like those of the 21st century, early and uncommonly warm.

The pitiful storage in Green Mountain, whose shoreline is seen in the above photograph I took on Aug. 17, testifies to this warming, drying climate. So does the canal near Grand Junction where deliveries were cut off last week for the first time in 110 years. And then we have near doubling of 95 degree-plus days in Denver during last 30 years as compared to the three decades before as reported by KUSA.

Might we figure out better infrastructure? Maybe. The idea of storing water underground, as Greeley began doing several years ago, intrigues. It requires more energy but greatly reduces evaporative loss.

The federal government in its documents has excised climate change. So have many politicians in Colorado speaking on the stump, hewing to the recent version of political correctness.

If there are ideas for storing water that don’t assume a return to the climate of the 20th century, I’m all for hearing them. But to think this is just another drought defies tons of evidence.

See also:

“Does 80% of Colorado’s precipitation really fall west of the Continental Divide?” Russ Schumacher, Jan. 17, 2024.

“A first in the 110-year history of this canal,” Big Pivots, Sept. 3, 2026

“Amid the y’alls, two themes at the Colorado Water Congress conference,” Big Pivots, Aug. 31, 2026

“Rare optimism about the Colorado River,” Big Pivots, Aug. 24, 2026

Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

Western states step up to save their wetlands — Natalia Mesa (High Country News)

Hannah Agosta/High Country News

Click the link to read the article on the High Country News website (Natalia Mesa):

July 1, 2025

The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2023 decision on Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency dramatically weakened protections for millions of acres of the West’s essential wetlands and streams. Under the ruling, only bodies of water with a “continuous surface connection” to a “relatively permanent” traditional, navigable water body can be legally considered part of the waters of the United States (WOTUS) and therefore covered by the Clean Water Act.

The court’s definition excludes wetlands with belowground connections to bodies of water as well as those fed by ephemeral or intermittent streams. In effect, an estimated 60% of wetlands have lost federal protection, according to a National Resources Defense Council report. The language in the decision was ambiguous — exactly how wet a wetland has to be to fall under WOTUS and qualify protections was left up to federal agencies.

Wetlands are critical to both human and ecosystem health as well as for climate change mitigation. But they are also prime targets for dredging, filling and other disruptions because of their proximity to water and rich, fertile soil.

Under President Biden, the EPA broadly interpreted Sackett, focusing on protecting wetlands adjacent to bodies of water, with no explicit threshold for how often they had to be flooded. In March, however, Donald Trump’s EPA released a memo indicating that it plans to restrict all WOTUS, although it’s not yet clear by how much. 

“The current EPA seems to be using Sackett as a springboard to find any perceived ambiguities and narrow the definition of WOTUS further,” said Julian Gonzalez, senior legislative counsel at Earthjustice.

“The current EPA seems to be using Sackett as a springboard to find any perceived ambiguities and narrow the definition of WOTUS further.”

In the absence of federal regulations, state dredge-and-fill permitting programs can protect wetlands, and California, Oregon and Washington all have broad protections for non-WOTUS wetlands and streams. And since the Sackett decision, Colorado and New Mexico have passed laws restoring clean water protections for waters excluded from WOTUS. “It’s a dereliction of duty on the federal government’s part by not appropriately protecting the waters of the U.S. and that leaves it up to the states to fill in those protections,” said Rachel Conn, deputy director of Amigos Bravos, a New Mexico conservation organization.

The result is a patchwork of laws protecting the nation’s wetlands. But if more Western states were to emulate their neighbors’ efforts and take action, millions of acres of wetlands could be saved, even in the absence of strong federal protections. 

National Resources Defense Council estimates are based on scenarios in which the federal government adopts two interpretations of Sackett that are supported by industry and some states: one, excluding wetlands adjacent to intermittent or ephemeral streams (bottom of range), and another, excluding wetlands that are not wet or flooded most of the year (top of range). According to legal experts, the EPA’s current guidance suggests that the administration will limit WOTUS significantly, excluding most wetlands. Alaska is excluded from this graph due to lack of data.

Credit: High Country News

Arizona

Wetland oversight is primarily conducted through the Surface Water Protection Program (SWPP), administered by the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality. House Bill 2691, passed in 2021 before Sackett, established the SWPP, which allows the state to protect some waters not covered under the Clean Water Act. 

Wyoming 

While Wyoming lacks a permitting program, it does bar the discharge of any pollution or wastes into its waters without a clean water permit. In addition, Wyoming established a Wetland Banking Fund before Sackett to encourage individuals and companies to preserve wetlands. It enables entities to bank wetland credits earned from wetland conservation projects and use them later to offset a development’s impacts on wetlands, with the goal of achieving “no net loss of wetland function and value in the state.”

Colorado

Wetland protections are primarily governed by House Bill 24-1379, a law passed in 2024 that aims to restore Clean Water Act protections to state wetlands that lost them owing to Sackett. It establishes a state permitting program.

New Mexico

The Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Act (SB 21), which was signed into law on April 8, gives the state authority to regulate surface waters. It creates a statewide permitting program and addresses polluted groundwater that falls outside federal programs.


Credit: Hannah Agosta/High Country News

How wetlands work

Approximately 40% of species, including half of all federally listed species, rely on wetlands, which act like sponges for excess water, offering billions of gallons of flood protection and storing this water for later use. Their plants, roots and microbes filter pollution from drinking water and also store 20%-30% of the world’s total soil carbon. But Western states have lost 50% of their wetlands since colonization, and roughly half of the region’s remaining ones are degraded.  

Illustrations by Hannah Agosta/High Country News

SOURCES: From Gold, 2024 in Science/Environmental Defense Fund, National Resources Defense Council, U.S. Fish and Wildlife National Wetlands Inventory, Wetlands International. 

This article appeared in the July 2025 print edition of the magazine with the headline “In defense of wetness.”

Iron Fen. Photo credit from report “A Preliminary Evaluation of Seasonal Water Levels Necessary to Sustain Mount Emmons Fen: Grand Mesa, Uncompahgre and Gunnison National Forests,” David J. Cooper, Ph.D, December 2003.

The #ColoradoRiver is on a knife’s edge. We need long-term solutions that protect the river and our communities” — John Berggren (Western Resource Advocates) #COriver #aridification

Click the link to read the article on the Western Resource Advocates website (John Berggren):

August 31, 2026

  • Communities across the West have been anxiously waiting for a plan to manage the Colorado River. The states that share the river have been unable to reach an agreement over how to manage it, forcing the federal government to move forward without one.
  • The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation recently published a management framework for the next 10 years.
  • This is not the long-term agreement many had hoped for, but it does leave room for collaborative solutions.

Communities across the West have been anxiously waiting for a plan to manage their water supply from the Colorado River. They watched as the states that share the river talked in circles behind closed doors. They attended conferences where state negotiators repeated the same tired arguments, did not present together, or were entirely absent.

Outside the conference rooms, conditions on the ground were deteriorating. The Colorado River Basin experienced its warmest winter on record. The meager snowpack in the mountains was sucked into parched soils, rivers dwindled, and the Basin’s two major reservoirs hit record lows.

And the situation continues to worsen.

While negotiators were struggling to find consensus, farmers were fallowing fields, raft guides were staring down an uncertain season, neighbors were reporting each other for overwatering, families were discovering that their favorite fishing spots had closed, and municipalities were on the hunt for alternative water supplies.

Three years ago, the U.S Bureau of Reclamation set out to work with the Basin states, Tribes, and stakeholders on a 20-year management plan for the Colorado River. But the states never reached a long-term agreement, forcing the federal government to move forward without one.

On Aug. 21, Reclamation published a framework for managing the river over the next 10 years. While it is not the long-term agreement many had hoped for, it does leave room for collaborative solutions.

What happens next will shape the river for generations.

What Is the Record of Decision?

A Decision-Making Framework

The record of decision lays out a 10-year framework for managing the river.

Under this framework, the Bureau of Reclamation will issue preliminary guidelines every two years for operating the river’s reservoirs and distributing shortages. Those guidelines will inform Reclamation’s annual plan for the river, which will be released every summer. Reclamation can adjust that plan each April depending on the winter’s snowpack and current reservoir levels. It is a tedious process, but one that allows the agency to modify operations as river conditions change.

State officials have raised concerns that the two-year framework will result in never-ending negotiations while making it difficult to plan ahead and finance solutions. These are valid concerns, but there is an off-ramp. If the states collaborate, they could replace the framework with a long-term deal that provides more certainty to their constituents and removes the need for prolonged negotiations.

Rafting the Colorado River. Photo credit: Western Resource Advocates

A Plan for Managing Water Shortages

In addition to the record of decision, Reclamation issued operating guidelines for 2027 and 2028. These guidelines outline Lake Powell and Lake Mead operations and include shortages the Lower Basin offered earlier this year. Under the guidelines, the Lower Basin will reduce its use of the Colorado River by 1.25 million acre-feet in both 2027 and 2028. It will also pursue 700,000 acre-feet in additional conservation by 2028.

The record of decision allows Reclamation to impose even deeper cuts on the Lower Basin — up to 3 million acre-feet per year — if Lake Mead starts to approach the minimum levels needed to produce hydropower and to avoid hitting deadpool.

Reclamation is not mandating cuts in the Upper Basin because its authority to do so is less clear. But that doesn’t mean conservation isn’t urgently needed in the Upper Basin. In the record of decision, Reclamation includes up to 200,000 acre-feet of voluntary conservation each year collectively by Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.

While this conservation is considered voluntary, it is in the Upper Basin’s best interest to be part of the solution. Flows on the Colorado River have declined by over 30% since 2020.  The river will continue to be on a knife’s edge unless everyone contributes.

By saving water now, the Upper Basin can help keep things from getting worse and reduce the need for emergency releases from upstream reservoirs to prop up Lake Powell. This can help rebuild storage and support the outdoor recreation economy in places like Flaming Gorge in Utah and Blue Mesa in Colorado.

Conservation in the Upper Basin can also help avoid expensive and risky legal battles over the river. The 1922 Colorado River Compact says that the Upper Basin will not cause the flow of the river to be depleted below a certain amount over a 10-year period. The Upper Basin argues that this volume is 75 million acre-feet. The Lower Basin says the amount includes water deliveries for Mexico and is set at 82.5 million acre-feet. We could hit the 82.5 trip wire as soon as this fall, potentially triggering litigation from the Lower Basin. Such a dispute would likely cost taxpayers millions of dollars, take years to resolve, and leave the river’s future in the hands of the U.S. Supreme Court. If the Lower Basin prevails, water users in the Upper Basin could see drastic cuts to their supply and little time to implement solutions or secure funding to ease the pain.

The four Upper Basin states are at various stages of developing programs to pay water users to decrease their consumption. WRA is advocating for long-term programs that prioritize projects that keep rivers healthy.

Credit: Western Resource Advocates

Is the Latest Plan Enough?

Reclamation’s models show that the reductions planned for the next two years will just barely allow the Basin to scrape by. In the worst-case scenario, the Basin could drain its accessible water savings in Lake Powell. The only water left would be what flows in the river, and that is nowhere near enough to meet current demands.

What’s Next?

Implementing Solutions or Handing the Reins to the Supreme Court

The Basin states have an important decision before them — implement the new guidelines and work toward a long-term deal or take their chances in court.

Nevada was the first to take the plunge. Three days after Reclamation released the record of decision, Nevada filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of the Interior and Bureau of Reclamation. The state claims that the plan and the potential cuts to Nevada’s water supply violate federal law and seeks to halt its implementation.

Nevada’s lawsuit underscores the need for a deal that all seven states can agree to, rather than a plan imposed by the federal government. There is still an opportunity to reach such an agreement — the Nevada case does not preclude the seven states from continuing to negotiate or from entering into agreements to stabilize the river.

The states must not let this one case spiral out of control. Litigation between all seven Basin states over the Colorado River Compact would make things much worse.

History shows that multistate water disputes can take at least a decade to be resolved and often have unintended consequences. Arizona v. California, a dispute over Colorado River allocations in the Lower Basin, began in 1952 and was not resolved until 1963. The court settled the disagreement over water allocations and ruled that the Secretary of the Interior has broad authority to act as watermaster in the Lower Basin — giving the federal government greater control over Lower Basin water deliveries. Texas v. New Mexico, a dispute over the Rio Grande, went on for 13 years before reaching a resolution last spring. And a dispute between Kansas and Colorado over the Arkansas River was on-again, off-again for more than a century. The court ruled that Colorado was overusing water and awarded both water and monetary damages to Kansas. And these cases all involved two states — not seven.

The Colorado River does not have decades. Researchers predict that it will only take one more dry winter to drain the Basin’s accessible water savings.

On top of lost time, state litigation over the 1922 Compact would cost millions of dollars — money that is better spent implementing conservation programs, restoring watersheds, and increasing water efficiency. And litigation would leave decisions with the Supreme Court, not the communities that depend on the river and know it best.

Nevada’s lawsuit against the federal government does not change the fact that we have a river to manage. New guidelines are still needed by Oct. 1. The decision-making process must continue and the Basin states must act now to prevent a seven-state legal brawl.

In the coming months WRA will be advocating for:

  • Protections for the river: Protecting river health and our communities are two sides of the same coin. The day-to-day operations of the river’s reservoirs affect everything from fish habitat to hydropower production to local water supplies and outdoor recreation. Operating guidelines must consider the full range of impacts and incorporate policies that maximize benefits for both our communities and the environment.
  • Transparent decision making: The record of decision includes a plan for issuing new operating guidelines every two years. Those guidelines will affect 35 million people and must not be developed behind closed doors. A clear public process is needed to incorporate input from the Basin states, Tribes, Mexico, water users, communities, scientists, and conservation organizations.
  • Sustained federal funding: Federal funding will be critical to implementing the changes that are needed to secure the West’s future, including restoring watershed health and incentivizing water use reductions. The river that supplies water to 1 in 10 Americans is worthy of federal investment.
  • Equitable water access and Tribal inclusion: The 30 federally recognized Tribes in the Colorado River Basin have long been excluded from key decisions and denied their fair share of the river’s water. The new guidelines and programs must uphold Tribal water rights and provide clear pathways for Tribal collaboration.
  • State collaboration: The states have been talking past each other for the last three years and it’s resulted in a federal management plan that few decision makers are happy with, and one state has already filed a lawsuit on. It is time to try a new approach before things get worse. The states must enlist the help of a professional mediator who can facilitate more productive negotiations. And the states must finalize and sign implementation plans — like the Lower Basin’s proposal to reduce its water use by 1.25 million-acre feet in 2027 and 2028 — as soon as possible.
  • Basinwide collaboration: Many of the river’s most successful programs — including those that restored hundreds of miles of fish habitat and put tens of millions of dollars toward water conservation — were the result of collaborations between states, federal agencies, Tribal nations, water users, conservation organizations, and others. The challenges the river faces are growing. We must accelerate our efforts, build new partnerships, launch new programs, increase investment, and expand on successful initiatives.

The record of decision has set the stage, now it is time for the river’s next act.

Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

Political theater at the Ray Nixon plant: Energy secretary Wright, Rep. Jeff Crank and Rep. Gabe Evans make the case that #coal keeps the lights on and electricity affordable. To make that case they must be selective in their facts — Allen Best (BigPivots.com)

Ray Nixon Power Plant. Photo credit: Colorado Springs Utilities

Click the link to read the article on the Big Pivots website (Allen Best):

September 8, 2026

U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright was at a coal plant near Colorado Springs last Friday to talk about the virtues of coal. It’s what keeps the lights on, you know, and it’s not expensive, not like renewables.

To make those claims, as he did in not so many words, he had to stubbornly turn a blind eye to another coal plant not more than 30 miles away. Comanche 3, the state’s youngest and largest coal plant, went down on Aug. 12, 2025, and hasn’t produced electricity since then.

Wright is the front man for President Donald Trump’s alliance with fossil fuel companies. It would seem to be a comfortable fit for Wright. Until he joined Trump’s team, Wright was CEO of Liberty, an oil and gas field services company based in Denver that he founded. While there, Wright consistently argued that while human-caused climate change was real, it was a distant threat. Far more important, he said, was to elevate the world’s living standard.

After he joined Trump’s cabinet, Wright went about implementing Trump’s order that fossil fuel plants should not be retired. First in 2025 was a coal plant in Michigan. On Dec. 30, he issued another order, this one for Craig No. 1. The coal-burning unit began production in 1980 and was scheduled to formally be retired on New Year’s Eve 2025.

Wright’s order cited several reasons that added up to an emergency. Collectively they fell under the heading of worries about resource adequacy in the regional grid.

Tri-State Generation and Transmission, the operator and part owner, said it didn’t need the electricity. Ditto for another part owner, Fort Collins-based Platte River Power Authority. The plant has three other part owners, including Xcel Energy.

As for the emergency, how severe was it? Not so much. Sources tell Big Pivots that the plant has been operated about three weeks since January, most of that time during April. That was just after Southwest Power Pool launched its electricity-sharing regional market, the West Balancing Authority Area.

On Aug. 20, the day this photograph was taken (and a particularly hot day it was), only one of the three units at Craig Generating Station appeared to be in use. Photo/Allen Best

Resumed electrical production Craig No. 1 has been in response to SPP’s level 1 resource advisories, which do not suggest imminent threat to reliability.

Since that order from Wright last December, he has reissued the three-month emergency orders twice more, again in late March and late June.

The irony of Wright’s order for Craig last December was immediately noted by the team of Gov. Jared Polis. The 427-megawatt coal plant ordered to be available for the emergency had broken down about 10 days before.

Of course coal plants keep the lights on! Except when they don’t!

As for Comanche 3, the giant coal plant at Pueblo, it has literally been down for 25% of the time since operations began in July 2010. “It has been reliably unreliable,” says Danny Katz, the executive director of the Colorado Public Interest Research Group. CoPIRG and other groups are arguing that Xcel, the company, and not its customers should be saddled with the repair costs of Comanche 3 or the replacement costs for purchasing power. Those costs also included bringing an older coal unit, Comanche 2, out of retirement.

The Nixon plant that Wright toured along with two members of Congress from Colorado has no blatant problems comparable to those of Comanche 3. It was to have been closed in 2029, but Colorado legislators this past session agreed to give Colorado Springs Utilities, the owner, a pass. It is now scheduled to be closed by 2032. That would make it, according to current schedules, the last in Colorado.

So what exactly is the fuss about?

In statements issued after their tour, Wright and the two congressmen he had in tow — Rep. Jeff Crank and Rep. Gabe Evans — emphasized the reliability of coal and the cost of renewable energy.

“Coal has powered American prosperity for generations and continues to provide the reliable, around-the-clock electricity our grid needs,” said Wright in a statement. “The Trump administration is committed to adding reliable power to the grid, not prematurely shutting down generation that is already keeping the lights on.”

U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright, right, and U.S. Rep. Gave Evans answer questions after an event held in Thornton during June. Photo/Allen Best

Evans, a former police officer in Arvada, calls Fort Lupton home. Early in his first term in Congress, he showed up at solar farms to get his photo taken. In at least three appearances with Wright so far this year, it has become evident that Evans has learned to talk the fossil fuels language more purely.

“Denver Democrats spent years attacking reliable coal generation, only to run headfirst into reality: you cannot shut down dependable baseload power without something ready to replace it,” said Evans in the statement issued after the tour.

“Keeping Ray Nixon online longer will protect grid reliability and save ratepayers hundreds of millions of dollars. With electricity demand skyrocketing, Colorado needs more safe, affordable, reliable energy – not political mandates that take power off the grid and leave families paying the price.”

As for Crank, he played the party line in the Colorado Springs version. “Colorado’s burdensome energy mandates continue to cost our region, not only with higher utility bills but they also threaten our national security assets,” he said.

It’s all political theater, but exactly to what purpose?

The harder question is why Colorado Springs needed to keep Ray Nixon operating longer than planned. And also, whether keeping this coal plant operating is better than building a new gas plant, as Wright told reporters, according to a report in the Colorado Springs Gazette. And a new wild card of the last two years is what exactly data centers will need — and under what terms.

As for utility costs, they are indeed rising. But why? That’s a complicated story. What can be said is that renewable energy comes in cheapest, but transmission is a pickle, and we do have supply chain issues.

What also must be said is that Holy Cross Energy, the Glenwood Springs-based electrical cooperative, has consistently had among the state’s lowest electrical rates even as it stretches to decarbonize. Through July, it was at 87% renewable energy for the year.

Granted, it’s easier to pivot when you’re a smaller dancer. Holy Cross has 58,000 meters compared to the 264,000 of Colorado Springs Utilities or the 1.6 meters of Xcel Energy in Colorado. And in an ironic footnote, Holy Cross actually has an 8% ownership interest in Comanche 3.

