On Tuesday, April 21, the Colorado River District board of directors unanimously supported initial actions in response to extreme drought conditions on the western slope. The board’s actions allocated $450,000 from the District’s Community Funding Partnership for strategic water releases from District-owned, District Enterprise, or other storage pools across the western slope. The board also acted to suspend a previous water marketing policy that allowed contracts on a first-come, first-serve basis, instead taking staff recommendation to develop a cooperative approach that best uses available supplies to meet critical needs. The board delegated authority to its Water Supply Projects Committee to consider and approve subsequent contract water leases and funding allocations.
“This action alone won’t solve the drought, but it will help meet critical water needs in the short term,” said Hunter Causey, director of asset management and chief engineer for the Colorado River District. “Our reservoirs were built to help communities on the western slope weather exactly this kind of year. Maximizing the use of our available storage now is the responsible thing to do.”
“We were already bracing for a dry summer, but the low snowpack was absolutely flattened by extreme heat in March, leaving statewide water supplies facing unprecedented gaps,” said Colorado River District Board Vice President and Grand County rancher Mike Ritschard. “Irrigators and agriculture producers in Colorado are familiar with working within uncertainty, but when supplies are this limited, we know we have to be especially conscious of balancing our use with the health of the system as a whole.”
The Board also prioritized its contract water supplies to first support critical domestic and municipal needs, while striving to then address agricultural and industrial needs. Prioritizing these uses will also boost stream flows and reduce water temperatures through strategic releases. For domestic and municipal uses, the board directed staff to work with water suppliers and land use authorities to provide clear guidance that outdoor water use for lawns and ornamental applications be strictly limited.
“The reality is that in a year like this, any water that you put on your lawn is water that will not show up in the river,” said Andy Mueller, Colorado River District general manager. “This drives up water temperatures and negatively impacts the health of the river for everyone downstream, including our local farms and regional food production. We are asking all residential water users and municipalities to consider limiting outdoor water use to one or two days a week. This year, we all need to be asking if we value healthy rivers and local food production over green lawns.”
Over the next few weeks, Colorado River District staff will work with constituents and other partners to determine the best use of available supplies in a manner that meets critical needs of the residents of the River District and brings benefits to as many communities as possible.
Please refer to the staff memo, linked HERE, for more details on the initiative.
Breckenridge Town Council approved more stringent water restrictions, limiting outdoor watering to two days per week, as town officials respond to drought conditions and declining streamflows in the Blue River. The new Stage 2 restrictions come as the town faces a water shortage tied to this year’s historically low snowpack and reduced runoff into Goose Pasture Tarn, according to Shannon Cahill, town engineer. The restrictions officially take effect on Friday, May 1.
West Drought Monitor map April 28, 2026.
“We remain in a sphere of drought here in Summit County, throughout the state and the greater Western U.S.,” Cahill told council members at a meeting Tuesday, April 29. “The historically low snowpack has already directly impacted streamflow in the Blue River, and this subsequently affects the town’s ability to supply treated water to our customers.”
Until this week, Breckenridge allowed outdoor watering three days per week. The new temporary restrictions reduce that to two days in hopes of cutting outdoor water usage by roughly 30%. The town largely sources its drinking water from snowmelt (and other high-altitude surface water) collected in the Blue River Basin…The new restrictions exempt any newly installed landscaping, along with hand watering and drip irrigation for flowers and plants. Council member Dick Carleton clarified whether downtown businesses could continue watering flower baskets and using microsprayers.
…as the city gears up for an unprecedentedly dry summer, it will begin ramping up enforcement on water users who violate the stage 2 water restrictions. That will include issuing formal notices of violation and collecting fines for repeat violations.
“We are taking this year more seriously, given that it’s conditions we haven’t quite seen before,” Loughlin Molliconi said. “We want to make sure we can prioritize the most important uses of municipal water without having to degrade any environmental protections or streamflow.”
The city water department has issued 11 formal notices of water use violations in 2026, Loughlin Molliconi said. One notice was issued last week. Ten were issued on Wednesday. They were all first-time violations, which don’t come with fines…Aspen City Council declared a stage 2 water shortage last August after declaring a stage 1 water shortage in June. The declaration came after a lackluster monsoon season, and has remained in place because of unusually high winter temperatures that impacted snowfall accumulations and the snow water equivalent in the Roaring Fork watershed. Stage 2 water restrictions are mandatory. Watering of any lawn, garden, landscaped area, tree, shrub or other plant is prohibited from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. Household watering schedules are also mandatory.
This story was produced by Circle of Blue, in partnership with The Water Desk at the University of Colorado Boulder’s Center for Environmental Journalism.
KEY POINTS
Glen Canyon Dam, completed in 1963, was not designed to be operated at extremely low water levels in Lake Powell.
The decline of Lake Powell is putting hydropower generation and downstream water deliveries at risk.
The Bureau of Reclamation, the federal water manager, is studying options for retrofitting Glen Canyon Dam.
In the span of U.S. history certain years are turning points, milestones in the nation’s story. 1776. 1865. 1929. 1968. Circumstance and consequence conspire to make it so.
For the Colorado River and those who rely on it, 2026 is on the verge of similar prominence. Circumstances in the basin today are that urgent.
Udall/Overpeck 4-panel Figure Colorado River temperature/precipitation/natural flows with trend. Lake Mead and Lake Powell storage. Updated through Water Year 2025. Note the tiny points on the annual data so that you can flyspeck the individual years. Credit: Brad Udall
A slow-developing water supply calamity, decades in the making, has boiled over, like a cold war turning hot. Extreme heat in March – triple-digit temperatures never witnessed that early in the year – obliterated a meager snowpack. The basin’s big reservoirs, the supposed buffers against short-term drought, were already uncomfortably low after a quarter-century of declining river flows. They will drop even lower. The amount of water flowing this summer into Lake Powell, the nation’s second-largest reservoir, will be one of the smallest ever measured, barely a trickle.
“This is unprecedented, but it’s not unpredicted,” said Eric Balken, executive director of the Glen Canyon Institute. “I like to say that this is the most predicted disaster of all time.”
Lake Powell is formed by Glen Canyon Dam, a striking 710-ft tall concrete arch braced against ruddy sandstone walls. It plugs the Colorado just after the river enters Arizona. Meant to ensure water deliveries to the lower basin states of Arizona, California, and Nevada, Glen Canyon Dam was finished in 1963 to complement the Colorado River’s audacious engineering that distributes water through mountains and uphill to the largest cities in the Southwest and to the region’s most productive farmland. When full, Lake Powell holds enough water to flood the entire state of Virginia to the depth of one foot.
Climate change and water demand that still exceeds supply have flipped the engineering script. Lake Powell is less than 25 percent full today. Glen Canyon Dam, instead of being a guarantor of water, is now the most significant water chokepoint in the basin. The hard-won asset has become a glaring liability.
The back of Glen Canyon Dam circa 1964, not long after the reservoir had begun filling up. Here the water level is above dead pool, meaning water can be released via the river outlets, but it is below minimum power pool, so water cannot yet enter the penstocks to generate electricity. Bureau of Reclamation photo. Annotations: Jonathan P. Thompson
The reversal of fortune is because of how Glen Canyon Dam was designed. The dam was never meant to be operated at the extremely low water levels that Lake Powell is rapidly approaching. Doing so for extended periods of time could damage the pipes that move water through the dam, according to the Bureau of Reclamation, the federal agency that manages the structure.
Reclamation is now studying its options for retrofitting Glen Canyon Dam to accommodate a lower Lake Powell. It expects to release those findings later this year or in early 2027. As any home remodeler knows, renovating an aging structure is neither quick nor cheap, especially when failure could have disastrous consequences.
In the short term, Reclamation is relying on operational band-aids for Glen Canyon Dam and Lake Powell. With the consent of the seven states in the basin – Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming – the agency took unprecedented action this month to prop up the reservoir. Releasing more water from upstream reservoirs and holding back more in Powell will delay Glen Canyon’s infrastructure reckoning. But that day will soon come, and Reclamation’s answer to the dam’s engineering problems will have far-reaching implications – not only for the reliability of the basin’s water supply, but also for its power customers, ecology, and recreation economy.
An Assessment Deferred
Dams are difficult to manage under any circumstance. Management is even more troublesome when operators must balance multiple, conflicting objectives. In Glen Canyon’s case those objectives are water supply, flood control, hydropower generation, and releasing water to protect the ecology downstream in the Grand Canyon – namely, beach-building and threatened native fish like the humpback chub. This is in addition to ensuring the safe operation of the dam itself.
How to operate Glen Canyon Dam and Hoover Dam, its larger downstream sibling, is what the seven basin states and Reclamation are attempting to figure out right now. The current agreement covers operations through 2026. Reclamation published a draft environmental impact statement, or EIS, in January that would impose severe cuts on water users in the lower basin, particularly Arizona, in part to protect Glen Canyon Dam’s fragile infrastructure.
For that reason, water users in the lower basin and elsewhere support an engineering fix for Glen Canyon Dam. Many were incredulous that Reclamation did not include an assessment of dam modifications in its draft environmental analysis.
“This EIS could have been a great avenue to look at real changes at Glen Canyon Dam that could solve the water delivery problem and some of the ecological problems, too,” Balken said.
Patrick Dent is the assistant general manager for water policy at the Central Arizona Project (CAP), which delivers Colorado River water to the densely populated center of the state. He said that CAP does not favor any particular fix – only one that provides dam managers with more flexibility.
“Our primary interest is that they could release water at a lower lake level,” Dent said.
The Gila River Indian Community, which receives Colorado River water through CAP, told Reclamation that the agency has a duty to safeguard the tribe’s water rights, which are at risk if the dam cannot release enough water. “The United States must take action to fix Glen Canyon Dam,” Gov. Stephen Roe Lewis wrote in a March 2026 letter.
The Colorado Water Conservation Board, which represents that state’s water interests, said it supports a reevaluation of Glen Canyon Dam, but “in a separate action” from the EIS.
Becki Bryant, a Reclamation spokesperson, said the agency will release an appraisal study assessing three dam modification alternatives at the end of this year or in early 2027. Any action beyond the study, she said, requires congressional authorization and funding.
Illustration from the report, “Antique Plumbing & Leadership Postponed” from the Utah Rivers Council, Glen Canyon Institute and the Great Basin Water Network. Courtesy of Utah Rivers Council
‘Antiquated Plumbing’
The tool for managing the dam’s multiple objectives, which are a legislative requirement as well as a practical necessity, is the water held in Lake Powell, said David Wegner, a scientist who has worked on Glen Canyon policy for more than four decades. But even water has limits when the engineering is inadequate. “Sadly, these dams were not built for multiple objectives,” Wegner said. And Glen Canyon was certainly not built for extremely low water, he added.
The problem with Glen Canyon is what a coalition of environmental groups calls the dam’s “antiquated plumbing.” The groups – Glen Canyon Institute, Great Basin Water Network, and Utah Rivers Council – published a report in August 2022 that outlined these engineering deficiencies.
Water can exit Glen Canyon in only three ways. One is the spillways, a pressure-release valve for flooding, which are located at elevation 3,648 feet, near the top of the dam. They are irrelevant today. Lake Powell rests 122 feet below them.
The main exit point is through the eight penstocks, the 15-foot diameter tubes that move water through the turbines to generate hydroelectricity. The penstocks are incapacitated when Powell drops below 3,490 feet. (The lake today is 36 feet higher than that level.) If the lake falls below what is known as minimum power pool, hydropower generation also ceases.
If that happens, water must be released through four 8-foot diameter pipes called the river outlet works. Smaller than the penstocks, the river outlet works are located at elevation 3,370. Below that elevation water cannot be released from Powell, a status known ominously as “dead pool.” (Functionally, the river outlet works may be useless at elevation 3,394, Reclamation says.)
The environmental groups identified two limitations with the river outlet works. One is that they were not designed to be operated full-time. They are a role player, not the star. The other is that their smaller size means less water can pass through them. That’s a problem because the upper basin states of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming are required to send a set amount of water downstream to the lower basin, according to the 1922 Colorado River Compact that divided the river.
The flow restrictions imposed by the river outlet works, if they had to be used full time, means that the upper basin could violate the compact, which could mean water cutbacks imposed by the lower basin.
“It’s just so counterintuitive that the tool that was designed to meet this delivery obligation” – the construction of Glen Canyon Dam – “is now going to be the roadblock that may prevent the delivery obligation from being met,” said Balken of the Glen Canyon Institute.
The engineering problems are not a new discovery. Wegner, who was with the Bureau of Reclamation at the time as its Grand Canyon environmental studies manager, helped lead a 1987 National Academies report on Glen Canyon. The report recommended that the Interior Department consider the “installation and operation of multiple outlet structures” at Glen Canyon, which would give dam managers more flexibility with water releases.
Glen Canyon’s structural problems were substantiated in 2023, when Reclamation used the river outlet works during an experimental “high-flow” release of water to flush sediment downstream and rebuild eroding Grand Canyon beaches.
The high-volume release caused pitting, or cavitation, within the river outlet works, a risk that was heightened due to the physics of water when Lake Powell is low. Reclamation coated the pipes with epoxy as a temporary fix to prevent more damage, a process that took several months. The agency has since used two small-scale physical models at its Technical Service Center in Denver to test dam operations at low water levels and the effect on infrastructure.
Reclamation acknowledged the limitations of the river outlet works in a technical memopublished in March 2024 by Richard Lafond, director of the agency’s Technical Service Center. The memo’s conclusions were endorsed by the top decision-makers in Reclamation’s Upper Colorado River Office.
“Long term operation of the river outlet works will result in accelerating regular operation and maintenance tasks,” LaFond wrote. Reclamation should “not rely on the river outlet works as the sole means for releasing water from Glen Canyon Dam.”
Wegner put it in starker terms. If the river outlet works had to be relied upon and the pipes began to erode again, then Reclamation could potentially lose control of water flows.
“Potentially that could fail,” Wegner said, meaning an inability to control water releases through the dam if the pipes are structurally compromised. “And if that fails, now you have a catastrophe on your hand and you have limited options to manage that catastrophe.”
In other words, there would be no way to release water downstream into the Grand Canyon and into the lower basin.
Neither Quick Nor Easy
What fixes are possible? Reclamation received $2 million from Congress in the fiscal year 2022 budget for an appraisal study.
Reclamation outlined three engineering possibilities in a 2023 presentation, most of which centered on preserving hydropower generation as Lake Powell declines.
One possibility is a new, lower intake that uses the existing power generation turbines. An intake located deeper in the reservoir would allow Glen Canyon to pass water in what is currently dead pool. But it would entail “increased risk from penetration through the dam.”
The second would connect new power generation equipment to the river outlet works.
The third option is tunneling through the canyon wall and installing a new underground power station. This would also provide more flexibility for water releases.
Reclamation also included three operational or policy changes for power production, including investing in wind and solar to offset hydropower declines.
Other ideas that seemed kooky and fringe just a few years ago – draining Lake Powell and filling Lake Mead first; changing the basin’s water accounting system – are now being discussed throughout the basin with more seriousness and candor.
Beyond that presentation, Reclamation has not said much publicly about dam modification. The agency declined an interview request to discuss Glen Canyon Dam’s engineering problems.
Whatever direction Reclamation chooses – an option outlined above or something new – the process will not be quick or easy. Any change to Glen Canyon must go through an environmental analysis and public comment period. Congress will have to authorize actions and appropriate the funds. Construction alone will take years.
Wegner, who was the staff director for the House Natural Resources Water and Power Subcommittee from 2008 to 2014, knows the difficulty and sees a lack of leadership. “There’s nobody in Washington who has been willing to lead the charge trying to get Congress to provide authorized funding to do this sort of work.”
‘Reservoir Triage’
Because Reclamation is not confident it can operate the river outlet works for an extended run, the agency is focused on keeping Powell above elevation 3,500 feet.
Protecting 3,500 feet comes with all sorts of baggage. It preserves hydropower generation, which power customers appreciate. But in effect the redline at that elevation strands some 4.4 million acre-feet in Lake Powell. (Only 3.7 million acre-feet is technically accessible with the current plumbing.) Some have called this elevation a “de facto” dead pool. Thus, the agitation in the lower basin for a plumbing system within the dam that provides access to this water.
Balken said that downstream water deliveries, not preserving hydropower, should be Reclamation’s biggest concern.
“When these decision makers are talking about Glen Canyon Dam from only a hydropower perspective, I think it’s missing the larger point, which is the dam is about to become the biggest roadblock of water deliveries that the basin has ever seen,” Balken said.
Flaming Gorge Reservoir, on the Green River, straddles the Wyoming-Utah border south of Rock Springs. The Flaming Gorge dam, on the Utah side, was completed in 1964 and is a critical component of the Colorado River water storage system. The Green River, the chief tributary to the Colorado River, originates in the Wind River Range, flows to Flaming Gorge Reservoir, then connects with the Colorado River in Canyonlands National Park in Utah.
To avoid the infrastructure risks of dropping below 3,500 feet, Reclamation has started to take extraordinary action. The agency has two emergency levers it is pulling. One is to hold more water back in Lake Powell. Reclamation cut water releases to the legal minimum this year, something it has never done. The other is releasing more water from Flaming Gorge, a reservoir upstream that is in better shape.
As Balken describes it, “This is reservoir triage.”
These emergency actions have serious side-effects. Upstream, Flaming Gorge is expected to lose 35 feet of elevation by next spring, once the extra water has been released. That will hurt the recreation economy of northeastern Utah and southwestern Wyoming – fewer boat ramps in the water, less fishing access.
These upstream releases have limited utility, Wegner said. “You can do that once or twice. But you got to then depend upon Mother Nature refilling those reservoirs upstream.”
Hoover Dam at low water. Jonathan P. Thompson photo.
Downstream, Lake Mead will drop quickly and it too will approach a level in which hydropower generation at Hoover Dam severely drops. Algal blooms in a warmer, shallower lake could be a problem. “They’re going to be robbing Mead to pay Powell,” Balken said.
Trying Not to Hit Bottom
The idea of dead pool – when Lake Powell can no longer release water – was almost inconceivable when the reservoir was designed and filled. The official device for measuring Lake Powell’s elevation ends at the top of the penstocks, at elevation 3,477.5 feet. According to Reclamation’s 2024 technical memo, “This is an indication that reservoir elevations below minimum power pool” – 3,490 feet – “were not anticipated.”
Cavitation at the Glen Canyon Dam, the cause of the emergency in 1983 via Flow Science.
Reclamation finished filling the reservoir in 1980. Three years later, after an intense El Niño winter, the dam’s upper limits were tested. Floodwaters in the summer of 1983 nearly broke the dam. Such volumes are almost inconceivable now.
In a typical year, Lake Powell would be rising in late April, flush with the deposits of snowmelt from headwater basins in the Rocky Mountains. Not this year. The snowpack peaked in many basins in late February or early March. What little snow there was has already melted. As of April 28, Lake Powell inflows are projected to be just 16 percent of average. Lake level forecasts from mid-April showed a long downward slope for the next 12 months. Those projections were what triggered the emergency release of water from Flaming Gorge and the reduction in Lake Powell releases.
Scientists have been warning about circumstances like this for years. In a defining period for the basin, all the predictions of water supply shocks in the Colorado River from the past two decades are coming to pass.
“We should have been prepared for this,” Balken said.
Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0
Click the link to read the article on the Tucson.com website (Tony Davis). Here’s an excerpt:
April 26, 2026
It’s time to bring in a mediator to handle the prolonged dispute over managing the Colorado River between the Upper and Lower Colorado River Basin states, representatives of the four Upper Basin states say.
“The proposal for mediation attempts to address the current deadlock between Upper Basin and Lower Basin approaches and begin to deal with the basin’s dire hydrologic conditions.” said the Upper Colorado River Commission, which represents Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming.
“The commissioners believe a structured mediation process can support authentic negotiations and collective action to address the Basin’s operational challenges,” the commission said in a news release last week.
The request for a mediator to handle this dispute follows about two years of fruitless negotiations among the various state representatives. There have been several major sources of dispute, but the biggest one has been over how the two basins should split the cuts in river water use that would be needed to bring human demand in line with shrinking supply…The Upper Basin states’ request comes not long before the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation is supposed to announce its plan for managing the river, in the absence of an agreement among the basin states. A new plan is necessary because the river’s current operating guidelines expire Sept. 30…
The request for mediation also comes as the river’s condition continues to deteriorate. Hot, dry weather has held down water flows in the river for most of the year, and there’s a risk that spring-summer runoff into Lake Powell will be the lowest on record since Lake Powell started filling in the 1960s.
Click the link to read the article on the Summit Daily website (Ali Longwell). Here’s an excerpt:
April 20, 2026
With a historic drought hitting the Colorado River basin, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation is making preparations to slow releases from the river’s largest reservoir while increasing withdrawals from an Upper Basin reservoir.
“Given the severity of the risks facing the Colorado River system, it is imperative that we take action quickly to protect a resource that supplies water to 40 million people and supports vital agricultural, hydropower production, tribal, wildlife and recreational uses across the region,” said Andrea Travnice, the Bureau of Reclamation’s assistant secretary of water and science in a Friday, April 17 news release…
As a result, the Bureau of Reclamation is anticipating that inflow to Lake Powell will be 29% of the historical average, which it reports is one of the lowest on record. If water levels fall below a certain elevation — below 3,490 feet or roughly 15% of its capacity — it can impact operations, regional power and water supplies as well as reduce hydroelectric power generation. The Bureau is projecting it could hit this minimum power pool level by August. As of April 19, Lake Powell and Lake Mead were 24% and 32% full, respectively.
View below Flaming Gorge Dam from the Green River, eastern Utah. Photo credit: USGS
At an April 9 meeting, the Pagosa Area Water and Sanitation District (PAWSD) Board of Directors approved revisions to the district’s drought management plan. District Engineer Justin Ramsey opened discussion of the plan, which he explained was a complete rewrite of the previous plan and was adopted in 2020 with a stipulation that it be reexamined in 2026. He added that the district also had to implement the plan in 2025 due to dry conditions, which gave additional insights into how the plan functions. He explained that he recently reconvened the committee that drafted the plan, including PAWSD board members, water experts in the community, business owners and other community members. Ramsey stated that, although there were some changes recommended to the plan, it has, overall, been highly successful. He explained that the drought stages outlined in the plan are entered based on triggers, which are different depending on the time of year.
Early in the year, he stated, the triggers are the snowpack in the mountains, measured by the amount of snow water equivalent (SWE) at the U.S. Natural Resources Conservation Service SNOwpack TELemetry Network (also commonly known as SNOTEL) station on Wolf Creek Pass and the date when the district’s water supply is cut off on Four Mile Creek due to other senior water users diverting water…If specific SWE levels or a call on Four Mile do not occur by specific dates in the spring, the plan shifts to a different set of drought triggers based on water levels in Lake Hatcher (one of PAWSD’s primary reservoirs), water flows in the San Juan River and the drought stage for Archuleta County designated by the National Integrated Drought Information System (NIDIS). He explained that the amount of water in Lake Hatcher is weighted the most heavily, with flows in the San Juan being the next most influential factor and drought designation being the least. He added that the different drought stages come with different drought surcharges and water rate adjustments…He explained that the first drought stage (voluntary drought) aims to cut water use by 10 percent, while the most severe drought stage (stage four) is intended to cut water use by 50 percent.
On April 22, the Pagosa Area Water and Sanitation District (PAWSD) entered stage one drought under its drought mitigation plan, imposing new restrictions on irrigation and rate multipliers for high water use. The district’s drought plan calls for Conservation Service SNOwpack TELemetry Network (SNOTEL) site reaches zero between April 17 and May 1. SWE fell to zero on April 22, triggering stage one drought, according to PAWSD District Engineer Justin Ramsey. During drought stage one, irrigation is permitted only between 6 p.m. and 9 a.m., and residential customers who use more than 5,000 gallons of water a month will have a 1.25 times rate multiplier applied to their water bills. According to the PAWSD website, the imposition of this multiplier will begin to impact customer bills received in May, although the irrigation restrictions will start immediately. The plan notes that gardens may be hand watered using a hose or drip irrigation.
Drip irrigation graphic via Sonoma County Nurseries Resource
The Colorado River carves through mud left behind from Lake Powell when the reservoir was at full pool, near Hite, Utah in October 2022. (Alexander Heilner/The Water Desk with aerial support from LightHawk)
This year’s historic winter of low snow might feel novel. But recent years give some insight into just how dry the West’s most important river system can get. This season’s scant snowpack is melting rapidly, and turning up memories of other notably dry years.
Prolonged drought conditions and warming temperatures since 2000 have produced severe single-year droughts in 2002, 2012, 2018 and 2020 in the river’s headwaters states of Colorado, Wyoming and Utah. As severe drought years continue to put the Southwest’s water infrastructure to the test, communities in the region are grappling with how best to understand and adapt to a changing climate.
2002 stands as the worst drought on record for the Colorado River, measured as the flow into one of its biggest reservoirs, Lake Powell on the Utah-Arizona border. It’s possible 2026 could break that record. Back then the year acted as a wake-up call to the region’s water leaders, spurred important policy changes, and reshaped attitudes around conservation.
We asked Colorado River experts Eric Kuhn, Jeff Lukas and Jim Lochhead to share five important takeaways from the 2002 drought, and what to know as we enter the warmer, drier months of 2026.
1. Reservoirs have memory
Reservoirs act as batteries for water availability, charged by inputs such as snowmelt, streams, rivers and precipitation.
“What you did two or three years ago can affect your water supply now,” said Eric Kuhn, former general manager for the Colorado River Water Conservation District. “So in a good year, if you are conserving, you are actually helping the system out for the next drought.”
The 2002 drought prompted municipal utilities to rethink their reservoir usage.
“Water managers and agencies have absorbed several lessons from 2002, including holding something back. They’re operating the reservoirs a little differently,” said Jeff Lukas, an independent climate and water researcher who has lived on Colorado’s Front Range for 40 years.
By conserving reservoir water, municipal utilities can maintain water storage for less abundant water years of the future. But as dry conditions have dogged the entire Colorado River basin for more than a quarter-century, the system’s buffer is gone.
“The biggest issue is that Lake Powell and Lake Mead were relatively full in 2002,” Kuhn said. Now, both Lake Powell and Lake Mead are at critically low levels, and the water scarcity is increasing the likelihood of multi-state litigation.
In 2002, drought was dealt with on a local level; water utilities were not thinking about drought in terms of the entire river system, but instead how to regulate municipal water use. This year’s dry conditions are pushing the whole region to the brink.
2. Conservation can make a big difference, if it is mandatory
Individual contributions to water conservation, adhering to local outdoor watering restrictions for example, can make a difference. Prompted by the 2002 drought, a 2004 University of Colorado study aimed to measure the effectiveness of water restrictions put in place by water providers on the state’s populated Front Range.
The study followed municipal water providers Thornton, Aurora, Westminster, Fort Collins, Boulder, Louisville, Lafayette and Denver Water, comparing 2002 usage to average water usage in 2000 and 2001. Researchers determined that water restrictions are most effective when mandatory. Mandatory restrictions in Lafayette reduced water usage by as much as 53%, according to the study.
The same study found that under mandatory restrictions, savings of expected water use per capita was as successful as 56%, while voluntary restrictions only measured up to 12%.
Outdoor watering represents a big slice of a city’s water budget, and 2002 showed utilities that in times of crisis people can rein in their use.
“Everyone should realize that they can make a small contribution to the solution,” Kuhn said. “Even though their individual contribution might be miniscule, when you add up all their neighbors and other people, it’s not miniscule. It’s very, very big.”
Watering a lawn once or twice a week, and not during peak hours, is a practical way to conserve water while keeping grass alive.
3. This is not a one-off year
It’s easy to shrug off a dry year and hope for wet weather’s return. But the long-term trends are concerning.
“This is really the 26th year of extreme drought,” said former Denver Water CEO Jim Lochhead. On a larger scale, the seven Colorado River basin states—Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming—have been preparing for worsening drought conditions since the shock of 2002. But river policy hasn’t kept pace with the aridification, leaving the region’s largest reservoirs at near record lows.
The Colorado River flows through canyons in northern Arizona in October 2020. (Ross Rice/The Water Desk & LightHawk)
“This has been a slow moving train that I think the states have known was coming, and they have frankly failed to do anything about it,” said Lochhead, who also represented the state of Colorado amid interstate Colorado River negotiations in the 1990s and early 2000s.
The Colorado Climate Center anticipates droughts to increase in severity and frequency, a trend that is only expected to continue in Colorado and across the Southwest as warming temperatures upend the water cycle.
“We should be managing and thinking about water, using water, as though it were always a drought,” Lukas said.
4. Communities have more practice dealing with drought, but still struggle
Drought conditions in 2002 led some municipal water utilities to organize and create incentives for conservation, and transformed the urban landscape, swapping grass for more drought-tolerant plants. Those water restrictions allowed municipal water providers to curb water demand while steadily growing in size. However, there is still room for improvement in disproportionately affected communities.
According to Lochhead, urban areas need to prioritize heat reduction in neighborhoods that have fewer trees in order to lessen the impacts of drought and warming temperatures. Using scarce water supplies to encourage tree-planting and increase shade should remain a priority.
“I think we need to work with those communities to enhance some landscaping,” Lochhead said. “Whether it’s the homeless population, whether it’s just kids that are out, whatever it may be, those areas are where they’re pretty hard hit by heat.”
Farmers and ranchers are used to riding the highs and lows of western weather. But extremely dry years like 2002, and now 2026, can push their operations to the limits.
“This is going to be a really tough year,” Lukas said. “You’re going to have a lot of people selling off their herds and taking insurance out because of low crop yields.”
The majority of Colorado’s annual water supply is used for irrigation, so any proposed restrictions can be costly for the agricultural community. “There are going to be a lot of farms and ranches that just can’t operate because they don’t have any water,” Lochhead said. “There are going to be some significant economic consequences.”
5. Stay aware, even if things seem bleak
For Lukas, this year and its predecessors test our expectations about what nature can provide.
Even in periods of prolonged drought, there are wet years. “Judging from history, that tends to put everyone back on their heels, a little complacent,” Lukas said, but maintaining water storage relies on year-to-year vigilance, not complacency.
Another primary concern during drought years is wildfire. With less moisture in the soil, dry vegetation acts as fuel for wildfire, which becomes harder to contain under hot and dry conditions.
“I worry a lot less about municipal water supply than I do about wildfire,” Lukas said. Many of Colorado’s notably dry years have also recorded severe and destructive wildfires.
It comes at no surprise that worsening drought falls in line with worsening wildfires. “Climate change is delivered to people through changes in the hydrologic cycle,” Kuhn said, so being aware of water usage now is just as, if not more important as it was in 2002.
This story was produced and distributed by The Water Desk at the University of Colorado Boulder’s Center for Environmental Journalism.
The federal government ordered Flaming Gorge water released and cuts to Lake Powell releases, to prevent collapse.
Last week, the federal government ordered emergency measures to prevent water levels at Lake Powell from falling so low that Glen Canyon Dam, which created the reservoir, could no longer generate power or deliver water downstream. Without this intervention, models showed that the reservoir could drop below safe operating levels in August, meaning that the river would not have a reliable way to flow past the dam. This would threaten water and power supplies for millions of people across the Southwest, as well as the flow of water through the Grand Canyon.
Westwide SNOTEL basin-filled map April 24, 2026.
Across the Colorado River Basin, an extremely low snowpack combined with a record-shattering March heat wave, have left water managers with few other options. The region’s reservoirs were already depleted from years of relying on wet winters to balance the growing demand with the ongoing drought.
Flaming Gorge Reservoir, on the Green River, straddles the Wyoming-Utah border south of Rock Springs. The Flaming Gorge dam, on the Utah side, was completed in 1964 and is a critical component of the Colorado River water storage system. The Green River, the chief tributary to the Colorado River, originates in the Wind River Range, flows to Flaming Gorge Reservoir, then connects with the Colorado River in Canyonlands National Park in Utah.
“This is a short-term solution,” said Jenny Dumas, water attorney for the Jicarilla Apache Nation, which sits near the border of Colorado and New Mexico. “It’s going to take time to recover these reservoirs before we can do this again. So while we can exhaust our reserves to avoid system collapse this year, it means reserves won’t be there next year.”
This is not the first time water managers have turned to Flaming Gorge to stabilize the larger river system. In 2022, the federal government ordered the reservoir to release 550,000 acre-feet to stabilize the downstream river system, which disrupted recreation and rattled upstream communities. This time, Reclamation has authorized releases of up to 1 million acre-feet. Over the next year, a third of the reservoir’s storage is expected to be gradually released. By September, water levels are projected to drop about 12 feet.
Flaming Gorge Reservoir stores water from the Green River in Wyoming, and is shared by Wyoming and Utah. Ted Wood/The Water Desk
“This is an unprecedented release volume — more than double the last time,” said Amy Haas, executive director of the Colorado River Authority of Utah, who briefed communities bracing for the releases at Flaming Gorge Reservoir. “We really just don’t know the actual impacts of these releases to surrounding communities, and our water users are struggling. My goodness, we are on target to become one of the worst water years on record. The forecasts are stunning to all of us.
The amount of water projected to flow into the river from snowmelt is rapidly declining. Over the first two weeks of April, forecasts for Lake Powell fell by 500,000 acre-feet. The spring forecast is shifting so quickly, some experts believe the releases from Flaming Gorge may need to increase.
“I think it’s a target, and they’re going to have to revise it,” said veteran water manager and researcher Eric Kuhn, who co-authored a paper last September predicting this kind of shortage and calling for action. “It’s many river miles from Flaming Gorge to Lake Powell. What are the transit losses?”
“Also, when March looked like June, what are June and July going to look like?” he added. “I could easily see that 1 million becomes 1.5 million acre-feet by March of 2027.”
Kuhn sees the emergency actions as a sign of broader failure to address the underlying issues that led to the current situation. “The Department of Interior no longer acknowledges that the fundamental problem is climate change. We’re dealing with the symptoms of the disease. We’re not dealing with the underlying problem,” he said. “The law of the river was written for a river that no longer exists from a hydrologic standpoint.”
In a meeting Tuesday, Upper Basin state commissioners acknowledged the need for emergency action but warned that this was not a long-term solution.
“I want to make darn sure people understand … the incredibly difficult, heartbreaking decisions that are having to be made with the lives of generations of cattle production, and farming communities in the Upper Basin states,” particularly in Utah, said Gene Shawcroft, Utah’s Colorado River commissioner.
Wyoming Commissioner Brandon Gebhardt reported that 13,000 acres of agricultural land in the South Piney drainage on the eastern slopes of the Wyoming Range had been cut off from water, adding that even some of the state’s oldest and most senior water rights — some dating to 1898 — will likely be impacted.
“We expect three of the five Flaming Gorge boat ramps in Wyoming will be rendered unusable, and low reservoir levels will have long-lasting negative impacts on reservoir fisheries,” said Gebhardt. “We recognize what we are approving today will have significant negative impacts on our water resources, local economies and recreation.”
Map of the San Juan River, a tributary of the Colorado River, in Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico and Utah, USA. Made using USGS National Map data. By Shannon1 – Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=47456307
Shortage is affecting more than agriculture and recreation. The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, for example, reported its sacred springs going dry, affecting ceremonies, and the tribal farm will have to operate with just 14% of its normal water supply. Meanwhile, the Jicarilla Apache Nation said it received just 25% to 35% of its contracted water allocation, leaving tribal leaders uncertain about whether they can divert enough water from the Navajo River to meet the community’s domestic needs.
With no sign of long-term agreement on how to manage the river past September, legal tensions among the basin states remain high.
Arizona’s Department of Water Resources released a statement agreeing with plans to order upstream releases to stabilize Lake Powell but also warning that the revised downstream releases were “substantially less than required under the 1922 Colorado River Compact,” referencing the foundational legal document dividing the river. “Failure to comply,” the release stated, “is itself a serious development that Arizona will assess and respond to accordingly.”
Upper Basin state commissioners plan to hold a special meeting to revisit the issue and vote on whether to continue emergency actions past August after assessing water levels and determining whether or not the releases are working.
Regardless of the possible legal battles, the reduced water in the river, infrastructure limits and political gridlock have left basin communities feeling uncertain about their future water security. After the planned releases from Flaming Gorge, if next winter brings another dry year, it is unlikely that upstream reservoirs will have enough water to stabilize Lake Powell.
The basin needs more than emergency actions, Dumas said. “We really want to emphasize the need for serious and permanent changes in how we use and manage the river to adjust to current and future hydrology.”
This story was produced by High Country News, in partnership with The Water Deskat the University of Colorado Boulder’s Center for Environmental Journalism.
Illustration from the report, “Antique Plumbing & Leadership Postponed” from the Utah Rivers Council, Glen Canyon Institute and the Great Basin Water Network. Courtesy of Utah Rivers Council
Click the link to read the article on the Aspen Public Radio website (Caroline Llanes). Here’s an excerpt:
April 21, 2026
The agency announced on April 17 that it would release between 600-thousand and one million acre feet of water from Flaming Gorge Reservoir on the Wyoming-Utah state line over the course of the next year. In addition, Reclamation will reduce the amount of water it sends from Lake Powell through Glen Canyon Dam, decreasing flows downstream through the Grand Canyon and into Lake Mead. Through September 2026, the agency will reduce its annual release volume from about 7.5 million acre feet of water to just 6 million acre feet.
Westwide SNOTEL basin-filled map April 23, 2026.
The drought contingency actions come in response to a water year that has been incredibly dire for the Western United States and the Colorado River Basin. Snowpack has been at record lows for much of the winter, which is bad news for a region that relies on snowmelt for much of its water use. The forecast for runoff into Lake Powell from the entire Upper Basin is forecast to be just 23% of normal. The agency estimates that these combined actions will boost Lake Powell’s elevation by 54 feet over the course of the year, bringing it to 3,500 feet in April 2027. Currently, Lake Powell’s elevation is about 3,528 feet. 3,490 feet is the elevation at which hydropower can no longer be produced at Glen Canyon Dam. Any lower, and water will not be able to enter the hydroelectric turbines. Instead, the water has to go through what’s called “river outlet works,” which are tunnels that bypass the turbines to get the water downstream to the Colorado River.
The back of Glen Canyon Dam circa 1964, not long after the reservoir had begun filling up. Here the water level is above dead pool, meaning water can be released via the river outlets, but it is below minimum power pool, so water cannot yet enter the penstocks to generate electricity. Bureau of Reclamation photo. Annotations: Jonathan P. Thompson
Seth Arens, a hydrologist at the Western Water Assessment, said Glen Canyon Dam was not designed to have the river outlet works as the primary way to get water out of the reservoir.
“When the Bureau of Reclamation has used those river outlet tubes, most of the times they’ve used them, there’ve been some damage to those tubes,” he said. “They’ve had to repair damages after relatively short uses, you know, a scale of weeks dumping water out of those.”
Environmental attorney Chris Winter said it’s clear Reclamation has to take emergency actions to protect its own infrastructure. But, he said the plan leaves a lot of uncertainty and unanswered questions.
“We’re not going to be able to release a whole bunch of water from Flaming Gorge Reservoir (next year) because that water will have been released this year, and it’s not going to refill if we get another dry year,” he said. “Releases of water from Upper Basin storage units, that’s like a one-time thing, unless we happen to get some wet years in the future.”
View below Flaming Gorge Dam from the Green River, eastern Utah. Photo credit: USGS
Flaming Gorge is currently about 82% full. Reclamation estimates that its plan will bring the reservoir down to about 59% of its full capacity over the next year. Other Upper Basin reservoirs are not part of the plan at the moment, due to poor forecasted inflows and low water levels. Blue Mesa Reservoir in Western Colorado is currently 47% full and Navajo Lake on the Colorado-New Mexico state line is 63% full. Winter said reducing flows out of Glen Canyon Dam could also lead to legal issues. The Upper Basin states of Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and New Mexico have not reached a deal with the Lower Basin states of Arizona, California, and Nevada on how to allocate water—and take cuts to usage in the midst of a changing climate—over the next 20 years. On top of that, reducing flows this year would mark a fulcrum point: the first year that the amount of water at Lees Ferry, just below Glen Canyon Dam, falls below the averages set by the Colorado River Compact of 1922.
As the Rio Grande dries out months early, water managers look to blessings, prayers and groundwater to save the acequias that have spread water, history and culture to farmers and families since the 16th century.
On a sunny spring morning at the end of March, a woman raised her little girl above an irrigation ditch that runs just west of the Rio Grande in Albuquerque’s South Valley. The toddler, with a braided head piece crowning her long, brown hair and artificial flowers around her neck, enthusiastically tossed an assortment of colored petals into the water below as a small crowd cheered.
It was part of a blessing ceremony at the headwaters of the Atrisco Acequia Madre (Atrisco Mother Ditch)—considered to be the oldest and most important of these irrigation canals in the area—during “Primera Agua,” an annual celebration that commemorates the first water flow of the season.
The day, sponsored by the Center for Social Sustainable Systems (CESSOS), a local advocacy group, was filled with traditional dances, songs, chants, blessings and speeches about community.But it also included acknowledgments of the water challenges that New Mexico faces.
New Mexico snowpack April 23, 2026.
This year, New Mexicans are confronting record-low snowpack, which is essential for supplying an even flow of water into acequia systems. Record heat isn’t helping, as it accelerates evaporation throughout New Mexico waterways and has contributed to an early melt off of the already thin snowpack.
At the March 29 Primera Agua event, temperatures were 14 degrees Fahrenheit above average in Albuquerque, and about a week earlier, the city set a record for the earliest 90-degree day of the year. Like much of the West, the city also experienced its warmest winter on record.
“Every year seems like it’s a new bar in terms of the record low,” Paul Tashjian, director of freshwater conservation for Audubon Southwest, said of the low water levels that were already hitting the state in late March. “But this year is almost like that on steroids…It’s not a pretty picture.”
Santiago Maestas, president of the South Valley Regional Association of Acequias, stands next to the Pajarito acequia in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Visual: Lourdes Medrano for Undark
“It’s in Your Blood”
New Mexico’s acequias date back to the late 16th century, when the Spanish colonized the region. By 1700, what would become New Mexico had around 60 of these community-managed irrigation ditches. Today, there are more than 700 active acequias in the state, many of them concentrated in Northern New Mexico.
The man-made, gravity-fed earthen canals transport snowmelt and river water to fields for flood irrigation. They each have a governing body called a “mayordomo” or “ditch boss” and elected commissioners who oversee maintenance, water distribution and conflict resolution.
Some areas have seen traditional acequias absorbed into larger water conservancy districts. The Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District (MRGCD), for instance, covers a 150-mile stretch of the Rio Grande from Cochiti to Bosque del Apache. Here, MRGCD diverts water from the river to the agency’s irrigation system, which delivers it to acequia headgates, where local groups take over.
Most acequias across the state, however, still operate as individual political subdivisions.
Dawn Nieto Gouy grew up in Albuquerque’s historic Los Duranes, a neighborhood where acequias such as the Duranes Lateral run alongside homes and agricultural fields.
“It’s in your blood. It’s in your soul,” Nieto Gouy said, describing the cultural significance of these waterways. She recalled playing with her best friend alongside an acequia near her home as a child.
“It was like I would spend almost a lifetime in a day getting from our house to the end, meeting at the acequia, running around barefoot and playing and bathing, doing whatever we did there,” she said. “And then the days would just run away from us.”
Despite their long history and cultural importance, acequias—and the people who depend on them—face an urgent threat from climate change. This year, New Mexico’s snowpack hit historic lows in early spring, dropping to around 20 percent of normal as of April 20. That record-low snow collided with warmer-than-usual temperatures—the state experienced its hottest March in recorded history, surpassing the old record by 4.4 degrees Fahrenheit—to produce this outcome.
People cross a bridge over the Atrisco Acequia Madre during the Primera Agua event in Albuquerque. Credit: Tina Deines/Inside Climate News
In Northern New Mexico, water rights holders—known as parciantes—expressed concern that the meager snowpack wouldn’t sustain the many acequias that weave through the region. One Santa Fe New Mexican reportdescribed the dire situation in the village of Truchas, where acequias were already running low at the start of the irrigation season.
Further south, MRGCD announced in late March that there may not be enough water this year to meet the needs of its 11,000 irrigators, including acequia parciantes. And as of March 27, the Rio Grande showed early signs of drying at the San Acacia reach, an area that typically begins to diminish in early summer.
“Historically, we used to talk about May as being a very early time to see that happen,” said Anne Marken, river operations manager for MRGCD, which oversees irrigation, drainage and river control for around 60,000-70,000 acres of farmland. “Last year it happened in April and we were all very shocked by that, but this year it happened in March.”
Praying for Rain
During times of water scarcity, acequia communities have long relied on sharing practices. Users may be assigned specific days or hours when they can access water, for instance. Similarly, MRGCD utilizes rotating water deliveries within its district—delivering water to different irrigators at different times, depending on availability—and is implementing that management strategy this year.
“Water users are strongly encouraged to take water when it is available, future opportunities may be uncertain,” the agency said in a press release.
Other than that, water managers and acequia parciantes across the state are praying for rain to help replenish the system and water fields.
“There’s not a ton of tools in our toolbox right now from a water management perspective,” Marken conceded, explaining her department is currently working in a run-of-the-river system, meaning that the only available water is what is in the river.
Map of the Rio Grande watershed. Graphic credit: WikiMedia
Click the link to read the article on the KJZZ website (Alex Hager). Here’s an excerpt:
April 21, 2026
The nation’s second-largest reservoir will get a boost to keep water levels from dropping too low, but the fix won’t last long…The Bureau of Reclamation will take water from Flaming Gorge Reservoir in Utah and Wyoming and send it downstream to Lake Powell. The agency, which manages major dams and reservoirs across the Western U.S., will also ratchet back the amount of water released from Lake Powell. The efforts are mainly focused at keeping Glen Canyon Dam running smoothly. If water levels drop much further, Lake Powell’s surface will fall below the intakes that pull water into hydropower generators within the dam…Water levels had been forecast to drop below the hydropower intakes level as soon as this summer…
Illustration from the report, “Antique Plumbing & Leadership Postponed” from the Utah Rivers Council, Glen Canyon Institute and the Great Basin Water Network. Courtesy of Utah Rivers Council
Reclamation’s plan will likely stave off catastrophe at Glen Canyon Dam, but it will do little to solve the problem that imperiled it in the first place. Climate change has left the river with less supply, and humans have not been able to adequately rein in demand.
“This action that’s being taken is a band-aid solution for a gaping wound,” said Eric Balken, executive director of the nonprofit Glen Canyon Institute. “It’s a short-term measure that does not get at the root of the problem, which is over consumption of water.”
The Grand Canyon survey party at Lees Ferry. Left to right: Leigh Lint, boatman; H.E. Blake, boatman; Frank Word, cook; C.H. Birdseye, expedition leader; R.C. Moore, geologist; R.W. Burchard, topographer; E.C. LaRue, hydraulic engineer; Lewis Freeman, boatman, and Emery Kolb, head boatman. Boatman Leigh Lint, “a beefy athlete who could tear the rowlocks off a boat…absolutely fearless,” later went to college and became an engineer for the USGS. The Grand Canyon survey party at Lees Ferry in 1923. (Public domain.)
It’s been a record dry winter across the West — and it’s making an already bad situation on the Colorado River even worse. If water levels get any lower, Lake Powell and the dam that holds it back could be in dire straits. So now, the federal government is stepping in to prop up water levels. But, as KJZZ’s Alex Hager reports, it could be a Band-Aid solution to a much bigger problem. Hager joined The Show to explain.
LAUREN GILGER: Good to have you. So, what’s the situation on Lake Powell right now after this really dry winter? Kind of a worst-case scenario almost.
ALEX HAGER: Well, right now water levels there are forecast to drop to dangerously low levels as soon as this summer. And when I say dangerous, that means we would start to see some of the infrastructure in Glen Canyon Dam, which is up in Page, Arizona, start to fail. So water levels are on track right now to drop below the intakes for the hydropower turbines that sit inside the dam. That means it would become difficult or impossible to spin them and make electricity for 5 million people across seven states. If water drops a little bit further than that, it might not be able to pass through the dam at all. We are already looking at — you know, if it falls below that hydropower intake, it could only travel through this little-used set of backup pipes. We don’t know that it could carry enough water through. You start to have all of these problems. So we are seeing some actions to prevent that from happening now.
LAUREN GILGER: OK. So tell us about those actions. This is the federal government sort of taking control of at least this aspect of it. What are they going to do?