Whether Wright’s emergency orders for Craig No. 1 were legal are yet to be resolved. Environmental groups and others argue that the orders issued by Wright go beyond what the federal law passed by Congress in 1935 (and amended twice since then) allowed. A federal judge heard the case involving the Michigan plant in May but has not issued a ruling. That ruling, whatever it is, almost certainly will have bearing on the orders for Craig.

To be clear, this pivot from fossil fuels to non-emitting sources of electricity is not an easy one. It might yet get expensive. Also be clear that the story told at the Ray Nixon plant was political theater, nothing more.

Credit: Jonathan P. Thompson/The Land Desk

The #ColoradoRiver Has New Guidelines, but the Underlying Challenges Remain: What we do next will determine the river’s future — Moira Mcdonald and Ted Kowalski (WaltonFamilyFoundation.org) #COriver #aridification

Click the link to read the article on the Walton Family Foundation website ( Moira Mcdonald and Ted Kowalski):

August 28, 2026

Tens of millions of people across the West depend on the Colorado River for drinking water, food, power and their livelihoods. But years of drought, rising temperatures and declining reservoirs have put that lifeline under extraordinary strain. The newly released Record of Decision and federal Operating Guidelines for the river provide a framework for operations, but they cannot resolve the region’s underlying challenges on their own. The work that happens next will determine the future of the river and the communities that rely on it.

2026 marks one of the worst water years on record for the Colorado River Basin and throughout the American West, as river flows dwindle and megafires consume landscape after landscape. Water in Lake Mead, the largest reservoir in the U.S., has dropped to its lowest level since it was filled more than 90 years ago. Long-term planning and investment is critical to stabilize the river while protecting communities from increasingly severe fire, floods and drought.

Reclamation announces 2026 operating conditions for Lake Powell and Lake Mead. Hoover Dam. Photo credit: USBR

The release of the guidelines is a milestone, not the finish line. A document can’t ensure safe water supplies or combat the impacts of severe drought and wildfires. Significant federal, state and local funding needs to be directed towards strategies that make the health of rivers, forests and wetlands a priority. Without it, the Basin will remain at risk of chronic shortages, food supply disruption, energy grid vulnerability and rising economic instability that breed disruption and conflict for the entire region.

It is critical that we take this opportunity to invest in work that focuses on ensuring healthy watersheds, sustainable water use and collaboration between Colorado River Basin states and Tribal Nations.

Nature-based solutions—including river and forest management and wetland restoration—are a crucial part of the Basin’s infrastructure. They enable dependable water supplies, reduce threats from wildfires and flooding, sustain fish and wildlife and support local communities and economies. With so much attention focused on water allocations, reservoir levels and operational decisions, the role of these natural systems cannot get lost in the mix.

Fortunately there are projects throughout the Colorado River Basin that offer a blueprint for how to work with the power of nature to create a more sustainable path forward.

Projects designed to better manage forests and restore wetlands can improve water quality and create natural firebreaks. Regenerative agriculture practices like growing crops that use less water, and limiting the disruption of soil, can help create healthier farmland that better absorbs and retains water so farmers can use less. These approaches are an important part of a broader portfolio of tools that help communities conserve water, reduce risk and strengthen watersheds.

As the Colorado River endures one of its worst water years on record, long-term planning and investment is critical to stabilize water supplies while protecting communities from increasingly severe fire, floods and drought. Grand Canyon and Colorado River by Brian Richter

Transparency and collaboration between the federal government, Basin state leaders, Tribal Nations and Mexico is essential. We know that those closest to the problem are closest to the solution and that we will be more effective when we draw on the collective expertise of everyone who relies on the river. Basin states have not yet been able to negotiate a long-term management plan but that cannot stand in the way of continued work to create a more reliable and resilient Colorado River system.

Philanthropy also has a vital role to play in the future of the Colorado River. We are continuing to collaborate with our grantees to advance innovative, nature-based solutions for the region. Philanthropic investment can help test and scale approaches, fill gaps, build partnerships and demonstrate what is possible in complement to the much-needed federal, state, Tribal and local investments. Together we can help make sure the river can continue to provide for the next generation.

The U.S. Forest Service-owned parcel known as Janeway is adjacent to the Crystal River. A potential nature-based aquifer recharge project could reconnect the historic floodplain to the river and retime spring flows as part of a water supply replacement plan. CREDIT: HEATHER SACKETT/ASPEN JOURNALISM

Yosemite, again in corporate crosshairs, embodies the long war over US national park privatization — Michael Childers (TheConversation.com)

Several massive reddish tree trunks rise from grass-covered ground.
Yosemite National Park is home to three groves of massive ancient sequoia trees. Jim West/UCG/Universal Images Group via Getty Images

Michael Childers, Colorado State University

Reports that the Trump administration is working to transfer part of Yosemite National Park to a private land developer have heightened concerns among park advocates and the public about privatization of public land.

The proposed deal, which a government spokesperson said has not been finalized, would involve a land swap: The government would give the developer a small area of the park’s land on which to build a private access road between a proposed resort and the park itself. In exchange, the developer would buy land of similar value near the park, or elsewhere in California, and transfer that land to federal ownership.

Environmental advocates and park staff have worried for more than a year that the administration’s cuts to the National Park Service’s budget and staffing would lead to further privatization of the national parks’ land and business operations.

The nation has a long history of similar efforts, including a wildly unpopular 1980 attempt by Reagan administration Interior Secretary James Watt to promote development and expand private concessions in the parks. But debate over using public national park land for private profit dates back more than a century before that.

As I explain in my book, “The Mountains Are Calling: Tourists and the Unmaking of Yosemite National Park,” no park has played a more central role in that debate than Yosemite, in California.

Early concerns

In early 1864, Central American Steamship Transit Company representative Israel Ward Raymond wrote a letter to John Conness, a U.S. senator from California, urging the government to move swiftly to preserve the Yosemite Valley and the Mariposa Grove of giant sequoia trees to prevent them from falling into private hands. Five months later, President Abraham Lincoln signed the Yosemite Grant Act, ceding the valley and the grove to the state of California, “upon the express conditions that the premises shall be held for public use, resort, and recreation.” This was years before Yellowstone became the first federal land designated a national park in 1872.

A sepia-toned image of a lake with massive trees and even bigger mountains behind it.
For centuries, the natural beauty of the Yosemite Valley has impressed visitors. Sepia Times/Universal Images Group via Getty Images

Controversy arose quickly at Yosemite. Two men – James Lamon and James Hutchings – had claimed land in the valley before the federal government gave it to California. Both began commercial operations, Lamon growing cash crops and Hutchings operating a hotel.

California said their businesses threatened the state’s ability to develop roads and trails in Yosemite by competing for tourist dollars. A legal battle ensued and was not resolved until an 1872 U.S. Supreme Court ruling found that the men’s land claims had not been fully validated according to the procedures of the time. The California legislature paid both men compensation for their land, and both left the park.

In 1890, neighboring parts of the Yosemite area became America’s third national park – and in 1906, the federal government again took possession of the Yosemite Valley itself and the Mariposa Grove, specifically to incorporate them into an expansion of the national park.

Development rights

Yet, as my research has found, the role of private interests in the park remained unsolved. Private companies under contract to the National Park Service have long provided needed amenities such as lodging and food within the national parks. But questions over what is acceptable in national parks in the pursuit of profit have shaped Yosemite’s history for generations.

In 1925, I found, the question centered on the right to build the first gas station inside the park, in Yosemite Valley. Two private businesses, the Curry Camping Company and the Yosemite National Park Company, had long competed for tourist dollars within the park. Each wanted to build a gas station to boost profits.

A large building stands in front of a massive set of cliffs.
The Ahwahnee is a privately run hotel inside Yosemite National Park. George Rose/Getty Images

Frustrated over the need to decide, National Park Service Director Horace Albright ordered the rival firms to simplify management of the park’s concessions. The companies merged, and the newly formed Yosemite Park and Curry Company was granted the exclusive rights to run lodges, restaurants and other facilities within the park, including the new gas station.

But as I found in my research, the park service and the concessions company did not always see eye to eye on the purpose of the park. The conflict between profit and preservation is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the construction of a ski area within the park in the early 1930s. The park service initially opposed the development of Badger Pass Ski Area as not conducive to the national park ideal, but the Yosemite Park and Curry Company insisted it was key to boosting winter use of the park.

In 1973, the Music Corporation of America, an entertainment conglomerate, bought the Yosemite Park and Curry Company. The company already had a tourist attraction operating near Hollywood, where visitors could pay to tour movie sets, but had not yet changed its name to Universal Studios or launched major theme parks in Florida and California. Its purchase of the park’s concessions set off a firestorm of controversy over fears of turning Yosemite into a theme park.

That didn’t happen, but annual park visitor numbers climbed from 2.5 million to 3.8 million over the 20 years MCA ran the concessions, which sparked concerns about development and overcrowding in the park. Conservationists argued the park service had allowed the corporate giant to promote and develop the park in ways that threatened the very aspects of the park most people came to enjoy.

With three restaurants, two service stations with a total of 15 gas pumps, two cafeterias, two grocery stores, seven souvenir shops, a delicatessen, a bank, a skating rink, three swimming pools, a golf course, two tennis courts, kennels, a barbershop, a beauty shop, Badger Pass Ski Area and three lodges, the Yosemite Valley was a busy commercial district. Critics argued that such development contradicted the park service’s mandate to leave national parks unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.

A few people stand in a large gap within a tree trunk while other people stand nearby.
Crowds gather at some of Yosemite’s most popular sites, such as the California Tunnel Tree. David McNew/AFP via Getty Images

Who owns the names?

Falling profits and consolidation within the music industry led MCA to sell its concessions rights in Yosemite in 1993. The Delaware North Companies, a global hospitality corporation, took over and ran the park’s concessions until 2016, when it sold the rights to Aramark.

But in that sale, the question of public resources and private profits arose again. Delaware North demanded $51 million in compensation for Aramark continuing to use the names of several historic properties within the park, such as the Ahwahnee, a hotel, and Curry Village, another group of visitor accommodations. The company claimed those names were a part of its assets under its contract with the park service.

The park service rejected the claim, saying the names, which dated back more than a century, belonged to the American people. But to avoid legal problems during the transition, the agency temporarily renamed several sites, including calling the Ahwahnee the Majestic Yosemite Hotel and changing Curry Village to Half Dome Village. Public outrage erupted, denouncing the claim by Delaware North as commercial overreach that threatened to distort Yosemite’s heritage. In 2019, the park service and Aramark agreed to pay Delaware North a total of $12 million to settle the dispute, and the original names were restored. https://www.youtube.com/embed/LXfnTKLw8Qg?wmode=transparent&start=0 Protesters unfurl an upside-down U.S. flag from the top of El Capitan in Yosemite National Park in February 2025, protesting Trump administration changes to the National Park Service.

Renewed interest in commercial efforts

In June 2025, Yosemite again took center stage in the dispute over the role of federal funding versus private interests at the start of the second Trump administration when a group of climbers unfurled an American flag upside down off El Capitan in protest of the administration’s cuts in personnel and slashing of the park service’s budget.

Conservationists, including former National Park Service Director Jonathan Jarvis, argued that by defunding the park service and laying off as much as a quarter of its workforce, the Trump administration was “laying the groundwork to privatize” the national parks by allowing corporate interests more access to public lands. Those concerns echo ones raised during the first Trump administration, when the White House argued privatization would better serve the American public by improving visitor experiences and saving federal dollars.

Members of Congress and former park service officials say the reported effort in 2026 to turn over park land to a private owner would be a major blow to federal efforts to protect parks and conserve land.

Whichever side prevails in the short term, the debate over the role of private interests within national parks like Yosemite will undoubtedly continue.

This article contains material previously published July 31, 2025.

Michael Childers, Associate Professor of History, Colorado State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The Colorado River Water Supply Crisis in a Few Graphs: Part 2 — Agricultural Water Use in the Lower Basin — The Traveling Wilburys of the #ColoradoRiver #COriver #aridification

Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

Click the link to read the report on the University of New Mexico Digital Repository website (Jack Schmidt1, Anne Castle2, Eric Kuhn3, Kathryn Sorensen4, Katherine Tara5):

September 2, 2026

KEY POINTS

  • Reductions in Lower Basin water use during the last four years, including forecast use in 2026, are similar to the initial targets for Lower Basin shortages described in the Final Environmental Impact Statement for Post-2026 Operational Guidelines and Strategies for Lake Powell and Lake Mead (FEIS) and the accompanying Record of Decision (ROD). 6 Lower Basin consumptive use in 2023, 2024, and 2025, and forecast for 2026 has been the smallest for the entire 2010-2026 period. These four years of smallest use are between 1.4 and 1.7 million acre feet/year (maf/yr) less than the 7.50 maf/yr amount generally recognized as the Lower Basin’s mainstem allocation.
  • Reductions in Lower Basin use have been achieved by large reductions implemented by Central Arizona Project (CAP) contractors and subcontractors, the Imperial Irrigation District (IID), and non-CAP water users in Arizona. The reductions in use in the IID have been in summer water use and have not affected consumptive use in winter when garden crops, such ass lettuce, onions, carrots, and broccoli, are grown.
  • There is no historical analogy for implementing Lower Basin shortages of 3 maf/yr that would reduce annual consumptive water use to 4.5 maf/yr. We identified the lowest use in each month between 2010 and 2026 in each Lower Basin state and summed those monthly values, even when those months did not occur in the same year. The annual total of the summed lowest monthly uses yielded a minimum total Lower Basin use of 5.03 maf/yr. Thus, implementation of 3 maf/yr shortages would require reductions in monthly use greater than the sum of the smallest monthly uses during the past 17 years.

INTRODUCTION

This paper is part of a series, The Colorado River Water Supply Crisis in a Few Graphs, whose goal is to provide readers with summary information about the natural water supply, reservoir storage, and consumptive uses and losses in the Basin so that readers can better understand and consider the current water crisis. The long-term fate of the water supply provided by the Colorado River depends on many complex and interconnected factors: the natural flow of the river, the amount of water stored in the Basin’s reservoirs, the consumptive uses of that water, the losses caused by reservoir evaporation, and the losses associated with water flowing through natural channels (i.e., transmission losses).

In 2024, approximately 60% of all uses and losses of Colorado River water in the United States occurred in the Lower Basin (Table 1).⁷ In this paper, we summarize water use in the Lower Basin since 2010, primarily focusing on consumption by the Imperial Irrigation District (IID), the largest user in the entire Colorado River Basin, and on the aggregate consumption by Arizona users not served by the Central Arizona Project (CAP). We focus on these agricultural users, because agriculture makes up approximately 60% of consumptive uses in the Lower Basin,⁸ and the agricultural sector will play a significant role in future reductions in water use in the Lower Basin.

Table 1. Consumptive uses and losses in the United States part of the Colorado River Basin in 2024.9

This paper provides historical context in which to consider the magnitude of recent reductions in Lower Basin water use by comparing current water use with typical rates of use since 2010. We also provide historical context for the shortage goals described in the recently released ROD and Operating Guidelines for 2027 and 2028. 10 The ROD lists a potential maximum Lower Basin reduction of 3.0 maf/yr but also includes language that seems to allow for even greater reductions, after consultation, in extraordinary circumstances.

We analyze the Lower Basin water use data summarized by the Bureau of Reclamation in annual decree accounting reports formally titled Colorado River Accounting and Water Use Report: Arizona, California, and Nevada.¹¹ These reports are issued each May and summarize monthly water use by every Lower Basin user. Reclamation also provides monthly provisional data on the current year’s water use, and the agency provides forecasts of annual use for the current year.¹² Similarly extensive and precise data describing Upper Basin use are not readily available.

Lake Mead and Lake Powell are the largest reservoirs in the United States and essentially are one gigantic reservoir separated into two parts by the Grand Canyon.¹³ Inflow to this gigantic reservoir primarily is snowmelt from the Rocky Mountains, and a significant amount of that runoff is put to beneficial use by Upper Basin users before it reaches Lake Powell. A small amount of additional inflow occurs within the Grand Canyon, and there are occasional inflows to Lake Mead from the Virgin River. Southern Nevada Water Authority directly withdraws water from Lake Mead, and other Lower Basin users divert stream flow after it is released from Lake Mead.

RECENT LOWER BASIN WATER USE

In 2025, total consumptive use in the three Lower Basin states was 5.755 maf, the smallest annual total use since at least 2010 (Fig. 1) and 17% less than the average for 2010-2025.14 This small amount resulted from the lowest annual use in California (3.647 maf) since at least 2010 and the second lowest annual use since 2010 in Arizona (1.911 maf). Lower Basin use in 2026, 5.961 maf, is forecast to be slightly more than in 2025.15

Figure 1. Consumptive use in the Lower Basin since 2010. Estimated use in 2026 based on forecast of September 1, 2026.

Water use in California since 2023, including forecast use in 2026, has been 13% less than between 2010 and 2022.16 Decreased use in California in those years has been primarily due to reductions in use by IID (Fig. 2). IID’s consumptive use of 2.187 maf in 2025 was the lowest since 2010 and forecast use in 2026 of 2.242 maf is also very low. Average use by IID between 2023 and 2026 will be 12% less than average use between 2010 and 2022.17 Annual consumptive use by the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD) between 2023 and 2026 will be 13% less than between 2010 and 2022, although the savings are not as great because MWD uses less water than does IID.18

Figure 2. Consumptive use in California since 2010. Estimated use in 2026 based on forecast of September 1, 2026.

The proportionate reductions in water use in Arizona have been much larger than in California. Average statewide water use between 2023 and 2026 will be 25% less than between 2010 and 2022.19 CAP has reduced its uses by 40% between those two time periods, while non-CAP users have reduced consumption by 6%. The smallest use by Arizona was 1.890 maf in 2023 (Fig. 3). Use in 2025 by non-CAP customers, 1.004 maf, was the lowest since at least 2010. Non-CAP use has exceeded CAP use since 2022.

Figure 3. Consumptive use in Arizona since 2010. Estimated use in 2026 based on forecast of September 1, 2026.

LOWER BASIN AGRICULTURAL WATER USE

Imperial Irrigation District

IID is the largest individual user of mainstem Colorado River water in the Colorado River Basin, exceeding use by any state in the Basin except California itself. Much of California’s ongoing reductions in use are due to decreased use by IID resulting from various compensated agreements. Future reductions by IID have the potential to significantly affect the Basin’s effort to balance consumptive use with declining supply.

In comparison to typical annual use since 2010, IID’s use in 2024 and 2025, as well as forecast use in 2026, has been notably reduced, as represented in a box-and-whisker plot (Fig. 4).20 The box in Figure 4 encloses 50% of the years since 2010, and the length of this box is called the Inter Quartile Range (IQR), bounded by the 25th and 75th percentile of the 17 years of data, including forecast use in 2026. The line through the middle of the box is the median value for this period. Lines extending up and down from the box (i.e., whiskers) extend from the box to values within an acceptable range. Values that are greater than 1.5 times the IQR above the 75th percentile or below the 25th percentile are beyond the acceptable range and are outliers and individually plotted. Thus, 2024, 2025, and forecast use in 2026 are outliers, indicating that use in those years has been significantly less that typical use during the entire period since 2010.

Figure 4. Box-and-whisker plot showing distribution of annual use by IID since 2010. The box is the Inter Quartile Range, defined by the 25th and 75th percentile of the years of annual use data. The line inside the box is the median. Whiskers extend from the box to an acceptable range, and outliers are circles that are labeled. The three most recent years are outliers of low water use. Estimated use in 2026 based on forecast of September 1, 2026. See text for explanation of a box-and-whisker plot.

The largest proportion of irrigated land in IID is devoted to field crop production, the largest proportion of which is devoted to alfalfa (Fig. 5).²¹ The area devoted to alfalfa production changes little from year to year and during the year and was approximately 150,000 acres in 2025.²² In 2025, other significant field crops were Bermuda grass and kleingrass, whose average irrigated area was 80,000 and 20,000 acres, respectively. The area devoted to garden crop production changes greatly throughout the year and is largest between November and March. Little land area is devoted to garden crop production in the heat of summer. The most significant garden crops are lettuce, onions, carrots, and broccoli.

Figure 5. Area of IID irrigated for different categories of crops in 2025. Field crops include alfalfa that is also plotted separately.

Water use by IID is typically lowest between November and February when garden crops are grown (Fig. 6). Water use increases greatly in March and remains high through October when field crops are the primary focus of production (see Appendix).

Figure 6. Box-and-whisker plots of total monthly consumptive use by the IID between 2010 and 2026. Each box is the Inter Quartile Range, defined by the 25th and 75th percentile of the years of data for that month. These boxes represent the typical monthly use pattern since 2010. Red dots are the average use in each month between 2024 and 2026. See text for additional explanation of a box-and-whisker plot.