ALEX HAGER: That’s right. The federal government is stepping in. It is kicking into action something of an emergency backup plan. It’s been done before, but it is definitely a backup plan. And they’re going to shuffle some water around. There is another big reservoir up in Utah and Wyoming called Flaming Gorge, and they’re going to release extra water from Flaming Gorge, send it down the Colorado River to help fill up Lake Powell. At the same time, they’re going to start tightening the tap on Lake Powell, meaning that less water comes out of it. That water will — less of it will flow into the Grand Canyon downstream to Lake Mead and downstream to us.
Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0
The back of Glen Canyon Dam circa 1964, not long after the reservoir had begun filling up. Here the water level is above dead pool, meaning water can be released via the river outlets, but it is below minimum power pool, so water cannot yet enter the penstocks to generate electricity. Bureau of Reclamation photo. Annotations: Jonathan P. Thompson
A bad year in the Colorado River Basin – barring a truly miraculous spring, probably the worst in recorded history. It is bad enough so the Bureau may have to stop creating power from the Glen Canyon powerplant by this coming fall. At that point, the only way to get water downriver from Glen Canyon Dam will be dribbling it through four outlet tubes that the Bureau is now wishing it had built differently (better) 65 years ago. And praying for enough precip to push the level back above the danger point for the turbines.
Meanwhile the negotiations between the seven basin states about the future distribution of the water remained at an impasse. One might think that a really bad year might generate some new thinking, but the two Basins are still debating Compact numbers like 7.5 million acre-feet for the Lower Basin with a river that might produce less than 5 maf this year, and maybe not much more than that more frequently in the future.
It should be obvious by now that any further negotiation between the states needs to have an independent facilitator guiding the discussion, pushing both factions to disassemble their own non-negotiables. A hard-ass facilitator speaking on behalf of river reality. [ed. emphasis mine]
It seems likely that we will go into the 2027 water year this fall with some new ‘interim plan’ for operating the river system for the water year that begins in October – probably some mix-and-match from the Bureau’s five alternatives proposed last year and ‘EISed’ while the seven states fiddled. The real purpose of the new interim plan will be to keep the infrastructure of the river system viable – dancing with the dead pool. This will probably impose serious delivery shortages on those below the Powell and Mead Reservoirs (meaning the Lower Basin), and also drop the Upper Basin’s rolling 10-year total closer to the 75 million acre-feet (maf) that will cause the ‘compact call’ threat to rear its ugly head.
Year-to-year might be the most honest approach now, anyway, getting a habit of feeling our way forward carefully, with our eyes wide open – woke, one might say. The managerial ‘need for certainty’ in projections may not be part of the future we’ve imposed on ourselves.
But that’s a good place to let the present sit and settle, and go back to the unfolding saga of the ‘Era of Conquest’ in this update of Fred Dellenbaugh’s Romance of the Colorado River. You may remember that in the last post here, I related that the Bureau of Reclamation, feeling much loved for the Boulder Canyon Project that watered, fed and powered a massive regional development in Southern California, came out of World War II ready to do the same for the Compact’s Upper Basin, in response to a mandate in the Boulder Canyon Project Act that a plan be developed for the development of the rest of the river.
There was, however, already quite a lot of development going on in the Upper Basin – at least in the state of Colorado, beginning in the 1930s, simultaneous with the Boulder Canyon Project.
Udall/Overpeck 4-panel Figure Colorado River temperature/precipitation/natural flows with trend. Lake Mead and Lake Powell storage. Updated through Water Year 2025. Note the tiny points on the annual data so that you can flyspeck the individual years. Credit: Brad Udall
To establish context – the whole Colorado River Basin was experiencing its first serious modern-times drought, even as the Great Depression was settling over the whole nation. After the ‘pluvial’ of water abundance in the first three decades of the 20th century, which convinced the water mavens that the river would deliver a dependable-enough flow of nearly 18 maf, the basin experienced its first 5 maf flow in 1933; by the end of the 1930s, there was reason to doubt that the river would ever again average 18 maf.
But Colorado had a special problem to resolve about Colorado River water distribution: the transdivide situation. I will not bore you again with my opinion of the imperial arrogance in randomly laying down straight line state boundaries in a region of great geographic and geological diversity. But what this created in the irrelevant rectangle called Colorado was like a blanket laid over a fence – the fence being the Continental Divide. West of the Divide, precipitation that fell (mostly snow in the winter) all ran off toward the Pacific Ocean in the Colorado River tributaries. East of the Divide, it all ran off toward the Atlantic in the Platte, Arkansas and Rio Grande Rivers. Because the weather mostly rode in on the prevailing westerlies, considerably more precipitation fell on the West Slope than fell on the East Slope. But the vagaries of cultural and economic development put most of the population and economic growth on the East Slope – ‘80 percent-20 percent’ is the rough ratio frequently used to describe the imbalance between water and population in the blanket dropped over the fence.
The distribution of water on both sides of the ‘blanket’ was governed by the appropriation doctrine as stated in the Colorado Constitution: all the water in the state belongs to the people of the state, subject to appropriation for individual use, and the right to divert ‘shall never be denied’ – with seniority among users determining the right to use the water in times of shortage. And by the turn of the century, challenges in water court had established the right to divert water from one basin to another.
As the drought of the 1930s settled in, farmers on the East Slope began to experience serious pressures on the water supply. And consistent with the optimism and technological advances of the early 20th century, this was not regarded as a fact of life to be acknowledged and adapted to, but as a problem to be addressed – in this situation, by moving water from the West Slope. A major task – but Franklin Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ efforts to alleviate the Great Depression offered the possibility of some help, through new agencies like the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Public Works Administration.
So when the Colorado General Assembly gathered early in 1933, two water project bills were in the hopper: one to divert an unspecified quantity from the Upper Colorado River in the Grand Lake area to the South Platte River basin, and one to divert an unspecified quantity from the Gunnison River to the Arkansas River basin.
Inhabitants of the West Slope, however, knew nothing about this until they read about it in the newspapers. And they were even more surprised that summer when construction actually began on two transdivide projects: the Denver Water Board began constructing a system of small canals high in the Fraser River headwaters (Upper Colorado tributary) to bring water to the Moffat railroad tunnel pilot bore, which the Water Board had leased from the railroad – an unused but already dug ‘pipe’ to the northern Denver area. And the sugar-beet industry led by Great Western Sugar was doing the same collection system in the headwaters of the Roaring Fork River above Aspen for diversion into a small tunnel to the Arkansas River basin. Both of those enterprises were self-funded.
All of this precipitated a regional West Slope meeting in Grand Junction of ‘water people’ – county commissioners and attorneys who were also all ranchers or farmers – at which a ‘Western Colorado Protective Association’ (WCPA) was formed, and a letter was drafted to the state engineer expressing concern that the proposed and in-process projects threatened the future development of the West Slope, and requesting inclusion in all future discussion of them.
The situation as the West Slope people saw it was not a ‘water grab.’ The leadership in the WCPA knew that the East Slope irrigators and city-builders were exercising a constitutional right in appropriating ‘the people’s water’ on the West Slope. They also knew that most of the Colorado River water left the state’s West Slope in an unmanageable snowmelt flood anyway, and it might as well go through a tunnel to the Front Range as through Grand Junction and on to – well, soon, on to enviable storage behind the great dam being built far downstream rather than its historical destiny of flowing on into the salty sea unused.
Storage! That was the key to the West Slope’s chief water problem, which was water available throughout the growing season for finishing as well as starting crops. West Slope engineers had been drafting up a number of reservoir-and-irrigation projects to present to the Bureau of Reclamation, but dams are expensive, and all of the proposed reservoirs served mountain-valley populations too small to pass the Bureau’s cost-benefit analyses.
So the concept of ‘compensatory storage’ for water lost through transdivide diversions became the WCPA’s central focus. And despite their small population, the WCPA had two good cards to play. One was the fact that New Deal federal funding distributed to the states had to be for projects approved by the entire state; the transdivide diversions that needed federal assistance needed for the basin of origin to be as happy as the basin of destination.
A image shows a guest column by Rep. Edward Taylor that appeared from the Steamboat Pilot in 1921. Graphic credit: Northern Water
The other card was a congressional representative, Edward Taylor, whom they had returned to Congress for 12 terms by 1933, and who had over that quarter-century ascended to chairmanship of the subcommittee that controlled the Interior Department budget in the powerful House Appropriation Committee. Congressman Taylor launched the WCPA’s ‘defensive offensive’ by saying that any project seeking federal assistance for a transdivide diversion would have to provide, as part of their project, an acre-foot of compensatory storage for the West Slope for every acre-foot to be diverted.
That was a large and very expensive demand. Taylor exempted Denver and its Moffat project from the mandate – because, he said, we all want to see ‘our capital city’ grow unrestricted. More likely, he knew that Denver could fund its own project and would at best just ignore him; he was not their congressman, and the Denver Water Board at that point was coming under the domination by their attorney, Glenn Saunders, a city-builder who envisioned a water supply for a ‘thousand-year city,’ most of which he thought would have to come from the West Slope. He just wanted the hicks to stay out of his way. (Not an exaggeration at all.)
Taylor could, however, impose his acre-foot-for-every-acre-foot demand on those seeking federal Public Works Administration funds or Bureau of Reclamation assistance. And that set up what is really an interesting story of people working out difficult problems they’ve imposed on themselves in draping a blanket over a fence and calling it a state, then adopting a wide-open appropriations doctrine for the distribution of a limited resource statewide. It’s a story with many moving parts that we don’t really have time for here in depth; I will note, however, that the whole story is told in my Water Wranglers book, the story of the development of Colorado’s share of the Colorado River. (Out of print, but copies supposedly in all Colorado libraries.)
The principal players in the story were the Western Colorado Protective Association (WCPA), led by Frank Delaney, a lawyer-rancher, and D.W. Aupperle, a Grand Junction lawyer and fruit grower; the South Platte Water Users Association (SPWUA), led by Charles Hansen, a newspaper editor in farm country and a couple lawyer-farmers; and of course the Bureau which wanted to do a big transdivide diversion to the South Platte River. And what turned out to be the ‘wild card,’ Congressman Taylor.
A seemingly endless series of meetings began between the WCPA and the SPWUA with the Bureau in attendance. There was fundamental agreement that, first, the East Slope had legal right to appropriate West Slope water, and second, that the East Slope owed the West Slope some compensation for diverting part of the West Slope’s base for future development. The challenge was arriving at the amount of compensation. The SPWUA wanted to divert more than 300,000 acre-feet from the Colorado River, for what became the Colorado-Big Thompson Project, but they did not see how (even if they could get some New Deal PWA financing) they could afford to also create that much West Slope storage. But the WCPA felt bound to support their congressman – without whom they really had no card to keep them in the game. Frustration and ire grew on both sides – compounded by having to travel back and forth either on the slow trains or drive on roads that were really ‘country’ (a major West Slope chronic complaint).
Finally, in the spring of 1936, Frank Delaney of the WCPA suggested a compromise. If the Bureau and SPWUA wanted to rush into construction, it would have to be Taylor’s acre-foot-for-an-acre-foot mandate. But if they could delay their project until the Bureau did a thorough study of what the loss of 300,000 af of free-flowing water (most of it annually leaving the state unused anyway) would be to the West Slope, and how much storage would actually compensate the West Slope users for that loss of spring runoff, the West Slope would accept that number (and work on getting Cong. Taylor to accept it).
The ‘Delaney Resolution’ broke the stalemate. The Bureau men spent months poring over existing rights and land maps (long before computers and spreadsheets), and came up with a need for 152,000 acre-feet of compensatory storage: 52,000 af to make sure that the Shoshone power plant water right above Glenwood Springs could be met year round (which would also ensure enough late season water for the Grand Valley farms and orchards), and 100,000 af for future irrigation and domestic water development.
That cut Taylor’s demand in two – and the Bureau planned to add a powerplant to the dam that would significantly reduce what the SPWUA would have to pay back. During this period, Taylor – an old man – was actually too sick to participate, and the Delaney Resolution was adopted for the Colorado-Big Thompson Project. (Taylor would die in office in 1941 – still believing that an acre-foot-for-every-acre-foot was what should be adhered to.)
Graphic credit: RogerWendell.com
The compromise process was codified as ‘Senate Document 80,’ part of the Colorado-Big Thompson Project Act passed in 1937. Senate Doc. 80 became part of all subsequent transdivide project planning – except where Denver was concerned; it wasn’t until the veto of Denver Water’s Two Forks Project half a century later that Denver Water finally conceded to take West Slope needs into account in its transdivide projects.
That process of working through a significant challenge to mutual benefit stands, in at least my mind, as one of the highlights of the Era of Conquest in the Colorado River region – a period not without occasional efforts measuring up to the often naive but high-minded vision driving the developers’ ‘romancing of the river’ – to bring deserts into bloom, to reshape unfriendly environments to accommodate individuals and their families willing to work at it. It is too easy to condemn that from this side where we reap the harvest of all the mistakes involved that they didn’t know about until they had made them.
Next post, we’ll look at what happened to that carefully forged intrastate resolution when serious Colorado River planning came to the Compact’s Upper Basin. Meanwhile – pray for monsoons, or just a good rainy spell.
Colorado transmountain diversions via the University of Colorado
A high desert thunderstorm lights up the sky behind Glen Canyon Dam — Photo USBR
Click the link to read the article on the AZCentral website (Debra Utacia Krol). Here’s an excerpt:
April 17, 2026
Key Points
The Colorado River system’s water storage has dropped to 36% of its capacity due to a warm winter and ongoing drought.
Water levels in Lake Powell are projected to fall below the minimum needed for hydropower generation by this fall.
Federal officials are considering moving water from other reservoirs and reducing downstream releases to prevent a shutdown at Glen Canyon Dam.
Within charts listing projections of water levels, inflow and outflow, and anticipated releases for 15 reservoirs in the Colorado River Basin, one message was clear: The river is in dire straits and conditions likely won’t get better anytime soon. The warmest winter on record, coupled with an ongoing drought, has produced dismal conditions for the West’s water lifeline, conditions reflected by the Bureau of Reclamation in its April 24-month report. The system’s storage has plunged to about 36% of its capacity, the agency said in a statement. More alarming in the near term is the threat to hydropower production at Glen Canyon Dam. Water levels in Lake Powell would drop too low to operate the turbines by fall, according to the latest projections, unless the federal government steps in…The situation at Lake Powell raised red flags: The giant reservoir’s “minimum probable inflow,” a measure of winter runoff, is projected to total just 2.78 million acre-feet, or 29% of the historical average, one of the lowest on record, the agency said. By September, projections show the reservoir could decline to below 3,490 feet above sea level, the minimum needed to power the turbines at Glen Canyon Dam that supply electric service to about 5.8 million households and businesses in the region…
Reclamation said it would consider all tools that are available to avoid water levels below 3,500 feet, including a plan to move water from Flaming Gorge Reservoir in Utah and reduce downstream releases from Powell. Flaming Gorge would give up between 660,000 acre-feet up to 1 million acre-feet over the next year. Lake Powell will release about 1.48 million acre-feet less than planned. The move will lower water levels in Lake Mead and potentially reduce Hoover Dam’s hydropower generating capacity by as much as 40%, and would impact recreation throughout the Lower Basin…
The Arizona Department of Water Resources said in its March drought report that most of the state’s snowpack is gone, melted during Arizona’s warmest March on record. The Arizona Drought Monitoring Technical Committee also published its latest three-month drought map, which showed most of the state listed as enduring exceptional drought conditions, the driest level.
On April 1, 2026, the Indian Peaks Band of the Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah, represented by the Native American Rights Fund, filed a Notice of Appeal and Petition for Stay with the U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA), challenging the Bureau of Land Management’s March 2, 2026, approval of the Pine Valley Water Supply Project.
The filing seeks review of BLM’s decision authorizing a large‑scale groundwater extraction and pipeline project in southern Utah and asks the IBLA to stay the project approvals while the appeal is pending. The Band argues that the decision violates federal law, including the National Environmental Policy Act, and unlawfully threatens the Band’s federally reserved water rights and culturally significant resources.
The Band’s former Reservation, which is on the ancestral lands of the Band, is located just a few miles west of the Pine Valley Water Supply Project’s proposed wellfield. The amount of water that the Cedar Valley Water Conservancy seeks to extract from the Pine Valley exceeds the amount of water available and will harm the Band’s water resources.
“These water resources are fundamental to our Band’s history, culture, and future,”said Chairwoman Tamra Borchardt-Slayton of the Indian Peaks Band of the Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah. “Federal law is clear that the Band’s water rights must be protected, and we are asking the Interior Department to do just that.”
The Indian Peaks Band holds federally reserved water rights associated with its former reservation lands under longstanding federal law. Those rights, which predate many other uses of water in the region, remain protected today and cannot be impaired by federal agency action. The appeal asserts that BLM failed to adequately consider these rights or uphold its federal trust responsibility to Tribal Nations before approving the project.
“Federal agencies have both a legal and moral obligation to protect Tribal water rights,” said NARF Staff Attorney Tom Murphy. “This appeal seeks to ensure that those obligations are honored for the Band’s water rights.”
The appeal and petition for stay were filed pursuant to 43 C.F.R. Part 4, which governs administrative appeals of BLM decisions. If granted, the stay would preserve the status quo and prevent construction or further project commitments while IBLA considers the merits of the appeal.
Difficult decisions for the Colorado River are starting to be made.
In what will be a defining year for the struggling watershed, the federal agency that manages the basin’s dams took unprecedented actions on Friday to store more water in Lake Powell in order to preserve hydropower generation and protect water-delivery infrastructure at Glen Canyon Dam that the agency says is at risk of damage due to low reservoir levels.
The April 17 announcement from the Bureau of Reclamation will also set in motion events that could result in first-ever lawsuits from Arizona, California, or Nevada against their upstream neighbors over water supply from the shrinking Colorado River.
The Central Arizona Project, which delivers Colorado River water to Phoenix and Tucson, called Reclamation’s actions “a band-aid” and urged the agency to release even more water from upstream reservoirs into Powell. CAP, because it has lowest water-rights priority in the lower basin, is the most vulnerable to proposed water cuts that would attempt to align water supply with demand.
“There is no time to delay,” Patrick Dent, CAP’s assistant general manager for water policy, told Circle of Blue two days before the announcement.
The Bureau of Reclamation will make two moves to support Lake Powell, the huge reservoir formed by Glen Canyon Dam that is less than 25 percent full and shrinking.
Utah, Colorado, Wyoming and New Mexico are asking the federal government to pause some releases from Flaming Gorge Reservoir, which straddles the border between Wyoming and Utah. The reservoir, pictured here in 2021, is the third-largest in the Colorado River system.
Reclamation’s first move is to release more water from Flaming Gorge, an upstream reservoir that is 82 percent full. With the consent of the four upper basin states, between 660,000 acre-feet and 1 million acre-feet will flow from Flaming Gorge into Powell over the next 12 months.
Reclamation previously used upstream reservoirs to prop up Powell in 2022-23, when some 463,000 acre-feet were released. These extra releases are supposed to be recovered if water supply conditions turn favorable. If more dry years are ahead, then the upstream releases will have been a one-shot intervention.
The agency’s second move is to hold back more water in Powell. Using authority granted in a 2024 decision, the agency will cut Powell’s water releases from 7.48 million acre-feet to 6 million acre-feet. This is the first time that Reclamation has invoked its Section 6(E) authority.
Water supply conditions in the basin worsened each month this year as hot, dry weather drained a meager snowpack that is on a downward trend due to manmade climate change. A heat wave in late March was the most extreme on record in the Southwest for that time of year. Inflows into Lake Powell this year are projected to be the lowest ever measured, breaking a record set in 2002.
The water elevation at Powell currently sits at 3,526 feet. Reclamation has stated that it will do what it can to prevent the reservoir from dropping below 3,500 feet. Hydropower generation stops at 3,490 feet. Without Reclamation’s announced interventions, that level is expected to be breached by August.
With the two interventions, Powell is projected, with average weather conditions, to remain above 3,500 feet by April 2027, but just barely. If the next 12 months continue to be hot and dry, more emergency actions might be necessary.
The back of Glen Canyon Dam circa 1964, not long after the reservoir had begun filling up. Here the water level is above dead pool, meaning water can be released via the river outlets, but it is below minimum power pool, so water cannot yet enter the penstocks to generate electricity. Bureau of Reclamation photo. Annotations: Jonathan P. Thompson
If Powell were to drop below 3,490 feet, water would have to be released through a smaller set of pipes called the river outlet works. Reclamation has said that using these pipes for extended periods of time is untested and risks damaging them.
Reducing outflows from Powell will have two effects. One is that Lake Mead, located downstream, will shrink more quickly, as will its hydropower output. Boating access will be more difficult.
The other consequence is the specter of litigation. The 1922 Colorado River Compact requires the four upper basin states – Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming – to deliver 75 million acre-feet over 10 years. Add in the upper basin’s share of the water required for Mexico and the figure rises to roughly 82.5 million.
Cutting Powell outflows this year to 6 million acre-feet will likely push the 10-year total below the required threshold.
Reclamation is not focusing on the legal implications, says James Eklund, a partner at Taft Law.
“Reclamation is essentially telling the basin states, ‘We are going to protect our billions of dollars’ worth of infrastructure, including Glen Canyon Dam, and if you believe that violates your compact entitlement, you know where the courthouse is’,” Eklund, a former Colorado River commissioner for Colorado, wrote to Circle of Blue.
States in both upper and lower basins have already set aside money for potential litigation or are considering it.
Still, a legal right does not necessarily mean the water is available, Eklund cautions. “No court can conjure acre-feet that aren’t in the reservoir.”
Udall/Overpeck 4-panel Figure Colorado River temperature/precipitation/natural flows with trend. Lake Mead and Lake Powell storage. Updated through Water Year 2025. Note the tiny points on the annual data so that you can flyspeck the individual years. Credit: Brad Udall
Click the link to read the article on The Denver Post website (Elise Schmelzer). Here’s an excerpt:
April 19. 2026
The multitude of water managers tasked with overseeing the drying Colorado River systemstand at a dire crossroads. As a years long stalemate in negotiations persists between the seven states that share the river, it’s become increasingly likely that the federal government will impose its own long-term plan, choosing from a range of proposals officials have outlined in recent months. But experts and water managers across the 250,000-square-mile Colorado River basin are raising the alarm about the five plans, questioning if any of them hold up under the new climate reality. They say the federal plans won’t keep the system from crashing in critically dry years — which are becoming more frequent — and could wreak chaos on the pivotal lifeline for 40 million people in the American Southwest.
“In every one of those alternatives, under what they call critically dry hydrology, the system is failing,” said Andy Mueller, the general manager of the Colorado River District, a taxpayer-funded agency based in Glenwood Springs that works to protect Western Slope water. “And critically dry hydrology is what we have continued to see consistently in the basin in the last 25 years and what we should expect going forward.”
[…]
In extremely dry years, the longer-term plans under consideration by Reclamation would allow the water levels of the system’s two main reservoirs to repeatedly fall below minimum power pool. Federal officials then would be forced to make recurring emergency cuts to the water supplies of the three states downstream of the reservoirs, creating uncertainty for millions of people and a massive agricultural industry…Letters from a number of Colorado entities — including the Northwest Colorado Council of Governments, irrigation districts, the Western Slope’s Club 20 and county commissions from a vast swath of the state — urged federal officials to present at least one plan that would hold up in extremely dry years.
“Sound science dictates that Colorado River management must evolve to handle a permanently drier future,” Tina Bergonzini, the general manager of the Grand Valley Water Users Association, wrote in her comments to the bureau. “The current federal preference for predictability is an atmospheric impossibility given that studies indicate rising temperatures have already slashed river flows by a fifth.”
[…]
The conflict on the Colorado is likely one of the world’s first major water policy overhauls to grapple with the reality of climate change, said Brad Udall, a senior water and climate research scholar at Colorado State University’s Colorado Water Center. In the past, Colorado River managers made operational tweaks and short-term deals to address drought. This time, it’s different.
“We’re not looking at an incremental step here,” Udall said. “We’re looking at a complete redo of how we operate this resource that affects 40 million people.”
Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0
Sometimes it feels like there are two parallel Southwestern United States out there.
One is naturally arid, is getting hotter and hotter by the year and is gripped by the most severe drought of the last millennium or more. Its water lifeline, the Colorado River system, is on the brink of collapse, and communities and farmers from Wyoming to Calexico are facing painful mandatory water cutbacks this summer.
And then there’s the other one, a sort of fantasy world, or maybe just an oblivious one, in which new water diversion projects like the Lake Powell Pipeline remain on the table, state leaders prepare to go to legal war to protect their states’ profligate water consumption, and a developer is breaking ground on a 2,300-acre “city within a city” called Halo Vista in North Phoenix.
Halo Vista’s developers are billing it as a companion development to TSMC’s $165 billion semiconductor fabrication facility complex. It will wrap around the industrial campus (thus the “halo” in the name), and plans call for some 30 million square feet of industrial, retail, office, research, and healthcare spaces along with 9,000 or more residential units.
“You have to think about all the people at full build-out who’ll work in this area — about 60 to 80,000 people,” Greater Phoenix Economic Council President Christine Mackay told AZFamily. “They’ll work in the Halo Vista science and technology park. They need restaurants, hotels, places to live — and places to shop for what they need.”
Historically, Arizona’s economy was said to run on five Cs: copper, cotton, citrus, cattle, and climate. Copper is still going fairly strong, most of the citrus groves have given way to housing developments, alfalfa has surpassed cotton, and the beef-cattle have been replaced by dairy factories. Now another C — computer chips — is being added to the mix, as the Phoenix-area experiences a semiconductor manufacturing boom and a coinciding data-center buildup.
The tech industry’s expansion is adding economic diversity, making the city somewhat less vulnerable to 2008-like financial breakdowns. But as Halo Vista demonstrates, it is also feeding Phoenix’s dominant economic force, the Growth Machine. And both the Growth Machine and the data center/semiconductor boom need water, and quite a lot of it. This, in turn, increases Phoenix’s exposure to future water shortages, which seem more and more likely with each passing day.
According to TSMC’s draft environmental assessment, the first phase of its Phoenix fabrication plants will initially use about 4.75 million gallons of water per day, or 5,320 acre-feet per year, which would jump to about 19,400 acre-feet yearly if and when all three phases are built out. But the company says it will eventually install a recycling system that will bring that number down considerably. The 9,000 residential units in Halo Vista would use about 2,800 acre-feet per year (based on Phoenix’s current per-capita water consumption multiplied by a rough estimate of 20,000 people occupying those residences). Halo Vista’s other industrial and commercial properties will consume an unknown additional amount of water.
So let’s say the whole development, including the “fabs,” will use about 25,000 acre-feet per year — less if the water efficiencies are realized, more if Halo Vista’s tech district includes data centers or other water-intensive industries.
That’s a lot of water, or a drop in the bucket, depending on how you look at it.
On the one hand it is equal to about one-fourth of Nevada’s total consumptive use from the Colorado River. Yes, the city of sin and excess only uses about four times more water than the TSMC/Halo Vista “city” will use.
On the other, it’s far less than the alfalfa farms in Maricopa County — in which Halo Vista is located — use for irrigation each year, which totals something like 500,000 acre-feet.1 And yet, Halo Vista/TSMC, once all built out in 20 years or so, will have a significantly larger economic output than a bunch of hay fields (which isn’t the only measure of value or even the most important one, and yet, well, water does flow uphill to money).
So yes, it is possible to sidestep water concerns by pulling out the “what about alfalfa” comparison. But it’s also not all that productive.
Halo Vista, which is being built on a plot of uncultivated state land in the desert, is not displacing an alfalfa farm’s water use. Rather, it represents a new water use piled on top of existing consumption. The water will come out of Phoenix’s municipal system, and therefore officially has an “assured and adequate” 100-year water supply, which is necessary in Arizona for this sort of development.
Yet there’s nothing assured about Arizona’s water future. Phoenix’s water comes primarily from high priority rights on the Salt and Verde Rivers, and from the Colorado River via the Central Arizona Project. But those rights will hardly matter if the rivers dry up: This year’s Salt River Basin meagre snowpack had vanished by March 1, spring runoff peaked weeks ago, and flows are rapidly falling. Meanwhile, the Central Arizona Project has relatively low priority rights, meaning it will be the first to take cuts as the river shrinks.
In other words, aridification and the Colorado River crisis pose an existential threat to Phoenix’s tech boom and, well, Phoenix, itself, which is one of the reasons Arizona Gov. Katie Hobbs is preparing for a bitter legal fight with the feds and the Upper Basin states over the Colorado River.
The good news for the developers and the semiconductor makers is that agriculture continues to use a lot of water in Arizona. And where there is large consumptive use, there is also more room for increased efficiencies and, if it comes to it, “buying and drying” the farms for their water — which has its own negative consequences. The bad news is that the shortages to come may very well exceed the amount that could be wrung out of the existing farms.
Halo Vista, which is on a 20-year buildout schedule, is far from the only major water- and energy-guzzling development on slate for the increasingly arid West. And maybe it’s not realistic to expect all such development to come to a screeching halt simply because the water may run out sometime in the future. After all, climate change could cause more precipitation; maybe in 20 years we’ll be worrying more about flooding than desiccation.
But you would think that planners and policymakers and the developers would at least act in line with our current reality, where resources, especially water, are limited. Halo Vista-esque projects should be required not just to certify an “assured” 100-year supply, but they also should have to offset new consumption with cuts somewhere else, whether it’s paying for farmers to install drip irrigation or funding treated wastewater recycling projects.
Continuing to consume water at current rates is one thing. Adding new uses on top of our current overconsumption is quite another.
***
And so it begins. It looks like residents of the small Arizona community of Kearney may lose their water altogether later this summer, making developments like Halo Vista look even more surreal.
The town sent this emergency memo out to residents in April:
Kearney sits in Arizona’s “Copper Triangle” along the banks of Gila River and in the proverbial shadow of the Hayden copper smelter smokestack. The town was established by the Kennecott Mining Company in 1958 to house residents displaced from Ray, Sonora, and Barcelona as the mine’s gaping Ray mine pit gobbled up the communities. Resolution Copper’s proposed Oak Flat mine is also nearby, as is Faraday’s proposed Copper Creek project.
Kearney has a maximum allotment of 610 acre-feet of water from the Gila River. This year, however, extreme drought conditions have brought the allotment down to just .76 acre-feet, forcing the town to impose severe restrictions on use to try to make it last until the monsoon arrives.
As for all the mines surrounding Kearney? I’m guessing their dealing with their own water issues, but I’d also wager that they’re allowed a heck of a lot more than three-fourths of an acre-foot.
Condors perched on steel girders some 450 feet above the Colorado River. Jonathan P. Thompson photo.
🐟 Colorado River Chronicles 💧
In the comment section on the last Land Desk dispatch, reader wkarls reported on the Colorado River’s flows during a recent raft trip on the Grand Canyon. It got me to thinking about how low those flows might go and what that could mean.
I’ve only boated down the Grand Canyon once, back in October and November of 1995 with a group of slightly crazy Salida rafting folks. It was a beautiful, terrifying, sublime — if somewhat debauched — experience. During the trip, releases from Glen Canyon Dam — which make up about 95% of the flow in the Grand Canyon — fluctuated between 11,000 and 16,000 cubic feet per second, a number that was bolstered downstream after a good rainstorm moved through, turning the river that intimidating blood-and-chocolate-milk color. That seemed like plenty of water to me; it was certainly enough to generate waves big enough to toss our little rafts about like toys (did I mention it was scary as hell?).
Somewhat surprisingly, the releases were about the same in September of last year, bouncing between 10,000 and 16,000 cfs, which appears to have been an effort to get the annual flows past Lees Ferry up to about 7.5 million acre-feet to keep the Upper Basin in compliance with the Colorado River Compact’s non-depletion obligation. Then, on Oct. 1, the beginning of the 2026 water year, releases plummeted. This spring they’ve been in that 7,000 to 9,000 cfs range that wkarls mentioned.
That’s in line with the Bureau of Reclamation’s plan to release just 6 million acre-feet from the dam this water year: 6 million acre-feet per year averages out to about 8,200 cfs. That’s also right in line with the Grand Canyon Protection Act’s operating criteria, which set a minimum allowable release during the day (between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m.) at 8,000 cfs, while the minimum nighttime release is 5,000 cfs.
So, given all of that, we can assume that the flows shouldn’t drop much below current levels this summer. Of course, if conditions are worse than expected, then the reservoir could drop to 3,500 feet earlier than anticipated, which could force dam operators to further curtail releases to “defend” minimum power pool. If so, then you might see nighttime releases drop as low as 5,000 cfs. If that’s not enough, then I suppose dam operators would have to go to a run-of-the-river scenario, where flows could plummet to 2,000 or 3,000 cfs, which would make rafting quite interesting.
📸 Parting Shot 🎞️
Colorado River at/around Lees Ferry in autumn 2024, when Glen Canyon Dam releases were around 8,000 cfs.
Colorado River at/around Lees Ferry in autumn 2024, when Glen Canyon Dam releases were around 8,000 cfs.
Colorado River at/around Lees Ferry in autumn 2024, when Glen Canyon Dam releases were around 8,000 cfs.
The Mexican Hat uranium tailings repository on the Navajo Nation holds contaminated waste from uranium mills in Utah and Arizona. The Navajo Nation has raised concerns about its proximity to the San Juan River, a source of drinking water. Russel Albert Daniels/High Country News
Last fall, constructionon the Velvet-Wood uranium mine broke ground in the sandstone deposits of San Juan County, Utah. It’s the first mine that the federal government has permitted under a new expedited “emergency” process that allows projects to go through the environmental review required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in just 14 days, a process that previously took months or even years. Tribal governments were given just seven days to offer feedback, and the standard public comment period was eliminated owing to the project’s “emergency” status. In the past, both tribes and the public had at least 30 days give input.
The mine is located in an area already deeply scarred by uranium mining, where the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe has long opposed the White Mesa Uranium Mill, which abuts the community. During the weeklong tribal comment period, six nations shared their concerns with the Bureau of Land Management, citing the expedited process and possible water contamination from the mine’s activities. No changes were made to the project, however.
Earlier this year, in addition to mandating expedited “emergency” processes for NEPA reviews, the Trump administration finalized its proposed elimination of standards — including public comment periods — for how federal agencies carry out NEPA environmental reviews for large-scale projects on public lands. The changes came without consultation with tribal nations and despite their strong opposition.
Water towers in White Mesa, Utah. The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe has long opposed the neighboring White Mesa Uranium Mill. Six tribal nations warned the Bureau of Land Management about possible water contamination from the new Velvet-Wood uranium mine, but no changes were made to the project. Russel Albert Daniels/High Country News
“The announce-and-defend method of developing federal Indian policy is an inappropriate, paternalistic, unjustified, and historically inefficient method of decision-making,” the National Congress of American Indians and National Association of Tribal Historic Preservation Officers said in a joint letter. Eliminating previous standards “ignores federal trust and treaty responsibilities, impinges on roles and sovereignty of Tribal Nations, and flouts longstanding policy and practice by failing to consult with Tribal Nations.”
The federal government is legally required to consult with tribal nations on rules and policies that affect them, but so far the Trump administration has regularly bypassed consultation requirements or sped through them in order to accomplish its “energy dominance” agenda on tribal nations’ ancestral lands. Altogether, the changes represent a shift in the way that tribal nations — and the public — are able to have a say in how land in the Western U.S. is managed.
A map of the upcoming Thacker Pass mine in northern Nevada. The federal government has bought stakes in mining companies, including the company behind the Thacker Pass lithium mine in Nevada, which is opposed by some tribal nations and Indigenous communities. Image used courtesy of Lithium Americas
FROM THE START, agencies under Trump have changed or revoked rules and policies to prioritize extraction, citing the so-called energy “emergency.” The BLM and the Forest Service rescinded the Public Lands Rule and the Roadless Rule without tribal consultation, even though both decisions have major implications for tribes’ ability to protect natural and cultural resources on public land. Meanwhile, the administration is seeking to “streamline” Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, one of the most useful tools tribal nations have for ensuring government consultation. Changes are also proposed for Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, which enables tribes to review the impacts of extractive projects within reservation borders before a federal agency permits the project.
“It’s all predicated on something that isn’t true: We don’t have an energy emergency,” said Gussie Lord, managing attorney at Earthjustice’s Tribal Partnerships Programs. Chipping away at public input and tribal consultation will only exacerbate issues that tribal nations face, Lord said. “A lot of their resources, their cultural and environmental resources often are one and the same. The existing laws and regulations that we have are already insufficiently protective of tribal rights and resources.”
The administration’s changes to the NEPA review process took effect immediately last year, also without consultation. Under the Biden administration, the Council on Environmental Quality spent three and a half years updating the implementation regulations by consulting with tribal nations and the public, incorporating provisions requiring agencies to consider climate change and environmental justice impacts when reviewing projects. NEPA applies to all federal agencies, meaning that each agency has to come up with its own implementation guidelines. Tribes and experts worry that, under the new guidelines, agencies may not be compelled to work with tribes.
According to University of Arizona professor of law Justin Pidot, who previously served as general counsel for the White House Council on Environmental Quality, the resulting uncertainty could have serious consequences. “One is the agencies don’t know how to work together. The second is that there’s litigation risk. The third is that project sponsors don’t know what they’re supposed to do,” Pidot said. The removal of those standards “creates lots of complexity for the public, for tribes, for states, for local governments, for nonprofits.”
Under the Interior Department’s new interim set of standards, for example, reviews for something like a mining project will take 28 days. When the “emergency” declaration is added, it could take just 14 days, as it did with the Velvet-Wood mine. Past reviews could take up to four years. “It substantially limits the degree of information flowing from the federal government to the public about big projects, including to tribes,” Pidot said. “What is surprising about this particular decision of theirs is that having a common set of rules makes sense for everyone.”
In comments to the Council on Environmental Quality about the elimination of the NEPA standards, many tribal nations expressed similar concerns. (See sidebar.) Tribes said they were not consulted, and that while dealing with numerous agencies and their different processes was burdensome, the removal of the regulations weakens the whole purpose of NEPA. The National Congress of American Indians and other organizations noted that some streamlining and deregulating could prove useful — but not when tribal perspectives were excluded from the process.
Last year’s federal budget cuts and mass layoffs further complicate matters, affecting agencies’ ability to carry out their work. Meanwhile, congressional budget cuts impacted funding for, among other things, tribal historic preservation officers, which are key to carrying out government-to-government consultation. The idea seems to be to “drown people in an avalanche while providing them with no resources to meet the moment, and call that consultation and collaboration,” Pidot said.
At the same time that the federal government has moved to reduce public and tribal input, it has also been buying stakes in mining companies, including the two companies behind controversial projects opposed by some tribal nations and Indigenous communities: the Thacker Pass lithium mine in Nevada and the Ambler Road project in Alaska. “It’ll be interesting to see if their approval processes for mines in which the federal government has a stake is quicker than it otherwise would have been,” Lord said.
Pidot summed it up this way: “The big theme is that anything and anyone that stands in the way of the kinds of projects that this administration wants to do is an obstacle to progress that they’re going to overrun.”
The Daneros uranium mine in the Red Canyon uranium mining district in San Juan County, Utah. All uranium ore mined from this area travels through Bears Ears National Monument. Russel Albert Daniels/High Country News
Gay Mine, a former phosphate mine and current Superfund site on Fort Hall Reservation, in 1948. P1972-201-101. Courtesy of Idaho State Archives
Tribes’ perspectives on changes to nepa implementation
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, ID “On the Fort Hall Reservation are environmentally hazardous sites created prior to modern-day NEPA protections. … By stripping away NEPA’s provisions for public participation and environmental review, the federal government would further entrench long-standing historic inequities that have disadvantaged Tribal communities.”
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, MT “CEQ (Council on Environmental Quality) states that it does not need to consult with Tribes. … This is a tortured and disingenuous reading of EO 13175, in part because it focuses almost exclusively on a federal view of economic impacts on Tribal governments rather than the universe of environmental impacts.”
Susanville Indian Rancheria, CA “The proposed removal of these regulations represents a significant step backward in our nation’s commitment to environmental protection and tribal sovereignty.”
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, SD “CEQ is ignoring its established policy of including indigenous traditional ecological knowledge in environmental reviews under NEPA. These issues that have been part and parcel of the implementation of NEPA for decades, such as the consideration of impacts to environmental justice communities, the cumulative effects of projects, and climate change, are being arbitrarily cast aside in contravention of explicit statutory language.”
Bishop Paiute Tribe, CA “Our traditional and ancestral lands extend far beyond the exterior boundaries of our reservation, and the natural resources on these lands are not merely commodities to be exploited. They are vital to the cultural, spiritual, and economic fabric of all Tribal communities, sustaining traditions that have endured for generations.”
Tulalip Tribes, WA “The lack of consultation exacerbates the already existing power imbalances, further diminishing the ability of tribes to exercise meaningful sovereignty and protect their interests.”
Nez Perce Tribe, ID “The Tribe strongly objects to CEQ’s Proposed Rule, which eviscerates the framework that has been relied upon since CEQ first issued NEPA regulations in 1978.”
Big Pine Paiute Tribe, CA “The interim final rule sidesteps NEPA … as it endorses Donald Trump’s personal agenda. The USA is a country of laws, not a place where one’s personal agenda may supersede the law.”
Native land loss 1776 to 1930. Credit: Alvin Chang/Ranjani Chakraborty
The AVC agreement stores water down-river in the Pueblo Reservoir, built after President John F. Kennedy signed legislation authorizing the Fry-Ark agreement in 1962. Photo courtesy of the City of Aurora.
In April and May of each year, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (which operates the Fry-Ark Project) and the Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District (SECWCD), which handle allotments of this water, make forecasts about the amount of water that can be imported through the Fry Ark Project. According to Chris Woodka, Senior Policy and Issues Manager, Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District (SECWCD), the 20-year average for imported water is 60,000 acre-feet per year. On April 1, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation forecast importing barely ten percent of that, only 6,500 acre-feet in 2026. This is the least amount imported since the system became fully operational in the late 1970’s.
Also on April 1, the SECWCD projected allocating 4,600 acre-feet of those 6,500 acre-feet to water right holders. However, with the current snowpack, at this time it is not known if there will be any allocation this year. If not, the imported water will be held in storage in one of the Fry Ark Project’s reservoirs.
Fryingpan-Arkansas Project via the Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District (Click to enlarge)
Long-term drought has reduced Colorado River system storage to about 36 percent of capacity, and the combination of the lowest snowpack on record and record-breaking March heat has further intensified drought conditions across the Basin. These compounding factors are creating elevated risks to essential water and power infrastructure that supply water to more than 40 million people, underscoring the need for immediate action.
Lake Powell’s water year minimum probable inflow is forecasted at just 2.78 million acre-feet—29% of historical average and one of the lowest on record. Reclamation’s April “24 Month Study” projects Lake Powell may decline to below 3,490 feet—the minimum power pool level—by August 2026 without major intervention. If Glen Canyon Dam declines below 3,490 feet, water releases would be only through the river outlet works, which could cause operational issues, uncertainty for users, downstream impacts, instability in regional power and water supplies, and a reduction in power generation.
Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum met with Governors for the seven basin states, Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming, and their designees again today to discuss the concerning hydrology and plans for operations.
“I am grateful for the Governors and their teams working diligently to find a solution to the complex challenges created by these unprecedented drought conditions which require immediate action,” said Interior Secretary Doug Burgum. “Interior and Reclamation continue to coordinate with the basin states, tribes, Mexico and basin stakeholders as we make the decisions necessary to operate and protect the system.”
To stabilize the system, Reclamation is moving quickly and initial plans include adding up to about 2.48 maf of water to Lake Powell by moving water from the upstream Flaming Gorge Reservoir and by reducing releases from Lake Powell. [ed. emphasis mine]
Through the 2019 Drought Response Operating Agreements, Reclamation is intending to release 660,000 acre-feet to 1 maf from Flaming Gorge Reservoir from April 2026 through April 2027. In addition, Reclamation is intending to reduce the annual release volume from Lake Powell to Lake Mead by 1.48 maf—from 7.48 maf to 6.0 maf—through September 2026 by utilizing section 6E of the Record of Decision from the final 2024 Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for near-term Colorado River Operations.
Together, these actions are expected to increase Lake Powell’s elevation by approximately 54 ft to at least elevation 3500 feet by April 2027. Through the current, ongoing DROA process, the basin states, tribes and partners continue to provide feedback related to the proposed releases. A final decision will be coming next week.
Flaming Gorge Reservoir now holds about 3.1 maf of water, which is 83% full. These actions are expected to lower the reservoir’s elevation by roughly 35 feet over the next year to approximately 59% of capacity. This will have no effect on contracted water rights at Flaming Gorge or Lake Powell. No additional releases from the other upstream initial units of the Colorado River Storage Project Act—Blue Mesa and Navajo reservoirs—are planned at this time, due to their low water levels and poor forecasted inflows. [ed. emphasis mine]
“Given the severity of the risks facing the Colorado River system, it is imperative that we take action quickly to protect a resource that supplies water to 40 million people and supports vital agricultural, hydropower production, tribal, wildlife, and recreational uses across the region,” said Assistant Secretary – Water and Science Andrea Travnicek. “As we weigh current conditions and prepare for future operations by working with states, tribal nations and stakeholders, the Department of the Interior and Reclamation remain fully committed to taking the actions necessary to reduce impacts on water deliveries, safeguard critical infrastructure, and preserve as much operational flexibility as possible.”
Basin-wide impacts
Reclamation acknowledges that the proposed reduced releases from Lake Powell will accelerate the downstream decline of Lake Mead, with the potential for up to an additional 40% reduction to Hoover Dam’s hydropower generating capacity as early as this fall. Reclamation and its lower basin partners are collaborating to conserve water in Lake Mead and maintain its water levels, even as releases from Lake Powell are planned to decrease.
The initial proposed drought response actions may also impact recreation across multiple sites. At upstream reservoirs, boating access may be reduced earlier in the season than normal. In the Grand Canyon, lower flow rates will affect rafting conditions, and fishing may be more challenging. At Lake Mead National Recreation Area, reduced water levels may further limit boating access. Reclamation is working with reservoir recreation management partners now and as the summer progresses.
The 2026 operational challenges come at a time of transition as the existing agreements that guided the operations of the Colorado River for the last two decades are set to expire at the end of the year. As we approach the new water year on October 1, the seven basin states have not reached consensus on a new operating framework. With time running out, there is a need for extraordinary collaboration for 2027 and beyond. In the absence of a consensus and following the completion of the NEPA process, the Interior Department will be prepared to determine operations for Post 2026 later this summer to provide certainty and stability for the Colorado River Basin.
To learn more about the Interior Department’s or Reclamation’s activities around the Colorado River, please visit the Colorado River Basin website.
Colorado River “Beginnings”. Photo: Brent Gardner-Smith/Aspen Journalism
The Colorado River passing Grand Junction, Colorado. Photo by Robert Marcos.
Click the link to read the article on the Summit Daily website (Ali Longwell). Here’s an excerpt:
April 13, 2026
Despite pressure from Colorado’s congressional delegation, around $140 million in federal funding previously granted to Western Slope water projects has lingered in limbo for nearly 16 months. The funds, awarded to 17 Western Slope projects in the final days of President Joe Biden’s administration, were part of the Inflation Reduction Act’s drought mitigation grant opportunity for the Upper Colorado River Basin. This included $40 million granted to the Colorado River District to aid in its purchase of the Shoshone water rights, the oldest and largest non-consumptive right on the Colorado River tied to the hydropower plant in Glenwood Canyon. Three days after the awards were announced, President Donald Trump took office, and his Day 1 order, “Unleashing American Energy,” called for all federal agencies to “immediately pause the disbursement of funds appropriated through the Inflation Reduction Act.” In June, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation released funds for two of the projects in the Orchard Mesa Irrigation District in Palisade, but the rest remain frozen.
“The funding has not yet been released, and that’s a real concern given current conditions across all of Colorado, but particularly western Colorado,” said Rep. Jeff Hurd, a Republican representing Colorado’s third district spanning the Western Slope, in an interview on Thursday, April 9. “I am continuing to press hard for clarity on timing and next steps because those projects were awarded for a reason and the need has not gone away.”
The Inflation Reduction Act set aside $4 billion toward drought mitigation, including funds for the Bureau of Reclamation’s Upper Colorado River Basin System Conservation and Efficiency program, also known as the Bucket 2E funding. In January, the Bureau under Biden’s administration allocated a total of $388.3 million to 42 projects on tribal land and in states in the Upper Basin.