Reductions in consumption during the past few years have been accomplished primarily by reduced water use between June and September when alfalfa and grass hay are the primary crops. These reductions are reflected in Figure 5 where red dots are the average monthly water use since 2024. Red dots plot below the grey boxes of the IQR in June, July, August, and September, demonstrating that recent water use in these months has been significantly less than typical since 2010. In contrast, recent water use between December and May has been within or slightly less than the IQR.

Agricultural use of mainstem Colorado River water in Arizona

We estimated agricultural use of mainstem Colorado River water in Arizona by subtracting the total diverted by the CAP from the total use in Arizona. This remainder includes all the agricultural uses along the Colorado River as well as a small amount used by the City of Yuma, other towns along the river, and military bases.²³

The monthly pattern of water use is similar to the monthly pattern by the IID. The smallest uses are between November and February (Fig. 7). Consumptive use increases in March and is highest between April and August.

Reductions in water use by these Arizona growers have been more modest than by IID. Recent average use has been somewhat less than the typical range between April and July and has been within the typical range in other months, except for November when there was significant precipitation near Yuma in 2025.

Figure 7. Box-and-whisker plots of total monthly consumptive use in Arizona by users of mainstem Colorado River not served by the CAP between 2010 and 2026. Each box is the Inter Quartile Range, defined by the 25th and 75th percentile of the years of data for that month. These boxes represent the typical monthly use pattern since 2010. Red dots are the average use in each month between 2024 and 2026. See text for additional explanation of a box-and-whisker plot.

Management and Policy Implications

Consumptive water use of mainstem water in the Lower Basin has been less than 7.5 maf/yr in every year but one since 2010. Since 2023 including forecast use in 2026, this reduction ranged between 1.4 and 1.7 maf/yr. The Lower Basin states have reduced water use comparable to the initial targets for Lower Basin shortages described in the recently released ROD24 and Operating Guidelines for 2027 and 2028.25 Thus, the good news is that the initial shortage goals of the FEIS have been achieved in recent years.

These savings have been achieved by large reductions in use by the CAP (Fig. 3) and by reduced agricultural water use in summer by IID (Fig. 6) and non-CAP water users in Arizona (Fig. 7). These reductions in agricultural water use have not resulted in changes of the amount of water consumed in winter when garden crops are grown.

The ROD allows for potentially large Lower Basin shortages of up to 3 maf/yr and potentially more in the event that Basin runoff continues to be low and reservoir live storage drops to critical levels. We placed these potential shortages in perspective by summing the smallest monthly use in each Lower Basin state since 2010 even though these months of smallest use did not occur in the same year. In some cases, the smallest water use was not due to significant water conservation but to unusually rainy conditions when demand for supplemental irrigation water was low, such as in November 2025. In other words, there is no historical experience with implementing the annual sum of these smallest monthly uses, because the smallest monthly uses did not occur in the same year.

Nevertheless, summing the lowest monthly use in each state provides perspective to the magnitude of the proposed 3 maf/yr shortages. The summed value of smallest monthly uses yields a potential minimum annual Lower Basin use of 5.03 maf/yr for the three Lower Basin states (Table 2). Although many of the months of smallest use occurred between 2022 and 2026, some were unique months of very low use in the 2010s. There is no historical analogy for imposition of the largest Lower Basin shortages envisioned by the recently released ROD and 2027-28 Operating Guidelines. [ed. emphasis mine]

Table 2. Smallest monthly consumptive use in each Lower Basin state since 2010.

CONCLUSION

The analyses summarized in this paper demonstrate that agricultural water use that supports winter garden crop production has not changed despite recent reductions in annual water use by IID or by non-CAP water users in Arizona. To date, water use by IID and by non-CAP water users in Arizona has been reduced in summer when garden crops are not grown. In times of acute water shortage, it is likely that continued and additional water savings can be achieved by reductions in irrigation of field crops in summer, without causing shortages to garden crop irrigation in the winter.

It is notable, however, that summing the lowest monthly water use in each state since 2010 results in a theoretical reduction from the Lower Basin allocation of 7.5 maf/yr of approximately 2.5 maf/yr, less than the maximum potential Lower Basin shortage envisioned in the recently released ROD. Our calculation of a theoretical shortage is based on summing the smallest use in each month between 2010 and 2026, and these months are not all in the same year. In some cases, the lowest use resulted from unusually large precipitation that reduced irrigation demand, rather than explicit conservation efforts.

The Priority Shortage Allocation Model utilized in the FEIS distributes shortages among the Lower Basin states in a much different manner than the way shortages have been achieved in the past.26 Tabulating the historical minimum monthly uses demonstrates that achieving the 3 maf/yr reductions described in the FEIS and ROD would be very difficult and is without historical precedent. Implementation of such large shortages would likely require new management policies, including compensated fallowing, permanent retirement of irrigated acreage and corresponding water rights, and unprecedented investment in increased irrigation efficiency.

We recognize that our theoretical comparison of minimum monthly uses since 2010 in no way captures the economic dislocation and secondary impacts that might result from implementing such shortages now. A full economic analysis of the impacts of the largest potential Lower Basin reductions described in the FEIS and the ROD is critical for understanding the consequences of significant reductions in water use in the Lower Basin. That type of analysis is beyond our expertise. Nevertheless, we recognize the importance of such an analysis, and we recognize the real-world distress that such large reductions of use might cause.


1 Center for Colorado River Studies, Utah State University, former Chief, Grand Canyon Monitoring and Research Center.

2 Getches-Wilkinson Center, Univ. of Colorado Law School, former US Commissioner, Upper Colorado River Commission, former Assistant Secretary for Water and Science, US Dept. of the Interior.

3 Retired General Manager, Colorado River Water Conservation District.

4 Kyl Center for Water Policy, Arizona State University, former Director, Phoenix Water Services.

5 Staff Attorney, Utton Transboundary Resources Center, University of New Mexico.

6 FEIS is available at https://www.usbr.gov/ColoradoRiverBasin/post2026/final-eis/index.html. ROD is available at https://www.usbr.gov/ColoradoRiverBasin/post2026/decision-doc/P26_RecordofDecision_Final.pdf.

7 All annual data in this paper are calendar year. 2024 is the most recent year that consumptive uses and losses data are available for the entire Basin.

8 Richter et al., 2024, New water accounting reveals why the Colorado River no longer reaches the sea. Communications Earth & Environment 5:134. available at https://www.nature.com/articles/s43247-024-01291

⁹ Upper Basin state uses in Table 1 do not include state reservoir evaporation. Total major and minor state reservoir evaporation is listed separately in Table 1. Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP) reservoir evaporation is evaporation from Blue Mesa, Morrow Point, Flaming Gorge, and Lake Powell reservoirs. Source of Upper Basin data: J. Prairie, Upper Colorado Basin Research and Modeling Group Chief, Bureau of Reclamation. Source of Lower Basin state uses: Reclamation. 2025. Water use report: Arizona, California, Nevada, calendar year 2024. Source of mainstem reservoir evaporation (Mead, Mohave, Havasu) data: S. Tighi, Hydrologist, Reclamation, Lower Colorado Region. Evaporation at Senator Wash and diversion dams estimated at 28,000 af.

10 Department of the Interior, August 2026, Operating Guidelines: Colorado River Guidelines for Coordinated Operations of Lake Powell and Lake Mead, Operating Years 2027 and 2028 (2027-28 Operating Guidelines), available at https://www.usbr.gov/ColoradoRiverBasin/post2026/decision-doc/2027-2028OperatingGuidelines_Final.pdf. We note that these Operating Guidelines provide for 1.25 maf/yr of shortage, allocated among the Lower Basin states as previously proposed: 760,000 af/yr in Arizona, 440,000 af/yr in California, and 50,000 af/yr in Nevada, The distribution of shortages greater than 1.25 maf/yr is not specified but would presumably be subject to consultation. See 2027-28 Operating Guidelines at 5.3.A. The ROD allows for the development of different methods of shortage allocation. See ROD at 5.

¹¹ Colorado River Water Accounting and Water Use Report: Arizona, California, and Nevada, available at https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/wtracct.html.

¹² Lower Colorado River Water Accounting – Actual Water Use and Official Water Use Forecast, both available at https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/wtracct.html. Throughout this paper, we refer to the forecast for 2026 that was made on September 1, 2026. The forecast is frequently revised.

¹³ There is no significant water use in the Grand Canyon.

14 Average Lower Basin consumptive use between 2010 and 2025 was 6.880 maf/yr.

15 Reclamation, Lower Colorado River Basin, available at https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/hourly/forecast.pdf.

16 Average use between 2010 and 2022 was 4.326 maf/yr. Average use between 2023 and (forecasted) 2026 will be 3.764 maf/yr.

17 Average use between 2010 and 2022 was 2.600 maf/yr. Average use between 2023 and (forecasted) 2026 will be 2.290 maf/yr.

18 Average use between 2010 and 2022 was 925,000 af/yr. Average use between 2023 and (forecasted) 2026 will be 804,000 af/yr.

19 Average use between 2010 and 2022 was 2.590 maf/yr. Average use between 2023 and (forecasted) 2026 will be 1.930 maf/yr.

20 IID used 2.187 maf in 2025, 2.312 maf in 2024, and is forecast to use 2.242 maf in 2026. Median use between 2010 and 2026 was 2.546 and use in 50% of the years of that period was between 2.481 and 2.558 maf/yr.

21 Imperial Irrigation District, 2025, written communication, Monthly crop acreage summary, 2011-2025.

22 Total net area of crops in 2025 was approximately 350,000 acres.

23 Forecast use in 2026 for Bullhead City, Lake Havasu City, Parker, Yuma, U.S. Army Yuma Proving Grounds, and the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Yuma is 35,000 af.

24 Department of the Interior, August 2026, Record of Decision, Decision Framework for Colorado River Guidelines: Coordinated Operations of Lake Powell and Lake Mead (2027-2036), available at https://www.usbr.gov/ColoradoRiverBasin/post2026/decision-doc/P26_RecordofDecision_Final.pdf.

25 Department of the Interior, August 2026, Operating Guidelines: Colorado River Guidelines for Coordinated Operations of Lake Powell and Lake Mead, Operating Years 2027 and 2028 (2027-28 Operating Guidelines), available at https://www.usbr.gov/ColoradoRiverBasin/post2026/decision-doc/2027-2028OperatingGuidelines_Final.pdf. We note that these Operating Guidelines provide for 1.25 maf of shortage in each year, allocated among the Lower Basin states as previously proposed: 760,000 af in Arizona, 440,000 af in California, and 50,000 af in Nevada. The distribution of shortage greater than 1.25 maf/yr is not specified but would presumably be the subject of consultation. See 2027-28 Operating Guidelines at 5.3.A. The ROD allows for the development of different methods of shortage allocation. See ROD at 5.

26 See FEIS Appendix C, Shortage Allocation Model and Alternative Distribution Model Documentation, at C.4.2. However, the ROD specifies that other methods of shortage allocation may be developed. ROD at 5.

Colorado River “Beginnings”. Photo: Brent Gardner-Smith/Aspen Journalism

#Nevada preached peace on the #ColoradoRiver. Now it’s suing to protect its water. The state’s lawsuit claims the federal government’s plan for the river could strip Las Vegas of two-thirds of its water supply — Austin Corona (Grist.org) #COriver #aridification

Las Vegas circa 1915

Click the link to read the article on the Grist website (Austin Corona):

August 28, 2026

Nevada officials have long presented themselves as a voice for compromise and conservation in debates over the Colorado River. The Las Vegas area, home to two-thirds of the state’s population and most of its economy, has become a model of urban water conservation. As the river has declined from overuse and a decades-long drought exacerbated by climate change, southern Nevada water planners built extensive water reuse facilities and implemented tight restrictions on new turf and fountains, dropping the region’s per capita water use by 58 percent in roughly 20 years. Meanwhile, in interstate negotiations over the management of the Colorado River, state representatives have positioned themselves as bridge-builders, sometimes referring to themselves as the “middle basin” between the river’s divided upper and lower basin states. 

When the federal government’s new management plan for the river was announced earlier this month, most observers thought Arizona, which stands to take the largest immediate cuts, would launch the first lawsuit over the plan’s implications for its water supplies. So it came as a surprise to many Colorado River experts when Nevada became the first to sue the federal government over the plan this week.

“I expected that there would be litigation, but it was surprising to me that Nevada fired the first shot,” said Anne Castle, former chair of the Upper Colorado River Commission.

The natural flow flow at Lees Ferry, which is a calculation of what the Colorado River’s flow would be without any upstream dams, diversions, or human consumption. Land Desk graph using Bureau of Reclamation data.

Nevada’s lawsuit comes after more than two years of negotiations among the seven Colorado River states and the federal government over how to reduce water use on the declining river. The states failed to reach a long-term agreement before the river’s current management procedures expire in October, leaving the Interior Department to impose its own plan. The federal government’s plan largely relies on cuts to water use among the Lower Basin states — Arizona, Nevada, and California — to prop up water levels in the river’s largest reservoirs. Those reservoirs have been draining so quickly that the dwindling water depth could threaten hydropower and dam operations within months without intervention. 

Nevada argues that the federal government’s plan illegally forces it to take too much of those cuts. In a worst-case scenario, the plan could allow for a 71 percent cut to the Las Vegas area’s water supply, the state argued, calling it an unacceptable risk to the state’s largest population center and economic hub. Nevada believes this outcome results from a misreading of the law and also claims the government didn’t consider important alternatives to such drastic cuts.

This worst-case scenario, which experts say is an interpretation of the plan’s implications by Nevada, would become possible if reservoir levels continue to drop and if Nevada couldn’t reach an agreement with Arizona and California to help it absorb more of those cuts. Those three states already have such an agreement, which is incorporated into the federal plan and meant to last through 2028, at which point the plan allows the states to update the operations with a new agreement. Without an agreement, the federal government will implement cuts based on preexisting water rights and agreements, cutting the most from Arizona and leaning increasingly on Nevada and California as potential shortages increase. The plan was created through a decision-making process required under the National Environmental Policy Act, or NEPA, which mandates that federal agencies gather public input and consider environmental and socioeconomic impacts of major decisions.

Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

Amid the y’alls, two themes at the Colorado Water Congress conference — Allen Best (BigPivots.com) #CWCSC2026

Lauren Boebert at the Colorado Water Congress Annual Summer Conference. Photo credit: Allen Best/Big Pivots

Click the link to read the article on the Big Pivots website (Allen Best):

August 31, 2026

Many political office-seekers spoke at the annual summer conference in Steamboat. Some ‘y’alled to the attendees. Others not so much. Most called for  more water storage and “forest resilience.”

“God bless, y’all,” said Victor Marx, the Republican candidate for governor in Colorado in wrapping up his allotted 15 minutes at the podium at the Colorado Water Congress summer conference in Steamboat Springs.

Lauren Boebert, who represents the Fourth Congressional District in Colorado, followed him on the agenda. “It is wonderful to be back with y’all at Water Congress,” said Boebert, a Republican seeking her fourth term in Congress.

Y’alls were common during her quarter-hour on stage. It being a water conference, one of them had to do with water. “So y’all better get real good at that xero-scaping for your lawns and everything you’re building out there because your cactus, your cacti might do just fine, but we’re taking it back,” she said of Arizona.

Dwayne Romero, the Democratic candidate in Boebert’s former Third Congressional District, who preceded them, used none.

What this says exactly, I’m not sure. Y’all is a Southern locution that has become somewhat more common across the United States. I do note that Romero grew up in southeast Texas while Marx was reared in Louisiana, both of those places thick with y’alls and drawls. As for Boebert, she came to Colorado from Florida at the age of four.

Water Congress’s twice-annual conferences always have elected officials as well as water leaders from across Colorado. This being election season in 2026, the time devoted to the pols was greater than normal.

Victor Marx, the Republican nominee for Colorado governor, says Colorado must be prepared adequately for when the rain and snow returns. Photo/Allen Best

Like Marx, some are seeking statewide offices, while others, including Boebert and Romero, are running for Congress in districts with more rural areas.

That makes sense, as the Water Congress has a strong rural constituency. Denver Water is well represented, but so is Logan County. I also noted that Rod Lenz, the chair of the Republican River Water Conservation District’s board of directors, managed to get to the conference by Wednesday morning after a meeting in Holyoke that lasted long into the previous afternoon. That’s a good five-hour trip by car.

As for the y’alls, I have no idea whether Jeff Hurd, the Third Congressional District incumbent, Phil Weiser, the Democratic nominee for governor, drawled y’alls. I suspect not. I have heard both speak several times. Neither is a y’all guy. Both are also attorneys.

Perhaps not surprisingly, Romero and Boebert started out on much the same note in their remarks about the Colorado River. Romero mentioned “decades of lower-basin use” and urged solidarity with Colorado’s negotiating team on “protecting Colorado’s compact entitlements.” Boebert struck the same tone but with more pugilistic language. “We’re fighting for what belongs to us and for our future generations.”

Beyond those obligatory remarks, the two candidates differed greatly. Boebert talked about what she has done for her constituents regarding water and mentioned her work on the Arkansas Valley Conduit Project. “Even though my dear great president may have vetoed that, we are still working to get that over the line for Southeast Colorado.”

Boebert was typical Boebert, saucy and sort of interesting in how she played to her base. She wore blue jeans, as that seems to be her style when making the rounds in Colorado. In what may be more revealing, she also tried to talk about her bi-partisan work. I also noticed she did so when running in a tight race in her former congressional district, the third, in 2022. She won that race by a mere 546 votes, precipitating her move across the Continental Divide.

Maybe it’s because she is in what appears to be a tougher contest with the Democratic candidate, Eileen Laubacher, a retired Navy rear admiral, in a district that in the past has been unflinchingly Republican. Laubacher’s resume, money and growing institutional support could, noted Axios in a story last week, “make Boebert sweat.” Laubacher also spoke at the conference. But again, I was elsewhere.

Themes

Two themes were evident in remarks made by the office-seekers and others at the conference. One was the need for more storage, the other for more “watershed restoration” via Proposition 137, the proposal on the November ballot to divert sales tax revenues from sporting goods to do work in the forests and expand funding for parks.

The discussions in a general way crossed party lines but the storage case was cited more prominently by Republican speakers. Absent, though, was the sort of specifics I thirsted for.

Politicians rarely get into the details when on the stump, of course. And 15 minutes isn’t much time. Boebert’s comments will likely be echoed in the next two months.

“Forest management is not optional anymore. It never was, and for anyone to come up and present policy that is more reactive then proactive is failing you and each and every one of us — is failing future generations,” said Boebert. “Healthy forests hold snow longer, release water cleaner, and protect our watersheds from catastrophic fires that turn drinking water into ash.”

Boebert then took aim at clean energy.

“We hear all the environmental claims about carbon emissions, but these wildfires that are too quickly growing out of control, burning down our beautiful state, neighboring states in the West, with more than 6 billion standing dead trees that no one will allow us to harvest or not harvest enough of, unfortunately even taking lives of first responders…”

Boebert attributed to NASA a statistic: A wildfire produces more greenhouse gas emissions than all of the cars fueled by fossil fuels in a year.

“So EVs aren’t the answer. Sending your money to DC for wind and solar isn’t the answer. It’s being good stewards of our land, managing our forests.”

The storage theme also got lots of attention. It was bipartisan. Little of the conversation went very deep. Some of it was almost insultingly oversimplified.

Consider what Marx had to say: “We can’t make it snow. We can’t make it rain. But we can decide whether we’re prepared for when the water comes. So I believe we should store water in good years. Lord, please send it.”

Udall/Overpeck 4-panel Figure Colorado River temperature/precipitation/natural flows with trend. Lake Mead and Lake Powell storage. Updated through Water Year 2025. Note the tiny points on the annual data so that you can flyspeck the individual years. Credit: Brad Udall

It sounds good, being “prepared adequately.” But that statement assumes good years will come. Examining the science, Colorado State University’s Brad Udall has suggested there may not be any good years, let alone enough to fill all the [reservoirs] already built.

Consider that we have two giant reservoirs on the Colorado River sitting 75% empty. And in the headwaters, Green Mountain Reservoir is 15.1% full, as of Sunday, according to the Bureau of Reclamation. Blue Mesa Reservoir was only marginally better. Navajo, on the Colorado-New Mexico border, is doing better at 40% to 45%.

Romero’s call for partnership

Of the three office-seekers I heard, Romero was most interesting. It was obvious to me he had taken the time to study the Colorado River issues. As for Marx, he rambled.

Romero’s comments were calculated, of course. He was making a case for stability after the chaos of the Trump presidency.

“We have to restore Congress and our federal agencies as institutions that work. Congress has to legislate. It has to authorize projects. It has to appropriate money. It has to conduct oversight. Those are all the rules that were stipulated in the Constitution for our Congress,” he said.

I suspect Jeff Hurd would agree with at least parts of that statement.