Shoshone Falls hydroelectric generation station via USGenWeb
This included $152 million for 17 projects in Colorado, including those for wildlife habitat, watershed and stream restoration, water infrastructure improvements and more. Only $12 million of this funding for two Orchard Mesa Irrigation District projects — meant to improve water delivery to the 15-mile reach of the Colorado River, which extends from Grand Junction and the confluence of the Gunnison River and serves as critical habitat for several endangered fish species, as well as install new metering technology in the Grand Valley — has been released to the awardees. The largest Colorado award was the $40 million promised to the River District, which represents 15 Western Slope counties. This funding represented a large chunk of the $98.5 million that the River District needs to purchase the Shoshone water rights from Excel Energy. Outside of the frozen federal dollars, the River District has raised $57.2 million from the state Legislature, its board and the various Western Slope municipalities and utilities it serves. Matt Aboussie, Colorado River District’s communications director, said the district continues to work closely with the Bureau of Reclamation to secure this promised funding and remains committed to securing the rights.
“Funding will not be the obstacle that stops this effort,” Aboussie said. “If needed, River District leadership is prepared with alternative funding options and continues to rely on all our communities to get this project across the finish line.”
Elkhead Reservoir is taking center stage following a winter of historically low snowfall, leaving water managers with hard decisions and water users with a high degree of uncertainty. Courtesy Photo/Colorado Parks & Wildlife
A historically dry winter is setting up what water officials describe as one of the most challenging runoff seasons in recent memory, with operations and allocations at Elkhead Reservoir expected to play a critical role in stretching limited supplies across Northwest Colorado….That challenging outlook [ed. snowpack and streamflow in 2025] and lessons learned from past years with low snowfall are key focal points in early planning and coordination among water managers, particularly for reservoirs like Elkhead, which serves irrigators, municipalities and environmental needs in the Yampa River Basin…Calahan said warm, dry conditions have dramatically accelerated snowmelt, raising the likelihood of a runoff season that arrives early, fades quickly and leaves water managers facing difficult decisions for a wide range of stakeholders…In a more typical year, gradual warming allows the snowpack to melt slowly, sustaining river flows well into summer. This year, however, that prolonged runoff is not materializing, which is already increasing pressure on stored water supplies. While late spring storms or summer monsoons could provide some relief, officials do not expect conditions to return anywhere near an average water year. That uncertainty leaves reservoir managers balancing how much water to store versus how much to release to meet downstream demand.
The Central Arizona Project canal, which carries Colorado River water to Phoenix and Tucson, as it runs past fields in the desert (that are irrigated with groundwater, not CAP water). The CAP is not likely to see new cuts this year beyond the levels already imposed. Source: Google Earth.
With each passing April day without major snowfall, we gain more clarity on the Colorado River situation and what things might look like this summer, which is, in a word, grim. Or, as Arizona’s top water officials put it: “The winter and spring snowpack and runoff projections in the upper basin are abysmal.”
The Colorado River Basin Forecast Center is putting a number to that term by predicting that the Colorado River system will deliver about 1.4 million acre-feet1 of water to Lake Powell from April 1 through July 31. That’s about 23% of the median for the spring runoff season, which is when flows are most abundant, and just over half of last year’s not so great figure of 2.6 MAF.
This year’s Upper Colorado Basin spring runoff is forecast to be about 1.4 million acre-feet. That isn’t as low as 2002, which was just below 1 million acre-feet, but if conditions don’t improve it could fall even lower than that. Source: Colorado River Basin Forecast Center.
Believe it or not, that figure — the official 50% forecast, made by an actual person — may be optimistic. Over the last two weeks, the Ensemble Streamflow Prediction model (which is a constantly updating automated forecast) has come up with an even more dire outlook, downgrading the forecast to 1.16 MAF during that same time period.
Abysmal, indeed.
We’re also getting a little more information as to how the feds plan to address the crisis, at least in the near-term. Most significantly, they tentatively plan to “defend” minimum power pool at Glen Canyon Dam, which is to say they will do what it takes to keep the surface level of Lake Powell at or above 3,500 feet in elevation to avoid relying on the lower river outlets, which are not engineered for sustained use. The weapons they will use for this defense include:
Reducing Lake Powell releases from the planned 7.48 million acre-feet to 6 million acre-feet.
Releasing up to 1 MAF from the “Upper Initial Units,” which includes Flaming Gorge, Blue Mesa, and Navajo Reservoirs. Hydrology may make this impossible, however, meaning that these releases could be as low as 650 MAF .65 MAF (or 650,000 acre-feet).
For now, Interior is not asking for larger cuts from the Lower Basin (beyond the 1.5 MAF cuts they’ve already taken), which presumably means the feds will not reduce Lake Mead releases through Hoover Dam.
But will it be enough to avoid dipping below what I call de facto deadpool at Lake Powell? We won’t really know until later this summer, but a fairly simple calculation can help predict that future. Keep in mind that I’m no hydrologist, I’m just working with the numbers that are available to see whether potential inputs (Lake Powell inflows) are at least equal to planned outputs (Glen Canyon Dam releases).
I put together this little diagram to help visualize things. I know the text is tough to read in the email version, and especially if you’re reading this on your phone. So I’d suggest clicking on the image (or the headline of this post) and viewing it in the web version.
Simplified diagram of Glen Canyon Dam with inputs (on the right) and outputs (on the left). *Fish pool is the surface level scientists have deemed necessary for minimizing the potential of non-native bass escaping through the dam and propagating downstream, where they can compete with endangered native fish. Infographic by Land Desk using data from Bureau of Reclamation and the Colorado River Basin Forecast Center.
Here are the figures for the equation.
Inflows:
1.5 MAF: Lake Powell Storage available above 3,500 feet.
1.1 MAF to 1.4 MAF: Forecast Lake Powell inflows April-July
.65 MAF to 1 MAF: Planned releases from upper basin reservoirs.
TOTAL INFLOWS: 3.25 to 3.9 MAF
Outflows:
2.9 MAF: April 1 – Oct. 1 releases to reach 6 MAF for the water year (3.13 MAF has already been released)
.3 MAF: Rough estimate of evaporation from Lake Powell for the remainder of the water year.
TOTAL OUTFLOWS: 3.2 MAF
That gives us a whopping .05 to .7 million acre-feet to spare. That is cutting it close, folks; a hot, dry summer could drive evaporation levels up, and/or bring inflows down, shaving off the sliver of breathing room this affords. But unless the outlook dims considerably, the BoR should be able to avoid a run-of-the-river situation this year, which is good news. And, since Arizona likely will not be required to take more cuts this year, the state will probably hold off on doing a compact call and dragging the Upper Basin to court.
These measures, however, will have a variety of consequences, including:
The Upper Basin reservoirs (Flaming Gorge, Navajo, Blue Mesa) are also likely to see record low inflows this year. That, combined with up to 1 million acre-feet of additional releases to benefit Lake Powell, will draw them down considerably, affecting hydropower production, irrigation, and, especially, recreation.
Non-native smallmouth bass are abundant in Lake Powell, but since they are warmer-water fish, they tend to stay near the surface of the reservoir, meaning under normal conditions they stay well above the penstocks, or the outlets in the dam that lead to the hydropower turbines. However, as the surface drops closer to the penstock openings, so do the fish, allowing them to get flushed through the dam into the Colorado River. And because the water released from the dam is warmer (since it’s nearer to the surface), that warms the river downstream, allowing the bass to thrive and compete with the endangered native fish downstream. This is likely to be exacerbated as the surface level nears 3,500 feet.
This year’s 6 MAF release from Glen Canyon Dam will bring the ten-year aggregate flows at Lees Ferry down to about 79 million acre-feet. This potentially puts the Upper Basin in violation of Article III of the Colorado River Compact, which mandates that the Upper Basin “not cause the flow of the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75 million acre-feet” for any 10-year period. A 1944 treaty added another 7.5 million acre-feet to this figure to cover half of Mexico’s allotment, making for a total of 82.5 MAF over ten years. Note: The interpretation of this provision is in dispute.
The diminished reservoir levels, combined with the reduced releases, will lead to lower hydropower output from the dam. That will force tribes, communities, and utilities that buy the relatively cheap power to purchase it on the open market. And it will also cut into power-sale revenues, which help fund endangered fish recovery programs.
Reduced dam releases will mean lower flows, on average, through the Grand Canyon, affecting riparian ecosystems and boating.
Reduced dam releases equate to lower flows into Lake Mead. Since the BoR apparently does not plan to cut releases from Hoover Dam, that reservoir will likely see its levels drop considerably, diminishing hydropower output and affecting recreation. My rough calculation suggests Lake Mead’s surface level will drop from the current 1,060 feet to about 1,030 feet, which would be lower eventhan in 2022. The BoR has suggested it will “defend” a level of 1,000 feet. That would almost certainly lead to Lower Basin shortages.
It’s still a long ways out, but for now the NOAA is calling for above average precipitation in the Southwest later this summer.
A super El Niño appears to be forming, but the effects in the Upper Colorado River Basin are especially hard to predict because it sits right in between the “warmer, drier” and the “wetter, colder” zones, meaning it could go either way. Source: NOAA.
There is potentially good news on the horizon. Conditions are ripening up for a “super” El Niño to begin forming this summer. It’s difficult to predict how that will affect the Upper Colorado River Basin, but for now, forecasts are calling for a strong monsoon in the Southwest, beginning in July. That probably would not do much to bring up Lake Powell’s levels, but it would provide relief to the many farmers who are almost certain to lose irrigation relatively early this summer and may help keep late-summer megafires at bay. And, you never know, El Niño might just bring a monster winter just when we need it most.
1 *The forecasts are for the “unregulated flow,” which means that it is an estimate of what the flow would be without upstream dams holding water back. This is not the same as “natural flow” which is a calculation of what the flow would be without upstream human consumptive use, dams, or diversions. In this case, actual inflow and unregulated inflow are almost the same.
Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0
Crystal Dam, part of the Colorado River Storage Project, Aspinall Unit. Credit Reclamation.
From email from Reclamation (Andrew P. Limbach):
April 14, 2026
Meeting date changed to Monday, April 20th, 2026 at 1:00 pm.
In an effort to better coordinate with the upper initial unit work groups and ongoing DROA discussions, the upcoming Aspinall Unit Coordination Meeting for the Aspinall Unit & Gunnison River has been changed to Monday, April 20th, 2026 at 1:00 pm. Sorry for the short notice and any inconvenience this may cause.
This meeting will still be held virtually via Microsoft Teams. There will not be an in-person meeting location for this meeting. The link to the Teams meeting is below.
Contact Andrew Limbach (alimbach@usbr.gov or 970-248-0644) for more information regarding Aspinall operations or the Operation Group meeting.
Denver Water’s collection and service areas continue to face severe drought conditions, with historically low snowpack and concerns about the diminished spring runoff that will be available to meet customer’s water needs in the future.
As a result, at its meeting today, the Denver Board of Water Commissioners adopted a resolution approving the implementation of temporary drought pricing on outdoor water use. The drought pricing will apply starting with May water use (reflected in June bills) and will be in effect through April 30, 2027, or until further action by the board.
Under the temporary drought pricing, residential customers will see a drought charge on Tier 2 water use of $1.10 per 1,000 gallons. Tier 3 will have a drought charge of $2.20 per 1,000 gallons. The temporary drought charges will be added on top of the customer’s existing 2026 water rates.
Tier 1, which covers essential indoor water use, is exempt from drought pricing.
“Implementing temporary drought pricing is not a step we take lightly. It is one of many tools Denver Water has available — when needed — to respond to drought conditions, encourage customers to conserve our water supply, and ensure our ongoing ability to operate and maintain the system that delivers clean, safe water to 1.5 million people,” said Alan Salazar, Denver Water’s CEO/Manager.
“Drought charges signal to our customers the premium value of water in a drought, while exempting essential indoor water use. We haven’t needed to use this tool in more than 20 years — since the historic drought of 2002-04 — and conditions surrounding this year’s snowpack and potential runoff are shaping up to rival, and possibly be worse than, those years,” Salazar said.
Please keep sprinklers OFF until mid-to-late May, or later if it rains, to help stretch the water supplies we have. Hand water trees and shrubs if needed. It’s a drought. Use Only What You Need. Photo credit: Denver Water.
Under the temporary drought pricing approved by the board, for Denver Water residential customers in Denver and the suburbs:
e first tier will be exempt from the temporary drought charge. This tier is charged at the lowest rate and covers essential indoor water use for bathing, cooking and flushing toilets. Each customer has their individual first tier determined by the average of their monthly water use as listed on bills that arrive in January, February and March — when there is very little or no outdoor watering.
The second tier will have a temporary drought charge of $1.10 per 1,000 gallons added on top of their 2026 water rates. This tier is for water consumption, typically used for outdoor watering, that is above the customer’s first tier and up to 15,000 gallons of water per month. Water use in this tier is considered to be an efficient use of water outdoors.
The third tier will have a temporary drought charge of $2.20 per 1,000 gallons of water added on top of their 2026 water rates. Tier 3 is for water use above the second tier each month. It is priced at the highest level to signal potentially excessive water use and encourage conservation efforts by larger-lot customers.
The board’s decision to impose temporary drought charges on outdoor water use follows its March 25 declaration of Stage 1 drought. The declaration seeks a 20% reduction in water use effective immediately, with the goal of preserving water supplies and to help avoid the need for Denver Water to take further actions later this summer if conditions don’t improve. Read the March 25, 2026, drought declaration.
The snowpack, which supplies the water Denver Water captures, stores, treats and delivers to customers, is at historically low levels despite recent storms that brought some much-needed precipitation to the mountains and city last week.
It’s a drought. Image credit: Denver Water.
“We welcome the storms that do come, while knowing that this year’s snowpack is at historically low levels and hopes for a Miracle May snowstorm are dimming. And Denver Water has made a number of tools available to help customers reduce their water use — whether it’s a normal year or a drought year. We encourage our customers to take steps to conserve water for this drought and be better prepared to manage through future dry times,” Greg Fisher, Denver Water’s manager of demand planning and efficiency.
Denver Water’s temporary drought pricing charges a premium for outdoor water use and covers several classes of customers, including residential, large irrigation, wholesale and raw water customers. (See the chart at the bottom of this story for additional information on nonresidential customers.)
An individual residential customer’s monthly water bill will vary depending on where they live in Denver Water’s service area (in Denver or in one of the utility’s suburban distributor districts) and how much water they use. Drought charges are expected to incentivize customers to reduce outdoor water use.
The following two charts illustrate the potential impact of the temporary drought charges on an annual water bill for residential customers living inside the city of Denver and, below that, in a Total Service suburban distributor district.
Examples of the impact of temporary drought charges on an annual water bill for Denver Water customers living inside Denver. In this example, “super conservers” will see their bills increase by roughly $7 annually. High users who do not conserve will see their bills increase by roughly $76 in one year. Individual bills will vary. Image credit: Denver Water.
In these charts, the categories are:
“Super conserver”: A customer who has very little outdoor water use, maybe only watering trees and shrubs throughout the year.
“Good conserver”: An average customer who reduces their annual water use by 20%, from 104,000 gallons (the average use by residential customers in an average year) to 82,000 gallons.
“Non-conserver”: An average Denver Water residential customer who uses 104,000 gallons of water over the course of the year (the average use by residential customers in an average year) and doesn’t respond to Denver Water’s call to reduce water use by 20%.
“High user”: A customer in the top 25% of residential water users.
The following chart illustrates temporary drought charges impacts for residential customers who live in one of Denver Water’s Total Service distributor districts in the suburbs. (Learn more about Denver Water’s suburban customers.)
Examples of the impact of the temporary drought charges on an annual water bill for Denver Water customers living in one of Denver Water’s Total Service suburban distributor districts. “Super conservers” will see their bills increase by roughly $8 annually. High users who do not conserve will see their bills increase by roughly $76 in one year. Individual bills will vary. Image credit: Denver Water.
“This is not Denver Water’s first drought. We know our customers strive to be efficient in their water use, and we know we are asking them to use less to stretch the water supplies we have in this drought. We also know that success in reducing water use will result in reduced revenue for our organization. We have tools to address reduced revenue and ensure the organization maintains its financial foundation for when this drought is over,” said Angela Bricmont, Denver Water’s chief financial officer.
If customers comply with Denver Water’s request to reduce water use by 20%, the utility estimates 2026 revenue to fall by a commensurate amount. While drought pricing can offset a portion of that reduction, the utility will rely on cash reserves and budget reductions to cover the majority of the gap.
Denver Water has proactively reduced its spending, taking steps that include enacting a hiring freeze and reviewing maintenance and other projects to see which ones could be deferred.
Now is the time to replace non-native plants with with drought-tolerant plants. Photo credit: Denver Water
To help customers Use Only What They Need indoors and outdoors, Denver Water offers a range of tools, including:
Aerial image of entrenched meanders of the San Juan River within Goosenecks State Park. Located in San Juan County, southeastern Utah (U.S.). Credits Constructed from county topographic map DRG mosaic for San Juan County from USDA/NRCS – National Cartography & Geospatial Center using Global Mapper 12.0 and Adobe Illustrator. Latitude 33° 31′ 49.52″ N., Longitude 111° 37′ 48.02″ W. USDA/FSA, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
From email from Reclamation :
April 14, 2026
Reminder Navajo Reservoir Spring Operations MTG Tuesday April 21st from 1-3pm. The meeting will be entirely virtual; members of this list should have received a Teams invite. If you did not and would like to attend email cfelletter@usbr.gov for a meeting invite.
Reclamation conducts Public Operations Meetings three times per year to gather input for determining upcoming operations for Navajo Reservoir. Input from individuals, organizations, and agencies along with other factors such as weather, water rights, endangered species requirements, flood control, hydro power, recreation, fish and wildlife management, and reservoir levels, will be considered in the development of these reservoir operation plans. In addition, the meetings are used to coordinate activities and exchange information among agencies, water users, and other interested parties concerning the San Juan River and Navajo Reservoir.
The Atlas Uranium Mill near Moab as it appeared in May of 1972. Source: DOCUMERICA: The Environmental Protection Agency’s Program to Photographically Document Subjects of Environmental Concern.
The Trump administration has formally cancelled the proposed withdrawal of more than 160,000 acres in the Upper Pecos River Watershed from new mining claims and mineral leasing.
Prompted by local advocacy and New Mexico’s congressional delegation, the Biden administration began the process of protecting the watershed and surrounding mountains east of Santa Fe in 2024. But the Trump administration nipped the process in the bud shortly after taking office by cancelling scheduled public meetings. Now it has officially ended the withdrawal.
For the past several years, Comexico LLC, a subsidiary of Australia-based New World Resources, has been working its way through the permitting process to do exploratory drilling at what it calls its Tererro mining project on more than 200 active mining claims in the watershed. It has met with stiff resistance from locals and regional advocacy groups, partly because mining has a dark history in the Pecos River watershed. In 1991, a big spring runoff washed contaminated mine and mill waste from a long-defunct mine into the upper Pecos River, killing as many as 100,000 trout. That prompted a multi-year cleanup of various mining sites.
The withdrawal wouldn’t have stopped the project outright, because it doesn’t affect existing, active, valid claims. Yet it would have stopped the company from staking more claims and would make it more difficult to develop the existing ones (especially if they haven’t established validity).
I have a saying I coined while writing River of Lost Souls that goes like this: Mining is hard. Putting the earth back together again afterwards is a hell of a lot harder.That’s probably especially true when it comes to mining and milling uranium, given that along with all the other nasty byproducts of mining, it also leaves behind radioactive material. The point was recently driven home by two events:
Meanwhile, over at the cleaned up Durango uranium mill site (now a dog park), the Department of Energy’s most recent verification monitoring report finds that natural uranium flushing in the groundwater beneath the site is happening slower than expected. There’s no reason for concern at this point: Researchers are still confident that uranium concentrations will drop below the compliance goal within the allotted 100-year time period.
I mention it here because of the time-scale involved: The Atlas mill in Moab stopped operating more than 40 years ago, and the cleanup has dragged on for close to two decades. The Durango mill shut down for good in 1963; the massive, years-long, multi-million-dollar cleanup was completed in 1991. And researchers expect it to take another 65 years for the groundwater contamination to finally get back to acceptable levels.
It’s just something to keep in mind when considering new uranium mines and mills.
The back of Glen Canyon Dam circa 1964, not long after the reservoir had begun filling up. Here the water level is above dead pool, meaning water can be released via the river outlets, but it is below minimum power pool, so water cannot yet enter the penstocks to generate electricity. Bureau of Reclamation photo. Annotations: Jonathan P. Thompson
🐟 Colorado River Chronicles 💧
One of the more frustrating things about the Colorado River crisis is that the federal government, which controls the big dams and most of the extensive plumbing system on the river, has hardly given even a clue as to what it might do when Glen Canyon Dam reaches the critical minimum power pool mark as early as this summer.
Will they shut down the hydropower turbines and route all releases through the river outlets, possibly compromising the outlet tubes’ — and the dam’s — structural integrity? Will they “defend” minimum power pool by cutting back releases, thereby putting the Upper Basin in violation of the Colorado River Compact? Or will they drain Upper Basin reservoirs in an effort to maintain minimum power pool while also keeping releases at a level that will keep Lake Mead from dropping too precipitously? Maybe they’ll use the bunker-busting bombs intended for Iran to very quickly blast bypass tunnels through the canyon walls to render the dam obsolete?
The answer is still a mystery, but Interior Secretary Doug Burgum finally hinted coyly about the government’s potential approach (Interior oversees the Bureau of Reclamation, which runs most dams). The Arizona Star’s venerable environmental reporter Tony Davis reports that Burgum told a Tucson roundtable this week:
Okay, I don’t know what that means, exactly, but at least they’re planning to do something. The last statement hints at their intent to defend the minimum power pool on Glen Canyon Dam (lest they’ll lose power generation altogether). We’ll probably learn more during the Glen Canyon Monthly Operations Call in the coming week or two. So stay tuned.
As long as we’re on the subject of the federal government doing something about the Colorado River, when’s Trump going to order his people to open the giant faucet up in Canada and send water gushing down to the Southwest?
This won’t come as a surprise to many people, but it’s now official: March 2026 was the hottest March on record by a lot in the Southwest and beyond. The Upper Colorado River Basin’s average temperature for the month was 46.5° F, or more than 13° higher than the 1895-2026 median. The graph below makes it very clear that the place has been getting hotter over the past fifty years, with the only real break coming in March 2023, when snow was piling up in the mountains.
March 2026 was the hottest March since 1895 by far in the Upper Colorado River Basin. Source: NOAA.
The March scorcher followed the warmest winter and first half of the water year (Oct-March) for most of the West.
The result is clear: Even though precipitation accumulation wasn’t terribly far below normal, the snowpack was. The April 1 snowpack across Colorado was at a record low level, according to this year’s snow course, which is done by manual measurement and so goes back much farther than SNOTEL measurements.
The April 1 snowpack this year was lower than in 1977, 1981, and 2002, the worst winters of the last nine decades, at least. Source: Center for Snow and Avalanche Studies and NRCS.
Early April storms have helped keep the snow around a bit longer in the mountains, but has done little to bolster the snowpack. It’s still at historically low levels.
Water Managers anticipate flows in the San Luis Valley’s rivers and creeks will be very low in spring and summer 2026.
The Colorado Division of Water Resources Division 3 Engineer’s April 6 10-day report forecasted the total annual flow of the Rio Grande at the Del Norte gage will be 270,000 acre-feet, which is 42 percent of the long-term average. For reference, flows of the Rio Grande at Del Norte in 2018 totaled 280,400 acre-feet. The forecasted flow of the Conejos River system is 110,000 acre-feet, which is 37 percent of the long-term average. The snow water equivalent on April 9 for the Upper Rio Grande Basin was 12 percent of the median for 1991-2020.
The National Weather Service is forecasting hot temperatures along with below average precipitation into the summer. The irrigation season began on March 23 on the Rio Grande and March 16 on the Conejos River. As such, on-stream reservoirs are required to pass all inflows to satisfy the needs of downstream senior water rights holders. Given the low amount of snow, the exceptionally warm spring temperatures, and the anticipated summer drought conditions, it is possible that local rivers reached peak flow in March.
Rio Grande operations
The operators of reservoirs on the Rio Grande will time their releases of irrigation water to coincide with the canals being in priority to allow water to reach farmers. It is anticipated that many of the canals will only be in priority to divert water for a short time window, in some cases only days or weeks. As such, releases of irrigation water will begin in the next week.