Green Mountain Reservoir, seen here on Aug.17, sits about 85% empty. Most other reservoirs have more water stored, but not that much. Photo/Allen Best

He later talked about what this meant on the ground. “A rancher can’t make long-term conservation investments around a pilot program that could disappear with the next administration,” he said.

What must be restored, he continued, is a federal partnership with the state, “where federal dollars turn local grit into lasting resilience. So here’s the heart of it: We have the right people, we have the expertise, we have the will. Now we need to bring real, sustained funding and solutions and resources to bear, enough to help us build resilience for the next 50 years of demand. And we need genuine, reliable partners.”

As for resilience, said Romero, it comes from many projects. “It’s a modernized diversion that lets a farmer grow more with less. It’s a storage that gives a community room to breathe in a drought. It’s a treated watershed that doesn’t burn catastrophically. And it’s securing an historic right like Shoshone, so it benefits Colorado permanently.”

Shoshone, of course, is the hydroelectric plant in Glenwood Canyon, and the Colorado River District is nearing success in its multi-year effort to make sure that the very senior water rights continue to ensure water flows downstream. It’s complicated, of course.

“These things take money. The federal government has helped build the water structure that made this modern American West possible. It is their responsibility to be a reliable partner with us, adapting that infrastructure and those institutions to the 21st century. They need to stay with us for capital and capital improvements.”

Romero wrapped up his speech with this observation: “Our hardest moments are often when we find our common ground.” That means, he said, “creating solutions that last beyond the next drought, the next negotiations, or the next administration, but for generations to come.”

Sounds good – but where does additional storage make sense that allows communities to breathe?

As for forest resilience, it sounds good — but what exactly is being proposed? Most environmental organizations seem to support Proposition 137, as do Denver Water and Northern Water. Western Resource Advocates and other environmental organizations are pushing it.

I still have major questions about the mechanics even after sitting through an hour-long press conference on Monday morning. Sometimes I can be fuzzy in my thinking, but in this case I think there’s some fuzziness about what is being proposed.

Colorado Rivers. Credit: Geology.com

The #ColoradoRiver District concerned legal tools for #conservation program could favor some regions over others: — Heather Sackett (AspenJournalism.org) #CWCSC2026 #COriver #aridification

This ditch in the Uncompahgre Valley Water Users Association flows past an unplanted field. The River District is concerned that legal tools the state plans to use for its new conservation program could favor certain regions, like the Uncompahgre Valley. CREDIT: HEATHER SACKETT/ASPEN JOURNALISM

Click the link to read the article on the Aspen Journalism website (Heather Sackett):

August 28, 2026

Colorado could most easily wring water from Grand, Uncompahgre, Upper Gunnison valleys

Western Slope water managers are raising concerns that the legal tools used under Colorado’s new conservation program could cause negative impacts to local communities and the state’s agricultural industry.

In a letter to the state water board, the Glenwood Springs-based Colorado River Water Conservation District said it is concerned that the legal mechanisms state officials plan to use to move conserved water into downstream reservoirs may mean certain geographic areas are more likely to give up water. The River District also says the program’s framework should be set by lawmakers – with a significant stakeholder process – during the 2027 session, instead of by the Colorado Water Conservation Board and state Division of Water Resources officials.

At its July meeting, River District staff presented a map of the river basins in its 15-county region, showing which areas were most likely to participate in a conservation program. The Uncompahgre River basin; Dolores River basin; Colorado River in the Grand Valley; White River near Rangely; and Green River, Little Snake; and the Yampa in the Maybell/ Lily Park area were the most likely regions to see participation in a new state conservation program. 

“What it shows is the potential for the disparate impacts,” River District General Manager Andy Mueller said at the July board meeting. “And because it’s so easy to pay someone in the Grand Valley for a full [growing] season, that’s going to be the inclination. That’s the easy thing.”

In July, officials from the CWCB and Division of Water Resources unveiled what they are calling a “near-term contribution program,” designed to pay water users in the Upper Colorado River Basin (Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming) to voluntarily cut back for the next two years. The state of Colorado will run its own program, alongside similar programs in Utah and Wyoming, using $100 million in promised funding from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation.

“We have this federal funding available to us and to bring those funds into Colorado, we need to hit the ground running and start the application window,” Amy Ostdiek, interstate section chief at the CWCB, said in an interview with Aspen Journalism. “So we are looking at doing this with the tools we have available under the law as it exists today. And that’s just kind of the reality of the timing of it.”

Shepherding vs. existing authorities

One of the complications of setting up a contribution program are the legal tools used to move water saved upstream to either Lake Powell or Blue Mesa Reservoir, where the state can then get credit from Reclamation for the stored water. One of the criticisms of past pilot conservation programs was that the water was not tracked to Lake Powell nor measured to see how much ended up there.

State lawmakers would need to pass a law to ensure that conserved water is protected as it moves through the river system so that it reaches a specified downstream reservoir without being taken by other water users along the way, a process known as “shepherding.” State officials believe they have the legal authority to shepherd water across the state line only in the case of a call from the Lower Basin states (California, Arizona and Nevada). And so far, the Lower Basin has never placed a compact call. 

That means the most straightforward places to wring water from the state are the Grand Valley, the Uncompahgre Valley and the Upper Gunnison Valley. The irrigation districts of the Grand and Uncompahgre valleys are close to the state line and the Upper Gunnison Valley is just above Blue Mesa, so the majority of water conserved in these locations will get to where it needs to go without the state Division of Water Resources having to actively shepherd it. 

The River District has long warned that these types of programs, if not done carefully, could cause negative economic impacts by removing water from the Western Slope’s rural agricultural communities.

“Without shepherding, you end up with the potential that there are certain areas that are targeted and can produce water in this program and other areas that cannot,” Mueller said. “Therefore, you end up with these disproportionate impacts that we’ve been concerned about.”

Sonia Chavez is the general manager of the Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District, one of the areas that could be singled out. The 59,000 irrigated acres of agricultural land in the district produces mostly hay and is above the state’s largest reservoir, Blue Mesa, where state officials plan to store water conserved under the program.

“That has not been lost on us that we are the only community sitting above a federal reservoir in the state of Colorado,” Chavez said. 

State officials say they intend to use their “existing authorities” for this new program, without the change in state law needed to allow shepherding. But the precise definition of existing authorities is still unclear. Officials said it could include loans of conserved water to the state’s instream flow program or releasing water from Blue Mesa Reservoir at times of year when downstream users won’t pick it up, so the water is nearly guaranteed to get to the state line. 

The River District’s letter asks the CWCB for more clarity on the definition of existing authorities and how they would be used as part of a contribution program.

From left, Interstate Section Chief at the CWCB Amy Ostdiek, Colorado representative to the Upper Colorado River Commission Becky Mitchell and State Engineer Jason Ullmann, speak on a panel at Colorado Water Congress on August 20, 2026 in Steamboat Springs. State officials are rolling out a water conservation program that would pay water users to temporarily cut back. CREDIT: HEATHER SACKETT/ASPEN JOURNALISM

Lawmaker involvement

The creation of a conservation program for Colorado comes at a critical time for the basin, which remains locked in the grip of a historic drought, combined with a management crisis. With the seven states that share the river still unable to find agreement on a new framework after more than two years of failed negotiations, the federal government has stepped in with its own two-year operating plan. That plan, which was released last week and includes cuts to water use in the Lower Basin, immediately triggered a lawsuit from the state of Nevada. 

While the Lower Basin states are subject to mandatory cuts under the federal plan, the Upper Basin is not. But the four Upper Basin states have offered to voluntarily contribute 100,000 acre-feet of water over the next two years, when conditions allow, which would be set forth in a parallel agreement with Reclamation separate from the federal management plan. Colorado’s conservation program is an effort to make good on that promise.

“We’re in the post-2026 world, and I think that acting now and doing what we can with the authorities that we have shows Colorado’s commitment and demonstrates that we are at the table in a meaningful way,” Ostdiek said. “We think it’s important, for various reasons, to move forward with this now.”

In its letter, the River District also asks for the state to limit the criteria it uses to approve participation to a one-year, temporary program so lawmakers can use the 2027 session to use a stakeholder process to come up with a framework for a future program beginning in 2028. 

“The Colorado River District has long advocated that any government action that facilitates a Colorado River conserved consumptive use program inside the State of Colorado – or directs the Colorado State Engineer to shepherd conserved water to the state line, whether done under existing authorities or otherwise – must only be done through legislation enacted by the Colorado General Assembly,” the River District’s letter reads. 

At a June hearing of the state’s Water Resources and Agriculture Review Committee, lawmakers told state officials that the legislature should be involved in the creation of a conservation program.   

But putting the conservation issue – which remains controversial – before stakeholders and lawmakers hasn’t yielded results in the past. In 2023, a 17-member, state-wide drought task force, was supposed to make recommendations to lawmakers about what a conservation program should look like. The group could not agree and did not advance any recommendations on that topic, with some members saying a state conservation program was premature.

And at an August 2025 meeting of the Water Resources and Agricultural Review Committee, some Delta County ranchers asked lawmakers to consider a bill to allow shepherding during the 2026 session. They did not.

State officials held a workshop to get feedback about a water conservation program at Colorado Water Congress Aug. 19 in Steamboat Springs. Water users have for years expressed concerns about equity and protecting water rights in programs like this. CREDIT: HEATHER SACKETT/ASPEN JOURNALISM

CWCB taking feedback  

CWCB officials are currently taking comments and feedback on the contribution program. They held a well-attended workshop for water users on August 19, 2026 at Colorado Water Congress in Steamboat Springs. Attendees had many of the same lingering concerns that have been voiced for years, including how to protect water rights and how to encourage participation across the state. 

State officials plan to offer different amounts of compensation to participating water users to account for the difference in the value of relatively cheap water on the Western Slope versus more expensive water on the Front Range. So far, in previous pilot conservation programs, every participant has been a Western Slope water user. 

Western Slope agricultural water users have long said that if they don’t see comparable cuts being taken by Front Range municipalities, which collectively draw about 500,000 acre-feet from the headwaters of the Colorado River each year, that they won’t want to participate. They don’t want Front Range urban growth to be fueled by water cuts west of the Continental Divide.

At the workshop, Northern Water’s Director of Engineering Kyle Whitaker tried to put that fear to rest, saying the water provider, which supplies water to farms and communities on the Front Range like Fort Collins, Boulder and Longmont through its Colorado-Big Thompson project, would participate in future conservation programs.

“As transmountain diverters to the east, I only speak for Northern Water, and we will participate from here going forward,” Whitaker said. “We’ve been working on things to be a part of this for a number of years now, and those are finally in place.” 

The CWCB is set to consider the criteria for program participation at its September meeting.

Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

SNWA filing against #ColoradoRiver Record of Decision in District court this morning [August 24, 2026] #COriver #aridification — Ed Millard

The #ColoradoRiver Compact is a dead parrot — Karl Flessa (InkStain.net) #COriver #aridification

BBC image

Click the link to read the article on the InkStain website (Karl Flessa):

August 20, 2026

In the classic Monty Python sketch, a customer returns to the pet shop where, just 30 minutes ago, he purchased a parrot.  He complains that the parrot is dead.  The shopkeeper tries to convince the customer the parrot is only resting or is stunned. 

In the ensuing argument, the customer uses no fewer than eighteen euphemisms: “This parrot is definitely deceased…demised…passed on…no more…ceased to be…expired…gone to meet his maker…a stiff…bereft of life…rests in peace…pushing up the daisies…metabolic processes are now history…off the twig…kicked the bucket…shuffled off his mortal coil…run down the curtain…joined the bleedin’ choir invisible.”

Indeed, the parrot was nailed to its perch, already dead when the customer bought it.

The Compact and its subsequent agreements are as dead as that parrot.

  • The Compact is dead because it is founded on a false premise: a river that can produce the prescribed amount of water.
  • The Compact is dead because it is unjust: neither the Tribes nor nature participate in negotiations.
  • The Compact is dead because it doesn’t work.  The Basin States are locked in battle; the Federal government tinkers and dithers.

In the longer version of the sketch, the shopkeeper goes to the back in search of a live replacement, returning to report “…we’re right out of parrots.”

So are we. 

We need a new Compact. 

Proposals are not lacking: proportional allocations, Tribal standing, a whole-basin approach, adjustments based on actual flows, a basin authority, nature’s fair share, interstate trading… .

What’s lacking is the courage to change. [ed. emphasis mine]

The Compact is a dead parrot.

Delph Carpenter’s original map showing a reservoir at Glen Canyon and one at Black Canyon via Greg Hobbs

Feds release two-year #ColoradoRiver plan, #Nevada sues: Suit says plan could cause devastating environmental, socioeconomic, and health and human safety impacts — Jonathan P. Thompson (LandDesk.org)

A moisture index satellite image of Las Vegas, Nevada. Southern Nevada stands to lose as much as 71% of its Colorado River allotment under the Department of Interior’s operating guidelines for the river and its two largest reservoirs. Source: Copernicus Browser.

Click the link to read the article on The Land Desk website (Jonathan P. Thompson):

August 25, 2026

THE NEWS: The U.S. Interior Department on Friday handed down the operating guidelines for the Colorado River for the next two years, while also finalizing the 10-year decision framework that will guide these plans. And on Monday, Nevada filed a lawsuit challenging both the framework and operating plan, saying that potential shortages required by the plan could cause “cause devastating environmental, socioeconomic, and health and human safety impacts to southern Nevada and its citizens.”

THE CONTEXT: Interior, i.e. the Bureau of Reclamation, did two things. The first was to hand down a record of decision on the framework that will guide operating plans for the next decade, which I wrote about here, so I’ll skip the details this time.


Feds release Colorado River plan, and no one’s very happy about it — Jonathan P. Thompson


They also released a more specific plan for the 2027 and 2028 operating years. In the new plan, the feds affirm their commitment to “defending” minimum power pool in Lake Powell, or a reservoir surface elevation of 3,490 feet. When the water falls below this level, water can no longer be released via the penstocks and hydropower turbines, so it must all go through the lower river outlet works, which weren’t designed for sustained use.

Notably, Reclamation plans to do this by “initially seeking to maintain a minimum elevation of 3,510 feet. This provides an operational buffer and provides additional flexibility in recognition of the operational risks associated with sustained operations below elevation 3,490 feet … .”

The current elevation is 3,518 feet, meaning it could reach that upper buffer zone of 3,510 feet in October if current levels of decline continue.

To prevent it from falling any further, Reclamation would cut back releases from Glen Canyon Dam, which in turn would cut flows through the Grand Canyon and into Lake Mead, which would pull down Mead’s levels and trigger mandatory cuts for the Lower Basin users. Under the new operating plan so far, these cuts aren’t as onerous as many feared, and actually match up with what the Lower Basin had proposed to do voluntarily. The deets:

  • The Lower Basin would receive 6.25 million acre-feet from the Colorado River, or 1.25 MAF below the Colorado River Compact’s allotment of 7.5 MAF.
  • Arizona would receive 2.04 MAF; California 3.96 MAF; and Nevada 250,000 AF.
  • This means Arizona would take a 760,000 AF cut; Nevada a 50,000 AF cut; and California a 440,000 AF cut.

Arizona takes the largest cut by percentage and volume because the Central Arizona Project, which delivers most of the state’s Colorado River water, has junior water rights to other big users on the river.

But if reservoir levels continue to drop, then Reclamation could impose further cuts on the Lower Basin, potentially slashing Nevada’s water deliveries by as much as 213,556 acre-feet, or about 71% of its total entitlement of 300,000 acre-feet. This would be truly disastrous for the Las Vegas metro area, which relies on the Colorado River for about 90% of its water. And it’s not like there are a bunch of alfalfa fields the city could “buy and dry” for the water rights.

The Southern Nevada Water Authority has managed to cut overall water consumptionover the last three decades, even as the population has soared, through system-wide efficiencies, incentives, tearing up ornamental grass, water recycling, and extra fees for water gluttons. Las Vegas still has room to conserve, but as Western water scholar John Fleck put it, there “is an absurdity to a plan that would require Las Vegas to cut 71%. That’s existential.”

Even more astonishing than the fact that the federal government is considering virtually drying up one of the Southwest’s major metropolises is their justification for doing so: To protect Glen Canyon Dam and keep it producing hydropower, even at greatly diminished levels, and — though it’s not stated — to keep lake-based recreation somewhat viable.


Glen Canyon Dam hydropower: What’s it good for? — Jonathan P. Thompson


You have to remember that when the feds vow to defend the 3,500-foot level at Lake Powell, and when they refuse to even consider re-engineering Glen Canyon Dam to allow for releases at lower levels, either by rebuilding the outlet tubes or tunneling a bypass around the dam, they are also saying they are going to trap more than 4 million acre-feet of water behind the dam that could otherwise flow downstream into the Grand Canyon and Lake Mead. That’s enough water to fill Nevada’s entire allotment for more than 13 years that, instead, will be sitting in the reservoir and slowly evaporating. 

Nevada’s lawsuit — which is against the federal government, not the Upper Basin states — alleges that the feds’ plan violates the Law of the River. It slams the plan for not explicitly calling for releasing more water from Upper Basin reservoirs to prop up Powell, does not require Upper Basin states to make any cuts, and fails to consider a long-term alternative or engineered solution alternative to address Glen Canyon’s infrastructure limitations. The plan also does not account for its potential impacts on hydropower production at Hoover Dam, which drops off steeply as reservoir levels decline (meaning that preserving power output at Glen Canyon could lead to a net reduction in combined output from the two dams).

Save the Colorado, a river advocacy group, came out in support of Nevada’s lawsuit in a written statement. “Las Vegas has one of the best water conservation programs in the entire U.S.,” said Gary Wockner, the group’s executive director. “Penalizing Las Vegas for water use is like penalizing an obese person who lost a lot of weight taking GLP1s.”


A Colorado River glossary and primer — Jonathan P. Thompson


🌵 Public Lands 🌲

Rough Times at the national parks these days. In Bryce Canyon, a sudden thunderstorm left visitors stranded on trails and requiring rescue, with two of them transported to a hospital for hypothermia. It also unleashed some serious flash flooding. In Zion National Park, a rockslide narrowly missed a shuttle bus and forced the closure of a portion of the Zion Canyon Scenic Drive. And in Canyonlands, officials were searching for a missing individual in Horseshoe Canyon, a remote area north of the park’s Maze district. Temperatures in the area were in the 90s. In Death Valley, a French tourist died after his car got stuck in the mud on a remote road in 116° F heat.

The video below shows flooding near Tropic, Utah, downstream from Bryce Canyon National Park. Source: Garfield County Sheriff.

In May, I wrote about how climate change and aridification and a shrinking Lake Powell were coming for the Bullfrog Marina, on the northwest side of the reservoir. The water was simply getting too low for the marina to remain viable, so they were planning on moving it across the reservoir to Halls Crossing Marina. 

At the time, it was not yet clear how lower water levels and the marina’s removal might affect visitation to the remote area. Now preliminary numbers are in:

  • 67,277: Total recreation visitors to the Bullfrog District of Glen Canyon National Recreation Area, January through July 2025
  • 44,206: Total recreation visitors to the Bullfrog District, January through July 2026.

That’s a decrease of over 23,000 visits, or a 34% drop. Even more dramatic is the drop in overnight stays in July, from over 47,000 in 2025 to just 17,000 in 2026. Then did folks make the long drive over to Halls Crossing, instead? It appears that some of them may have once the marina was moved, but overall this year visitation is also down on the northeast side of the reservoir.

  • 18,023: Total recreation visitors to the Halls Crossing District of Glen Canyon National Recreation Area, January through July 2025. 
  • 15,099: Total recreation visitors to the Halls Crossing District, January through July 2026.

That’s a decrease of 2,944 visits, or a 19% drop. This may not all be related directly to the dropping lake levels. Horseshoe Bend, which is in Glen Canyon National Recreation Area but downstream from the reservoir, has also seen a significant drop off in visitors this spring and summer. In a future dispatch I’ll take a closer look at tourism numbers in general to get a better sense of how widespread the declines are.


Climate change comes for a Lake Powell marina — Jonathan P. Thompson


And now for the images showing Bullfrog with the marina, and without. The first image is from August 2024, when the reservoir’s surface elevation was at about 3,580 feet. The marina was still there, and the boat ramps still made it all the way to the water. The second image is from August 2026, with a surface level of just over 3,518 feet. Look closely and you’ll see the marina is gone, and the ramps are high and dry.

Bullfrog Bay and Marina, August 2024. Source: Copernicus.
Bullfrog Bay and no marina, August 2026. Source: Copernicus.