The Santa Maria Reservoir Company will begin releasing stored irrigation water into North Clear Creek on April 14 at a rate of 200-300 cfs for 10 days. Additional releases will continue as farmers call for water. Rio Grande Reservoir will also begin releasing stored irrigation water into the Rio Grande on April 14 for approximately 20 days. The rate of the release will start at 100-150 cfs and increase up to 350-450 cfs. After deliveries are complete, releases will be limited to the natural inflows. As such, boatable flows on the Rio Grande may diminish as early as mid-May.
Entities including Colorado Parks and Wildlife, the San Luis Valley Water Conservancy District, and the Rio Grande Water Conservation District store water in reservoirs in the Upper Rio Grande Basin and call for releases for their operations in accordance with their water rights decrees.
Where possible, releases by these organizations will be prioritized during hot periods to supplement the natural flow of the Rio Grande and the South Fork of the Rio Grande to reduce high water temperatures to protect the health of fish. Unfortunately, there may not be sufficient water to keep temperatures below thresholds for responsible fishing. As such, anglers are encouraged to check temperature gages and not engage in catch and release fishing if water temperatures reach exceed 70 degrees. Temperature is measured at the 30 Mile Bridge, Wagon Wheel Gap, Del Norte, and South Fork Gages and can be viewed at the Colorado Division of Water Resources’ website (dwr.state.co.us). [ed. emphasis mine]
Platoro Reservoir. Photo credit: Rio de la Vista
Conejos River operations
Platoro Reservoir is passing inflows, which were 10 times higher than average for much of March because of rapid snowmelt. The Conejos Water Conservancy District allocated 6,500 acre-feet of project water to the irrigators. Unfortunately, river flows are currently too low to carry that water to farmers’ headgates and water will not be released unless river flows improve. It is likely that the river will have dry up points below Highway 285. Anglers are encouraged to check temperature gages below Platoro Reservoir and near Mogote before engaging in catch and release fishing.
Links to Stream Gages with Temperature Measurements:
Heather Dutton is district manager for the San Luis Valley Water Conservancy District, which provides leadership to the San Luis Valley water community, a forum for learning and development, and the service of well augmentation in five counties in the San Luis Valley. More by Heather Dutton
The Pitkin County Board of County Commissioners moved forward Wednesday with an intergovernmental agreement that expresses commitment “to protect the Crystal River from on-channel dams and transmountain diversions.” The agreement will be between Pitkin County, Gunnison County, the town of Marble, the Colorado River Water Conservation District and the West Divide Water Conservancy District. This was an approval of the first of two readings. The Colorado River Water Conservation District have yet to bring this agreement to their boards but have previously expressed support for the initiative, according to the district’s staff. Gunnison County and the town of Marble will be considering it in upcoming meetings.
“It would be an agreement that all the parties would oppose or not support any new dams on the main stem of the Crystal River, or any new trans-basin diversions out of the Crystal River,” Pitkin County Deputy Attorney Anne Marie McPhee told commissioners on Wednesday. “It is trying to keep the water in the river as long as possible.”
[…]
Despite moving the agreement forward after first reading, Commissioner Greg Poschman acknowledged that there has been concern around the agreement’s lack of enforcement ability, due to the signing bodies’ ability to leave the agreement at will. Poschman referenced specific criticism vocalized by Bill Jochems, a Pitkin County Healthy Rivers and Streams Citizen Advisory board member and Crystal River advocate.
“The expression from Mr. Jochems is, ‘it’s a nothing burger,’ right?” Poschman said on Wednesday. “It’s the weakest of all possible protections for the Crystal. Is that what we want to do at this point?”
Commissioner Francie Jacober commented that, despite the potential weakness that Jochems and Poschman pointed out, it would still be symbolically important for the county to lend their support to the intergovernmental agreement…The county has been pursuing a Wild and Scenic River designation for a portion of the Crystal River since the U.S. Forest Service found 39 miles of it eligible for the designation in 2002, according to county documents supporting Wednesday’s intergovernmental agreement. A Wild and Scenic designation could help with future conservation and preservation efforts.
A tourist visits the lower reaches of Flaming Gorge Reservoir in Utah in September 2021. (Dustin Bleizeffer/WyoFile)
Click the link to read the article on the Wyofile website (Dustin Bleizeffer):
April 10, 2026
The outlook for the Colorado River, and Lake Powell in particular, continues to worsen due to an historically warm winter and dismal snowpack.
Projections show that Lake Powell on the Utah-Arizona border could drop low enough this year that it stops producing hydroelectric power at the Glen Canyon Dam. If it drops even lower, the dam is in danger of structural failure.
Wyoming relies on some of that hydroelectric power, according to state officials. The state will also play a major, legally obligated role in trying to help prevent such a catastrophe. Primarily, the Bureau of Reclamation will release extra water from Flaming Gorge Reservoir — potentially 1 million acre feet, which is more than a quarter of its storage capacity of about 3.8 million acre-feet.
In addition to recreation and economic impacts at Flaming Gorge on the Wyoming-Utah border — boat ramps may be rendered inoperable — Wyoming officials worry about potential mandatory water use reductions in the southwest corner of the state, as well as potential legal entanglements over a seven-state negotiation that has so far failed to resolve how stakeholders will share the pain of a declining Colorado River.
Buckboard Marina owner Tony Valdez, seen here Sept. 26, 2022, says he’s made continual adjustments to boat docks to keep up with lowering water levels at Flaming Gorge Reservoir. (Dustin Bleizeffer/WyoFile)
Adding to frustrations and fears, the water crisis is so severe and crashing so rapidly that stakeholders can’t even track — with confidence — its extent.
“Even though these projections are painting an incredibly dire picture for us, we need to be mindful that runoff might even be worse than what’s being projected,” Wyoming Senior Assistant Attorney General Chris Brown said Friday, adding that dry soil throughout the region is a wildcard in water calculations. “It’s bad. It’s incredibly bad what we’re seeing in the Upper [Colorado River] Basin right now.”
Brown joined Wyoming State Engineer Brandon Gebhart Friday at a Wyoming Colorado River Advisory Committee meeting to provide an update on the crisis (click here to see a slidedeck presented at the meeting).
“The information we’re getting is evolving just about as quickly as the hydrology is declining, so we’re trying to react to what we’re seeing in almost real time,” Brown said. “We don’t know what’s actually going to happen.”
This graphic depicts the “probable” water year for the Colorado River Basin in 2026. (Bureau of Reclamation)
An extra release from Flaming Gorge, which will begin on or before May 1, is a certainty, according to Wyoming water officials. That’s because the reservoir was specifically built to serve as a sort of water bank to ensure legally obliged deliveries to downstream states Nevada, Arizona and California. Among four storage reservoirs in the upper basin, Flaming Gorge has the most — and the most legally unrestricted – water to send downstream to Lake Powell.
“It’s the low-hanging fruit,” Brown said. “It’s the biggest, by far, and it’s got the most available water.”
But this year, even considering decreased releases from Lake Powell to help maintain Glen Canyon dam’s functionality, “anything we do as far as upstream [extra water] releases is not going to be enough,” Brown said.
Flaming Gorge Reservoir on the Utah side near the dam in September 2021. (Dustin Bleizeffer/WyoFile)
Banks of Lake Powell, Arizona in March 2026 | Page Buono
Click the link to read the article on the American Rivers website (Page Buono and Sinjin Eberle):
March 18, 2026
The situation is clear: the precipitation outlook in the Colorado River Basin is dire, the river cannot sustain the demands placed on it, and this year we’re likely to face unprecedented management decisions with potentially catastrophic consequences.
Despite decades of warnings and years of negotiations, there remains no clear blueprint for how the West can live with less water. That future is no longer hypothetical—it is already here.
Lake Powell’s drastically low water levels are evident in the discoloration of ancient cliffs that were submerged for decades, often referred to as “the bathtub ring” in March 2026 | Page Buono
We often talk about the Colorado River and drought in ways that can feel removed, impersonal, abstract, and buried in jargon. But beneath the stories, there are real lives, livelihoods, ecosystems, and traditions that make the region what it is, and that are very much at stake.
West Drought Monitor map April 7, 2026.
On March 3, for example, the US Drought Monitor released their latest report, revealing that “snow water equivalent” is less than 70% of normal across the Central Rockies, and less than 50% in the Four Corners.
But it isn’t just one fire in one year – throughout the Southwest and in California, regions are experiencing some of the largest, most catastrophic wildfires in history, and they’re occurring much more frequently.
Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0
Today, Governors Jared Polis (D-Colo.), Mark Gordon (R-Wyo.), Michelle Lujan Grisham (D-N.M.) and Spencer Cox (R-Utah) released a statement on the proposed draw down of Flaming Gorge and other upper basin reservoirs:
“This is an unprecedented year on the Colorado River, and likely will be one of the worst on record. A dry year like this reminds us of why it is critical that all who rely on this resource learn to live within its means and adapt our uses accordingly.
The Upper Division States of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, are actively and strictly regulating water uses. Because of such diminished runoff, existing state laws in the Upper Division States require water users to face cuts to water rights dating back to the 1800s – these cuts are mandatory, uncompensated, and will have significant impacts on water users, including Upper Basin Tribes, and local economies.
It is critical that any releases made by the federal government from Flaming Gorge and other upstream reservoirs are in compliance with existing agreements, particularly the 2019 Drought Response Operations Agreement between the Bureau of Reclamation and the Upper Division States and governing law and done for the purpose of protecting Lake Powell. We must have a clear understanding of how these proposed releases will effectively protect elevations at Lake Powell. Once the releases conclude, we expect that all water released from Flaming Gorge and other upstream reservoirs will be fully recovered.
Further, any releases must be appropriately sized. Years like this one remind us that appropriate water storage helps us survive the dry years, and that we must be prepared not only for this year but future dry years, as well as average years.
As we continue to comply with commitments to our water users and the Law of River, we recognize the impacts of water shortages and water releases from Upper Basin reservoirs on local communities – not only related to future water supply availability, but also how they affect jobs and local recreational and other economies. We recognize the need to live within the available supply and expect other communities to do so as well.”
The Colorado River flows near Hite, Utah on July 4, 2022. The river’s water supply is shrinking, and states are caught in a standoff about how to cut back on demand. Alex Hager/KUNC
Click the link to read the article on the KUNC website (Scott Franz):
April 8, 2026
This story is part of ongoing coverage of the Colorado River, produced by KUNC in Colorado and supported by the Walton Family Foundation. KUNC is solely responsible for its editorial coverage.
Last month’s record breaking heat across the Mountain West led to the worst snowpack on record in Colorado and Utah, along with a significantly downgraded forecast for the upcoming supply of Colorado River water.
Cody Moser with the federal Colorado Basin River Forecast Center said in a monthly briefing Tuesday [April 7, 2026] that just 1.4 million acre feet of Colorado River water is expected to reach Lake Powell through July. That’s less than a quarter of what’s considered normal.
It’s also much lower than the 2.3 million acre feet Moser’s office projected a month ago, before the heat wave in the West melted away an already meager supply of snowpack.
“With record low snow pack, we have well below normal water supply forecasts,“ he said. “In many cases, our April through July (water) volume forecasts rank in the lowest five on record when compared to historical observations.”
The forecast for how much water will reach Flaming Gorge Reservoir also dropped more than 20% since the last monthly projection. Flows for the Yampa River are also projected to be near the record low.
Moser added it’s likely some rivers and streams in western Colorado have already reached their peak runoff for the year.
He said the water supply forecasts could improve if wet conditions arrive, or decline even further if the West remains dry.
The worsening river forecasts arrive as the seven states that use the waterway remain at an impasse this spring over how to share and conserve the water in the future.
If states can’t reach a deal, the Interior Department is expected to identify its preferred option for how to manage Lake Powell and Lake Mead after the current operating guidelines expire this fall.
Interior Secretary Doug Burgum told Arizona radio station KTAR News this week that the worsening spring runoff conditions are going to “require everybody to dig in and take bigger cuts than they want, and we haven’t reached that spot yet.”
Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0
U.S. Interior Secretary Doug Burgum, center, speaks during a gathering with governors from six states in the Colorado River basin on Friday, Jan. 30, 2026. Photo credit: Lowell Whitman/Department Of Interior
Click the link to read the article on the Tuscon.com website (Tony Davis). Here’s an excerpt:
April 8, 2026
U.S. Interior Secretary Doug Burgum, pressed Monday to spell out how he’ll handle the Colorado River’s water crisis, wouldn’t get specific but said repeatedly that “nobody will be happy” with how his department will split a rapidly dwindling supply of river water among the seven states, including Arizona, that want a piece of it. Speaking at a roundtable in the Tucson area populated by a host of public lands industry leaders and University of Arizona President Suresh Garimella, Burgum pledged to hand down a decision this month on the first of two crucial, divisive issues his office is confronting regarding the river. That decision will be how much water the Interior Department’s Bureau of Reclamation will release from its upstream reservoirs in the four Upper Colorado River Basin states to head off a potential calamity in which Glen Canyon Dam, forming the boundary between the Upper and Lower Basins, would no longer receive enough water to continue generating electricity that serves customers in seven Western states.
The white bathtub ring clinging to the sandstone walls of Glen Canyon is more than a marker of a receding lake; it is a physical manifestation of a century-old accounting error. PHOTO BY BOB HEMBREE (MARCH 2019)
The white bathtub ring clinging to the sandstone walls of Glen Canyon is more than a marker of a receding lake; it is a physical manifestation of a century-old accounting error. For decades, the conventional story of the Colorado River’s decline has been framed as a tragic stroke of bad luck. The narrative, popularized in modern classics like Cadillac Desert, suggests that the framers of the 1922 Colorado River Compact simply did their best with a limited record of “eighteen years of streamflow measurement” taken during an unusually wet “binge.”
However, emerging historical research and systems analysis tell a more complicated and troubling story. In their definitive study, Science Be Dammed, authors Eric Kuhn and John Fleck argue that the crisis we face in 2026 was not an accident of nature but a predictable consequence of “selective science.” The decision-makers of 1922 were not victims of ignorance; they were sophisticated professionals who chose to ignore inconvenient data in favor of a political vision that required the river to be larger than it actually was.
Eugene Clyde LaRue measuring the flow in Nankoweap Creek, 1923. Photo credit: USGS
The Inconvenient Hydrologist
As the seven basin states gathered at Bishop’s Lodge in Santa Fe to carve up the river, they were joined by Eugene Clyde (E.C.) LaRue, a hydrologist for the U.S. Geological Survey. [Eric Kuhn responding to my X post, “Actually LaRue was never allowed to attend a Commission meeting. He asked, but Hoover said no.] LaRue presented the commissioners with a conclusion that threatened the very foundation of their negotiations. His data, which included early gauge records and historical flood markers, suggested that the river’s long-term average was approximately 15 million acre-feet (maf)
LaRue explicitly warned the commission that the period between 1905 and 1922 was a hydrological anomaly. Had the negotiators included the drier records from the late 1890s, the estimated annual flow would have dropped significantly. As Kuhn and Fleck note, the decision-makers had at their disposal a relatively thorough, almost modern picture of the river’s hydrology. They chose to ignore it because accepting LaRue’s science might have left them with a flow too low to reach the compromises necessary to develop the West.
Members of the Colorado River Commission, in Santa Fe in 1922, after signing the Colorado River Compact. From left, W. S. Norviel (Arizona), Delph E. Carpenter (Colorado), Herbert Hoover (Secretary of Commerce and Chairman of Commission), R. E. Caldwell (Utah), Clarence C. Stetson (Executive Secretary of Commission), Stephen B. Davis, Jr. (New Mexico), Frank C. Emerson (Wyoming), W. F. McClure (California), and James G. Scrugham (Nevada) CREDIT: COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY WATER RESOURCES ARCHIVE via Aspen Journalism
Paper Water and the System Trap
By sidelining LaRue and enshrining a “paper water” figure of 16.4 million acre-feet into the Law of the River, the commissioners fell into a classic “system trap.” They created a legal stock of water rights that far exceeded the river’s physical flow. This inflated number was essential to the “reinforcing loop” of 20th-century growth. It provided the legal certainty needed to secure federal funding for massive infrastructure projects like the Hoover Dam and the Glen Canyon Dam.
This intentional overestimation created a massive “information delay.” For eighty years, the system appeared stable only because the Upper Basin states were slow to develop their shares, allowing their “unused” water to flow downstream. This masked the fundamental deficit, leading to a state of “overshoot” in which the regional economy came to depend on water that did not exist. Professor Rhett Larson describes the resulting legal framework as a system of “calling shotgun” that was excellent for settling a desert but is catastrophic for managing one in a time of scarcity.
The End of the Delay
Today, the “delay” has finally ended, and the “inconvenient science” of 1922 has become the undeniable reality of 2026. The river’s source is being further depleted by “aridification,” a process climate scientist Brad Udall describes as a “sponge above our head” that evaporates moisture before it can reach the streamflow. We are now witnessing the collision of a 100-year-old legal fiction with a 21st-century climate reality.
The current impasse between the Upper and Lower Basins is a symptom of “policy resistance,” where every actor is incentivized to protect their “paper” share even as the “wet” water disappears. As Professor Andrea Gerlak observes, if a system has 25 years to produce an agreement and fails, there is likely something fundamentally wrong with the system itself. Solving the crisis at Lake Powell will require more than engineering; it will require a paradigm shift that finally aligns our laws with the river’s actual physical limits.
The next Aspinall Unit Coordination Meeting for the Aspinall Unit & Gunnison River will be heldThursday, April 23rd, 2026 at 1:00 pm.
This meeting will be held virtually via Microsoft Teams. There will not be an in-person meeting location for this meeting. The link to the Teams meeting is below.
Reclamation conducts Public Operations Meeting three times per year to gather input for determining upcoming operations for the Aspinall Unit & Gunnison River. The meeting agenda will include updates on current snowpack, forecasts for spring runoff conditions and spring peak operations, the weather outlook, and planned operations for the remainder of the year.
Contact Andrew Limbach (alimbach@usbr.gov or 970-248-0644) for more information regarding Aspinall operations or the Operation Group meeting.
The All American Canal, the largest diversion on the Colorado River, passes through Winterhaven, CA on its way to the Imperial Valley. The Colorado River is seen flowing next to it.
April 2, 2026
In the southeast corner of California, 300-foot-tall sand dunes rise from a sunbaked landscape dotted with ocotillo and creosote bushes. Summer temperatures here regularly exceed 110 degrees, and annual rainfall is comparable to that of the Sahara Desert. Despite its unforgiving terrain, more than 180,000 residents live in Imperial County, one of the country’s most productive agricultural regions and more recently a magnet for data center development and lithium extraction proposals. This has all been made possible by turn-of-the-20th century canals that carve up the region, supplying it with more than a million gallons of Colorado River water every minute.
“We’ve often called it the lifeblood of Imperial Valley,” said Robert Schettler, a spokesperson for Imperial Irrigation District, the area’s public utility, which manages the region’s over 3,000 miles of drains and canals. “If something were to happen to that river, we would all have to pack up and leave.”
Something is happening to the Colorado River. Over the past century, its average water supply has fallen by nearly a third due to prolonged drought and climate change. Experts predict that decline will continue, threatening cities, tribes and farms that depend on the river’s flow, from Wyoming, Utah, Colorado and New Mexico to Arizona, Nevada and Northern Mexico. Most of the Colorado River’s water starts as snowpack in the Rocky Mountains, but after the American West experienced the warmest winter ever recorded, snow levels are now at historic lows, prompting experts to warn that 2026 may be one of the river’s driest years yet.
That could spell disaster for Imperial County, whose harsh desert landscape of windblown sand and rugged burnt-orange mountains was transformed more than a century ago into productive, gridded farmland dotted with small cities such as Brawley, El Centro and Calexico…Imperial Valley’s agricultural industry consumes by far the largest share of water in the region, about 97% of the 3.1 million acre-feet managed by the Imperial Irrigation District every year…Those ambitious and largely successful conservation efforts have come at a cost. Much of the water used by farmers historically flowed into the nearby Salton Sea, but as farmers have reduced their water use, less runoff has reached the man-made lake, accelerating an existing environmental crisis Over the last three decades, the Salton Sea has shrunk by more than 60 square miles, exposing a dry lakebed laden with pesticides, particulate matter and heavy metals. Those contaminants are carried as dust through the air into nearby communities, contributing to a childhood asthma rate triple that of the national average. Now, farmers such as Brian Strahm, whose family has been growing crops in the area for four generations, are concerned they may have to decrease their water use further. That may prove difficult since farmers have already put in place many efficiency measures, Strahm said…Farmers say cuts could seriously harm the area’s already struggling economy. In addition to being the county with the highest percentage of Latinos in California, Imperial has among the highest unemployment rates of any county in the country, at nearly 19%. For those who do find work, the agricultural industry offers a lifeline, accounting for one out of every six jobs in the region.
Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0
Rubble and a cone-shaped butte at Pierre’s Site, a Chacoan great house about ten miles north of Chaco Culture National Historical Park. The area around the site would be re-opened to new oil and gas leases under the Trump administration’s proposal to revoke a Biden-era “buffer zone” around the park. Jonathan P. Thompson photo.
The News: The Trump administration is formally proposing to revoke the Biden-era ban on new oil and gas leases within the 10-mile buffer zone around Chaco Culture National Historical Park in northwestern New Mexico. The Bureau of Land Management is accepting public comments for just seven days, with the input period ending April 7.
The Context: When President Theodore Roosevelt wielded the brand new Antiquities Act in 1907 to create Chaco Canyon National Monument, he drew the boundaries around what is now known as “downtown Chaco,” a handful of structures including the 800-room Pueblo Bonito, constructed between the 9th and 12th centuries by ancestors of today’s Pueblo people.
That was merely the center of the Chacoan world, however, which extended over 100 miles outward into the Four Corners region. No one knows if this was a political empire, a religious or cultural society, or a school of architecture, but it is clear that the dozens of Chacoan outliers or “great houses,” along with thousands of smaller sites, shrines, and architectural features with unknown function, did not exist in isolation. They were part of a cultural tapestry woven into the natural landscape. The national monument, in other words, was vastly incomplete, which is especially concerning given that it lies in would become one of the nation’s most heavily drilled oil and gas fields.
Wall at Twin Angels Great House, a Chacoan outlier along the Great North Road with an oil and gas well pad and tanks visible in the background. This site is well outside the 10-mile Chaco buffer zone. Jonathan P. Thompson photo.
That’s not to say that Chacoan sites are devoid of protections. The park itself is off-limits to all oil and gas development. Pierre’s Site and several other outliers are part of the Chaco Culture Archaeological Protection Sites Program, and all sites on federal land are shielded by the Archaeological Resources Protection Act and Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, which requires oil companies to conduct a cultural inventory of all land in the path of development. If the surveyors happen upon a “significant” site, the well pad or road or pipeline must be relocated, if possible, at least 50 to 100 feet away, a process known as “identify and avoid.” Tribes are supposed to be consulted in these cases, as well, though their concerns aren’t always considered.
But “identify and avoid” misses a great deal.
“Even though agencies try to mitigate the impact, it isn’t enough because you’ve literally destroyed the context in which those things exist,” Theresa Pasqual told me several years ago when I was writing about Indigenous resistance to drilling around Chaco. She is the former director of Acoma Pueblo’s Historic Preservation Office, and a descendant of the Pueblo people who occupied the Four Corners region for thousands of years. “Most of our pueblos are still transmitting their migration history through oral means. So when you have development that begins to impact many of these sites — that range in size from the grandeur of Chaco Canyon or Mesa Verde to very small unknown sites that still remain un-surveyed and unknown to the public — they are literally destroying the pages of the history book of the Pueblo people.”
Pierre’s Site, a Chacoan great house about nine miles north of the park’s boundary, illustrates this concept. The site is made up of a collection of thick-walled stone structures built among and in harmony with distinctive shale and sandstone buttes and bluffs. That “page,” or the structures and their immediate surroundings, has been kept intact by the aforementioned protections. But a cluster of well pads, along with pumpjacks, tanks, and associated infrastructure sit less than a half-mile away, and they are visible — and their whir-pop-whir sounds audible — from the site. They not only affect the way one experiences Pierre’s, but also have surely erased some of the important context.
Rubble at Pierre’s Site. Jonathan P. Thompson photo
Pierre’s lies along the Great North Road—the most prominent and visible of several such “roads” in the region—an architectural feature that stretches directly north of Chaco Canyon for 30 miles or more. It may have been a symbolic path through time, connecting old worlds with new, or a reminder of the power Chaco-central wielded over its outliers, or a giant arrow pointing people to a holy place. Chaco scholar Paul Reed calls it “a landscape monument on a large scale.” Yet little effort has been made to protect it. Oil field roads and pipelines cross it in dozens of places, and workers have bulldozed well pads right on top of it, erasing the subtle signs that it was ever there. If something so significant can get plowed under, how many more subtle features—shrines, corn fields, plant-gathering sites, ceremonial areas, flint-knapping spots—have been destroyed indelibly?
It was with the greater context in mind that in 2023, after years of consideration, public meetings, and analysis, President Joe Biden signed Public Lands Order 7923, which withdrew about 336,000 acres of public land from oil and gas leasing for 20 years. Tribal nations with ties to the cultural landscape, environmental advocates, and archaeologists had sought the withdrawal to provide a buffer zone around the national historical park and to add a layer of protection to the associated sites within 10 miles of the park’s boundaries.
Map of the 10-mile buffer zone. Source: All Pueblo Council of Governors.
The withdrawal was incomplete, in that it still covered only a tiny slice of the greater Chaco landscape. Several significant outliers, along with about 20 miles of the Great North Road, remained unprotected. Chaco is also in the middle of what’s known as the Checkerboard, a hodgepodge of land ownership and jurisdictions, which complicates the withdrawal, since it only applies to BLM land. The Checkerboard lies within the Navajo Nation’s borders, but it is not reservation land, and it includes Bureau of Land Management land, state lands, private lands, and Indian allotments, which exist in a sort of limbo between private, tribal, and federal land.
The Navajo Nation initially supported the withdrawal, but when tribal leadership changed, so did its stance. In response to pressure from allotment owners within the buffer zone, who worried that their royalties from drilling would be threatened, the Buu Nygren administration turned against the buffer. While leasing is still allowed on those allotments within the withdrawal area, an oil and gas company is less likely to drill there because they can’t “pool” the allotment resources with those of neighboring federal parcels.
Pumpjack and Haystack Mountain as seen from the “Acropolis” at Pierre’s Site, with “Downtown Chaco” in between (but out of view since it’s in a canyon). This view looks directly south down the Great North Road, which is aligned with the meridian stretching from Haystack Mountain to Mount Wilson in the San Juan Mountains in Colorado. Jonathan P. Thompson photo.
Project 2025, the right wing’s playbook for the Trump administration, directly called for the Chaco buffer zone’s elimination, and Interior Secretary Doug Burgum has been toying with the idea for the last year. Finally, on the last day of March, the administration opened a one-week public comment period, on the proposal to either revoke the buffer zone altogether, or to reduce it to a five-mile radius around the park, which would leave out Pierre’s and other significant sites.
The All Pueblo Council of Governors, Indigenous and environmental advocates, archaeology groups, and New Mexico’s congressional delegation all pushed back on the Trump administration’s move and called for the current buffer zone to be retained.
The Trump administration announced it will move the U.S. Forest Service headquarters from Washington, D.C., to Salt Lake City as part of a “sweeping restructuring of the agency to move leadership closer to the forests and communities it serves.” The shake-up includes:
Moving about 260 employees from Washington HQ to Salt Lake City, and shuffling around another 2,600 staffers;
Eliminating its region-based organizing structure and shifting it to one centered around 15 state-level offices. This will include shuttering regional offices, some of which will be retained for other purposes;
Closing 57 research and development stations, while retaining 20, eight of which are in Western states;
As for firefighting, a Forest Service press release noted:
Administration officials say the overhaul is aimed at making the agency, which is a branch of the U.S. Agriculture Department, more nimble and efficient. Yet it has not provided an analysis of how such a vast restructuring would accomplish those goals, or how much money it would save. It comes about a year after the so-called “Department of Government Efficiency,” or DOGE, fired about 3,400 Forest Service employees, or more than 10% of the agency’s total workforce.
It’s all part of a larger departmental overhaul designed to “bring the USDA closer to its customers,” according to a USDA memorandum from last year. Customers? Do they mean the extractive industries? The American people? Or what? Either way, it seems like strange terminology for a government agency to be using.
In reality, as Christine Peterson reports in High Country News, the overhaul is doing little except sowing confusion and concern among agency staffers and observers.
These maps show where the new state offices will be after the reorganization is complete. Source: USDA.
Which research facilities will survive the overhaul (below). Source: USDA.
As I’ve written here before, I don’t see moving public land agencies out of Washington to be an unmitigated disaster in and of itself. And contrary to some takes, it won’t automatically lead to wholesale clearcutting of the West’s forests. Forest Service and BLM higher-ups don’t need to be close to Capitol Hill or the White House to do their jobs, especially in the Zoom age. And it wouldn’t hurt to get the Forest Service Chief or the BLM Director out on the landscapes they oversee a bit more often, where perhaps they can see the consequences of projects or policies they may sign off on. Utah may be a questionable location, given the state’s leaders hostility toward public land management, but Salt Lake City is a fairly progressive place, and the likes of Sen. Mike Lee will have just as much access to agency leaders in D.C. as they would in SLC.
That said, if such a move is not done correctly, it can be disastrous. Take Trump’s first-term relocation of the Bureau of Land Management’s headquarters to Grand Junction, Colorado, in 2019. That led to a de facto agency housecleaning; many senior staffers chose to resign or move to other agencies rather than uproot their lives and families and move across the country, and only a handful of workers ended up in the Colorado office, which shared a building with oil and gas companies. A vast storehouse of institutional knowledge and expertise was lost, and virtually nothing was accomplished.
We’re likely to see the same sort of dynamic playing out with this move, even though SLC is larger, more cosmopolitan, and has a bigger airport than GJC. Plus, the USFS overhaul is far more than a mere HQ move. Shuttering nearly 60 research and development facilities, many of which are tied to universities or colleges, will have a major impact, even if their functions and staff are moved elsewhere. Ditto with the regional-to-state office shuffle (the point of which is what, exactly?).
And, this is all happening as the administration makes a push to return the Forest Service to its timber plantation era, which ran from the 1950s through the ’80s. During that time, logging companies harvested 10 billion to 12 billion board-feet per year from federal forests, while for the last 25 years, the annual number has hovered below 3 billion board-feet. Now, Trump, via his Immediate Expansion of American Timber Production order, plans to crank up the annual cut to 4 billion board-feet by 2028. How? By declaring an “emergency” that allows the agency and logging companies to bypass environmental laws. Never mind that the infrastructure and demand don’t necessarily exist to carry out this plan.
Rollins issued a memo last year declaring that the threat of wildfires, insects and disease, invasive species, overgrown forests, the growing number of homes in the wildland-urban interface, and more than a century of rigorous fire suppression have contributed to what is now “a full-blown wildfire and forest health crisis.” And she expanded the “emergency situation” acreage from 67 million acres under Biden, to almost 113 million acres, or 59% of all Forest Service lands, opening it up to streamlined forest “management,” aka timber operations.
🥵 Aridification Watch 🐫
I’m calling it: The Dolores River in Dolores reached peak spring runoff of 1,090 cubic feet per second on March 26. If this holds (and, yes, there is a chance that April showers will bring big May flows), then it will be the earliest peak on record by far. This is more an indication of how intense and unusual the end-of-March heat wave was than of how scant the snowpack was. It was the fourth lowest peak flow on record, behind 2002, 1977, and 2018.
The good news: The April 1 storm gave the snowpack a big boost. The bad news: In most places the snow water equivalent remains below that of the same date in 2002, which had been the worst snow year on record. The same pattern is evident in other San Juan Mountain river basins, but the picture looks a little better at higher elevation SNOTEL stations. Source: USDA NRCS.
Silverton, Colorado’s weather watcher Fred Canfield reports on a welcome burst of moisture at the high country burg in early April, writing:
Parting Cheeseburger Query
Four years ago, I asked you kind readers (or at least the ones that were around back then), for your recommendations on the best independent bookstores and green chile cheeseburgers in the West so I could add them to the Land Desk Green Chile Atlas. I know, it’s kind of weird to combine the two, and I apologize to all vegan booksellers that this pairing may offend (but I will add that vegan burgers are included, too).
Now I figured I’d come back and not only remind you that the Atlas exists, but also ask for updates, new book or green chile-related finds. So fire away!
Coloradans often hear that the Colorado River crisis is happening somewhere else. Headlines focus on Lake Mead, Lake Powell, and the Lower Basin, while Colorado is portrayed as a responsible headwaters state doing its part. Yet that narrative misses a deeper truth. The Colorado River crisis is not only about drought or downstream shortages. It is also about how the river is managed. In that sense, Colorado shares responsibility with every basin state.
Colorado’s water system is built on ‘prior appropriation’. The rule is simple: “first in time, first in right.” The earliest water users receive priority when supplies run low. This framework helped farmers, cities, and industries expand across the West during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, creating stability in a region where water determines survival.
However, the system was designed for a different climate and a by-gone West. It also encouraged states and water users to claim more water than the river could supply, contributing to the overallocation of the Colorado River. Legal analyses of the Law of the River show that the basin was effectively overburdened by water claims decades before climate change began reducing flows.
Today, climate change is altering the river itself. Scientists estimate that warming temperatures have already reduced Colorado River flows by roughly 20 percent. Federal water managers warn that declines could continue as temperatures rise. In a river system that is already legally overcommitted, treating water rights as fixed privileges can deepen instability rather than prevent it.
Colorado sits at the center of this challenge. As the largest contributor of water in the Upper Basin, the state must balance many competing demands. Front Range cities continue to grow. Western Slope agriculture depends on reliable irrigation. Rivers and aquatic ecosystems are under stress. Yet much of Colorado’s water policy still assumes shortages are temporary and that legal priority alone will determine who receives water. That mindset often encourages defensive politics rather than shared problem-solving.
Conflicts between upstream and downstream states are often described as unavoidable. In reality, much of the tension stems from the priorities of management. Upper Basin states emphasize uncertainty about future river flows, while Lower Basin states focus on delivery obligations and infrastructure investments, according to recent reports on Colorado River governance. Each group is acting logically within the current system. The problem is that the system frequently rewards delay and legal conflict rather than cooperation, as researchers studying collaborative governance in the basin have found.
Colorado has an opportunity to change that pattern. One promising approach is collaborative adaptive management. This framework begins with a simple idea: uncertainty is normal in complex systems. Instead of assuming managers already know the right solution, adaptive management relies on monitoring conditions, learning from outcomes, and adjusting policies over time. With collaboration of states, tribes, farmers, cities, and environmental groups conflict can be reduced and management decisions can improve.
Some elements of this approach already exist in Colorado, including experimental reservoir operations and voluntary conservation programs. However, research on collaborative drought science planning in the Colorado River Basin shows that these efforts remain limited and politically fragile.
Equity must also be part of Colorado’s leadership. For decades, Tribal nations and many rural communities have carried the environmental costs of water development while urban growth captured much of the benefit, a pattern highlighted in research on environmental justice and Indigenous governance. Tribal nations, many of which hold some of the most senior water rights in the basin, remain underrepresented in major water decisions. Adaptive governance recognizes that whose knowledge it is that counts, matters. Incorporating Indigenous knowledge, local experience, and community-based monitoring can strengthen decisions and build trust in governance. Research shows that when affected communities help shape policies, those policies are more likely to be trusted, followed, and sustained over time.
Importantly, collaborative management does not mean abandoning Colorado water law or taking away private rights. Instead, it means updating water governance so users can share risk and adapt together as conditions change. The alternative – waiting for wetter years or relying on courts to resolve disputes – ignores both climate science and political reality. Climate projections from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change indicate that the American Southwest will likely remain hotter and drier for decades. Planning for a return to twentieth-century river flows is increasingly unrealistic.
Critics argue that collaboration takes too long when the crisis is already severe. Colorado has already tried temporary agreements, emergency negotiations, and federal pressure. Those approaches have not produced lasting solutions. Short-term deals may stabilize reservoirs for a season, but they do little to address the deeper management problems driving the crisis. Without stronger cooperation, the basin risks repeating the same cycle of shortage and conflict.
Colorado has long prided itself on practical problem-solving and environmental leadership. The state now has an opportunity to apply those values to its most important river. Policymakers should strengthen collaborative water governance, ensure meaningful Tribal participation, and support conservation policies that reward flexibility rather than litigation.
Coloradans also have a role to play. Public participation in basin planning, engagement with watershed organizations, and pressure on elected officials can help shift water policy toward long-term climate adaptation rather than short-term crisis response.
The Colorado River begins in our mountains. Leadership today means recognizing that rules built for a wetter past may no longer work in a hotter future – and choosing cooperation before the river forces the decision for us.
Anderson, Patrick J., Jeanne E. Godaire, Daniel K. Jones, William J. Andrews, Alicia A. Torregrosa, Meghan T. Bell, JoAnn M. Holloway, et al. 2025. “Collaborative Drought Science Planning in the Colorado River Basin.” U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2025-1041. https://doi.org/10.3133/ofr20251041.
Birnbaum, Simon. 2016. “Environmental Co-governance, Legitimacy, and the Quest for Compliance: When and Why Is Stakeholder Participation Desirable?”. Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, 18, no. 3, 306–323.https://doi.org/10.1080/1523908X.2015.1077440
Hite, Kristen, Pervaze A. Sheikh, and Charles V. Stern. 2025. “Management of the Colorado River: Water Allocations, Drought, and the Federal Role”. Congressional Research Service Report R45546.https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45546.
Holling, C. S. 1978. Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management. New York: Wiley.
Kuhn, Eric. 2024. “The Risks and Potential Impacts of a Colorado River Compact Curtailment on Colorado River In-Basin and Transmountain Water Rights Within Colorado.” Colorado Environmental Law Journal, 35.https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/celj/vol35/iss2/4.
Sullivan, Abigail, Dave D. White, and Michael Hanemann. 2019. “Designing Collaborative Governance: Insights from the Drought Contingency Planning Process for the Lower Colorado River Basin.” Environmental Science & Policy, 91: 39-49. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2018.10.011.
David is a Colorado Certified Water Professional and environmental scientist dedicated to protecting aquatic systems through rigorous data analysis, public service, and responsible resource management. He holds a bachelors degree in Biology from Western Colorado University and will graduate soon from the University of Denver with a Masters Degree in Environmental Policy and Management.
Click the link to read the article on Ken’s Substack (Ken Neubecker):
March 27, 2026
The February 14 deadline for the seven Colorado River Basin States to come up with an agreement on future management of the river is long gone, and still no agreement in sight. The deadline for submitting comments on the Bureau of Reclamations Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) is also past. Reclamation didn’t have a “preferred alternative”, which is not normal. They were hoping the States would have an agreement so that could become the preferred alternative. So they are left with their suite of six alternatives. All six are fraught with what Reclamation calls “decision making under deep uncertainty” (DMDU, they love acronyms).
That is an understatement.
No one seems to be very happy with any single proposed alternative. Some are calling for a new DEIS, or at least a Supplemental DEIS. This would only push any deadline further down the road. Reclamation is caught between a rock and a hard place.
The only real alternatives that they can implement without full approval by the States are No Action and the Basic Coordination Alternative. Both would be disastrous. They would simply be going back to how things were done prior to the 2007 Interim Guidelines and even earlier policies, none of which reflect the needs of the Colorado River we have today.
Westwide SNOTEL basin-filled map April 4, 2026.
Adding to that is the very dry record low snowpack in the Rockies. This annual winter snowpack is the ultimate water storage reservoir for the entire basin, from Pinedale, Wyoming, to Yuma, Arizona. It is what puts water into the two great reservoirs, Lakes Powell and Mead, that the Lower Basin desert states of California, Arizona and Nevada depend on. It is the only real reservoir that the needs of the arid Upper Basin states, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico and Wyoming depend on. This year that snowpack reservoir is as low as it has ever been, even eclipsing the former record year of 2002 when all this mega-drought started. The recent heat dome setting up over the Four Corners area is melting and sublimating what little snowpack there is fast.
Lakes Powell and Mead are already at very low levels, and the 1.7 maf projected inflow from spring runoff is looking smaller every day. Reclamation predicts that the water level in Lake Powell will drop to a point where no hydropower can be generated, power pool, by as soon as late July or at least in December. That, in effect, could be dead pool, with very limited releases from the lower “river outlet” tunnels. In effect, the flows from Lake Powell will become run of the river, what comes in is what goes out. No more storage for expected water deliveries downstream except what they might risk in lowering Lake Mead even more.
Needless to say this has sparked a war of words between the Upper and Lower Basins, with the Lower Basin being particularly vitriolic. As the February 14 deadline passed, JB Hamby of California declared “The 1922 Colorado River Compact requires the Upper Basin to deliver an average of 8.25 million acre-feet (maf) annually to the Lower Basin and Mexico. That delivery obligation is fixed in law, even if the river produces less water.” Arizona has gone even further, declaring in TV ads that the water delivery is not only an obligation, but a “guarantee” for delivery.
Huh??? Fixed in law and a guarantee? The reality of the river disagrees. The requirements of the Compact are, yes, written in law. On paper. It is “paper water”, not real, or “wet” water. Colorado’s commissioner Becky Mitchell was more to the point, if less vitriolic, “We are being asked to solve a problem we didn’t create, with water we do not have.” At least someone understands the reality of the situation.
John Wesley Powell, the hero of the Colorado River was invited as the honored guest and keynote speaker at the second International Irrigation Congress, held in Los Angeles in 1893. He was held in high regard by the many boosters, speculators and people hoping to cash in with irrigated farms all across the Colorado River basin. After listening to what they were saying, Powell pocketed his prepared remarks and said,
“When all the rivers are used, when all the creeks in the ravines, when all the brooks, when all the springs are used, when all the canyon waters are taken up, when all the artesian waters are taken up, when all the wells are sunk or dug that can be dug in all this arid region, there is still not sufficient water to irrigate all this arid region.”
The delegates didn’t want to hear that. As they booed him off the stage he added,
“I tell you gentlemen that you are piling up a heritage of conflict and litigation over water rights for there is not sufficient water to supply the land.”
Powell was right, but the boosters didn’t listen. Many still aren’t listening. Agricultural dreams have faded and new dreams of housing developments and data centers are taking their place. The boosters, in both Basins, are still booing reality off the stage. Dreams continue to grow as the river continues to shrink.
I read of fears that the Upper Basin will take advantage of Lower Basin cuts by taking more themselves. Really? From where? That vast winter snowpack reservoir that is expected to “guarantee” so much water for the Lower Basin, to refill Powell and Mead, is the same shrinking reservoir that the Upper Basin depends on. Upper Basin diversions are being curtailed every year, not expanded. There isn’t enough water. The Upper Colorado River Commission’s “Amended 2016 Upper Division States Depletion Demand Schedule”, published in June 2022, was used in BOR’s modeling of Upper Basin demands, but the optimistic projections of that report have never born fruit. The report is a projection of potential future depletions from the Upper Colorado River, but they are just that, projections. And relatively modest ones at that. The report begins with a resolution of the Commission that states,
WHEREAS Depletion Demand Schedules issued by the Commission are not a prediction of future water use or depletions. The Depletion Demand Schedules are estimates that presume the continuation of the observed historically available supply and other demand drivers used for planning purposes and are useful for modeling purposes.
It is simply and estimate based on “observed historically available supply”. Observation and history have made some changes to any anticipated future depletions. The report cites 5.7 maf as the current historical use as of 2022, with potential for increased depletions up to 5.8 maf in 2020 and 6.6 maf by 2070. In reality the annual depletion has dropped to 4 maf or less. With continued aridification and dwindling snowpack Upper Basin depletions will likely stagnate, if not decline. That is just the reality.
Under Colorado law, and constitution, the right to divert water to a beneficial use “shall never be denied”. What that means, as I stated in the previous post, is that anyone can dig a ditch or throw a small pump into any stream and divert water. New applications for water rights are filed every month with the Water Courts, and their decrees will likely be granted. That is again, all on paper. The reality is they probably won’t get much if any water. When the river is flowing high in the spring it is a “free river”, meaning anyone can stick in their straw for a drink. But as soon as the first senior call is placed all that stops, and senior calls are happening earlier and earlier every year. And the local Water Commissioners, the ones who can shut down diversions, are getting busier.
The 1922 Compact has a fairly senior right on all streams and rivers in the Upper Basin. So far, the non-depletion requirement for flows averaging 75 maf over a ten year running average hasn’t been breached. Lake Powell will probably hit power pool or worse before then.
The difference between the demands, hopes, and fantasies of paper water and the hard reality of actual wet water are growing starker every winter and have been since the three giant reservoirs, Powell, Mead and the winter snowpack, have shrunk over the past 25 years. Nature doesn’t care much about paper, reports, lawyers or the dreams of boosters past and present. She always wins in the end.
And as Becky Mitchell, said, litigation won’t create any new water.
A correction/addition to my previous post about misunderstandings on the Colorado River
I need to make a correction on my previous post. The three large Upper Basin’s reservoirs, Flaming Gorge, Blue Mesa and Navajo do provide some water for Upper Basin use, especially Navajo, which provides water to the San Juan-Chama diversion to the Rio Grande basin and Albuquerque. It supplies on average 91 kaf of diverted water. It is expected that there will be no diversion this year. Navajo also provides water for Tribal use to the Navaho and Jicarilla Apachie. Downstream flows from Flaming Gorge, the largest of the three can provide smaller amounts for hay fields in Browns Park and the melons in Green River, but that’s pretty small too. Blue Mesa releases can benefit the Gunnison Tunnel diversions and Redlands downstream, but both are well senior to the Compact.
I knew better.
The main storage of the three reservoirs is still primarily as that Compact compliance savings account, and they will be called upon soon to bolster the levels of Lake Powell, where the inflow from runoff projection is dropping below 2 maf. If things keep going like this for another few weeks it will likely be lower.
Map of the Colorado River drainage basin, created using USGS data. By Shannon1 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0
Wastewater is aerated as it flows over steps at Aurora’s Prairie Waters Project, which treats wastewater to drinking water standards. Credit: Jerd Smith
Colorado homeowners and businesses are already planning for a brutally dry summer. They should also be planning for an expensive one, as Denver and other cities prepare to impose drought fees to encourage conservation and to buffer their budgets against millions of dollars in lost water sales as customers cut back.
Denver Water, which announced Stage 1 drought restrictions last week, said its preliminary estimates suggest $30 million to $70 million may be lost as a result of restrictions. It has annual revenue of $488.5 million. Denver Water is Colorado’s largest water utility, serving more than 1.5 million people in the city of Denver and across the southern and western suburbs.
The agency said its surcharges will be designed to penalize high-volume outdoor water use, while keeping the price for drinking, cooking and bathing water unchanged.
ts surcharge prices, if approved by the board this month, will vary depending on how homeowners and businesses use water indoors and outside. A low surcharge for a conservation-minded homeowner who doesn’t do much, if any, outdoor watering might be just $7 per bill, according to the agency, but the drought fee could rise to $76 a month on a residential bill where outdoor water use is high.
Denver Water spokesperson Todd Hartman said via email that the agency will use a portion of its cash reserves to offset the lower water sales and other costs associated with the drought. It has also taken steps to reduce other costs, such as leaving job vacancies open longer.
Colorado experienced record-low mountain snows this year and a scorching hot spring, which has the thin snowpack melting sooner than normal. Reservoir storage is stable for this year, at roughly 80% of average across the state. But heavy water use could drain those reservoirs too quickly, potentially causing major shortages next year if this winter is as dry as last winter’s was, officials have said.
To protect reservoir storage, cities want customers to reduce water use by 10% to 20%.
They’re hoping the surcharges will help them reach those goals.
Chris Goemans, a professor in the agricultural and resource economics department at Colorado State University, said the drought fees are an important tool in water conservation, and can have a lasting impact on water use if they go on for a long period of time.
For several years after the deep drought Colorado experienced in 2002, for instance, water providers saw a lingering “drought shadow” where users continued to tighten their spigots, even after the drought fees were removed, according to research by Goemans, and others.
“They can promote lasting change,” he said.
Not every city will use the fees. Colorado Springs has permanent three-day-per-week watering rules and does not plan to impose a surcharge, at least not this year, spokesperson Jennifer Jordan said. She said the city’s drought plan allows surcharges only when reservoir storage is below 1.5 years on April 1. Right now, the system has three years of storage available.
And Aurora has only used them once before, in 2023, but took them off almost immediately when big rains came, according to Aurora Water spokesperson Shonnie Cline.