#ColoradoRiver plan orders cuts in the Lower Basin, while relying on voluntary conservation upstream — Stephanie Daniel (KUNC.org) #COriver #aridification #CWCSC2026

Colorado River “Beginnings”. Photo: Brent Gardner-Smith/Aspen Journalism

Click the link to read the article on the KUNC website (Stephanie Daniel):

August 24, 2026

This story was produced by the Mountain West News Bureau, a collaboration between Boise State Public Radio, Wyoming Public Media, Nevada Public Radio, KUNR in Nevada, KUNC in Northern Colorado, KANW in New Mexico, Colorado Public Radio and KJZZ in Arizona as well as NPR, with support from affiliate newsrooms across the region. Funding for the Mountain West News Bureau is provided in part by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and Eric and Wendy Schmidt.

Three states are being required to cut their water use under a final plan for managing the Colorado River over the next two years, while the four upstream states are being asked to voluntarily conserve water.

The U.S. Department of the Interior released the Record of Decision for managing the river over the next decade and laying out more specific rules for the next two years. The plan is intended to protect Lake Powell and Lake Mead, which have fallen to historically low levels after years of drought.

Arizona, California and Nevada will have to collectively reduce their water use by 1.25 million acre-feet per year over the next two years, with additional restrictions possible if conditions worsen, according to the plan.

Nevada was the first state to sue the Interior Department over the plan Monday, asking a court to block it.

Colorado, Utah, New Mexico and Wyoming are not subject to mandatory reductions; instead, those states are setting up programs to voluntarily conserve water.

“Under the proposed plan issued by the Department of the Interior, southern Nevada could lose more than 70 percent of its already meager Colorado River allocation while the Upper Basin states of Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Wyoming are not required to contribute a drop,” Nevada Governor Joe Lombardo said in a news release on Monday.

Upper Basin officials say their water users already face reductions when drought leaves less water available and that the federal government doesn’t have authority to impose mandatory cuts in their states. But they say the Upper Basin is willing to contribute voluntarily.

“Not because we have to, or that we feel like we legally have to,” Colorado’s river negotiator Becky Mitchell said at a conference last week in Steamboat Springs, “but because the importance of this system and the survival of this system is a responsibility for everyone.”

The federal framework envisions up to 200,000 acre-feet of water per year in Upper Basin contributions when conditions allow. The federal government is dedicating $100 million to the Upper Basin to compensate farmers, cities or other water users to use less. Colorado, Wyoming and Utah are also setting up their own state programs to facilitate participation.

Colorado officials expect applications could open this fall and projects could start next year.

“Our position has been and continues to be that we’re going to be part of the solution,” said Amy Ostdiek, section chief for the Colorado Water Conservation Board at the Steamboat conference. “We’re going to do it in the ways that we can, at the times that we can, but we can’t provide water certainty for our neighbors downstream that we don’t have ourselves.”

Criteria for selecting projects, how water users will be compensated and how the Upper Basin gains credit for conserved water are still being worked out.

The Green River flows beneath the Flaming Gorge Dam in Utah. The federal government is sending water from the reservoir to prop up Lake Powell, something it could do in future dry years under a plan to manage the Colorado River. Ted Wood/The Water Desk

The federal plan also creates a potential “conservation pool” in Lake Powell, allowing the Upper Basin states to store a certain amount of conserved water.

John Berggren, a water policy analyst with the nonprofit Western Resource Advocates, has advocated for a conservation pool and said its inclusion in the federal framework is promising. However, exactly how it would work is not clear.

“How that pool operates, how the water is used, when it’s moved, if it’s moved, who decides that – all that is going to depend on future agreements,” he said.

Some key questions, he said, have to do with what the conserved water is credited towards, such as whether it’s used to offset shortages in the Lower Basin or help the Upper Basin fulfill their legal obligations to deliver water downstream.

The new framework also allows the Upper Basin to come to an agreement with the Interior Department to draw down a few reservoirs when Lake Powell nears getting too low for hydropower. That started happening this year, with water released from Flaming Gorge Reservoir in Wyoming.

ten tribes
Graphic via Holly McClelland/High Country News.

Romancing the River: Bankruptcy in the Slough of Despond — George Sibley (SibleysRivers.com) #ColoradoRiver #COriver #aridification

A simple illustration of water income and water expenses in a human–water system. Water bankruptcy is the outcome of both insolvency and irreversibility conditions, i.e., when water use (expenditure) exceeds water supply (renewable and non-renewable assets) for an extended period resulting in irreparable damages to the underlying natural capital that contributes to water production and stability of the hydrological cycle.

Click the link to read the article on the Sibley’s Rivers website (George Sibley):

August 25, 2026

You may remember my mention in early February of a research paper from scientists at the United Nation University Institute of Water, Environment and Health, titled Global Water Bankruptcy: Living Beyond our Hydrological Means in the Post-Crisis Era. The report begins:

Types of ground subsidence. Graphic credit: By Mpetty1 – Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=14698311

‘Amid chronic groundwater depletion, water overallocation, land and soil degradation, deforestation, and pollution, all compounded by global heating, a UN report today declared the dawn of an era of global water bankruptcy, inviting world leaders to facilitate honest, science-based adaptation to a new reality.’

Our Colorado River made their list of exemplary global ‘hot spots’ for bankruptcy, with the observation that ‘the Colorado River and its reservoirs have become symbols of over-promised water.’

Udall/Overpeck 4-panel Figure Colorado River temperature/precipitation/natural flows with trend. Lake Mead and Lake Powell storage. Updated through Water Year 2025. Note the tiny points on the annual data so that you can flyspeck the individual years. Credit: Brad Udall

You’ve seen the word ‘crisis’ used frequently this year in the countless morbid articles about the Colorado River. But the UNU Institute director Kaveh Madani argued that we are now ‘post-crisis’: the term ‘crisis’ implies a deviation from the normal, a disruption to be dealt with in order to get back to normal, but there is now, Madani says, no going back to what passed for ‘normal’ in the last century. [ed. emphasis mine]

The study indicates that we have drained too many aquifers, resulting in subsidence that destroys the aquifers for the rest of the geological age; we have lost high-storage wetlands to gullying and lowered water tables; we have spread too much surface water out to dry under an atmosphere heating up incrementally with every additional gallon of fossil fuel we burn; desertification spreads in our wake; et cetera, et cetera. As a result:

The report makes the case for a fundamental shift in the global water agenda—from repeatedly reacting to emergencies to “bankruptcy management.” That means confronting overshoot with transparent water accounting, enforceable limits, and protection of the water-related natural capital that produces and stores water—aquifers, wetlands, soils, rivers, and glaciers—while ensuring transitions are explicitly equity-oriented and protect vulnerable communities and livelihoods.

There is in this research paper the kind of lovely naivete that one finds in most of the analyses of Big Issues today (climate change, systemic racism, corporate personhood versus people, etc.); there is an underlying conviction that when the facts are all laid out, we will rationally accept that, yes, we are indeed in a bankrupt situation. And so we will all sit down together, like rational beings would, and work out ways to resolve the ‘reality deficit’ between what has been promised and what can be delivered.

The Slough of Despond, illustrated by Rachael Robinson Elmer, 1913. By James BaldwinArtist Rachael Robinson Elmer – https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Page:John_Bunyan%27s_Dream_Story.djvu/26, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=90455937

This ignores the fact that, when we are first confronted with evidence of something so big in its threat to our way of life, that its correction might require creating a whole new way of life, our first response is to say, ‘this can’t be so.’ There has to be a mistake. And a long winding road leads on, into and through a morass of denial, anger, blames cast, responsibilities denied, hopeful negotiations and underlying despair – the whole medieval pilgrim’s Slough of Despond that must be negotiated before we might actually sit down together and work out some way of resolving the ‘reality deficit.’

There is, however, a kind of honesty in coming around to realizing – and acknowledging – that a system might be bankrupt. Bankruptcy is not necessarily the end song of what has become bankrupt, although it can be (Chapter 7 bankruptcy).  It can instead be a time of operational or financial reorganization, aa time for acknowledging circumstances, conditions and misconceptions not originally taken into account that, accounted for, might enable a measure of eventual recovery and even success.

The seven Colorado River Basin states, still stuck in the zomboid Colorado River Compact, are not there yet, but the Bureau of Reclamation might be getting there. On the viable assumption that the seven states will not come up with a last-minute plan before the end of September and expiration of the Interim and Interim Interim Guidelines, they are preparing to institute a temporary plan that will maintain functionality in the river storage and delivery system, with (they hope) no embarrassing ‘dead pool’ episodes – which basically means getting and keeping as much water as possible in the two big reservoirs, Mead and Powell, and that can only happen at considerable cost to users below the big reservoirs.

The Bureau plan will not be carved in stone for forever like the Colorado River Compact; the Bureau will basically be planning operations for two-year periods, through the coming decade; every two years, the parties of interest will reconvene to review and revise the operating plan as circumstances require. This ‘adaptive’ approach makes sense in a bankruptcy situation in which the future is mostly unknown. [ed. emphasis mine]

The plan really has no surprises for anyone who remembers the 2022 bolt of reality that caused Bureau Commissioner Camille Touton to tell the water leaders in the seven states to immediately plan to voluntarily cut 2-4 million acre-feet (maf) of water use – basically a quarter of river use at that time – or the Interior Department would do it for them. That – in the centennial year of the Compact – is probably a good marker for the Bureau’s acknowledgement that we were beyond crisis, and slipping into bankruptcy.

The structural deficit refers to the consumption by Lower Basin states of more water than enters Lake Mead each year. The deficit, which includes losses from evaporation, is estimated at 1.2 million acre-feet a year. (Image: Central Arizona Project circa 2019)

That 2022 siren call was met by the Lower Basin states agreeing to finally take the Lower Basin system losses (evaporation, etc.) and their half of the Mexican obligation out of their river-use shares rather than out of Mead storage until the 2027 water year – provided they would be paid to do so. The absence of ‘surplus flows’ to take care of those losses – ~1.25 maf – from the coming online of the Central Arizona Project was a principal source of the draining of the big reservoirs, the so-called ‘structural deficit,’ 30 maf of storage gifted to the Lower Basin.

(A side note on this: The Upper Basin states, since a 1970 Law-of-the-River agreement, have been regularly sending downstream their 750,000 acre-feet for the Mexican obligation and absorbing as part of their whatever’s-left-over share of the river the ~400,000 acre-feet of Upper Basin system losses. The four states have never asked for or been paid for doing that.)

But that 1.25 maf of voluntary shortages was only a large fraction of the 2-4 maf of cuts the Bureau said needed to happen. So the Bureau’s original 2027-28 plan announcement in late July included cuts of up to 40 percent for the states below Mead Reservoir (Arizona, California and Nevada) – roughly equivalent to the 2022 request for 2-4 maf in cuts. The three downriver states countered that with an offer to permanently do the same 1.25 maf cut (with payment) for 2027-28 they were doing for 2025-26, with intimations of lawsuits if the Bureau pushed too far beyond that.

Arizona has led the countercharge from the states below Mead Reservoir – being the state with the most to lose, since the junior status of the Central Arizona Project means it would be practically shut down by 40 percent cuts in usage.

A letter to the Interior Department from Tom Buschatzky, Arizona’s Director of Water Resources, castigated the Bureau plan for making no mention of the Colorado River Compact and the Law of the River (LOTR). The letter insisted that Article III(c) and (d) of the Compact be executed to the letter as stated in the LOTR 1970 agreement: that a minimum of 8.23 maf be released from Powell Reservoir every year – the Compact commitment of 7.5 maf per year on average passing Lee Ferry, plus the Upper Basin’s share of the Mexican obligation (750,000 af/year).

In their August 21 announcement of the more detailed plan for 2027-28, the Bureau backed down from the 40 percent number, and now wants a 20 percent reduction in use for the two years – more in line with the Lower Basin’s willingness to continue taking care of its own system losses and Mexican share, but requiring some additional cuts – and avoided discussion of the Compact issue raised. It will, however, probably be pushing for more cuts in the 2028 discussions for the 2029-30 plan renewal; the Bureau still feels that it needs at least 3 maf in permanent cuts to begin any hope of turning the current near-bankruptcy around, and bringing demand in line with at least current supply.

The Bureau would also like the seven states to be reviewing, revising and executing the two-year plans consensually by 2036, rather than imposing it on them. But Arizona, according to the Buschatzky letter, wants a ‘longer, more comprehensive’ plan from the states, consistent with the LOTR, and ‘does not accept a framework that gives the federal government the discretion to select from a wide range of alternatives—including catastrophic cuts to the Lower Basin—every two years for the next decade.’

‘Bankruptcy management’ would seem to argue that the Colorado River Compact should be on the table along with everything else – including the nonexistence of the 18 maf river for which the Compact was written. A detailed analysis of the current situation by the ‘River Elders’ – the Kuhn-Schmidt-Castle group – suggested that ‘Basin water users must focus on solutions to the fundamental, wet-water math problem, rather than legal arguments over paper water.’ [ed. emphasis mine]

Nonetheless, Buschatzke’s letter states that ‘Arizona reserves the right to seek the resolution of its Compact rights in an appropriate judicial forum.’ The states are not yet willing to acknowledge the bankruptcy of the Compact – a Humpty-Dumpty that not all the patches and bandaids of the Law of the River can put back together for an ever-shrinking 21st century Colorado River.

That, more or less, is where the river system’s future sits as of August 21. There will – thanks to the Bureau – be a plan for moving carefully into the future, a two-year step at  time. A big question is how hard the Bureau will begin to push for the 3-4 maf in permanent cuts by users necessary to stop the march into real dead-pool bankruptcy of the system – leading to another big question: whether the Compact nostalgitarians will push the system into dead-pool bankruptcy by suing the Bureau/Interior Department over paper water, tying things up in court for another several years.

Chestnut-backed Chickadee (Poecile rufescens). By Nigel – https://www.flickr.com/photos/11652987@N03/51012511770/, CC BY 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=104161465

Ah, the lovely Slough of Despond. There with Henry: ‘All day the sun has shone on the surface of some savage swamp, where the single spruce stands hung with usnea lichens, and small hawks circulate above, and the chickadee lisps among the evergreens, and the partridge and rabbit skulk beneath; but now a more dismal and fitting day dawns, and a different race of creatures awakes to express the meaning of Nature there….’ Bankruptcy, the Apocalypse – only the end for those who fail to see that something else is always struggling for a chance to be born; don’t put a period where God (or Nature) would put a comma (Gracie Allen). As Henry also observed, ‘The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us. Only that day dawns to which we are awake….’

Next post, I want to go back to the ‘desert river’ concept to think a little outside the (Compact) box.

Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

Statement on Reclamation’s Record of Decision & Operational Guidelines for Future #ColoradoRiver Operations — #Arizona Department of Water Resources #COriver #aridification

Arizona Rivers Map via Geology.com.

Click the link to read the release on the ADWR website:

August 21, 2026

After more than three years of difficult negotiations over post-2026 Colorado River Operations guidelines, Arizona and the Lower Basin states have created a level of stability for the Colorado River system with the adoption of the 2027-2028 operating guidelines in the Record of Decision. While the framework for years 3-10 continues to be of concern, we applaud the Department of the Interior for clarifying the decision-making process for operations beyond 2028.  That outcome allows for continued negotiations for years 3-10 while preserving our ability to protect Arizona’s legal rights to Colorado River water. 

We will continue to work with our partners in Arizona, the Lower Basin and Interior, to finalize the agreements necessary to implement the Lower Basin Plan. With the Record of Decision, the 2027-2028 Operating Guidelines and the supporting agreements in place, we can focus on a longer-term, equitable, basin-wide outcome that includes shared sacrifices along with our Upper Basin partners in an effort to avoid protracted litigation. The actions in the Lower Basin in recent decades to protect the system have demonstrated how much we can accomplish when we all join together as part of the solution. – Tom Buschatzke, Director of the Arizona Department of Water Resources

Tom Buschatzke. Photo credit: Arizona Department of Water Resources

‘Devastating’ cuts: Nevada is first state to file suit over Colorado River plan — Las Vegas Review-Journal #ColoradoRiver #COriver #aridification

Colorado River negotiators are seen at the 2025 Colorado River Water Users Association Annual Conference. From left to right: Becky Mitchell (Colorado), Tom Buschatzke (Arizona), Brandon Gebhart (Wyoming), and John Entsminger (Nevada). (Photo by Jeniffer Solis/Nevada Current)

Click the link to read the article on the Las Vegas Review Journal website (Alan Halaly). Here’s an excerpt:

August 24, 2026

Nevada officials filed a federal lawsuit challenging the Trump administration’s order for cuts in water use Monday, marking a major escalation of tensions between the seven states that share the Colorado River. The complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court of Nevada, asserts that the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s operating plan unlawfully authorizes the federal government to reduce the state’s allocation of the river by up to 71 percent annually sometime over the next 10 years. Such a cut would slash the state’s share of 300,000 acre-feet down to 86,444 acre-feet. Nevada’s use, after cashing in water recycling credits with its state-of-the-art system, came in at 198,000 acre-feet last year.

“There are four states upstream of us that are facing zero mandatory reductions,” said John Entsminger, general manager of the Southern Nevada Water Authority, in a Monday interview. “That is not going to balance the system. This is a system-wide problem. It requires system-wide solutions.”

Lawyers for the Colorado River Commission of Nevada, the water authority and the state as a whole requested an injunction to halt implementation until federal documents can reflect the toll water cuts would have on Southern Nevada’s $180 billion economy.

“This shortfall will cause devastating environmental, socioeconomic, and health and human safety impacts to southern Nevada and its citizens,” attorneys wrote. “Federal Defendants failed to consider such impacts in any meaningful way.”

While 2027 and 2028 will see allocation cuts that the Lower Basin states of Nevada, California and Arizona have already agreed to, the years 2029 to 2036 could bring much harsher reductions. Entsminger said he felt it was important for Nevada to have its own representation on the issue, but he added he would be surprised if California and Arizona don’t sign on to the lawsuit, considering officials remain aligned in their positions. No mandatory cuts will be imposed on the Upper Basin states of Colorado, Utah, New Mexico and Wyoming. Entsminger submitted a letter to all six Colorado River basin states Monday, saying the state’s decision to sue wasn’t made lightly but that “hiding from reasonable legal interpretations in order to defer hard political decisions helps no one over the long term and further endangers our shared resource.”

Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

Rare optimism about the #ColoradoRiver: Brad Udall says the seven basin states have “blundered” their way into a situation that may produce better sharing of the diminished waters — Allen Best (BigPivots.com) #COriver #aridification

Brad Udall. Photo credit: Allen Best/Big Pivots

Click the link to read the article on the Big Pivots website (Allen Best):

August 24, 2026

Brad Udall is known far and wide as a prophet of doom about the Colorado River. So why the optimism provoked by last week’s federal marching orders?

“I think we can solve this. I really do,” Udall said in a lecture delivered in Boulder on Aug. 21.

Earlier that same day, the Department of Interior had issued its record of decision about how it would manage the key dams and hence the river during the two water years beginning in October. This came after Colorado and the six other basin states had failed during two years of negotiations to agree about how to share diminished river flows.

As even schoolboys in Kentucky likely know, the Colorado River has encountered severe problems since 2000. Flows in the river are down 20% and continuing to decline in direct proportion to rising temperatures. The two big reservoirs, Mead and Powell, have declined 75% in stored water.

The lower-basin states, which get their water from these two big reservoirs, had already cut their use significantly. The Department of Interior has ordered the three states to expect 1.25 million acre-feet less water from Mead during the next two years. It also expects the three states to figure out how to store 700,000 acre-feet over the next two years. Colorado and other upper basin states cannot expand water use.

Agriculture users, said Udall, will bear the brunt of these cutbacks. Municipal users — all the cities from Colorado’s Front Range to southern California get water from the river and its tributaries — will have to chip in with water savings. Infrastructure limitations of the two big dams, Hoover and Glen Canyon, when holding little water need to be resolved. For example, penstocks [river outlet tubes] on the two big dams were never designed for day-in, day-out use, as may be necessary with reduced amounts of water. And as for the hydroelectric production? Yes, it’s a small amount but important. It provides backup power.

The process created by the Interior Department — the Bureau of Reclamation is the key agency within Interior — requires new plans every two years for the next decade. Udall sees merit in this approach.

“When the negotiations started, the idea was that we’re going to get a 20-year plan. We got five two-year plans, which you might see as a setback, but I think we might have blundered into something actually useful, because it potentially is true adaptive management, where people get to pay attention repeatedly as this evolves.” [ed. emphasis mine]

Udall also sees strong dynamics producing solutions.

“I think we’re going to see a solution because the people who are involved in the negotiations are hard-working. They’re knowledgeable. They’re intelligent. They have super good relationships with each other. And they know that the chips are down. If they don’t solve it, the solution Mother Nature provides will be downright ugly. I think we will solve this. I actually do.”

When the breakthroughs will occur, Udall said he didn’t know. And he hedged his confidence with caution. “I won’t put bets on this.”

What is clear, though, is that Arizona will be key to solving the conundrum of 21st century flows being far less than 20th century expectations. The river in the last century average 15.2 million acre-feet. Even when it carried healthy volumes of water, though, the river had ceased to reach an embayment of the Pacific Ocean. Flows this century have declined and, since 2020, remarkably so: to an average of just 10 million acre-feet.

Flows will almost certainly decline further. Accumulating greenhouse gas emissions guarantee continued warming, producing reduced flows.

“Western water law is enormously complicated and really inhibits solutions,” he said. “We’ve made a whole bunch of policy mistakes through time, including permanent allocations, assuming way too much water, and enforcing or legalizing really unrealistic policies.”

Whether the framework created by the federal government for finding solutions will work, he said, will depend upon hydrology. In some circles optimism remains that the strong El Niño this year will produce improved precipitation and hence greater flows. And maybe it will, said Udall, but the record on flows during El Nino years has been all over the scattergram. A few very big years — 1983 and 1998 stand out — yes. But some real duds, too. In other words, this coming winter could conceivably be as bad as the past winter. Or, if not as bad, then will continue the downhill slide.

Now rewriting the rules

Udall also made the point that prior agreements were incremental in nature, unlike what the new federal rules represent.

“The rules in 2007 and 2019 were really hard fought, but they were incremental. They were truly incremental. What we’re looking at right now, it’s not incremental. It’s a complete rethink,” he said.

“I think people mistakenly thought that, given the successes in 2007, 2019, we would just kind of waltz our way to new rules. And I think that’s the wrong way to think about what’s going on. This is a really a different deal in 2026.”

This new paradigm imposed by the federal government, Udall went on to say, is the “first global instance where climate change is forcing a complete redo of water management. I think I can make a pretty good case for that.”

Udall/Overpeck 4-panel Figure Colorado River temperature/precipitation/natural flows with trend. Lake Mead and Lake Powell storage. Updated through Water Year 2025. Note the tiny points on the annual data so that you can flyspeck the individual years. Credit: Brad Udall

Udall has become well known at water meetings in Colorado and beyond, particularly during the last decade, in warning that communities and economic sectors dependent upon the Colorado River were headed for trouble. Climate change is water change, he began saying more than 20 years ago. And in 2014, he conducted research along with another scholar, Jonathan Overpeck, that showed the strong correlation between rising temperatures and reduced flows in the river. That science, he said, has strengthened.

Although living in Boulder, Udall in recent years has been affiliated with Colorado State University’s Colorado Water Center. There, he wears the title of senior water and climate research scientist/scholar.

However, Udall is also understood in terms of his family tree. He is a descendant of John D. Lee, the Mormon settler for whom Lee Ferry (also called Lees Ferry) is named. Located in Arizona, near the Utah border, it divides the Colorado River’s upper and lower basins.

Don’t make too much of being a John D. Lee descendant, he said. “He had 21 wives that we know of, and some have suggested he has 800,000 descendants. That might actually be part of the problem with the Colorado River.”

Ken Sleight the original Monkey Wrencher photo via Salon

As for his personal familiarity with the river, Udall divulged that he has rafted the Grand Canyon 45 times, at least some of those in the employ of Ken Sleight, best understood by readers of Edward Abbey’s “Monkey Wrench Gang” as the model for Seldom Seen Smith.

Arizona’s role

In Udall’s view, Arizona is central to solving this 21st century problem. The Central Arizona Project will “see a whole lot less water, but it’s not going to zero. I don’t know quite how that gets revolved, but that’s just so clear,” he said.

The Central Arizona Project delivers water from the Colorado River through 336 miles of canal to metropolitan Phoenix and ultimately Tucson, with farms along the way. It was authorized by Congress in 1968 and completed in 1993. Both his father, Morris, and his uncle, Stewart, were key figures in this. It can deliver 1.6 million acre-feet, the majority of the 2.8 million acre-feet that Arizona was scheduled to receive from the Colorado River under a 1964 court ruling.

As Udall pointed out, farms that got water from the project have received far less since cutbacks began in 2020. And now, more cuts for the farms — and cities — will be coming.

Given an hour for his presentation, far longer than his usual 20- or 30-minute slots, Udall had time to sketch some history, even taking time to define the universal way of measuring water quantities in the basin, the acre-foot.

“The reason that an acre-foot is used is farmers farm in terms of an acre,” he explained. “In the upper basin, you might put a foot or two feet of water on top of an acre to get a hay crop out. In the lower basin, near the Mexico border, you might put 10 feet of water on top of an irrigated field to get 10 different cuttings of alfalfa.”

Credit: The Land Desk
Thoughts about hay

Alfalfa came up in the Q&A. The question, in not so many words, was how to cut back water used to feed livestock. After all, agriculture uses about 75% of the water (after evaporation) in the Colorado River, and alfalfa and other feedstocks comprise a large portion of that. A full hour could have been devoted to that question — and likely left topics on the table. The tension inherent in this topic is revealed in how the Family Farm Alliance describes this push replace animal forage to crop switching: “crop shaming.”

“It’s easy to hate on alfalfa because people don’t eat it, but we kind of do, right? Dairy, ice cream, beef cattle. And the idea that you’re going to tell farmers not to grow alfalfa, which turns out to be a pretty good crop for them in their rotation, probably isn’t going to work very well. You’re probably far better off to say, ‘Hey, here’s your reduced allocation. You use it as you want,’” responded Udall

“I think most people in this room don’t care about corn. We very much care about alfalfa, and its water use, but I’m not sure trying to prohibit farmers from using a crop that’s key in their rotation and actually has some kind of interesting benefits is a suitable way to get there. “

Udall also mentioned the difficulties of crop switching.

“It’s been suggested that ag shift to higher value products that use less water. One way to do that is only grow stuff in the winter because growing in Yuma (Arizona) and Imperial (Valley) in midsummer is not a great idea. But when you ask a farmer to shift produce or products, you ask them to change marketing, you ask them to (change) labor, transportation, storage, equipment, knowledge. You ask them to change a lot of things, and arguably there’s a need to help this transition happen.”

This discussion, he concluded, is one that needs to be had but is very complicated. “It really is going to take a deep dive to figure out how to deal with this.”

You will be able to soon hear what Udall had to say (and see the slides he shared) at the Getches-Wilkinson Center’s site. The history lessons alone make it worth an hour.

A few other snippets:

• “The lower basin wants some contribution from the upper basin (in reducing use) maybe 5% or maybe 2%, but some kind of skin (in the game). And the upper Basin says no way. Until recently, the upper basin wanted to reserve the right to increase its use.”

• Our (Colorado delegate to the Upper Colorado River Commission) Becky Mitchell has recently been saying, you know, none of this gets us any extra water. And we need to move beyond this, and I applaud Becky for saying that.”

• Udall told a fascinating story about the Central Arizona Project. At the time the proposal for federal funding was before Congress, the Upper Colorado River Commission paid a Denver-based engineer to examine the numbers. That engineer’s conclusion: There’s not enough water for the Arizona project once the upper basin uses its full allocation (as defined in the Colorado River Compact of 1922). The number was 1.2 million acre-feet a year. And the two big reservoirs, Mead and Powell, have been losing 1.25 million acre-feet a year.

Map of the Columbia River watershed with the Columbia River highlighted. By Kmusser – self-made, based on USGS and Digital Chart of the World data., CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=3844725

• The idea in 1968, said Udall, was that the federal government was going to figure out how to augment flows of the Colorado River. One of the ideas was to export water from the Snake River in Wyoming’s Jackson Hole to the Green River and hence the Colorado. Washington Sen. Henry “Scoop” Jackson and other members of Congress from the Pacific Northwest objected. And the augmentation that was part of the thinking never has happened.

Green River Basin

• On the first-in-time, first-in-right premise of Western water law. “You know, first-in-time, first-in-rank gets reinvented by 4-year-olds every day of the year throughout the world. I was here first; it’s mine. And most parents step in and say you’re going to share, right: But not Western water law. It was completely understandable in the 1800s, where you had a few users. But it’s really not so great in modern society. …

“You can’t have a case where 1,500 famers deprive 5 million people in Phoenix or 2 million people in the Front Range of water, of what I’ll call critical human water needs. It just isn’t going to work politically. Shared sacrifice would be a whole lot better way to deal with this.”

It’s pretty hard to cut back water use under Western water law, because if one user decides not to take water, the next user downstream can grab it. “If we’re trying to get water to Lake Powell, you have to rethink how this gets done.”

Colorado statewide annual temperature anomaly (°F) with respect to the 1901-2000 average. Graphic credit: Colorado Climate Center

• Temperatures have increased 3 degrees Fahrenheit since 1979. “Not a single year after 2000 is below the 20th century average,” he said of the Colorado River Basin. “Increased temps lead to increased evaporation. We think you can lose up to 5% flow (of water) per degree rise.”

Temperature increases have produced up to 15% increase in losses due to evaporation.

• As for precipitation, the last 27 years have been the worst 27 years since record-keeping began in 1895. The declines worsened beginning in around 2015.

A 1% decline in precipitation leads to a 2% decline in flows.

• As for Udall writing a book, as one audience member suggested, he said other authors have covered much of the same ground, even if he has a somewhat different angle. “I don’t know. I need an assistant!”

Brad Udall is pictured at Boulder Reservoir, which helps deliver water from the Upper Colorado River to the Front Range. Photo: Vance Jacobs/Colorado State University

President Trump attacks the Roadless Rule, again, Plus: Hoback Report on the Traffic Apocalypse — Jonathan P. Thompson (LandDesk.org)

Click the link to read the article on The Land Desk website (Jonathan P. Thompson):

August 21, 2026

🌵 Public Lands 🌲

Sometimes it feels like the deeper the Trump administration sinks into various quagmires of its own making, the more it lashes out at politically popular protections for public lands. Each passing day brings a new assault on the environment, the climate, and, well, humanity.

This time, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has moved (again) to rescind the Roadless Rule, which protects some 45 million acres of U.S. Forest Service land from new roadbuilding and logging. Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins predictably and baselessly claimed that the rule has hampered forest management and fire-fighting capabilities. This is untrue.

When the Bill Clinton administration implemented the Roadless Rule in 2001, it culminated a multi-decade effort to identify and set aside forest lands that hadn’t been disturbed by roads for possible designation as wilderness. At the time, management of inventoried roadless areas was carried out by individual Forest Service offices. The Roadless Rule put a nationwide prohibition on timber harvesting, road construction, and road reconstruction in inventoried roadless areas, with a number of exceptions. The intent was not only to conserve these relatively undisturbed areas, but also to save money: By 2001, the Forest Service’s existing road network was over 386,000 miles long, with an estimated $8.4 billion in deferred maintenance and reconstruction. Building more roads would just exacerbate that deficit.

While inventoried roadless areas have many of the same characteristics as wilderness areas, the Roadless Rule stops far short of offering wilderness-level protections, and expressly allows for motorized uses of existing roads, off-highway motorized use in specified areas, livestock grazing, and energy and mineral development.

So it’s hard to take Rollins seriously when she says the rule is hampering access for fire prevention and fighting efforts. In fact, the rule clearly allows for road-building to fight fires. It also allows for cutting, removing, and selling “generally small diameter timber” for various reasons, including “reducing the likelihood of uncharacteristic wildfire.”

In a Senate hearing this spring concerning Sen. Mike Lee’s (MAGA-UT) amendment aiming to repeal the Roadless rule, Sen. Alex Padilla, D-California, pointed out that 240,000 acres of inventoried roadless areas in his state alone had been treated for wildfire hazard mitigation treatment, showing the dubiousness of Lee’s (and now Rollins’) claims. And the Trump administration, for better or worse, has lagged on forest thinning: A Center for Western Priorities analysis found the Forest Service treated 35% less acreage in 2025 than it did under Biden in 2024. That suggests that vegetation management is being stifled not by regulations, but by a lack of resources — the Trump administration has slashed Forest Service staffing and budgets considerably since taking office.

In fact, the evidence suggests that the Roadless Rule has actually helped deter wildfires. A 2007 Pacific Biodiversity Institute study found that 88% of the nation’s wildfires are sparked by humans, and 95% of human-ignited blazes occur within a half-mile from a road. Roads act like syringes, injecting humanity — along with their errant cigarette butts, untended campfires or grills, sparks from machinery or hot catalytic converters — further into the backcountry than they would go by trail.

The Roadless Rule originally applied to almost 60 million acres, but in the years following its implementation, it was bandied about by presidential administrations and the courts. In 2005, the George W. Bush White House revoked the rule and replaced it with the alternate roadless rule, which allowed states to petition the Forest Service to create their own standards; Colorado and Idaho chose to do so. When the Tenth Circuit court later reinstated the 2001 rule, the 2005 rule was nullified, but Idaho and Colorado’s rules remained in effect. As a result the administration’s proposed repeal would not affect Colorado and Idaho’s plans.

The rule and its moderate protections for habitat, wildlife, forests, and watersheds have proven deeply popular across a wide demographic swath of the public. Last June, Rollins moved to repeal the Roadless Rule for the first time, resulting in intense backlash not only from environmentalists, but also from the more conservative-leaning hook and bullet crowd and general public, which barraged the department with comments supporting the rule. It’s worth noting that even Project 2025, the ultra-right-wing “blueprint” for the Trump administration, called for repealing only the portion of the Roadless Rule that pertained to Alaska’s Tongass National Forest. This spring, when Lee tacked a Roadless Rule-repealing amendment onto bipartisan wildfire legislation, he annihilated the cross-aisle support for the larger bill, effectively ruining its chances of passing.

Now the public has a chance to weigh in once again. The USDA is accepting comments until Sept. 21, so go here and say your piece.

⛈️ Wacky Weather Watch⚡️

The summer of nightmare heat continues as yet another heat dome settles over parts of the West. Parts of southern California, Las Vegas, Phoenix, and most areas in-between are under heat watches or extreme heat warnings for the next several days. There is also a chance of thunderstorms, which may bring a bit of relief, but if the summer so far is any indication, they’re just as likely to bring catastrophic flash flooding, damaging winds, fire-starting lightning, and huge dust storms, a.k.a. haboobs.

🛢️ Hydrocarbon Hoedown 📈

I know that many of you have been hating on data centers lately, especially the ones used to process all that AI slop so that billionaires can become trillionaires (through some process that defies all logic). But please, I beg you, save some of your disdain for the oil and gas companies, too! After all, they are using the data center energy-use scare to justify drilling for natural gas to power the damned things. Not only that, but every day that our president screws up negotiations to end his war on Iran is another day that the Strait of Hormuz remains closed to oil tankers, another day of rising oil prices, and another day of record-high profits for petro-corporations, their executives, and their shareholders. 

For example: ExxonMobil reported adjusted earnings of $23.5 billion for the first half of 2026; Chevron’s adjusted earnings were $14.7 billion; Valero raked in a $5.4 billionprofit … you get the picture. 

🗺️ Messing with Maps 🧭

If you want to know what’s happening on the U.S.-Mexico border, you go to the Border Chronicle. And now, if you want to know what’s happening with Trump’s border wall, which is just a monumental piece of environmental disaster, you can go to the Border Chronicle’s new Wall Watch, the publication’s community-reported interactive map tracking construction of the barrier.

Say you want to know what sort of wall is being built in the Big Bend region? Or what sort of structure already exists near Lochiel, Arizona, where border wall contractors have destroyed old-growth cottonwood trees and are threatening the remainder of the grove? You can toggle the map to the satellite view, zoom in on the place of interest, and click on the border and get a pop-up informing you of what work is taking place, who the contractor is, and the expected cost.

Screenshot from the Border Chronicle’s Wall Watch.

📝 Hoback Report

A guest post by Bob Frodeman


Could the West be the place where America finally gives up its belief in endless growth? Probably not, but you can imagine different triggers. For instance, drought, a shrinking snowpack, and a parched Colorado River could halt growth in Phoenix. Or overwhelming numbers of tourists in Yellowstone or Arches National Park could force the establishment of timed entry (which Arches had, until the Trump Administration decreed that this was oppressing the right of people to sit in traffic). Or climate change-driven wildfires threatening entire cities (see Spokane) could put a crimp in sprawl.

But in my neck of the woods traffic may be the trigger.

Traffic is getting absurd in Jackson. The chaos used to be limited to the summer months; now it’s pretty much year-round. Climate change has extended the hiking season on both ends: this May a new record was set for visitation in Grand Teton National Park. And while the valley floor was denuded of snow last winter (a brown Christmas – in Jackson?!), the snow fell higher up, giving us some of the best skiing in the West during a generally horrific snow year.

Policy, history, and geography all contribute to the situation. First, it’s just plain hard to get here: there are only three roads into the valley. The spectacular mountains and forests mean that more than 97% of Teton County is publicly owned – Teton and Yellowstone National Parks, Bridger-Teton National Forest, and the National Elk Refuge. The Elk Refuge offers a striking visual: created in 1912, when Jackson had a population of a few hundred, the Refuge now hems town in on the north side, preserving land that would otherwise be jammed with hundreds of homes. Another 1% of the land is covered by conservation easements.

Caught between public land, various bumps and ridges, and the Snake River, there’s only one artery in town, called Highway 89 when it runs north-south, and Broadway when it turns east-west. Pressed up against Saddle Butte, Broadway already is five lanes and would be hell to expand. Highway 22, a two-lane spur that runs up and over Teton Pass that WYDOT wants to expand to five lanes, is already a traffic nightmare morning and night. And all the other roads in town are suburban streets lined with homes.

Nonetheless, the Town of Jackson currently has 825,000 square feet of additional development in the works. This includes the 245,000 (down from the original 400,000) square-foot Mogul development, a humungous hotel and condo complex planned for the northern entrance to Jackson (traffic already backs up a mile or two every afternoon on that road coming into town). The Jackson Town Council has approved the sketch plan for the complex. The other 600,000 square feet are scattered across the downtown area. On top of this, on the southern edge of town – on what will essentially become an extension of town – a new subdivision called Northern South Park has begun construction. Situated on ranch land, Teton County has approved a neighborhood of 1,437 homes, which would add 23% to the existing housing stock of Jackson.

What’s bizarre is the lack of self-consciousness about what’s happening. A few weeks ago I wrote a town council member asking for the list of ongoing projects. There isn’t one. I generated the 825,000 number by calling up the town clerk and asking her to go through the various applications. We added it up together.

Given all this, plus the 4 million annual tourists, it’s hard to see how Jackson will avoid utter and complete gridlock. But wait—it gets better, by which I mean worse. Because land is so scarce in Teton County, and home prices so high (median price $2.5 million, eight times the Wyoming average), workers drive in from Star Valley (30 miles to the south) and Teton Valley, Idaho (30 miles to the west). Both areas are primed for more growth: the population of Teton Valley doubled from 2000 to 2020 (to 10,000) and is projected to be the fastest growing part of Idaho. And this is to say nothing about the dangers of traveling Teton Pass – there was a landslide there two summer ago that diverted traffic for three weeks, and this summer a runaway truck killed two people.

Most of these people, as well as the commuters from Star Valley, come to Jackson for work and play. It adds up to a traffic apocalypse. Alas, Jackson and Teton County has no control over these outlying areas. The obvious move is to create a regional authority to work on the problem. But no such authority exists, and the political culture of these areas is quite different from Jackson, which makes conversations hard.

In Jackson you hear a lot of talk about managing growth. What you don’t hear is talk about the necessity of stopping growth. But this is the conversation that Jackson needs to have – as well as many other places across the West that are bumping up against limits.

Colorado River water conservation efforts get only halfway to a solution — Sarah Porter (TheConversation.com)

A person stands at an overlook, from which a lake is visible in the distance, with a wide dry area all around it.
A view over Lake Mead shows how far the lake’s level has fallen. AP Photo/Ty ONeil

Sarah Porter, Arizona State University

In August 2026 the nation’s two largest reservoirs, Lake Mead and Lake Powell, both on the Colorado River, hit their lowest levels since they first began to be filled in 1936 and 1963, respectively.

The federal government and the seven Colorado River basin states – Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming – have been unable to reach an agreement about who should reduce water usage by how much to avoid catastrophic declines in lake levels.

And the existing plans and commitments, including a federal outline announced in late July 2026, don’t get close to achieving what’s needed to keep the river flowing. Here’s a look at the key issues making an agreement so hard to reach.

Big cuts are needed

To stabilize the Colorado River system, seven states and Mexico need to reduce annual consumption of Colorado River water by at least 3 million acre-feet (980 million gallons), and probably more like 4 million acre-feet (1.3 trillion gallons), each year.

The Lower Basin states – Arizona, California and Nevada – have been using less water, even as their populations have grown.