Cline said the severity of this drought is forcing the city to gear up for unprecedented times.
“We always thought that 2002 was the worst possible year, but we are expecting something worse this year,” she said.
Castle Rock will impose surcharges, if its council approves them in the coming weeks, but it is taking a different approach because its customers live with a water system based on what are known as water budgets, according to Mark Marlowe, director of Castle Rock Water.
Its customers already are limited every year in how much water they can use during the lawn-watering season, an amount that is based on home and lot size. A small home with a small yard is allocated less water each year and typically has a smaller bill than a large home with a large yard, which is given more water and pays a larger bill.
This year, Castle Rock will reduce everyone’s water budget. If homeowners exceed those lower budgets, they will be hit with a higher fee than normal.
To help offset that and keep its conservation message top of mind, Castle Rock envisions drought surcharges of $6.91 per thousand gallons initially and rising to $10.31 if the drought deepens, Marlowe said.
Is there any good news here? Maybe. City officials said if customers cut back as much as they are being asked to, say 10% to 20%, their bills might not change at all because they are using less water.
An Xcel truck outside the Shoshone hydropower plant in Glenwood Canyon. Denver Water has enacted with water rights owner Xcel to implement a call reduction agreement, which lets the Front Range water provider divert more water for a limited time. CREDIT: BRENT GARDNER-SMITH/ASPEN JOURNALISM
Facing an abysmal snowpack and spring runoff, the state’s largest Front Range water provider has enacted an agreement that lets it take more water from the Western Slope for a limited time.
On March 18, Denver Water put the Shoshone call reduction agreement into effect with water rights owner Xcel Energy, which allows Denver Water to divert more water from the headwaters of the Colorado River in an attempt to alleviate shortages. The agreement reduces the call at the Shoshone hydroelectric plant in Glenwood Canyon by half, from 1,408 cfs to 704 cfs.
The call reduction can only be implemented when two drought conditions are met: an April to July streamflow forecast for the Colorado River measured at the Kremmling stream gauge must be at 85% or less than average and the forecasted storage for the 10 largest Denver Water reservoirs for July 1 must be at or below 80% full.
The March water supply outlook from the National Resources Conservation Service for the Colorado headwaters from Kremmling to Glenwood Springs was 56% of normal. Experts expect conditions to have worsened when the April forecast comes out next week.
This winter is shaping up to be one of the worst on record and since water supplies depend on snowmelt, municipal water providers have been quick to implement cutbacks this spring. Last week, Denver Water declared a Stage 1 Drought and will impose two-day-a-week outdoor watering restrictions this summer.
“In the wake of the worst snowpack conditions in some 50 years of records at Denver Water, we began exercising the Shoshone Relaxation Agreement with Xcel Energy starting March 18,” Denver Water’s Media Relations Coordinator Todd Hartman said in an email. “We have taken this step only one other time under the 2007 agreement with Xcel (2013) and we don’t do so lightly.”
According to the agreement, Denver Water will be able to divert additional water until May 20.
The water provider, which serves about 1.5 million people on the Front Range, gets roughly 50% of its supply from the Colorado River basin and brings it across the Continental Divide through a highly engineered system of tunnels and reservoirs that facilitate the so-called transmountain diversions.
The Shoshone water rights, which date to 1902, are some of the largest and most powerful on the mainstem of the Colorado River in the state. They can command the river’s flows all the way to its headwaters, ensuring water keeps flowing downstream on the Western Slope.
When the plant’s turbines are spinning, it can “call” for its full water right, effectively forcing upstream water users with junior rights – like Denver Water – to cut back. And because the water is returned to the river after it runs through the plant’s turbines, Shoshone benefits downstream cities, irrigators, recreators and the environment on the Western Slope.
Colorado River Basin in Colorado via the Colorado Geological Survey
Click the link to read the paper on the Getches-Wilkinson Center website (Eric Kuhn, Anne Castle, Carlos de la Parra, John Fleck, Jack Schmidt, Kathryn Sorensen, Katherine Tara). Here’s the abstract:
March 26, 2026
Since 1945, the United States and Mexico have managed common interests on their two largest shared rivers systems, the Colorado and the Rio Bravo/Rio Grande, under the terms of the 1944 international treaty that was designed from the beginning with tools to adapt to changing hydrologic and societal conditions. A recent emergency agreement on the Rio Bravo/Rio Grande illustrates what is possible, and with old river management rules on the Colorado both within the United States and between the United States and Mexico about to expire, we are at a moment of opportunity for meaningful change. The core problem on the Colorado River, which we address in the analysis that follows, arose from decisions made in the first half of the 20th century to allocate fixed volumes of water. As usage patterns and hydrology change in the 21st century, fixed volumes no longer work. [ed. emphasis mine] A shift to a percentage-based split between the United States and Mexico on the Colorado River, based on the river’s actual natural flow, would provide a solid foundation for the two countries’ joint management of the Colorado in the decades to come.
The Pinto Valley Mine, processing area, and tailings depositories in the Globe-Miami mining district. Pinto Creek is to the viewer’s left. Source: Google Earth.
Pinto Creek used to run year-round. Bubbling up from springs and occasional snowmelt in the Pinal Mountains of central Arizona, it nourished a riparian ribbon of green through the rocky, arid landscape, shaded by sycamores, willows, and alders, until it empties into Theodore Roosevelt Reservoir. Gila topminnow, longfin dace, and roundtail chub plied its waters. Even during drought years it reliably delivered at least 1,000 acre-feet of water at its Magma Weir gauge, and in wet times as much as 39,000 acre-feet annually might flow along its bed.
Then, a little over a decade ago, something odd happened. The flow volume plummeted from 4,147 acre-feet in 2013 to just 482 acre-feet in 2014, and ever since the once year-round stream has run only intermittently and at similarly diminished levels. Towering trees along its banks have died and toppled, and the green swath has lost much of its color. It’s possible that long-term aridification simply caught up with the little stream, as 2013 was a dry year. But there’s a more likely culprit: In October 2013 Capstone Copper Corporation acquired the nearby Pinto Valley Mine, a massive, open pit copper and molybdenum operation that had just emerged from several years of dormancy, and resumed heavy groundwater pumping from its Peak Well field.
While correlation is not causation, the Tonto National Forest saw enough evidence of a link to ask the Arizona Department of Water Resources to put the brakes on the mine’s groundwater pumping. Failing to do so would harm the Forest Service’s instream Pinto Creek water right — along with the downstream riparian ecosystem it supports. The state did nothing and the Forest Service dropped the complaint and approved the mine’s expansion in 2021.
The Land Desk has often looked at mining’s effects on water quality.1 But the Pinto Valley case highlights the fact that mines can also affect water quantity — and vice versa, as water scarcity can limit mining operations. It warrants a closer look during these water-constrained times, when water consumption by everything from data centers to golf courses to alfalfa farms has attracted more scrutiny.
A mining operation goes through water in two ways. First, the mine itself, whether underground or open pit, can act like a well. Dig a hole into the earth, and groundwater will flow into it. While gravity can drain this flow in underground mines burrowed into the sides of mountains, the water must be pumped from open pit and underground shaft mines, a practice known as dewatering, which can take large amounts of water out of the aquifer. Capstone says it pumps about 400 gallons per minute from its pit.
This draws down groundwater wells and can dry up springs and diminish streamflows. Without dewatering, you end up with something like the Berkeley Pit, which is now a 50-billion-gallon, acidic and contaminated lake that’s about 900 feet deep. Because this water is usually contaminated by acid mine drainage, it often can’t be reused without some treatment, and dumping it into a stream or back into the aquifer is also problematic.
A mining operation also requires significant amounts of water for dust control, mineral processing, slurrying, and other uses. Capstone’s 2024 sustainability report says its Pinto Valley Mine withdrew a total of 8,932 acre-feet — or 2.9 billion gallons — of groundwater and surface water.
West Drought Monitor map March 24, 2026.
The company has not released its 2025 data yet, but in financial filings reported that the Pinto Valley Mine had to slash mine production and mill throughput by about 37% in 2025 due to “unplanned downtime driven by water constraints due to the drought conditions in central Arizona.” The company is trying to address this by reducing per-ton water usage by 20%, but that may not be enough given the extreme drought conditions spreading across the Southwest.
A central clearing house or database of mine water use in Arizona does not exist, but various sources can help paint a picture of how much water the mining industry in the state uses (I’ll look at other states in a future dispatch).
Safford Mine Complex: Consumptive water use increased from 3,624 acre-feet per year to 6,099 af/yr following a 2020 expansion, according to the Arizona Department of Water Resources 2025 Safford supply and demand report. Municipal uses in the Safford Basin use about 6,000 acre-feet per year, while agriculture — primarily for cotton, pecans, pistachios, and alfalfa — consumes about 138,301 acre-feet annually.
Freeport-McMoran reported to the AZDWR that in 2023 it withdrew 22,490 acre-feet of groundwater for its Sierrita Mine south of Tucson. The cost? $3.50 per acre-foot. That’s about one penny for 1,000 gallons of water.
Freeport-McMoran’s Morenci Mine, one of the nation’s largest copper operations, uses about 14,000 acre-feet per year on average, according to the AZDWR. The mine imports much of its water from the Black River, a tributary to the Salt River, under a lease with the San Carlos Apache Tribe for a portion of its Central Arizona Project allocation.
The following chart is from an Arizona Department of Mines & Mineral Resources report from 2010 by Dr. Madan M. Singh. It’s a nice, comprehensive look at how much water the state’s major mines used in the preceding years. Current use is likely about the same, except that now there are additional mines (the Pinto Valley Mine was not operational in 2010, which is why it’s missing).
Source: Water Consumption at Copper Mines in Arizona, by Dr. Madan M. Singh, 2010.
So, according to Singh’s report, Arizona’s largest mines used a total of 55,659 acre-feet per year during the 2000s. Add the Pinto Valley Mine (8,932 af) and Safford Mine (6,099 af) and you get about 70,600 acre-feet per year, or 23 billion gallons annually.
That’s a lot of water, but it pales in comparison to many other uses. Arizona alfalfa, alone, probably uses more than 1.5 million acre-feet (based on 6 af water/acre over 280,000 planted acres, according to the USDA). “Turf facilities” guzzled some 157,000 af in 2024, according to the AZDWR, while power generation used 86,053 acre-feet. TSMC’s north Phoenix chip manufacturing facility is projected initially to use about 19,000 acre-feet of water annually.
In other words, when Arizona’s water cops come looking for the big water users, the mines probably won’t be at the top of their list. Since most mines rely on groundwater, Colorado River water shortages may not affect them too much, at least in the near future.
Still, some mines, including ASARCO’s Mission Mine, do pull some water from the Central Arizona Project, which could be hit hard by the Colorado River crisis as early as next year. And, as the Pinto Valley Mine situation last year demonstrated, continued aridification and relentless pumping could lead to groundwater shortages at the mines, forcing them to reduce production even as they work to become more water-efficient.
Prospective mines could face serious challenges, as well. Resolution Copper estimates its contentious Oak Flat mine would use between 15,700 acre-feet and 20,000 acre-feet per year. Others, however, say this is too low; one study says it would likely be closer to 50,000 acre-feet annually, based on the per-ton water consumption for copper at other Arizona mines. Resolution has said it would rely at least partly on Central Arizona Project water, the security of which grows shakier with each passing year. It’s hard to imagine that there will be any water available for new users by the time that mine is up and running if current climatic trends continue.
That may be what Faraday Copper had in mind when it signed a letter of intent to acquire the San Manuel copper mine in southern Arizona. While Faraday said it would be reopening the long-shuttered operation and combining it with its proposed Copper Creek venture nearby, it may also be eying the substantial water rights BHP Copper holds for the San Manuel Mine. Those could come in handy if and when the Copper Creek facility is developed.
Regardless, however, one thing is clear: Any new mine is going to rob the springs, the streams, and the wildlife and communities that rely on them of at least some of their precious water. [ed. emphasis mine]
1 In 1993, when the Pinto Valley Mine was operated by Magma Copper, a large rain event “overwhelmed the mine’s water management capabilities,” causing the reservoir to overflow the tailings pile, tear out a levee, and carry hundreds of tons of tailings and millions of gallons of contaminated water into Pinto Creek. The creek was found to have low pH (high acidity) and high concentrations of cadmium, copper, lead, mercury, and zinc, resulting in significant fish die off, specifically of desert or Gila Mountain suckers.
Rio Grande levy near Alamosa, November 2024. Photo credit: The Alamosa Citizen
The theme this year was “Where Water Connects Us: Past Meets Present in the San Luis Valley”. Paul Formisano and the staff and volunteers from the Salazar Rio Grande del Norte Center delivered a varied, timely and interesting agenda!
San Luis People’s Ditch March 17, 2018. Photo credit: Greg Hobbs
Ken Salazar set the stage for the sessions, reminding attendees that, “Early settlers knew the only way to bring prosperity to the valley was to do it collectively as the early acequias did.”
Upper Rio Grande snowpack March 29, 2026. Credit: NRCS
The first session was titled, “State of the Rio: The 2026 river outlook general basin and compact projections” and the general consensus from the speakers was, as Brad Udall recently said about the Upper Colorado River Basin, “There is no historical analog,” for these conditions. Snow drought is front and center in the San Luis Valley these days.
Upper Rio Grande accumulated precipitation March 29, 2026. Credit: NRCS
Precipitation in the basin started out the water year in great shape due to a big rain event in early October. Since then there have been modest accumulations but has flattened out since late February to date.
Colorado SNOTEL basin-filled snowpack map March 28, 2026. Credit: NRCS
Division Engineer Craig Cotten started off his presentation with the basin-filled snowpack map for Colorado. He joked that, “The good news is, the Rio Grande is not the worst in the state.” It is not a good year as far as #snowpack and many SNOTEL locations are already melted-out.
Slide credit: Craig Cotten
Projected streamflow is not looking good and the forecast will likely be worse when the April 1, 2026 numbers are released by the NRCS. However, streamflow right now is looking okay, there is a lot of water in the #RioGrande at this time for example. That means that the little snowpack in the basin is already coming off.
Slide credit: Craig Cotten
Reservoir storage is in good shape (as a percent of average) except Sanchez Reservoir which has been drawn down for maintenance and repairs.
Current compliance numbers for the Rio Grande Compact from Craig Cotten. Photo credit: Chris Lopez/Alamosa Citizen
Colorado’s Rio Grande Compact compliance numbers heading into the scary diversion season are a positive. There is no debt owed to New Mexico and Texas. With the early onset to runoff season the State Engineer allowed irrigation to start on March 23, 2026. Current estimated streamflow for the Rio Grande at Del Norte (the compact USGS gage used for the river) is 305,000 acre-feet which carries a compact obligation of 76,000 acre-feet to New Mexico and Texas. For the Conejos River the estimated upper index annual flow is 165,000 acre-feet and the downstream obligation is 27,500 acre-feet. However, water levels are going to drop in the unconfined aquifer significantly this year due to low flows in the river. The situation in the aquifer is bad and it is going to get worse.
Cotten updated the attendees about the Rio Grande Compact lawsuit status. It is mostly a fight between Texas and New Mexico and the latest stipulated agreement has been approved by the Special Master. The U.S. Supreme Court is expected to approve the agreement.
Nathan Coombs, in keepting with the symposium theme said, “I believe we’re going to be alright this season we’re going to survive. People in the San Luis Valley are working together and we’re going to get through it.”
Slide credit: Heather Dutton
Heather Dutton gave an overview of reservoir operations for 2026. It is possible that all irrigation water will be released in April and May. She added, “If you’re going to fish the streams emphasize fishing in the morning and visit one of our valley breweries in the afternoon. It’s going to be tough year for all of us. Please keep the farmers in mind.”
Reclamation informed attendees about the current status of the Closed Basin Project. Project priorities are:
Colorado’s compact deliveries
Mitigation for construction and pumping
Eliminate Colorado’s Rio Grande Compact deficit
Other beneficial uses/irrigation
Slide from Amber Pacheco
The session “Twenty years of subdistricts” illustrated how the well owners have been working together over the years to determine a solution to the declining unconfined aquifer. Because groundwater is not separate from surface water the lowered levels in the aquifer affect surface streamflow in the Rio Grande. Valley pumpers have formed several sub-districts fashioned around the different hydrology in areas of the aquifer and are retiring some wells and taking land out of production. Another strategy used has been o develop augmentation plans to offset pumping. All of the strategies involve fees to sub-district members. There is extensive coverage of the issue on Coyote Gulch if you are interested in taking a trip down memory lane.
Slide credit: Rachel James
The session “Flowing together: Agriculture, rivers, and communities in partnership” was an overview of collaboration between the City of Alamosa, the West Side Ditch, and Rio Grande Headwaters Restoration Project on the river at the east side of Alamosa. It included a new headgate for the ditch company and will include a new levy orientation and access to the river from Cole Park. The speakers emphasized that it would not have happened without collaboration and the emphasis on creating a win for all stakeholders. For example, Bill Schoen credited the Rio Grande Headwaters Restoration Project for finding funding for the new headgate which is often a problem for mutual ditch companies. Daniel Boyes of the Restoration Project said that the new headgate helps fish and safety for boaters.
Rio Grande, Colorado | National Park Service
The final session before the keynote was “Perspectives on valley recreation” where access to public lands and the value of building a recreation economy to bolster valley opportunities were discussed. While 39% of Colorado’s agricultural output is from the valley economic activity is seasonal. The discussion centered around bringing tourism to the valley to improve the outlook for employment and economic growth.
The keynote speaker was Ben Golfarb and it was a real treat. I never tire of learning about “Nature’s Engineers” and the amazing effect this keystone species has on hydrology and habitat. Trapped extensively by fur traders to enable the fashion industry in the 19th century the species was nearly extirpated from the North American West. Along with a torrent of information and photographs, Goldfarb informed attendees that the native tribes did not participate in trapping because of their understanding of beaver’s role in the arid lands.
Rio Grande and Pecos River basins. Map credit: By Kmusser – Own work, Elevation data from SRTM, drainage basin from GTOPO [1], U.S. stream from the National Atlas [2], all other features from Vector Map., CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=11218868
River managers need to conserve around 1.7 million acre-feet in Lake Powell to keep the reservoir from dropping below hydropower turbines this year, according to federal government projections. The Bureau of Reclamation, a federal agency that manages dams on the Colorado River, has estimated that reservoir levels could fall below required elevations for hydropower production before August as record-low snowpack turns into pitiful flows in streams and rivers.
“The situation is dire, the stakes have never been higher, and the reservoirs have never been drier,” Estevan Lopez, New Mexico’s negotiator on interstate Colorado River matters, said during a meeting of the Upper Colorado River Commission on Tuesday [March 24, 2026].
The back of Glen Canyon Dam circa 1964, not long after the reservoir had begun filling up. Here the water level is above dead pool, meaning water can be released via the river outlets, but it is below minimum power pool, so water cannot yet enter the penstocks to generate electricity. Bureau of Reclamation photo. Annotations: Jonathan P. Thompson
If water levels fall below required levels for hydropower production, dam managers will be forced to release water through bypass tubes, which are not designed for sustained, high-volume flows. With too much use, the bypasses could fail, turning the dam into a massive plug in the river and shutting off downstream flows. To keep Powell above those critical levels, federal officials can either fill it with water from upstream reservoirs, including some in Colorado, or they can reduce the water it drains from Powell and sends to the Lower Basin (California, Arizona and New Mexico). States are already expressing their views on how those operations should work. Upper Colorado River basin states, including Colorado, want the federal government to achieve the conservation requirement by reducing water releases to downstream states, at least in part. Upper Basin states say upstream reservoirs aren’t enough to save Powell without cuts to Lower Basin water deliveries. Draining the upstream reservoirs could also leave the system without backup supplies in the event of another dry year…The three primary reservoirs that could prop up Powell are Flaming Gorge in Wyoming, Navajo Reservoir in New Mexico, and Blue Mesa Reservoir near Gunnison, Colorado. Of the three, only Flaming Gorge is large enough to contribute the entire 1.7 million acre-feet on its own, and that would require draining the reservoir to halfway full. Blue Mesa and Navajo already stand at around halfway full, and the two reservoirs likely could not provide the water to save Lake Powell even if both were entirely drained.
Colorado River “Beginnings”. Photo: Brent Gardner-Smith/Aspen Journalism
American White Pelican and Double-crested Cormorant at Bill Williams Wildlife Refuge along the Colorado River, Arizona. Photo: Gary Moore/Audubon Photography Awards
Click the link to read the article on the Audubon website (Jennifer Pitt):
March 20, 2026
Audubon and partners cut through the conflict with a unique, basinwide perspective, championing the river’s health for the people and birds that rely on it.
The winter of 2025-2026 has not been kind to the Colorado River. Record-warm temperatures day after day across the mountains that feed the river have led to record-low snow levels. All indications are that spring snowmelt feeding the river will be scant.
That is a huge problem, because Colorado River reservoirs, which historically held vast water reserves, are already depleted, with Lake Powell at 25% and Lake Mead at 34% of capacity. This is bad news for people and birds relying on water from the Colorado River. The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), the federal agency managing the dams, projects that Lake Powell’s water levels could fall low enough to threaten Glen Canyon Dam’s infrastructure, downstream water delivery, hydropower, and native wildlife in the Grand Canyon including the California Condor and the Western Yellow-billed Cuckoo, among others.
As this crisis plays out, Reclamation has the difficult job of re-tooling systemwide, long-term dam operations on the Colorado River (often referred to as the “Post-2026 Guidelines”). Existing rules, first set nearly two decades ago and tweaked repeatedly to keep up with the declining Colorado River (the result of a warmer and drier climate), expire at the end of this year. As anticipated under this timeline, Reclamation issued a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (Draft EIS) in late January which laid out potential alternatives for federal management and solicited comments from stakeholders. This Draft EIS embraced uncertainty as a central planning condition as they tested different approaches under a broad range of hydrologic conditions. For a long time, the expectation was that the seven U.S. states sharing the river (Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah and Wyoming) would develop a consensus-based proposal for Reclamation, but that hasn’t happened and talk of litigation has increased.
Southwestern Willow flycatcher
Reclamation must now figure out next steps. The agency does have legal authorities, but those legal authorities were crafted long ago and do not necessarily spell out how to take meaningful action in this historic crisis. That threatens the water supply for more than 35 million people including the major cities of the American Southwest, Tribes, millions of acres of irrigated farms and ranches, as well as the Colorado River itself and every living thing that depends on its habitats, including hundreds of bird species like the Southwestern Willow Flycatcher, Yuma Ridgway’s Rail, and Summer Tanager.
This is a graph of snowpack above LakePowell using 104 snow measuring stations. It was 9 inches of water on March 7, now 6 inches. Other dry years shown.There is no historical analog to this — Brad Udall
Audubon submitted formal comments in response to the Draft EIS, joining conservation partners to weigh in on what comes next for Reclamation’s consideration (read our comment letter here). Dozens of comments were submitted by the Colorado River Basin states, water users, and other stakeholders making their case with Reclamation that their water uses need to be protected at the expense of others. In its comments Audubon emphasized the need to stabilize the Colorado River system from its headwaters to its delta—a unique, basinwide perspective that urges Reclamation to manage risks for people and nature rather than deferring hard decisions until emergency conditions force action. Our comment letter focused on constructive engagement noting the Draft EIS’s strengths in its analytical foundation while identifying and describing targeted refinements that would help ensure the Final EIS fully informs decision-makers about risks and real-world consequences. Specifically, Audubon calls for:
Clarity and predictability
Flexible, adaptive tools for conserving, storing, and managing water
Environmental stewardship embedded into operations
Meaningful and voluntary Tribal participation
Pathways for advancing in-basin mitigation and resilience-building opportunities
Pathways for advancingbinational cooperation with Mexico
Over the next few months, Reclamation still has an opportunity to persuade the Colorado River Basin states into consensus. Whether or not they are successful (and we hope they are), sometime this summer we expect Reclamation to issue a Final EIS that includes refinements to the Draft as well as an indication of their preferred alternative for Colorado River operations. In the meantime, it is urgent Reclamation also prepare for the water supply emergency that is unfolding in 2026.
For much of the last century, Reclamation was a leader in developing the southwestern United States by harnessing the Colorado River and delivering its water across the land. Today, Reclamation must lead in a new way, helping everyone and everything that depends on the Colorado River live with the river we have in a warmer, drier world.