They have proposed to further reduce water use in 2027 and 2028, and Mexico has, too. Those decreases, coming only from the Lower Basin states, would be the biggest-ever reductions of Colorado River water use, but they would amount to only about 3.7 million acre-feet over two years, about half what is likely needed.

Unless more water is conserved, the reservoirs that have stored surplus water over the decades could shrink to the point that only the water that naturally flows into the river each year would be released downstream. That’s a condition called “run of river,” which could result in drastic cuts to the Lower Basin’s water supply.

If the winter of 2026-27 is like the winter the West had in 2025-26, the river and reservoirs will likely be at that point by mid-2027. A really good winter with lots of snow might push the timing out a year or two, but it won’t solve the problem: People are using a lot more water from the reservoirs than nature is replenishing each year with rainfall and snowfall.

Why is there so little water?

Water was first divided among the Upper and Lower Basins in 1922, using an overoptimistic estimate of how much water there would be. In the past quarter century, low snowpack and reductions in the amount of snow that converts to surface water have meant that flows can’t keep up with demand.

The other key problem is evaporation. These massive reservoirs are in a hot, dry region. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that annual evaporation is about 1.5 million acre-feet. That’s about 10% of what the seven states expect to be able to use each year – and about half of the overall cuts in water use that would be needed to keep the river flowing.

Even if sufficient water were released from Lake Powell to Lake Mead to cover the Lower Basin’s and Mexico’s apportionments, Lake Mead would continue to decline because of evaporation.

What would deep cuts mean for people?

Farmers and ranchers in the Upper Basin have had less water available in 2026 because the winter was extraordinarily dry.

But if water levels at Lake Powell and Lake Mead fall too low to allow dam managers to release stored water, the effects would be on the Lower Basin.

Entities that receive water from the Central Arizona Project have junior priority in the Lower Basin. Central Arizona cities have years’ worth of groundwater they could access – not a forever supply, but enough to use for some years while they work on developing new water supplies.

If cuts go deeper, tribal and nontribal agriculture along the main stem would arguably take the hardest hit. They may have higher-priority rights, but if there’s no water they’re still in trouble. And there isn’t an alternative water supply for agriculture along the river’s main route.

Across the nation, people would notice higher costs and limited availability of some produce, especially in the winter. At times of year when those crops can’t grow in colder parts of the country, Yuma County, Arizona, and Imperial County, California, are key suppliers of vegetables. Other products would be affected too, including Desert durum wheat, a high-gluten wheat that is preferred for pasta.

What would those cuts mean for electricity?

The federal Bureau of Reclamation has made clear its commitment to continuing hydropower production by keeping reservoir elevations above the minimum level needed to generate electricity.

As a result, the reservoirs will likely not reach the point called “deadpool,” at which no water can move through the dam. But they may reach levels at which no water beyond what’s required to generate power – or what arrives as rain or snow – would flow downstream.

What are the states’ positions?

The Lower Basin states have said they would reduce water use by 1.6 million acre-feet a year, effectively handling the reduction due to evaporation. But the Lower Basin has remained insistent on the Upper Basin states’ sharing in additional conservation measures.

The Upper Basin states say they’re already using much less water than they are apportioned under the Colorado River Compact and that the shortfall is due to overuse in the Lower Basin.

Without a negotiated way forward, there are two potential legal fights on the horizon, which could happen at the same time.

One is a Supreme Court fight over how to interpret the Colorado River Compact. It tends to take about a decade to resolve interstate water-sharing fights in the Supreme Court. If that happens, the region will face years of uncertainty regarding the amount of water available to different users.

At the same time, negotiators, tribes and others in the Lower Basin have made clear that they don’t agree with the approach to the crisis the Bureau of Reclamation announced in late July 2026. The specifics of how that plan will be carried out have not yet been released, but Arizona and Nevada have already threatened to sue.

A long, straight flow of water travels through a dry desert area.
The Central Arizona Project canal brings Colorado River water to cities, tribes and industry in the Phoenix-to-Tucson region. Jim West/UCG/Universal Images Group via Getty Images

What’s required to achieve the water-use cuts that are needed?

Agriculture uses somewhere between 70% and 75% of the water in the Colorado system.

The reductions needed to protect the system can’t be achieved by getting people in Phoenix and other cities to turn the water off when they brush their teeth. Even if people ripped out all the grass that’s watered with Colorado River water, it wouldn’t save enough.

Ideally, farmers would be encouraged – and even paid – to permanently stop irrigating some land. My colleague Kathryn Sorensen and I have called for people to start talking about how to permanently eliminate some agricultural water demand across the entire Colorado River basin. The scope of the problem is too large: There’s no other way to balance the system.

I think it’s going to require federal leadership. In the 1930s a national effort set out to improve farming efficiency all around the nation, but especially in the South and West. Under the Bankhead-Jones Act of 1937, the federal government bought millions of acres of marginal farmland to take it out of production.

Farming is important, but not every acre of farmland should stay in production. If it’s a choice between making sure some water goes to cities or keeping every possible acre of farmland irrigated, we have to be able to discuss both options.

Sarah Porter, Director of the Kyl Center for Water Policy, ASU Morrison Institute for Public Policy, Arizona State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Colorado prepares for launch of water contribution program — The #PagosaSprings Sun #SanJuanRiver #ColoradoRiver #COriver #aridification

West Drought Monitor map August 11, 2026.

Click the link to read the article on the Pagosa Springs Sun website (Josh Pike). Here’s an excerpt:

August 12, 2026

Tensions about water management are high on the Colorado River, even as water levels in reservoirs like Lake Mead drop to record lows and the west faces severe drought conditions…On July 31, the federal Bureau of Reclamation released a final environmental impact statement which outlines a potential framework for management of the river between 2027 and 2036. This framework would include mandatory water use cuts of up to a combined 3 million acre-feet per year for the lower basin states of California, Nevada and Arizona while seeking 200,000 acre feet in voluntary reductions from the upper basin states of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming. The impact statement and the associated National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) decision-making process still leave an opportunity for the states on the Colorado River to reach their own agreement about future water use…

Colorado is introducing a new near-term water contribution program designed to take advantage of federal funding to encourage voluntary, compensated reductions in Colorado River water use. At a webinar on Aug. 6, Amy Ostdiek, section chief for the Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB) interstate, federal and water information section, explained that this program is one of several parallel activities that the state is undertaking alongside the ongoing NEPA process. She explained that the Bureau of Reclamation has announced that $100 million in funding will be available to support the upper basin states in establishing water contribution programs that will provide “water that but for these actions would not be there” to the Colorado River. She noted that funding would likely support about two years of a program, based on previous project costs, and that, to participate and claim the funds, Colorado would need to act now to begin establishing a program. Ostdiek stated that establishing such a program would honor commitments the state has made in negotiations to making voluntary water use reductions and would show that “Colorado is committed to being part of the solution.”

Map of the San Juan River, a tributary of the Colorado River, in Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico and Utah, USA. Made using USGS National Map data. By Shannon1 – Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=47456307

‘Pain and suffering’: What the feds’ Lake Powell proposal means for Utah and other Colorado River states — The Salt Lake Tribune #ColoradoRiver #COriver #aridification

Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

Click the link to read the article on The Salt Lake Tribune website (Brooke Larsen). Here’s an excerpt:

August 12, 2026

After years of analysis and stalled negotiations, the federal government last month finally laid out its proposal for managing the Colorado River’s biggest reservoirs for the next decade. The Bureau of Reclamation still needs to release its final decision and an operating plan for the next two years. But its final environmental impact statement provides a framework for how it intends to manage parts of the Colorado River system under its control…

It still might not be enough in a drying West

The Colorado River Basin has been mired in drought for more than two decades, and research shows that area will likely only get warmer and drier. The question that really matters is how the new plan operates in a dry world, said Jack Schmidt, senior research scientist at Utah State University’s Center for Colorado River Studies. The document gives Reclamation flexibility to respond to an uncertain, but likely drier, river basin. It doesn’t solve all issues, though.  If drought conditions don’t improve, Reclamation said in its analysis that “even large and unprecedented reductions may be needed and may not be enough to stabilize storage” at Lake Powell and Lake Mead.

“The scary thing about all of this is that none of this solves the problem if the world keeps getting drier,” Schmidt said. “That should be taken as an enormous warning for the desperate need to reduce the impact of a warming planet and the drying of the Colorado River Basin.”

[…]

Reclamation’s framework sets a goal of 200,000 acre-feet of voluntary water conservation in Utah and other Upper Basin states — Colorado, New Mexico and Wyoming.  Gene Shawcroft, Utah’s Colorado River negotiator, said it will likely take Utah and its upstream neighbors three to five years to conserve that amount.

Federal plan makes steep #ColoradoRiver water cuts to #Arizona, #California and #Nevada: The Bureau of Reclamation’s final environmental review leaves the door open for states to reach an agreement on how to share the water — by Jake Bolster (High Country News) #COriver #aridification

Lake Powell and Glen Canyon Dam. Photo credit: Western Resource Advocates


Click the link to read the article on the High Country News website (Jake Bolster):

August 4, 2026

This article originally appeared on Inside Climate News, a nonprofit, non-partisan news organization that covers climate, energy and the environment. Sign up for their newsletter here.

Water users in the American Southwest confronted on Friday the strong possibility that cities and farms in the region must reduce Colorado River use by hundreds of billions of gallons after the Trump administration released a new management plan for the coming decade.

The document, published by the federal Bureau of Reclamation, outlines a 10-year management approach that could adjust to changing hydrological conditions that affect the river’s flow, with operations updatable every two years. The agency proposed cuts in water allotments originally suggested by Arizona, California and Nevada, which make up the river’s Lower Basin. Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming, the region’s Upper Basin, could make voluntary conservation measures.

Interim guidelines and drought contingency plans agreed upon by the basin states in 2007 and 2019 are set to expire in 2027 and negotiations for a new agreement due this year have stalled, with the states missing repeated deadlines to come to a consensus.

But the Bureau of Reclamation operates much of the river’s infrastructure, including the Hoover and Glen Canyon dams, which form Lake Mead and Lake Powell, the nation’s two largest reservoirs. A federal record of decision finalizing operations on the river for the next two years will follow the final environmental impact statement Reclamation released Friday. 

“This plan strikes a balance between flexibility and predictability for the Colorado River system that is vital to the 40 million people who rely on it given unprecedented hydrologic conditions and the potential for considerable impacts on water users,” said Andrea Travnicek, Interior’s assistant secretary for water and science, in a statement accompanying the plan’s release. “It also allows a new flexibility to respond to changing conditions and potential consensus.”

The agency is considering releases from Lake Powell, the reservoir near the border of Utah and Arizona that delineates the upper and lower basins, ranging from 5 million to 12 million acre feet to the downstream states (one acre foot can supply about two to four households for a year). The Lower Basin, including Mexico, could take steep cuts in their water allocations, potentially losing 1.5 million acre feet in both 2027 and 2028.

Under such a scenario, Arizona would lose 760,000 acre feet of its allotment from the river, California 440,000 acre feet and Nevada 50,000, following a proposal submitted by the Lower Basin.

But beyond 2028, Lower Basin cuts could reach up to 3 million acre feet.

The Arizona Department of Water Resources called that figure “unacceptable” in a statement published online. “Such reductions would devastate Arizona’s water users and its economy,” the agency said. 

Reclamation appears to be seeking voluntary Upper Basin reductions of up to 200,000 acre feet, and discussed moving water from federally managed dams in the basin downstream, as hydrology allowed.

“The proposal responds to a fundamental reality: the Colorado River no longer reliably produces enough water to support all the uses and expectations built around it,” said JB Hamby, California’s Colorado River Commissioner, in a statement. “That challenge is shared across the Basin, and addressing it requires specific, measurable reductions in water use by every state.”

A spokesperson for the Colorado Department of Natural Resources said the state is “analyzing” the document.

Upper Basin governors said in a statement that they were “encouraged that new operating guidelines will better reflect existing water supply, which must underpin any practicable plan going forward.”

The Colorado River is perhaps the most climate-stressed waterway in the U.S. It provides water to between 35 and 40 million people across seven Western states, 30 tribes and two Mexican states as it wends its way through the Southwest, home to some of the country’s most arid and drought-stricken landscapes. Millions of Westerners also rely on the electricity the Hoover and Glen Canyon dams generate. 

The 1922 compact between the river’s users assumed roughly 17.5 million acre feet of water was available to the two basins and Mexico, but the historical average of its natural flow has only been roughly 14.7 million acre feet. That number plummeted to an average of 11.2 million acre feet between 2020 and 2024, according to provisional data from Reclamation. 

In that same time period, the agency calculated average use and evaporative loss across the basin at just over 13 million acre feet.

“The operational ranges that Reclamation put forward, they’re the right things that we need to be doing in order to fix the supply and demand imbalance,” said John Berggren, regional policy manager at Western Resource Advocates. “But it is just a range, and what they actually do over the next two years or within any given year, that will matter if they’re actually gonna be able to bring the system back into balance.”

Berggren hopes the short-term certainty this plan provides can unstick negotiations between the states.

“I hope [the basin commissioners] don’t just keep doing what they’ve been doing for the last two or three years, ’cause that clearly hasn’t worked,” he said. “I hope they try and take this opportunity to change things up. Let’s try something new and hopefully get to a seven-state agreement.”

Reclamation’s final environmental impact statement was initially supposed to codify the management plan the basin states have yet to agree on. Though deadlines for those negotiations have come and gone, Reclamation is still holding the door open for a deal, which is widely regarded as the most productive path to a durable long-term operating agreement for the river. 

“Let’s try something new and hopefully get to a seven-state agreement.”

Negotiations are stalled over whether cuts should be mandatory across the entire basin. After overdrawing from the river for decades, the Lower Basin now uses less water than it is apportioned, according to federal accounting; it wants to see future cuts shared across the seven states. The Upper Basin, which has never used the full amount of water it is legally entitled to, has fiercely contested demands for it to make mandatory cuts, offering voluntary conservation measures instead. The states that make up that basin contend that variable environmental conditions, such as this year’s record-low snowpack, already limit how much water they use.

Even with some idea of federal management options in place, the absence of a seven-state  agreement further increases the prospect of states dependent on the Colorado River suing one another in cases that would be adjudicated by the Supreme Court.

Still, proposing to manage the river in a way that is adaptive to hydrological conditions is “the kind of agreement that we are going to need to really think about long-term how do we live in this basin with much less water moving forward,” said Celene Hawkins, Colorado River program director at The Nature Conservancy. 

Hawkins hopes this spurs a seven state agreement “so that, ultimately, we can do really good work for communities and for the river itself.”

We welcome reader letters. Email High Country News at editor@hcn.org or submit a letter to the editor. See our letters to the editor policy.

Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

Feds release Colorado River plan, and no one’s very happy about it — Jonathan P. Thompson (LandDesk.org) #ColoradoRiver #COriver #aridification

Lake Powell and Wahweap Marina back in August 2021, when the surface level was at about 3,549 feet. It’s now at 3,522 feet, just above the all-time low reached in April 2022. Jonathan P. Thompson photo.

Click the link to read the article on The Land Desk website (Jonathan P. Thompson):

August 4, 2026

Last week, the federal Bureau of Reclamation released their final environmental impact statement for proposed alternatives for managing the Colorado River and its major reservoirs over the next decade. The preferred alternative is not a specific operating plan, but is the “decision framework” that will provide a structure within which those plans can be developed at two-year intervals. The operating guidelines for the 2027 water year, which begins Oct. 1, are expected to be released later this month.

The feds stepped in after the seven Colorado River states failed to agree on a new plan to replace the 2007 Interim Guidelines and the 2019 Drought Contingency Plans, both of which expire at the end of September. The states will continue to negotiate, and a seven-state consensus deal would take precedence over the federal plan.

Udall/Overpeck 4-panel Figure Colorado River temperature/precipitation/natural flows with trend. Lake Mead and Lake Powell storage. Updated through Water Year 2025. Note the tiny points on the annual data so that you can flyspeck the individual years. Credit: Brad Udall

Those plans were aimed at bringing overall demand back into balance with supply, which is not easy given that a warmer and drier climate is continually diminishing the already over-allocated river. While the document appears to have been completely scrubbed of any references to “climate change” or “global warming,” it does obliquely acknowledge that the cause of the current woes is a heating planet with passages like this one: “Imbalance between water supply and demand will be exacerbated by increasingly likely low-runoff conditions: The Basin is experiencing increased aridity due to climate variability, and long-term drought and low-runoff conditions are expected in the future.”

The natural flow flow at Lees Ferry, which is a calculation of what the Colorado River’s flow would be without any upstream dams, diversions, or human consumption. Land Desk graph using Bureau of Reclamation data.

While the supply-demand balance is the central objective, a secondary one is to “protect critical elevations” at Lake Powell, which is to say they will take significant measures to keep the surface level from dropping below 3,500 feet, which provides a 10-foot buffer above minimum power pool. This not only preserves hydropower output, but it also avoids relying on the river outlet works for sustained releases. Meanwhile, the feds didn’t even consider proposals to drain Lake Powell or to build bypass tunnels around Glen Canyon Dam to allow for low-level water releases. [ed. Note that the USBR EIS is constrained by the “Law of the River”, the suite of agreements and legislation that details what the agency can do to operate the river.]

Sorry, Ed. I’d like to help, but there’s not a whole lot of interesting things to say about this!

The release was met with much pomp and circumstance, along with a lot of hand-wringing and teeth-gnashing, though it didn’t contain any major surprises or changes from the draft EIS released earlier this year. The big takeaway, or at least the most talked-about one, is that the Upper Basin states will not be subjected to mandatory water use cuts, though they are being asked to cut about 200,000 acre-feet annually on a voluntary basis. The Lower Basin states, meanwhile, will be required to cut their consumption, perhaps by as much as 3.6 million acre-feet per year, depending on reservoir levels. That’s nearly half of those states’ Colorado River Compact allotment.

The cuts would be distributed based on water right priority, which would hit Arizona the hardest. That’s not because Arizona’s rights are junior to everyone else’s, but because their biggest straw — the Central Arizona Project — has junior rights, which the state accepted in exchange for federal funds to help build the thing and to help power its energy-sucking pumps.

Lower Basin leaders are, generally, livid. Arizona Gov. Katie Hobbs said the feds’ plan “still contains unacceptable options that include the federal government forcing Arizona to take the majority of draconian water cutbacks.” Nevada Gov. Joe Lombardo said the plan “seeks to impose unrealistic reductions on Nevada and our water users … {that} could have devastating economic and environmental impacts … .”

The response from the Upper Basin has been a more measured and mixed, but is predominantly one of relief at being spared mandatory cuts. But any celebration is tempered by the fact that nature is forcing its own cuts in the Upper Basin; irrigation canals are shutting down all over the place, long before the growing season is over, and some irrigators have received only a fraction of their usual allotment this year. Plus, the plan leaves open the possibility of draining Upper Basin reservoirs such as Flaming Gorge, Blue Mesa, and Navajo to buoy levels at Lake Powell. That will affect recreation and leave less water for irrigators and other users in the Upper Basin.

Meanwhile, advocacy groups are generally unhappy about the plan’s short-term approach, its focus on saving dams rather than the river, its willful ignorance of climate science, and its failure to force cuts on all river users. Even more dismaying is the fact that it doesn’t even cap Upper Basin consumption at current levels, implicitly allowing new diversions and water projects that would throw supply and demand further out of balance. “The Colorado River needs consequential and systemic change that confronts the ecological, political, and legal chaos caused by climate change and Glen Canyon Dam, but Reclamation’s plan is just ‘lather, rinse, repeat’ of past failed policies,” said Gary Wockner, of Save The Colorado, in a written statement.

This sentiment reveals a sort of paradox on the Colorado River: All of the water that flows to the Lower Basin and the industrial-scale alfalfa farms in the Imperial Valley also runs through the Grand Canyon, keeping that ecosystem healthier. Meanwhile, any water that the Upper Basin consumes or that is held back in Lake Powell to protect the dam’s integrity is water that doesn’t flow through the canyon.

There’s no indication that the Trump administration is punishing the Lower Basin states, however. It’s far simpler logistically to distribute and enforce mandatory consumption cuts in the Lower Basin because there are fewer diversion points, each of which is far larger than in the Upper Basin. Also, the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act made the Interior Secretary the “water master” on the Lower Colorado River, giving the feds greater authority to order shortages.

One question that remains unanswered is how reduced releases from Glen Canyon Dam would play out in the context of the Colorado River Compact, which dictates that the Upper Basin “not cause the flow of the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75 million acre-feet” for any 10-year period. There’s a high likelihood that the 10-year aggregate flow will drop below 75 maf in the next year, giving Arizona possible grounds to sue and putting the interpretation of the clause into the hands of the Supreme Court.

Here are a few more details from the final EIS:

  • Glen Canyon Dam annual releases, which will be determined on Oct. 1, will range from 6 maf to 12 maf. This could drop as low as 5 maf if necessary to defend the “de facto deadpool” Lake Powell surface level of 3,500 feet. That would reduce flows in the Grand Canyon to below 7,000 cubic feet per second, and cause Lake Mead to drop further.

  • The maximum shortages/cuts for the Lower Basin would be 3.6 maf distributed as such:
  • Arizona: 1.96 maf
  • California: .9 maf
  • Nevada .21 maf
  • Estimated shortage impacts by water user type under various shortage conditions:

Lower Basin 2027-2028:
Tribal: 209-346 kaf
Domestic: 313-858 kaf
Non-Tribal Irrigation: 2-70 kaf

Lower Basin (2029-later)
Tribal: 241-576 kaf
Domestic: 277-1,472 kaf
Non-Tribal Irrigation: 6-829 kaf

  • Acreage range of Indian Trust lands in the Lower Basin that would be fallowed under various shortage conditions:

AZ: 6,535 to 67,375
CA: 0
NV: 0

  • An alarming quote about how junior water rights holders are going to face shortages no matter what: Under the preferred alternative, “… for all Arizona, California, and Nevada junior entitlements (AZ CAP NIA-A and NIA-B; AZ CAP Indian, M&I, and 4(I); CA P4; and NV P8 priority groups) there are no potential futures in which >80% of normal domestic water delivery occurs.”
  • Lower Basin Tribal water users with present perfected rights would receive at least 80% of normal water deliveries in at least 90% of years across 2027-2039.
Glen Canyon Institute Executive Director Eric Balken observing the Cathedral. Photo credit: Glen Canyon Institute
  • During 75% of years under preferred alternative, Lake Powell’s level would be below 3,550 feet during at least 90% of months, meaning Cathedral in the Desert would be visible and accessible.

The EIS’s authors summed up the challenges with all of this — and the perils that may lie ahead — in one paragraph, writing:


A Colorado River glossary and primer — Jonathan P. Thompson


Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation released its final environmental impact statement for the post-2026 operating guidelines for #LakePowell and #LakeMead — The #GlenwoodSprings Post-Independent #ColoradoRiver #COriver #aridification

Click the link to read the article on the Glenwood Springs Post-Independent (Ali Longwell). Here’s an excerpt:

August 3, 2026

The plan charts a course for the basin’s next 10 years that could lead to significant water cuts in the Lower Basin and opens up the door for more frequent negotiations…

“The basin is experiencing increased aridity due to climate variability, and long-term drought and low-runoff conditions are expected in the future,” wrote the Bureau of Reclamation in the summary. “These conditions will exacerbate the now widely recognized imbalance between water supply and demand in the basin. Robust and flexible guidelines are needed to manage the Colorado River system and its resources under a broad range of potential future hydrologic conditions.”

[…]

The two reservoirs are currently governed by guidelines established in 2007 that are set to expire this year, and many agree the plan has failed to protect the Colorado River system…The final proposal does not provide specifics for how water will be distributed across the basin, with the Bureau of Reclamation describing it as a “framework” that identifies key triggers and ranges for developing future operating guidelines at Lake Powell and Lake Mead. It sets up a plan to negotiate 2-year operating plans for the reservoirs through 2036…The final statement provides a range of alternatives, including the Bureau of Reclamation’s “preferred” option. Each alternative sets guidelines for how it will reduce or increase annual consumptive water use allocations from Lake Mead to the Lower Basin states; store and deliver water saved through conservation efforts; manage and deliver surplus water; manage activities and make cuts above Lake Powell; and more.

Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

#Utah won’t face mandatory cuts in feds’ new #ColoradoRiver proposal, but Lower Basin states could — Annie Knox (UtahNewsDispatch.com)

The Colorado River is pictured near Moab on Sunday, Feb. 18, 2024. (Photo by Spenser Heaps for Utah News Dispatch)

by Annie Knox, Utah News Dispatch
July 31, 2026

After Utah and six other states along the Colorado River failed to reach a deal on how to share its dwindling water supply, the federal government on Friday released its own 10-year outline. 

Colorado River Collaborative

This article is published through the Colorado River Collaborative, a solutions journalism initiative supported by the Janet Quinney Lawson Institute for Land, Water, and Air at Utah State University. See all of our stories about how Utahns are impacted by the Colorado River at greatsaltlakenews.org/coloradoriver

Under the proposal from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, the Lower Basin states of Arizona, California and Nevada would share in cuts of up to 3 million acre-feet per year. The framework doesn’t mandate cuts for Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming. 

Instead, it identifies a conservation goal for the Upper Basin — 200,000 acre-feet per year — about as much as Utah’s Deer Creek and East Canyon reservoirs together can hold. The plan would also allow for smaller annual releases from Lake Powell of down to 5 million acre-feet, compared to the current 6 million acre-feet, with new operating guidelines every two years. 

Utah’s chief Colorado River negotiator, Gene Shawcroft, praised the proposal on Friday, telling reporters it recognizes the reality of the water available, not just the demand. But he emphasized it provides a broad framework, with the details to follow in coming days. 

“I would just simply say, this is a bridge, not a destination,” Shawcroft said in a virtual news conference. “It certainly could be a bridge over troubled waters, but perhaps a bridge over no waters. We just aren’t quite sure.”

He and Amy Haas, executive director of the Colorado River Authority of Utah, were still reading through the 2,600 pages contained in the bureau’s environmental impact statement released Friday.  

Haas said the state will know more about what it’s contending with when it gets a copy of a two-year operations plan for 2027 and 2028 in coming days, though the exact timeline wasn’t clear.

The Colorado River is pictured where if flows near Hite, just beyond the upper reaches of Lake Powell, on Friday, Sept. 19, 2025. (Photo by Spenser Heaps for Utah News Dispatch)

The Colorado River provides water to 40 million people across the U.S. and Mexico, contributing 27% of Utah’s water supply. It’s shrinking because of drought, overuse and hotter temperatures linked to climate change.

This year’s record-high temperatures and lowest snowpack on record aren’t helping. Normally, Colorado River runoff is about 13 million acre-feet, Shawcroft said. Now it’s 3.5 million acre-feet. 

He told reporters: “We’re in a dire situation.” 

On Friday, Arizona’s Department of Water Resources called the proposal’s cuts for the Lower Basin “unacceptable,” saying such reductions would devastate Arizona’s water users and its economy.”

The agency described negotiations over many months as “an exercise in lowering expectations, particularly for a long-term, seven-state agreement on operating this vital river system.” 

The disagreement could find its way into a courtroom soon. Arizona and Utah have both taken steps this year to build up litigation funds. 

“For Utah, litigation is never our plan A,” Haas told reporters Friday. “Whether it’s a plan B, depending on the context of this document, that remains to be seen. But litigation is not going to get us anywhere on this river. It’s not going to get us more water.” 

At issue in the negotiations is who absorbs necessary cuts. Upper Basin states argue they use less water than Lower Basin states, don’t have huge reservoirs to store water in dry years, and lack legal authority to place significant restrictions on water users. 

Lake Powell and the Wahweap Marina are pictured near Page, Arizona on Sunday, Feb. 2, 2025. (Photo by Spenser Heaps for Utah News Dispatch)

The proposal out Friday is adaptable and allows the states to keep negotiating, said Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum.  

“This framework provides the flexibility to respond to changing hydrologic conditions while preserving the opportunity for the Basin States to continue working toward durable, consensus-based solutions,” Burgum said in a statement. 

Utah Gov. Spencer Cox, in a joint statement with his counterparts in the other upstream states, said they’re encouraged that incoming operating guidelines “will better reflect existing water supply, which must underpin any practicable plan going forward.” 

They went on to say that both the upper and lower divisions of the basin “are feeling the pain of severe drought. This is a reality that all states, and the federal government, will need to address practically, which is why a seven-state agreement will provide the best outcome for all water users in the Colorado River Basin.”

Water use is outpacing the river’s flows, and that overconsumption adds up. The combined amount of water in Lake Powell and Lake Mead is at its lowest point since before Glen Canyon Dam began to fill up in 1963, the bureau said in its Friday news release. 

If water levels dip to critical lows, as forecasts suggest they could by late this year, the nation’s two largest reservoirs could fail to produce power. If their depths continue to slide, they’ll fail to send water downstream. 

Conservation and recreation groups have called for an end to the gridlock, saying it’s dragging on in the background while hotter and drier conditions are driving up wildfire risks, air quality concerns and restrictions on the water supply. 

Utah News Dispatch is part of States Newsroom, a nonprofit news network supported by grants and a coalition of donors as a 501c(3) public charity. Utah News Dispatch maintains editorial independence. Contact Editor McKenzie Romero for questions: info@utahnewsdispatch.com.

The Colorado River Basin spans seven U.S. states and part of Mexico. Lake Powell, upstream from the Grand Canyon, and Lake Mead, near Las Vegas, are the two principal reservoirs in the Colorado River water-supply system. (Bureau of Reclamation)

Feds to impose new cuts on lower #ColoradoRiver states amid climate-fueled #megadrought — Chase Woodruff (ColoradoNewsline.com) #COriver #aridification

Glen Canyon Dam holds back the waters of Lake Powell near Page, Arizona on Sunday, Feb. 2, 2025. Photo credit: Spenser Heaps/Utah News Dispatch

by Chase Woodruff, Colorado Newsline
July 31, 2026

The federal government on Friday formalized a set of guidelines for managing water use in the Colorado River Basin over the next decade, if Colorado and six other Western states can’t come to an agreement on how to deal with declining flows caused in large part by climate change.

“The Department has a responsibility to ensure the Colorado River system remains reliable and resilient for the millions of Americans, communities and industries that depend on it,” Interior Secretary Doug Burgum said in a press release. “This framework provides the flexibility to respond to changing hydrologic conditions while preserving the opportunity for the Basin States to continue working toward durable, consensus-based solutions.”

Under the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s “preferred alternative” for the management of the river’s reservoir system, outlined in a extensive environmental impact statement, the burden of the most severe cuts would continue to fall on the Lower Basin states of Arizona, California and Nevada, which could face mandatory cuts of up to 3 million acre-feet of water. The Upper Basin states of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming would face only voluntary conservation targets totaling 200,000 acre-feet.

All seven states were parties to the Colorado River Compact, a 1922 agreement governing the use of water from the vital Western watershed. Today, the Colorado River provides water to an area inhabited by 40 million people across the Southwest, though agricultural uses account for the vast majority of consumption.

Udall/Overpeck 4-panel Figure Colorado River temperature/precipitation/natural flows with trend. Lake Mead and Lake Powell storage. Updated through Water Year 2025. Note the tiny points on the annual data so that you can flyspeck the individual years. Credit: Brad Udall

Since 2000, a megadrought caused largely by global warming — the region’s worst dry spell in at least 1,200 years — has stressed water supplies across the basin and pushed the Colorado River Compact to a breaking point. The last set of federal guidelines to address shortages, issued nearly 20 years ago, will expire Jan. 1, and the seven Colorado River Compact states failed to reach a new agreement before a federally imposed deadline in February.

The combined amount of water stored in Lake Powell and Lake Mead, the Colorado River system’s two key reservoirs, fell this month to its lowest level since May 1957 — before Lake Powell, created by the Glen Canyon Dam, had even begun to fill.

Without a major turnaround in hydrologic conditions in the near future, water levels in Lake Powell are expected to fall by next spring to below “minimum power pool,” at which point the Glen Canyon Dam’s hydroelectric turbines would be unable to operate.

Negotiations over a comprehensive new agreement have led to an increasingly bitter dispute between the Upper Basin states — led by Colorado, the river’s headwaters state and by far the Upper Basin’s largest water user — and the Lower Basin states, especially Arizona, which has borne the brunt of the cuts imposed in recent years. Arizona is widely expected to launch a high-stakes legal challenge as soon as this summer, alleging Colorado and other Upper Basin states are failing to meet an obligation under the original Colorado River Compact to allow enough water to flow downstream.

Colorado Gov. Jared Polis issued a joint statement Friday with the governors of the other three Upper Basin states, saying that “both the Upper and Lower divisions of the basin are feeling the pain of severe drought,” and that they were “committed to continued good-faith discussions with our counterparts.”

“Many hours of meetings and negotiations took place between the Colorado River Basin states and these discussions will continue,” the statement said. “Today’s framework does not represent a final solution, but enables the River to be managed in the short-term while the seven states and (the Interior Department) continue to negotiate a consensus solution.”

In the absence of a new agreement among the states, the Bureau of Reclamation says it will continue to update its new guidelines every two years until 2036.

Andrea Travnicek, the Interior Department’s assistant secretary for water and science, said the plan “strikes a balance between flexibility and predictability … given unprecedented hydrologic conditions and the potential for considerable impacts on water users.”

In a statement, Democratic U.S. Sen. Michael Bennet of Colorado said he was “disappointed” by the failure to reach a new long-term agreement among the seven Colorado River Compact states.

“While a two-year operating plan is the bare minimum needed to operate the river, a long-term, consensus agreement that recognizes real hydrologic conditions is the only durable solution to bring certainty to the Colorado River,” Bennet said.

Colorado Newsline is part of States Newsroom, a nonprofit news network supported by grants and a coalition of donors as a 501c(3) public charity. Colorado Newsline maintains editorial independence. Contact Editor Quentin Young for questions: info@coloradonewsline.com.

Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0

Video and analysis: Lake Powell’s dying days; Alfalfa isn’t (always) the enemy — and other Colorado River lessons from ‘Life After Dead Pool’ author Zak Podmore — Sammy Roth (ClimateColoredGoggles.com) #ColoradoRiver #COriver #aridification

Glen Canyon Dam

Click the link to go to the Climate Colored Goggles Substack page, and to view the interview video (Sammy Roth):

You know the Colorado River crisis is serious when the Trump administration is willing to use hundreds of millions of dollars from President Biden’s climate law to help to solve it.

As of Wednesday night, federal officials had yet to release their plan for mandatory water cutbacks along the Colorado — a crucial water source for tens of millions of people and millions of acres of farmland across the American West. But with a plan expected later this week, details were starting to trickle out.


Click the link to access the final EIS released on July 30, 2026 by Reclamation.


The L.A. Times’ Ian James reported that Trump’s Interior Department would accept a proposal submitted by California, Arizona and Nevada — the Lower Basin states — to slash their water use by 12%, 31% and 28%, respectively, through 2028. They’ll receive $350 million from Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act to support water conservation.

The Upper Basin states — Colorado, Utah, New Mexico and Wyoming — will get $100 million in conservation funding. But unlike their downstream neighbors, they won’t face mandatory water cuts. However much water they end up saving, that will be good enough.

It’s always possible the plan will change. I’m eager to see the final details.

While we wait, let’s hear from one of the West’s most thoughtful and well-informed Colorado River chroniclers.

That would be Zak Podmore, author of “Life After Dead Pool: Lake Powell’s Last Days and the Rebirth of the Colorado River.” Earlier this week, he and I talked for an hour and took audience questions on Zoom; it was a great time. Thank you to everyone who joined us. Paid subscribers to Climate-Colored Goggles can scroll up to watch the full video.

Here are five lessons that stood out to me from our conversation — all of which are relevant to the high-stakes conflict playing out among the states.

1. We’re not doomed. Earth is resilient

My favorite thing about “Life After Dead Pool” is its hopeful message.

Most headlines about the Colorado River these days are gloomy. For instance, the last time Lake Mead and Lake Powell held as little water as they do right now was 1956 — before Lake Powell existed, meaning all the water was in Mead. Powell is currently 23% full; Mead is 27% full. These are the largest reservoirs in the United States.

A river returns. Almost 50 miles of the San Juan, once inundated by Powell Reservoir, are flowing free. Photo credit: Morgan Sjogren

But Podmore’s book flips the script, offering a firsthand look the amazing ecological recovery taking place as Lake Powell shrinks.

In and around the reservoir, which was flooded by Glen Canyon Dam more than 60 years ago, native vegetation is returning much faster than scientists thought possible — especially in narrow side canyons inundated by Powell. Exploring these remote, newly accessible places inspired Podmore to write his book.

“Instead of hearing the story that I grew up hearing — which was that Glen Canyon Dam had all these negative environmental consequences, it drowned this beautiful place — I was hearing these conversations from these researchers who were talking about the landscape that was coming back, and how excited they were about the way the ecology was recovering, and the way the endangered fish were expanding their habitat,” Podmore said. 

“Instead of a story about being too late, it was a story about realizing that I was right on time, as we all are, to see the rebirth of Glen Canyon,” he added.

The Colorado River flows through Glen Canyon in 1958, before the dam was built. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

2. Those who don’t learn from history…

Podmore starts the book by imagining what Indigenous life might have been like in and around Glen Canyon nearly 1,000 years ago — when the region had a far larger population than it does today. 

He wanted to show that the Colorado River Basin’s human history began long before white settlement — and that even environmentalists have often ignored the watershed’s Indigenous past.

“I was definitely indoctrinated into the mainstream environmental school of thought as I was growing up,” he said. “I had a copy of the really famous book about Glen Canyon called, ‘The Place No One Knew,’ which was published by the Sierra Club in the ’60s and talked about how nobody cared enough about Glen Canyon to protect it. And then I realized later on that [the] title was very offensive, and [in fact] there were people who knew Glen Canyon very well and lived there for thousands of years, and who were displaced as the waters of Lake Powell started to fill, in the case of many Navajo families.”

Podmore’s opening scene describes a 10,000-gallon stone water tank built by Ancestral Pueblo farmers, the ruins of which were eventually buried by Lake Powell. The tank’s key feature: a drain at the bottom, so that irrigation could continue no matter how low water levels got.

Diagram showing critical reservoir levels at Glen Canyon Dam and Lake Powell. Land Desk diagram with data from the Bureau of Reclamation.

Lake Powell doesn’t have a drain at the bottom. It could certainly use one.

3. The Upper Basin states aren’t doing enough

If Powell’s water levels sink much lower, water won’t be able to pass through the dam’s hydropower turbines, which generate cheap electricity for communities across the West. That wouldn’t be a “dead pool” situation; water could still flow downstream to the Grand Canyon and Lake Mead through bypass tubes lower in the dam. But the bypass tubes are surprisingly frail and could break with sustained use.

Translation: We are frighteningly close to “de facto dead pool.” That’s why the Trump administration is ordering everyone to use less water.

Well, not everyone. California, Arizona and Nevada are willing to cut back dramatically, and federal officials seem happy to make them do it. The Upper Basin states — the ones upstream of Lake Powell — say they shouldn’t have to commit to mandatory reductions, in part because they already consume a lot less.


[ed. It is not possible to measure or marshall water to Lake Powell (lack of infrastructure, gaining and losing reaches, priority, no way to color water in the river). Inflows are calculated values, or the height of the column at the dam. The Upper Basin consumes a lot less than their allocation under the compact, so yes, much less than the Lower Basin. Here’s an AI recap of inflows to Lake Powell.]


In a New York Times opinion piece earlier this year, I argued that the Upper Basin states need to do more. Podmore agreed.

“It’s a tricky situation, because the Lower Basin has always used more water, and that’s a convenient argument for the Upper Basin,” he said. “But also, there’s more people in the Lower Basin. And the most productive agricultural land that’s irrigated with Colorado River water is located in the Lower Basin.”

“Even with the cuts that the Lower Basin has offered, we still have a long way to go to balance the water budget,” he added. “Everyone needs to pitch in.”

Farmland in California’s Imperial Valley, irrigated with Colorado River water. (Photo by Sammy Roth)

4. Alfalfa isn’t (always) the enemy

Farmers are often vilified for sucking up copious amounts of water — and with good reason. Irrigated agriculture consumes more than half the water in the Colorado River Basin, with alfalfa and other cattle feed accounting for a stunning 32% of overall water use. (This is one of several good reasons to eat fewer hamburgers.)

The Colorado River’s largest water user, by far, is California’s Imperial Valley, where farmers grow vegetables, alfalfa and other crops. There’s no sustainable future for the American West that doesn’t involve Imperial using less water.

But easy as it is to hate on Imperial, Podmore pointed out that when the Lower Basin uses water, that water stays in the river for a long time, supporting healthy ecosystems along the way. And because Imperial is very far downstream, water flowing to alfalfa farmers there carries huge environmental benefits.

“The way that water gets from the Rocky Mountains to the Imperial Valley — or to Los Angeles or Las Vegas or Phoenix — is through the Grand Canyon. It’s through Glen Canyon. It’s through Canyonlands National Park,” Podmore said. “It’s through all these important and beautiful places.”

“If the Lower Basin agrees to a bunch of cuts — if L.A. builds tons of desalination plants — that would in theory be good, because you have to divert less water from the river,” he added. But at the same time, “that means less water in the river.”

Colorado River “Beginnings”. Photo: Brent Gardner-Smith/Aspen Journalism